In the shadow of the company : the VOC (Dutch East India Company)and its servants in the period of its decline (1740-1796) Nierstrasz, J.C. Citation Nierstrasz, J. C. (2008, November 5). In the shadow of the company : the VOC (Dutch East India Company) and its servants in the period of its decline (1740-1796). Retrieved from https://hdl.handle.net/1887/13267 Version: Not Applicable (or Unknown) License: Licence agreement concerning inclusion of doctoral thesis in the Institutional Repository of the University of Leiden Downloaded from: https://hdl.handle.net/1887/13267 Note: To cite this publication please use the final published version (if applicable). Introduction When Prime Minister Balkenende of the Netherlands recently urged his citizens proudly to follow the example of the VOC mentality (Dutch East India Company, hereafter VOC) and to return to what he assumed were the values of untrammelled entrepreneurship, his remarks were met with anger and disbelief. 1 For many people the VOC mentality simply meant slavery, violent extortion and the beginning of colonialism. With a strong feeling that righteousness was on their side, both parties involved tried to appropriate history to suit their personal agenda. Fascinatingly, the period of decline of the once mighty trading company (1740-1796) offers us a much more subtle and realistic combination of both a commercial utopia and political phantom. At this juncture, no longer the most powerful and dominant European company, the VOC trailed behind its competitors in enforcing its trade. Although the VOC traded on a global scale, the historical debate does not see the VOC as a company acquiescing into freedom of entrepreneurship either: Unlike its European competitors, it never relinquished its monopolies on trade in Asia in favour of its servants and subjects. The second half of the eighteenth century witnessed fundamental changes in Asian politics and trade, and in the whole organization of the European presence. The relationship between the Company and its servants provides us with an excellent tool to understand in some depth the full extent of these changes, instead of simply concluding that the Company was merely a precursor to the colonial state or that trade had made way to colonial exploitation in a day. 1 On 28 September 2006, Prime Minister Balkenende spoke of VOC-mentality in a debate in parliament. He wanted the opposition to follow that example of an international perspective on trade. 1. The historical debate: the decline of the VOC The decline of the VOC is strongly linked to the rise of the British Empire in Asia. This is best exemplified by the Fourth Anglo-Dutch Sea War (1780-1784), when superior English naval strength completely halted all Dutch trade between Europe and Asia. Without incoming ships the Company was no longer able to fulfil its financial obligations in Europe and had to ask for postponement of payment. Trade resumed after the war, although on shakier footing. The next time war broke out, in 1796, it sounded the death knell of the Company and it went bankrupt.2 The English hegemony was simply the ultimate step in a development which had started more than fifty years earlier in Bengal. The wars waged from 1780 only proved that English power had expanded to such an extent it now even reached the regions where the Company traditionally had ruled supreme. In order to study the early stages of the development of the influence of the British expansion on the VOC, we have to look at what happened to the VOC settlements on the Indian Sub-Continent and in Ceylon instead of focusing on the traditionally more studied Indonesian Archipelago. The commercial decline of the VOC in the eighteenth century was caused by changing political circumstances in Asia, which generated rising costs. This waning of power is best exemplified by the increasing amount of short-term loans, which gradually assumed a structural character before finally topping the VOC. The eighteenth century was a turbulent period which saw different Asian empires collapse and the inevitable resultant unrest depressed trade.3 The best known cases are the decline and collapse of the Mughal Empire in India and the Safavid Empire in Persia, but insular Asia also witnessed its share of unrest. The Company had to arm itself against this increasing violence, which in turn meant mounting military investments. Political change also led to instability, in which new indigenous traders profited. Out of the erupting violence in Asia, 2 I. G. Dillo, De nadagen van de Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie, 1783-1795: schepen en zeevarenden (Amsterdam: De Bataafsche Leeuw,1992). 3 C.A. Bayly, Imperial Meridian: the British Empire and the world, 1780-1830 (Harlow: Longman, 1989). new groups of traders emerged, whom the Company designated pirates.4 Indigenous allies grew restless and tried to follow a course more independent of the VOC.5 The best known example is the ruler of Kandy, who unsuccessfully challenged the power of the Dutch in Ceylon. Irrevocably, the suppression of this rebellion steered Dutch energy and resources away from trade.6 While the VOC was busy in its core regions in the Indonesian Archipelago, it had to forfeit influence in trade in India where its rivals pursued a more aggressive course.7 The rise of the English and the French Companies meant increasing competition for trade. The Europeans competed for the same import goods, causing profit margins to fall. This was noticeable in the prices in Europe, but also meant that competition for goods in India grew fiercer. In order to boost trade with Europe, all available cloth was bought up. For the VOC this increased competition had not only negative consequences on its profitability in the trade with the home country, it also reduced the volume and profitability of its intra-Asian trade. The Company had always traded cloth profitably in the Spice Islands, but when prices rose the interest in cloth in the Spices Islands ebbed. This confronted the Company with a new set of problems in the purchase of its spices.8 From 1740, the Directors in the Republic realized a change in policy was needed and sent Van Imhoff (Governor-General from 1743-1750) to Asia in order to institute change.9 Mindful of its reliance on the spice monopoly, the VOC reacted more conservatively towards change than its competitors. In terms of value in relation to volume, as well as the imperishable nature, spices were the most suitable items for trade with Europe. The spice monopolies in the Moluccas gave the VOC an edge in but also 4 O. Atsushi, Changes of Regime and Social Dynamics in West Java: Society, State and the Outer World of Banten, 1750-1830 (Leiden: Brill, 2006). 5 See the recent TANAP Phd theses by H.K. Kwee, The political economy of Java's Northeast Coast, c. 1740-1800: elite synergy (Leiden: Brill, 2006); M.S. Widjojo, Cross-cultural alliance-making and local resistance in Maluku during the revolt of Prince Nuku, c. 1780-1810 (Universiteit Leiden, 2007), to be published in 2008; S. Margana, Java's last frontier: the struggle for hegemony of Blambangan c. 1763­1813, (Universiteit Leiden), to be published in 2009. 6A. van den Belt , Het VOC-bedrijf op Ceylon: een voorname vestiging van de Oost-Indische Compagnie in de 18de eeuw (Zutphen: Walburg Pers, 2008); A. Schrikker, Dutch and British colonial intervention in Sri Lanka, 1780-1815: expansion and reform (Leiden: Brill, 2007). 7 G.D. Winius, M. Vink, The Merchant-Warrior Pacified: the VOC (the Dutch East India Company) and its changing political economy in India (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1991). 8 E.M. Jacobs, Merchant in Asia: the trade of the Dutch East India Company during the eighteenth century (Leiden: CNWS Publications, 2006). 9 Jacob Johan Steur, Herstel of ondergang: de voorstellen tot redres van de Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie, 1740-1795 (Utrecht: Hes, 1984). obliged it to engage in the intra-Asian trade. The spices were obtained most profitably against cloth from the Indian Sub-Continent, and in turn helped the company to open up markets all over Asia. The advantages the VOC enjoyed in the spice trade gave it a head start in the seventeenth century, but in the eighteenth century such other Asian products as textiles, tea and coffee became more important. 10 The heavy investment by the VOC (encouraged by their continuing profitability) in spices enabled its competitors to take the lead in dealing in the new products, although the VOC never lagged far behind. The more diversified and growing trade networks meant an increasing demand on the limited capital of the VOC. The different scopes of the various trades were hard to combine and the Company was forced to make choices and set priorities. For example, the emphasis shifted from the intra-Asian trade to the trade with Europe.11 The VOC did not want to open up the intra-Asian trade to its subjects and was therefore less able to adapt to change than its English rivals. The Company is believed to have kept all trade under its monopoly because of the perceived incompatibility of the exclusive spice monopolies and entrepreneurial private trade. This meant it preserved the sole right to all trade to and within Asia, to the exclusion of the participation of its servants and its subjects. Under these circumstances, private trade was considered illegal and the Company even exacted capital punishment on those who attempted to circumvent these stipulations. Its European competitors had a milder and more permissive view of private trade in Asia and allowed private entrepreneurs consisting of servants, free merchants and indigenous subjects room to develop freely in the changing circumstances of the eighteenth century. Rising costs and inability to change are generally regarded as having been major contributors to the decline of the VOC. Corruption or the misuse of public power for private profit was endemic throughout the two centuries of the Company’s existence, but it is hard to pinpoint their true extent owing to a lack of sources. The explanation for the decline of the Company as a result of the excessive corruption of its employees is found in the pun, Vergaan Onder Corruptie or translated from Dutch, perished under corruption. Corruption is actually a broadly defined term, entailing what we all typically think of as 10 Femme S. Gaastra, De geschiedenis van de VOC (Zutphen: Walburg Pers, 2002). 11 Jacobs, Merchant in Asia, 279-294. embezzlement, nepotism and illegal private trade, all considered activities militating against the true interests of the Company. The image of the Company servants has perhaps been too easily tarnished by what we nowadays consider reprehensible behaviour. They seem to have been preoccupied with making their own fortunes at the expense of the Company. In their own times, however, the servants thought of themselves as entrepreneurs taking care of the business of the Company as well as their own transactions, bringing their own knowledge and social capital to the service of the Company. In the execution of their tasks they bridged the spatial gap between Europe and Asia, as well as between Europeans and Asians. Because of these talents, the VOC depended heavily on its servants and had to shift part of the responsibility onto their shoulders, making it harder to assess the boundaries of corruption. 1.1 The relationship between Company and servant The VOC was a chartered trading company and as such it was limited by the initial capital it had at its disposal. In order to establish its trading network in Asia, the Company had to flex its financial and military muscles. Commercially and politically, the ‘faits et gestes’ of the Company were predetermined by its capital base. The strong position the VOC had built up in the seventeenth century meant it never at any time considered augmenting its initial share capital of 6.5 million guilders. In contrast, its European competitors were forced to augment their capital because of problems in trade or in European politics. The Dutch Company, however, simply financed trade on the Amsterdam stock market by taking on short-term debts with high interest rates. Although these loans were normally paid off quickly, as soon as the return fleet from Batavia had arrived, relatively speaking such a system easily led to financial and cash flow problems, certainly when the number of loans increased in the course of the eighteenth century and assumed a structural character. Consequently, political and economic factors have to be taken into account when studying the decline of the VOC. Every potential rupture in trade could lead to a halt in the repayment of debts and a failure to meet financial obligations, potentially threatening the survival of the whole Company. Although the VOC was limited by its relatively small capital base, it had several ways to circumvent these financial limitations. Apart from solving any temporary monetary shortage of funds by taking on short-term loans in order to finance trade, the VOC had several alternatives to increase its capital artificially. The simplest solution to the VOC’s occasional cash-flow problems would have been issuing more shares. This option was never considered. A second option would have been to ask the Republic of the Seven Provinces for help in military matters, offsetting military costs onto the Republic. The down side of this measure was the risk of losing its independence because the Republic would certainly seek to exert more influence on the Company’s policy. Until 1780 the Company was able to avoid any direct influence on policy by the Republic, although it was the Republic which had not been able to comply with requests for help before. In Asia, the VOC was also relatively powerful, which is also mirrored in the manner it organised its intra-Asian trade. Thanks to its spice monopolies, the VOC was able to launch several profitable long and regional distance trades in Asia. In this manner the Company profited directly from trade in Asia, and managed to successfully solve its dearth of capital. Its competitors failed to institute a similar intra-Asian monopoly and simply left trade to its servants and benefited from it by taxing private trade. Because all European East India companies held a total monopoly on trade with Europe, in Asia they could locally utilize servants’ fortunes by offering them remittance facilities.12 Officially all money sent home had to be handed in on loan to the VOC, which would invest it in Asian trade and pay out the sum in Europe plus interest. The difference between profit and interest was for the benefit of the shareholders in Europe, so by accepting funds for remittance East Indian Companies augmented their working capital in Asia and consequently also their turnover and profit. If we dismiss corrupt behaviour à priori on moral grounds, we shall fail to explain and understand why it may actually be quite functional. The Company deliberately used 12P.J. Marshall, East Indian fortunes: the British in Bengal in the eighteenth century (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976) and H. Furber, Rival empires of trade in the Orient, 1600-1800 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1976). the social capital of its servants to augment its own financial position and under these circumstances, the definition of corruption needs to be historicized. First of all, corruption in a company structure should be defined differently to the way this is done in a State structure and in our own day and age. The Company was not very strict in defining corruption because its Directors depended on their servants in Asia to arrange matters, if only because of the sheer distance impeding ready communication. The ultimate aim of the Company was to pay out to its shareholders in the Republic a profit from trade. The VOC wanted to invest as much capital as it could in trade and not squander it on working conditions. Therefore, its management opted for a cost-efficient organization admittedly with certain structural weaknesses. In this system, the private initiative of servants was not strictly forbidden, but indeed it was even applauded as long as it also served the Company. There is a grey area between our present-day definition of corruption and the definition the Company accepted for corruption. In the grey sphere, the relationship between Company and servant was determined by negotiating common ground and in the end this co-operation (or non-co-operation) partly determined the strength of the enterprise. A major tenet of the present study is that the definitions of corruption and informal institutions in previous historical analyses have been inadequate and need to be revised. Private trade, corruption and networking will be presented in the following chapters as relatively informal institutions which helped the VOC function. While Company servants tried to bend the political, economic and social power with which they were invested to their own needs, the Company also harnessed their energy to its own advantage and by a variety of measures controlled excess. 2. A new approach to decline Historicizing the present-day definition of corruption with respect to functional informal institutions in the past provides us with a tool by which to analyse the decline of the VOC. The main question we shall try to answer in this thesis is: What role did informal institutions play in the decline of the VOC and what do they tell us about the decline? By assessing the changing relationship between Company and servant in the second half of the eighteenth century, we built up an outsider’s view of how informal institutions adapted to change. What was the goal of the VOC in allowing such informal institutions to exist? How did the servants view and react to changes in informal institutions? First of all, we have to assess the problems with which the Company was struggling in the period under investigation and how it tried to formulate an answer. A second step is to crystallize the role of informal institutions by asking what purpose they served the Company in meeting the challenges of the age. The interaction with the servants within these institutions will be analysed in two different situations. First of all, in an area where the Company kept strict control over trade and over its territories, namely in Ceylon. Secondly, in an area where the Company exerted no control over trade and territories, namely the Coromandel Coast. After having defined the mechanisms at work in these two areas, we shall compare them to the interaction between the English East India Company and its servants before and after the conquest of Bengal. 2.1 Institutional change This thesis will pick up the thread where other historians have ended, but nevertheless their previous works will help us understand the problems the VOC faced. Detailed studies of the official trade the Company conducted with and within Asia provide a solid economic foundation for our knowledge of the trade conducted.13 These studies focus mainly on the official functioning of the company, but already pose a threat to understanding how the VOC was run because they look only at formal institutions. Recently, historians have noticed that the existing trading figures in the books make complete sense for the situation in Europe, but in Asia itself there was a clear divergence 13 J.R. Bru n, F.S. Gaastra and I. Schoffer, Dutch-Asiatic shipping in the 17th and 18th centuries (The Hague: Nhoff, 1979-1987); J.P. de Korte, De jaarlkse financiele verantwoording in de VOC, Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie (Leiden: N hoff, 1984); R. Shimada, The intra-Asian trade in Japanese copper by the Dutch East India Company during the eighteenth century (Leiden: Brill, 2006); F. S. Gaastra, De geschiedenis van de VOC (Zutphen: Walburg Pers, 2002); E. M. Jacobs, Merchant in Asia: the trade of the Dutch East India Company during the eighteenth century (Leiden: CNWS Publications, 2006). between what was noted down in the books and what was kept in the warehouses.14 This is underlined even further by the fact that the Directors in the Republic and the High Government in Batavia, in spite of their strenuous efforts and sometimes successful policies, lacked the required accounting skills to assess what was happening financially within the Company.15 All these studies suggest that relatively speaking corruption was not a larger problem in the eighteenth century than it had been in the seventeenth century.16 By combining different VOC archives at different levels, a more complete assessment will be made of the new challenges which had to be met in the eighteenth century. These archives are spread over the whole world and for this thesis several of these archives have been used intensely.17 In the VOC documents we come across all sorts of information, which can help us understand how the Company adopted to change. They give an insight into how servants on different levels assessed the challenges and sought a solution to political, commercial and social problems. The decision-making process was played out on different levels, from the Directors in the Republic to the High Government in Batavia and from Batavia to the outposts. In the outposts the servants were expected to follow orders, but often these men-on-the-spot had their own agenda. The VOC archives preserved in Asia give more specific information on policy in Asia, so I have made substantial use of them. The relationship between the VOC and informal institutions was susceptible to change and this can be traced in the official regulations. One historical study finishes by concluding corruption (in this particular case defined as illegal private trade) is hard to assess or condemn as it may have suited the company, while another study simply concludes the Company would have collapsed in Ceylon at an earlier date had it not allowed private trade.18 Both conclusions concur with our prime assumption. In order to 14Van den Belt, Het VOC-bedrijf op Ceylon, 277-279. 15 Steur, Herstel of ondergang, 187-196. 16 Jacobs, Merchant in Asia, 290. 17 The National Archives in The Hague (NA), Jakarta (ANRI), and Colombo (SLNA), all possess VOC archives, which have been extensively used for this study. In these archives can be found the official correspondence between Batavia and the Republic, as well as correspondence from Asia between the outer regions. Plans and directives can also be found in all archives, although such documents are often of a more incidental nature. 18 Jacobs, Merchant in Asia, 8-9 en Van den Belt, Het VOC-bedrijf op Ceylon, 221-280. understand private trade, corruption and networking, it is essential to define these fields anew according to the purpose they may have served. The increasingly large number of regulations issued in the eighteenth century, are already an official acknowledgement that the VOC was struggling internally with change. This extensive number of regulations gives us a first glimpse behind the doors. The VOC tried to regulate these informal institutions which served as lubricants for the Company’s adaptation to changing circumstances. The most traceable and concrete regulations are those directed towards private trade, but our other subjects of study can also be found. 2.2 Case studies Apart from the more structural VOC correspondence, the available archival collections offer us several documents which relate to the investigation of individual cases of corruption. The vast majority of historians limit themselves to using the official correspondence, but these individual cases present us with an insight into the unofficial functioning of the VOC. Although more factors, such as networks, come into play in punishing offenders, at least these cases give us a general idea of the contemporary definition of corruption. In 1765 a large-scale corruption investigation was set up on the Coromandel Coast after Governor Van Teylingen fled to Madras following accusations of fraudulent behaviour. After his flight, the Company launched a large-scale investigation involving all the high-ranking officials on the Coast.19 In turn, the servants had to account to Batavia for these deeds, giving us some clues about their views on corruption. In Ceylon, several such cases also occurred, which gives us an opportunity to compare similar situations. Caution is advised, however, as these sources give a one­sided and company-based account and view of what corruption really was and are focused on punishment of individual servants. 19 Documents on the malversations of Haselkamp, Maudave, Van Teylingen, Looman, and Keller, can be found in the archives of the High Government in the NA (349-352). Documents specifically on Van Teylingen can be found in both the official VOC archives (11286) and in the personal archives of Hope (49), who became known as the Director linked to the Stadtholder. Case studies based on the private correspondence of Company servants help us assess corruption from the perspective of the servants. If the information in the VOC archives is limited, the private correspondence still extant offers a different perspective because individuals were more outspoken among themselves. Company servants have often been accused of keeping their ulterior motives hidden from their superiors, but in private correspondence we can see a more intriguing game between superior and subordinate. Not only were the writers of these letters quite frank about their motives, the mechanisms behind their decision and conduct can also be extracted. Unfortunately, there is a dearth of the private correspondences preserved. The private letters of VOC servant Lubbert Jan van Eck (1719-1765)20 is the only known virtually complete (for at least eight years) private correspondence (outgoing and incoming) of a employee with Europe as well as within Asia. This lack of similar sources is no coincidence, since all employees wanted to avoid private information becoming public. Consequently, they made sure to destroy incriminating correspondence about their dealings in Asia when it had served its purpose.21 Therefore, we should be happy to have Van Eck’s correspondence at our disposal because it will provide us with new insights into how the VOC struggled with a decline even before 1780. The personal correspondence of other powerful servants has also been used so as to have a comparison with Van Eck’s mindset.22 20 NA, archief van Lubbert Jan, Baron van Eck (1719-1765), In order not to hamper the reader with details later, we shall now briefly introduce our primary source of information. The private letters we shall study were written and received by Lubbert Jan van Eck (1719-1765) from about 1756 until 1765. In about 1500 letters, he corresponded with the other servants in Asia, the powerful and famous but also many long­forgotten people. Although Van Eck was definitely a senior employee with an interesting career, he is not part of the best known group of employees. Born into an impoverished noble family from the province of Gelderland, as oldest son, he was forced to take on a great deal of responsibility and seek the restoration of his family’s fortune in the East. After spending a couple of years working in Batavia, he made his career on the Coromandel Coast of India. Ultimately, he became VOC Governor there, and later held the same position in the island of Ceylon. He is best remembered as the military commander who led the last major military victory of the VOC. In 1765, he headed the military campaign against the king of Kandy and conquered the Kandyan capital. This victory restored VOC power in the island after a rebellion against VOC authority. Less known is the fact that he was a successful private trader who succeeded in making an impressive fortune. 21 In Van Eck’s letters (NA, Van Eck, 27, 18, 20 January 1760, De Klerk to Van Eck), we find an example of such reasoning. After Van Eck’s friend, Diethar van Rheden died (at the time of his death, a member of the High Government in Batavia), his executor Reinier de Klerk, asked Van Eck to destroy all the letters he had ever received or written to Van Rheden, since, should they become public, they might tarnish the good name of Van Rheden and his family. 22 For example the NA-collections, Alting, Mossel, Hope, Nederburgh and Radermacher. With service on both the Coromandel Coast and in Ceylon, Van Eck helps us understand the problems the company faced in monopoly and non-monopoly areas, at a time when fundamental changes were taking place in India. By concentrating on three informal institutions, private trade, corruption and networking, parallels can be drawn between all three, each domain reinforcing the other. The most easily traceable subject in Van Eck’s private correspondence is once again private trade. This merits taking up this subject first, before drawing parallels with the other two areas. 2.3 Comparisons The VOC (1602-1799) was a very diverse trading organisation and formal and informal institutions functioned alongside each other according to the regional priorities of the Company. Several factors determined the regional policy of the Company in the matter of the degree of private initiative it allowed its servants. At the extremes of the spectrum we have to distinguish between areas where the company ruled as a territorial lord and those where it did not, and between areas were the company held colonies and areas where it only possessed a trading settlement. In some areas the company faced no European competition in trade, while in others it did: it was challenged by doughty opponents. The question of war and peace should also not be overlooked. In Ceylon for a longish period the VOC ruled a spice-producing colony without European competition, while on the Coromandel Coast it possessed non-spice-producing-trading settlements, where European competition was an inescapable fact. In Ceylon the Company went to war, while on the Coromandel Coast it was determined to remain neutral in factional strife.23 This presents us with the opportunity to compare the relationship between the Company and its 23 In Ceylon, for a century at least no European power other than the VOC was present, and the VOC had to deal with only one indigenous ruler, but on the Coromandel Coast fierce competition raged with the other European East India companies and different rulers made different claims. In this region, the VOC first faced the rising influence of the French and English Companies. In Ceylon, the VOC also faced strife and resistance to its presence during Van Eck’s tenure (1761-1765), as the indigenous VOC subjects rebelled with the help of the indigenous king. For both regions, we shall assess to what extent the VOC was aware of the threats to its position and in what manner it reacted to these threats. servants in two contrasting situations and enables us to study the logic of the local situation. In the historiography on the rise of the English East India Company as a colonial power, we find discussions on the same subjects which recur in the study of the decline of the VOC. The success of the EIC is often attributed to differences in organization in comparison with its Dutch counterpart, but as I hope to show these organizational differences were only relative. In both Companies, servants were accused of having taken too large a share through “corruption”. Within the VOC sphere this was seen as reprehensible because at that juncture the Company was struggling to make ends meet. In the case of the EIC, conversely the servants were seen to be taking too large a share in the expansion of the company. The EIC actually used the same mechanisms and informal institutions as the VOC to meet the problems presented by its rise to dominance and empire. Finally, we will analyse how both Companies reacted to changes in power and how the relationship between Company and servants provides an instrument through which to scrutinize all these developments. In the shadow of the company : the VOC (Dutch East India Company)and its servants in the period of its decline (1740-1796) Nierstrasz, J.C. Citation Nierstrasz, J. C. (2008, November 5). In the shadow of the company : the VOC (Dutch East India Company) and its servants in the period of its decline (1740-1796). Retrieved from https://hdl.handle.net/1887/13267 Version: Not Applicable (or Unknown) License: Licence agreement concerning inclusion of doctoral thesis in the Institutional Repository of the University of Leiden Downloaded from: https://hdl.handle.net/1887/13267 Note: To cite this publication please use the final published version (if applicable). PART I Power & Trade Chapter 1: India, caught in a dead-end street Introduction Military victories are often the final outcome of social and economic changes which have been brewing over several decades. In the 1780s and 1790s, the military defeats of the VOC at the hands of the English bear witness to a long-term development both in Europe and in Asia. Earlier conflicts in the middle of the eighteenth century had less drastic consequences for the VOC, but already carried in them the seeds of the future. In this chapter we shall focus on the embryonic phase (1740-1770) of the VOC decline. In this period the VOC and the EIC had only one direct military confrontation (the Battle of Bedara, 1759), although the VOC was constantly seeking to find an answer to the best way to counter the increasing ambitions of its European competitors. In the preceding century, the VOC had long enjoyed the position of the dominant European power in Asia, but it was now losing its power to its French and English rivals in the battle for control of trade in India. Halfway through the eighteenth century, the European presence in South and Southeast Asia began to evolve from a trading company structure to that of a colonial state, as a result of the restructuring of the English and French presence in India. When the VOC had still been dominant, its primary aim was to keep the European competitors away from its power base on the Spice Islands and Java, leading to a reorientation of the other European companies on the Indian Sub-Continent. When the EIC took over as the dominant force, the development was reversed and the VOC was pushed back politically and commercially as the EIC began expanding from India towards the East. Consequently, we shall focus on the VOC presence in India before and after the EIC became dominant. How did the VOC and its servants react to the first signs of change? 1.The Europeans in Asia: power and trade If we look at the long term development of the European presence in Asia, we inevitably encounter a constant discussion about whether this European presence was political and based on military power or commercial and focused on trade.24 For the period under study here, this debate runs parallel to the discussion of the development of European expansion and its subsequent evolution towards colonization. The incorporation of Bengal by the EIC seems to present a breaking point in this discussion, since the debate on the period before Empire focuses on the relationship between power and trade, while after Empire it evolves into a more specific discussion about the relationship between conquest and trade. Although the connection between conquest and an increase in trade does suggest itself in the English case, the Dutch case presents a less conquest-related debate, even though in a much earlier stage in its development, the VOC had already pursued a policy of conquest in order to establish the spice monopolies in the Moluccas. The initial attraction which brought Europeans to Asia was the prospect of trading precious metal for a return cargo of these highly valued spices. Consequently the European Companies concentrated their efforts on controlling the various spice­producing areas and the main junctions of trade. During the seventeenth century, the composition of the return cargos reveals that the Companies had a strong interest in spices, mainly pepper. When the Companies started adding such new goods as coffee, tea and textiles to the return cargo, the focus on spices began to wane. In Europe a market had to be created for these new consumer products.25 The European presence in trade in Asia was inseparable from the enforcement of military power, but the European Companies were never strong enough to have it completely their way. They used their superior military and naval technology to battle their way into existing trade structures. As they established strongholds at strategic 24 The political dimension of the European trading presence in Asia is quite obvious if we look at its organizational concept. By establishing a royal monopoly or by founding companies with a monopoly in the trade between Asia and the homeland, a guaranteed market was created in Europe, ensuring that investments in this long-distance trade would reap profits. 25 H. Furber, Rival empires of trade in the orient, 1600-1800 (London: Oxford University Press, 1976); Gaastra, De geschiedenis van de VOC and P. Haudrère, La Compagnie française des Indes au XVIIIe siècle (Paris: Les Indes Savantes, 2005). locations, it proved almost impossible for most Asian rulers to get rid of the newcomers from the West, even if they wanted to. Once they had settled on the coast, Europeans insinuated their way into local politics by securing alliances with indigenous rulers. Certainly on the Indian Sub-Continent, European collaboration with local elites was an absolute condition for colonial expansion. This was already the case when the Portuguese arrived in the fifteenth century and continued after 1600 when the chartered companies appeared on the scene. The intense warfare in Europe considerably widened the gap in military technology between Europe and Asia. At first Europeans were only partly successful in dominating local trade. By the second half of the eighteenth century this changed as the difference in military prowess on land had assumed such proportions that the Europeans could venture outside their fortresses with confidence and move into the interior. Nevertheless, the impact of the brute force of the Europeans on Indian society should not be exaggerated. An overly strong emphasis on military force conceals another story of how the European Companies were truly innovative in organizing trade. They had no difficulty outdistancing competitors, both in Asia and in Europe, by organizing and financing long-distance trade on a global scale.26 1.1 A spicy advantage to trade For a better understanding of European expansion in Asia until 1800, it makes good sense to distinguish clearly between three periods, each with increasing European political involvement. The first period of European expansion in Asia began when the Cape of Good Hope was rounded by the Portuguese. The Portuguese expansion came in the wake of the pope´s decree dividing the world as a mission field between the 26 The trade between Asia and Europe most aptly illustrates the profitability and effects of long-distance trade. Although the Portuguese had previously dominated the spice trade to Europe, they had never succeeded in totally replacing and supplanting the spice route via the Mediterranean which had existed before the arrival of Portuguese maritime trade to Asia. In the old way, spices changed hands at every stop which was made along the route from Asia to the Mediterranean. The European Companies succeeded in surpassing the success of the land-route spice trade, proving the efficiency of the new long-distance trade. See: N. Steensgaard, The Asian trade revolution of the seventeenth century: the East India companies and the decline of the caravan trade (London: University of Chicago Press,1975). Portuguese and the Spanish.27 Apart from the Philippines, which had to be left to the Spaniards in obedience to the papal decision, the Portuguese were left with free sway over the rest of Asia. Relying on their superior military power at sea, the Portuguese strategy was to control the maritime trading routes and to conquer the most important junctions of trade.28 This tactic for gaining control of the spice-producing areas proved less successful than had been hoped, because of the strong resistance offered by the indigenous rulers. Yet, the Portuguese managed to gain a grip on the spice-producing areas by shrewdly taking sides in long existing local feuds. Control of production was not essential as long as trade to these sites was controlled from the sea by the Cartaz System.29 Thus, in the Indonesian Archipelago the main trade junction in Malacca was supplemented by the creation of many fortified settlements and trading posts closer to the spice-producing areas. This system worked well, although it should not be forgotten that it was constantly challenged and that the Portuguese were not always on the winning side, nor was their power absolute.30 In the Moluccas they actually lost terrain and could only hang on to the island of Ambon. The succeeding European trading companies had to enforce their presence politically and militarily in order to surpass the extant Iberian commercial power. With the Cartaz System, the Portuguese had an effective means to control the trade in spices as long as nobody challenged their power at sea, but from 1600 their domination was challenged by the advent of other Europeans who equalled or surpassed the military skills 27 The Treaty of Tordesillas (1494). 28 With the conquests of Ormuz (1515) and Malacca (1511), the Portuguese controlled two main focal points of Asian trade and obtained a way to control trade in those regions. These conquests had been supported by the establishment of the Portuguese headquarters in Asia, in Goa (1510). 29 With or without permission or contracts with Asian rulers, the Portuguese could control and dominate the trade in spices through their superiority at sea. To help them control the spice trade, the Portuguese invented the Cartaz System. By issuing passes, the aim of this system was to reorganize trade according to the wishes of the Portuguese. Trade with certain ports and in certain commodities was made a monopoly of the Portuguese crown; merchants could share in this monopoly and would be offered ‘protection‘ for paying a fee and obtaining a pass. This system of passes served a double purpose. First of all, it adapted trade to the wishes of the Portuguese. Secondly, from the money they earned by issuing licences provided the Portuguese with a steady income. If merchants did not obtain a Cartaz, a ship was liable to be taken and she and her cargo confiscated. In this way, the system had to be enforced by naval power. 30 C.R. Boxer, The Portuguese seaborne empire, 1415-1825 (London: Hutchinson,1977), 48-49, When the Portuguese tried the same tactic of enforcing trade with the Chinese, they were even defeated at sea (1521 and 1522) and only allowed to conduct trade on the terms laid down by the Chinese authorities. To a certain extent the same interaction and negotiation existed with the Mughal, although India was more open­minded towards foreign traders. of the Portuguese in the second period of dominance. Dutch and English rivals were better equipped militarily, because of better capitalization and organization. Since the Portuguese were no longer successful in enforcing their will at sea by displays of naval power, the Portuguese Cartaz System proved impossible to maintain. It became apparent that new means of control were needed. The chief rival of the Portuguese in the Indonesian Archipelago, the Dutch East India Company (VOC), reinterpreted the idea of controlling the spice trade. The production sites of most spices were found in the Moluccas, a region of islands where such a monopoly was the easiest to preserve and could be most profitably exploited. The insular environment meant the VOC experienced no difficulty in deploying its superior naval power to enforce its will and isolate targeted islands. After the appropriation of the various production sites, the spice crops in surrounding production sites not controlled by the VOC were extirpated in order to curf the geographical spread of the spices. Other European competitors were chased from the vicinity of the islands producing spices, thereby ensuring competitors were kept at bay.31 The next chapter presents a discussion of how a similar situation evolved on Ceylon, where the VOC obtained a monopoly in premium quality cinnamon. For now it suffices to note that with the appropriation of Ambon and Banda in the middle of the seventeenth century, the VOC firmly established a monopoly in cloves, mace and nutmeg. There were limits to what the dominant European player in the region was able to enforce and no power ever accumulated enough might to force its European competitors out of trade completely. Even though the VOC certainly became the dominant power in the Moluccan spice trade, it was not able to conquer all the spice growing areas. There was one spice which proved to be impossible to monopolize: pepper. For the European market this spice was the most important one in terms of bulk of trade.32 In contrast to the other spices, the cultivation of pepper was geographically more widespread. It not only grew in the Indonesian Archipelago: Bantam, Palembang, Jambi, Padang, and 31 The first victims of the new way of controlling the production sites were the Portuguese and the Spanish. See: Boxer, Portuguese Seaborne Empire, 110. Secondly, the English East India Company (EIC) shared the same fate when it was ejected from Ambon (1623). This process of monopolising the spice-producing areas at the cost of local populations and other Europeans was not achieved without bloodshed. With the conquest of Makassar (1669), the last leak in the region was closed. 32 Jacobs, Merchant in Asia, 56-58. Banjarmasin were the major outlets, but it was also found on the south western Coastal area on the Indian Sub-Continent called Malabar, from where it originated.33 Efforts by the VOC to monopolize pepper were unsuccessful and serious doubt has been cast on whether the VOC could have achieved a monopoly on pepper, since the achievement of such a monopoly would have outstripped its financial means. In the end, the VOC limited itself to outdistancing its other competitors for pepper by signing several profitable pepper contracts with local rulers. There were also limitations to the degree of enforcement which could be used against the indigenous rulers. The geographical dispersion of the pepper plant and its search for suitable export products brought the VOC into contact with the bigger political entities of the larger islands in the Indonesian Archipelago, mainland South-East Asia and India. The strategy of coercion had worked successfully in the Indonesian Archipelago against the smaller islands, but it met its match in the larger islands and with the continental empires. Against these more powerful polities, the VOC encountered the same problem as had the Portuguese before it: the use of force at sea did not have the same impact on the mainland as it did have in the insular part of South-east Asia. The reasons for the failure of a stronger VOC policy on the Indian Sub-Continent are various. On the Malabar Coast and other parts of India, the VOC and the other European Companies could not gain dominance and had to limit themselves to trading posts. Even if the Europeans blockaded the harbours, the land route offered alternatives. Once several VOC monopolies had been established, it was time for the Company to pay its investors. The main goal of any East India Company was to make a profit for the shareholders by selling Asian products in Europe. The Gentlemen XVII, directing the VOC trade from the Dutch Republic, always emphasised that the Republic was financing the whole operation and was not a mere commercial office for Asian products. 34 European interests were conceived to be of prime importance, and employees in Asia had to be aware that their task was simply to supply the goods for Europe as cheaply as possible in order to guarantee the highest possible profit for the shareholders. The profits of the intra-Asian trade conducted by the VOC generated extra capital and enabled the 33 Jacobs, Merchant in Asia, 58-60.34 Steur, Herstel of Ondergang, 50-53. Dutch to purchase the spices at a better price in Asia. It also served to offset military costs, so that they would not affect profits in the Republic detrimentally. Once the monopolies had been obtained, the VOC grew more reluctant to go to war. Only if the monopolies or its political position were threatened was military intervention deemed an option, but it was clearly understood that if such action was undertaken, the costs had to be earned back afterwards by trade. 1.2 Change in government The commercial position of the Europeans in Asia has often been described in a manner to suggest that the Europe had little to offer to Asia except precious metal. This assumption hides the less acknowledged fact that European markets for Asian products were also limited. New markets were indeed created for Asian consumer goods in the eighteenth century, but naturally these markets had a saturation point. Even without extensive territorial possessions and an expected commensurate growth of opportunities in trade on the short-term this saturation point of trade was soon reached. This was doubly true for the Republic with its relatively small internal market. In the eighteenth century the Gentlemen XVII realized that the acquisition of more territorial possessions would not necessarily generate more trade, hence more profit in Europe. In order to conquer territories, military force was needed, and this inevitably costs money. Apart from the costs of maintaining this military power, any war would cause a fall in trade, both these conditions having a negative effect on the prime target of profit in Europe. A focus on taxation presented a fundamental danger to the companies, as this diverted attention from the trade which was their very reason for existence. Although the acquisition of territorial possessions and the pursuit of expansion for tax purposes may not have seemed a logical step for a commercial Company to take, the EIC emerged as a territorial power in Bengal after the Battle of Plassey (1757). Irrevocably, this territorial expansion required a new approach to solve new problems, and this was difficult to reconcile for a Company with shareholders who had short-term profit on their minds. Although the dividend was quickly raised after Plassey, it was an uphill battle for the Directors to maintain the profits as such a level they could meet the overheated expectations of the shareholders.35 Even when the EIC did extract money from taxation, it was difficult to invest this money in profitable goods for the Europe. The market for Indian products in Europe only grew slowly and costs kept rising as a result of the persistent warfare. More importantly, the prospect of larger revenue attracted the attention of the Government. This ultimately led to usurpation of the EIC’s rights by the British Government and the development of a colonial state, which no longer required a merchant company at its helm. It beggars belief that the EIC, a company lagging behind in the seventeenth century could reinvent itself in the early eighteenth century and reach a position of dominance on its own strength alone. Yet this is exactly what has been proposed in academic literature. In this, there is a strong insistence on the growing private trade by indigenous merchants in and around the English settlements in India, leading to conflicts with local governments.36 The true origins of these conflicts lay in the unrest and civil war which began to plague India when the decline of the Mughal Empire set in. Whereas in the seventeenth century, the VOC used military means to obtain monopolies, in the eighteenth century the EIC had to arm itself against the inherent threat war posed to its existing trade.37 The litany of historiography insists that the unrest was considered so dangerous that immediate action was necessary. The decline of the Mughal Empire and subsequent civil strife in India were a precondition to the rise of the EIC and enabled it to intervene at the time of Plassey. The question remains why such an initially relatively weak Company as the EIC was so successful in its pursuit of conquest. Anglo-Saxon historians have often interpreted the English military dominance in India as a result of the success of English private trade and trade patronage. This partly paralleled in the great success of English private trade in the later times and as a 35 H.V. Bowen, Elites, Enterprise and the Making of the British overseas Empire 1688-1775 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996), 87.36 S. Mentz, The English gentleman merchant at work: Madras and the City of London 1660-1740 (Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press, 2005); C. Bayly, Imperial Meridian, The British Empire and the world 1780-1830 (Harlow: Pearson Education, 1989). 37 C. Bayly, Imperial Meridian, 61-63. predecessor of the free-trade world. 38 The English country traders outran all their competitors in the intra-Asian trade, including the VOC, thanks to their relative freedom of action. One author even asserts indigenous traders were also drawn to the EIC not only because of their estrangement from local authorities, but also because of the freedom they were allowed. The estrangement from local authorities was attributed to unrelenting violence and extortion; to escape this the indigenous merchants willingly settled in the English settlements and paid tax to the English Company. This produced income for the English which in turn fuelled the military expansion and protection of trade, which to an even larger extent strengthened the alliance between the EIC and indigenous merchants.39 An alternative explanation for British expansion in India, one which has often been branded Eurocentric, is the view that State support from Europe had helped the EIC to establish its power. Although in times of peace the influence of the metropolis was limited, a comparison between the situation of the VOC on the one hand and of the EIC and French Company on the other, reveals a fundamental difference. Until 1784 the VOC never received any direct support from the Dutch Republic, in the sense that a naval ship or armies under command and authority of the Republic were sent to Asia to assist it.40 This meant that in the Dutch case there was no State interference in Company authority and policy in Asia. The situation faced by the French and English Companies was different. Here, in both cases we see a rising influence of State power. First Royal fleets were sent from Europe to help both Companies, and during the Seven Years war (1756­1763) Royal soldiers were also sent. Their arrival mainly coincided with the sudden English progress in Bengal. This was certainly an advantage to the EIC, even though the State sent these troops to fight the French, with no thought at all of creating a colonial empire.41 This explanation of the impulse behind English expansion also provides an alternative explanation to the rise of English country trade in the pre-imperial era. The 38 Furber, Rival empires of trade in the orient 1600-1800 (St. Paul: North Central Publishing Company, 1976), 331. 39 I. B. Watson, Foundation for Empire, English Private Trade in India 1659-1760 (New Delhi: Vikas 1980). 40 G. Knaap red, De Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie: tussen oorlog en diplomatie (Leiden: KITLV Uitgever , 2002). 41 P.J. Marshall, British Expansion in India in the Eighteenth Century: A Historical Revision, in: Trade and Conquest, studies on the rise of British dominance in India (Great Yarmouth: Variorum, 1993), VII, 30. intrusion of the navy and the army can also be seen in the light of an economic stimulus which created new economic and commercial possibilities for the EIC and the English country traders. In the debate about the presence of English garrisons around the Atlantic, it has been shown that the regions in the neighbourhood of army settlements experienced an economic boost. A similar effect was also noticeable in Madras, when it received military support from England after it had been ravaged by war. The presence of the British armies probably radiated out towards the economic activities in the other EIC settlements on the Indian Sub-Continent too. We shall return to the effects on country trade later, here it suffices to note that the military reinforcements helped the EIC to attain a level of military and economic involvement it would not have been able to sustain simply on the basis of its commercial performance. 2 The Indian battlefield: a land of opportunity During the Anglo-French wars of the mid-eighteenth century, ‘the Company’ and ‘the State’ clearly shared a common interest in sending sufficient military power to India to safeguard the trading possessions, but neither combatant had an official plan of campaign or design for colonial exploitation. War upset trade and the East India Companies and their shareholders were loath to have to bear the costs of military operations, preferring the more peaceful alternative. In principle, even the rival parties, the EIC and the French Company (CIO) preferred a peaceful existence: During the War of Spanish successions an unofficial truce was made between the two companies. An attempt by the French to make a similar arrangement with the English Company in the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-8) was defeated however, by the action of the English Government in sending a fleet to harass the French in these valuable possessions.42 42 L. S. Sutherland, The East India Company in eighteenth-century politics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952), 45. After having dispatched naval fleets to Asia during the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-1748), the English Crown decided to commit itself more deeply during the Seven Years War, and sent along Royal troops.43 Although there was no official plan to extend territorial power, the unsettled political and military circumstances on the Indian Sub-Continent soon held out a temptation to toy with such an idea. The reinforcements from Europe not only tipped the balance towards the English in the Seven Years’ War, they also transformed the EIC into a party to be reckoned with in the struggles between indigenous rulers. This sudden boost in power came at a time when there was more opportunity than ever to exploit it. With central authority on the decline, civil strife erupted among Indian princes and the political map of the Indian Sub-Continent was redrawn along the lines of smaller political entities. Since there was no longer a large, powerful polity which had the might to control the Europeans, these could assume a new role as power brokers in local politics, intervening in and playing out local politics. It is often supposed that Europeans were forced to shoulder this military responsibility in order to protect their own trading interests, but this explanation seems flawed, since colonization was never part of official policy. The goal of the EIC directors in London which was to maintain neutrality and stimulate trade was not shared by the employees in those regions affected by war. The same desire to avoid the costs of war was also illustrated in the case of the French Company. Not long after the war of the Austrian Succession had finished, the CIO recalled its most successful Governor, Joseph François Dupleix. Its Directors felt he had continued to wage the war without their approval, by putting his troops under the nominal command of local Indian allies. In return for this assistance, Dupleix had hoped the French Company would be rewarded by its Indian allies with extensive domains and the concomitant tax concessions. Personally, he had hoped to produce quick and impressive results, so that the directors at home would forgive him for the fact he had taken the liberty of acting on his own. However, Dupleix was unsuccessful and had simply incurred more costs for the CIO. This forced the Directors to recall and impeach him.44 43 Sutherland, East India Company, 46. 44 P. Haudrère, La Compagnie francaise des Indes au XVIIIe siècle (Paris: Les Indes Savantes, 2005). Even after Dupleix was recalled, the English still felt threatened and reacted by making the entire Carnatic area ‘a theatre of war, revolving, nominally at least, around rival Indian claimants’45 The trade-oriented agenda of the French and English Companies was disturbed not only by wars transferred from Europe onto local civil strife but was also thrown into disarray by the personal ambitions of the men-on-the-spot. The Company servants working on the Coromandel Coast were in favour of military intervention and thought the costs of war could easily be compensated by income to be derived from taxation. When Dupleix wrote a memoir after his return to France to defend his policy of intervention, he specified the advantages the French Company could have expected from an enlargement of its territorial possession. He began by comparing the circumstances of the French Company with the situation of the VOC. While the VOC enjoyed a large and steady income from its monopolies on spices, the French Company did not possess similar advantages. This meant the VOC could maintain its trading empire and pay for the costs of military intervention with income from trade. The French Company was left vulnerable in the event of war because it lacked similar funds and depended on the home country to supply it with money. If the colonies were cut off from contact with France, this would be catastrophic.46 So, local income from taxation was needed to secure France possessions in India in the event of a European war. In times of peace, the income from tax meant that sufficient military forces could be maintained. In the event of a new war, these forces could be immediately employed, instead of having to wait for support to arrive from Europe.47 Even the employees of the other Companies on the Coast admired Dupleix´s work in India, and thought the French Company had made a mistake in summoning Dupleix back under the present state of affairs, meaning they implicitly agreed with his policy.48 45 Winius, Merchant-warrior, 116. 46 Archives Ministère des Affaires étrangères, mémoires et documents, fonds divers, sous Asie, nr 4, mémoires Dupleix. 47 Ibidem, 3-10. 48 Martineau, Dupleix et l’Inde Française 1749-1754, IV, (Paris: Société d’’editions géographiques, maritimes et colonials, 1928), 465. 2.1 The Anglo-French struggle for power The symbol of the nascent British Empire is the Battle of Plassey (1757), where all the factors and developments we have depicted in the previous sections converged. After the Battle of Plassey, the English were increasingly able to seek a quasi-colonial control over the rich province of Bengal. The cause of the conflict leading to the Battle of Plassey was the English refusal in 1756 to present the customary monetary gift to honour the accession of the new Nawab of Bengal. While the Dutch and French did pay, the English declined to hand over such gifts on legal grounds. They estranged themselves even more from the Nawab by strengthening their fortifications in Calcutta and by giving asylum to one of his known enemies.49 These actions were seen by the Nawab as an infringement on his position as sovereign of Bengal and he decided to react.50 Fort William was taken after only a short siege and its fall was followed by the famous Black Hole incident.51 The English on the Coromandel Coast swore vengeance and sent a small expeditionary army to Bengal under Robert Clive. After retaking Calcutta in 1757 and after conquering the Nawab’s fort at Hughli, the Battle of Plassey followed, which ended in a British vicotry. The Nawab was forced to abdicate and replaced with their own claimant and, through him, the English controlled Bengal from then onwards. After 1765, the English deposed of their own Nawab and took direct control of Bengal. The main epicentre of the English and French military struggle had always been the Coromandel Coast, but strangely the most important military battle took place in Bengal. As a consequence, Bengal has often been seen by British historians as a special case, which even before Plassey represented the cradle of the Britsih Empire.52 It is generally overlooked, that Clive’s troops came from the Coromandel Coast. The strength of the British in Bengal after Plassey bare no relationship to the meagre British presence in Bengal in earlier times. In contrast, the situation on the Coromandel Coast had been 49 The Dutch and the French respectively paid Rs 450,000 and Rs 350,000. The declared enemy of the Nawab was called Raj Kissendas. 50 Winius, Merchant-Warrior pacified, 125.51 This refers to an incident in which the Nawab allegedly locked a large group of inhabitants in a room which was far too small, causing several men to succumb to the dreadful conditions. 52 P.J. Marshall, East Indian Fortunes, The British in Bengal in the Eighteenth Century (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976). much more dynamic than in Bengal, fuelled by the competition between the French and English. In Bengal, there was no such interaction.53 In the conflict situation simmering on the Coromandel Coast, the French had held the initiative from 1746 until 1756.54 In the Seven Years’ War (1756-1763),55 the French again seized the initiative on land,56 while the English maintained their superiority at sea. The eventual decline of the French position on the Coromandel Coast can be attributed in equal parts to indigenous resistance and to the English rise to dominance. The expedition to Bengal led by Robert Clive after the Black Hole incident left a void on the Coromandel Coast which the French used to expand their activities by securing indigenous alliances. Eventually, this widespread involvement led to an over-extension of the French power. At the moment the French were preparing to deal a final blow to the English by taking Madras in 1758, the army of the Marquis De Bussy, who was marching down from the north to converge with the local contingent to besiege Madras, was held up by the Marathas. This delay allowed the Comte De Lally time to move his army to Tanjore to force the king to contribute 55 lakhs of pagodas to the French cause. When the king refused to pay, a siege of Tanjore in order to force him became inevitable. That siege deteriorated into a disastrous adventure for the French when the king of Tanjore launched a nocturnal counterattack and slaughtered their enemy, which could not retaliate because of a shortage of gunpowder.57 In the northern part of the Coromandel Coast in 53 This is reflected by the fact that employees on the Coast were more afraid the French would achieve victory, than that the English would emerge the victors. 54 In collaboration with the French fleet commanded by Mahé de la Bourdonnais, sent from France to India precipitating the war, in 1746, after a siege of only six days, the French succeeded in capturing the English capital of the Coromandel Coast: Madras. This caused a conflict with the Indian ruler who thought Madras fell under his authority and that it had been attacked without his permission. Mahé de la Bourdonnais wanted to ransom the city to this ruler, but his fleet had to sail because of a storm, leaving the French commander, Dupleix, in the city with only a small force. He decided to defeat the Indian ruler and demolish the city. The EIC wanted to avenge itself and sent a fleet to shell Pondicherry and cut the city off from the mainland. See: Winius, Merchant-Warrior pacified, 126-129, Before the Seven Years’ War (1756-1763), the French was the first Company to resort to state support successfully, which gave it an edge. The VOC reluctantly participated in this siege, since it was officially allied to the EIC. The two VOC detachments were led by Roussel, the man who would later lead the ill-fated VOC expedition to Bengal. In 1748, at the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, Madras was returned to the English for geopolitical reasons. See: Martineau, Dupleix, 76-77 and Winius, Merchant-warrior, 113. 55 England and France were again waging war all around the world and this time the Republic remained neutral. 56 The success of the French in the first two years of the war is symbolized by the conquest of English Fort St. David, north of Madras. 57 Of the 2500 men only 600 returned to Pondicherry. the mean time English troops had defeated the army under the command of the Marquis De Conflans.58 After the defeat of Conflans, the commander of another French army in the north also took flight, leaving his army trapped.59 Having lost momentum after their disastrous siege of Tanjore, the French returned to Pondichery, searching ways to re­invigorate their war effort.60 Just as their position became precarious, the problems of the French were relieved by the arrival of reinforcements from France. Amid rumours of more reinforcements in the near future, three King’s regiments of 100 men each, accompanied by 1500 volunteers, arrived from France on a fleet of fourteen ships.61 The French could now dispatch an army of 8 to 9000 soldiers to Madras and their thoughts again turned to capturing the city. They realized this would be more difficult because the English had been in time to reinforce the city.62 The French were strong enough to encircle and to isolate Madras at a distance of 3 to 4 miles from the city and their first assaults were directed at a fortified garrison outside of the city. It was their intention to mount the real siege upon the arrival of their ships, which would allow them to isolate the city also from the sea.63 Yet the luck of the French changed when an English naval squadron arrived from Bombay, breaking the blockade and forcing the French to retreat.64 The arrival of the English ships meant that the French efforts to conquer the city by blockade on land would be futile, and so they ended the siege. After the siege of Madras, the English received further reinforcements in the form of 1000 soldiers of the king on six warships, tipping the balance against the French.65 58 NA, Van Eck, 20, 245, 29 December 1758, Van Eck to Visscher. 59 NA, Van Eck, 20, 391, 13 December 1759, Van Eck to Van Teylingen. 60 NA, Van Eck, 20, 129 21 September 1759, Van Eck to unkown and NA, Panthaleon van Eck, 55, 5, 13 April 1758, Van Eck to Van Teylingen. The French were very short of funds and in order to solve the problem they sold their possession of Naour to an indigenous ruler for 150,000 rupees. NA, Van Eck, 26, 3, 12 February 1759, unkown to Van Eck. The English did not face the same problem, in 1759 they received £ 20,000 from parliament. 61 NA, Van Eck, 20, 25, 28 June 1758, Van Eck to Vermont. 62 NA, Van Eck, 20, 184, 18 October 1758, Van Eck to van der Parra. 63 NA, Van Eck, 20, 211, 18 November 1758, Van Eck to Van Teylingen. 64 NA, Van Eck, 20, 266, 17 February 1759, Van Eck to Loovenaar. 65 NA, Van Eck, 20, 59, 3 August 1758, Van Eck to Orme and NA, Van Eck, 20, 155, 8 September 1758, Van Eck to Mossel, The defeat at Tanjore annihilated the plans of French, allowing the English in Madras extra time to strengthen the city’s fortifications and to obtain reinforcements. The English managed to bring their number of men up to 2500 Europeans and 6000 sepoys, making it much harder to take Madras than if the French had moved on Madras after the conquest of Fort St David. NA, Van Eck, 20, 212, 18 November 1756, Van Eck to Vermont, Although the King of Tanjore refused to send any help to the English, it was After the failed sieges of Tanjore and Madras had damaged the French position, it was the Battle of Wandiwash which dealt the deathblow to French aspirations in the Seven Years’ War.66 In the aftermath of the Battle of Wandiwash, the French had lost all their previous conquests to the English and a siege of Pondicherry threatened.67 Now the English were also blockading Pondicherry from the sea.68 Two more warships arrived from Bombay with 500 soldiers on board, bringing the total fleet to fifteen ships.69 The English even blockaded Pondicherry by sea during the monsoon, braving the storm.70 When their indigenous allies decented them, there was no escape left for the French.71 Soon afterwards Pondicherry fell and its fortifications were destroyed.72 3. An unresponsive VOC While its main European competitors were slugging it out in India, the VOC remained neutral and tried prudently to limit its military expenditure. This was done partly from a clear that their fortunes were changing. The situation became pressing for the English and they reacted by sending Colonel Fort from Bengal. He landed at Visinigapatnam with 400 to 500 Europeans and 1500 sepoys, but he was cut off and not able to help at Madras. As he waited, the French plundered the black quarters of Madras, which were situated outside of the wall. 66 Furber, Rival empires, 169. At Wandiwash, the English under the command of Colonel Eyre Coote pitted 1500 Europeans and 3000 sepoys against the French army of 2500 Europeans and 9000 sepoys. After the battle the French had lost 200 Europeans and 400 French soldiers were captured. The English only lost sixty-eight men and had 128 wounded, all Europeans. NA, Van Eck, 32, 1, unknown to Van Eck. Skirmishes with the French Cavalry continued from 6 in the morning till 4 in the afternoon. The English not only captured twenty-one canons, they also seized one of the main figures in the French military circles: Bussy. Hyder Ali withdrew his support for the French after the battle, having seen the number of troops Coote was amassing for the siege of Pondichery. 67 NA, Van Eck, 20, 432, 12 March 1760, Van Eck to De Jong. 68 NA, Van Eck, 20, 465, 2 May 1760, Van Eck to Bisdom. 69 NA, Van Eck, 20, 474, 25 May 1760, Van Eck to De Jong. 70 NA, Van Eck, 20, 555, 22 October 1760, Van Eck to De Klerk, NA, Van Eck, 20,579, 6 January 1761, Van Eck to De Jong and NA, Van Eck, 20, 587, 27 January 1761, Van Eck to Taillefert, During a storm a large number of the English ships were lost The final damage being three ships of the line, one frigate and one East Indiaman and its fire ship lost, four ships lost all their masts and on the Malabar Coast the Cumberland carrying sixty guns was lost. 71 NA, Van Eck, 20, 580, 9 January 1761, Van Eck to Schreuder. A good example is the former Nawab of the Carnatica, a strong ally of the French, who fled the Coast, taking refuge at Jaffna and later on the Malabar Coast. 72 NA, Van Eck, 20, 636, 21 May 1761, Van Eck to Mossel. In retaliation for the destruction of Madras by Dupleix in the previous war, the English raided Dupleix’s palace, all monasteries and churches and all the Company houses. strategic point of view and partly out of economic necessity.73 Military expenditure had to be kept in line with trading activities.74 If we compare the support received by the EIC and French Company in Asia from the homeland with the situation in which the VOC found itself, we see a totally different situation. The Dutch Company had to take care of its own fleet and army in Asia. At best, the VOC received assistance from the Republic in European waters, where the Dutch navy would escort the ships home. Nevertheless, there was also a positive side to the lack of direct involvement of the homeland. Since there were no troops or fleets in Asia under the command of the Republic, the VOC could manage any participation in wars in Asia on its own terms. In the eighteenth century the behaviour of the VOC in India was comparatively peaceful, and as a consequence the Dutch have been termed the best-behaved and most beneficent of all the major European powers once present on Indian soil.75 At the same time the men-on-the-spot constantly warned their superiors that fundamental changes were stirring in India and asked for resources to counter the imminent threat to the Company’s position there. The direct consequence of the VOC’s policy of neutrality allied to its lack of military muscle was that it had trouble protecting its possessions against its competitors. This lack of military force was the direct cause, Masulipatnam, one of the oldest VOC fortresses on the Coromandel Coast, was taken by the French in 1756. Hope of regaining Masulipatnam was irretrievably lost in 1759 when the English conquered the port from the French.76 During the Seven Years’ War, the French temporarily captured another VOC outpost on the Coromandel Coast: Sadraspatnam. They promised to return the fort after the French siege of Madras.77 Illustrative of the VOC-policy is the fact that the employees in the fortified settlement Sadras did not even offer any resistance to the French when they were attacked, but just handed over the keys of the gate. At sea the situation was similar. In retaliation for the English capture of a French ship the Roby in the roadstead of Nagapatnam, the French took the VOC ship the Haarlem just of the 73 During the Austrian War of succession the Dutch were officially on the side of the English, but managed to avoid untoward expenses. 74 NA, Panthaleon Van Eck, 55, 32, 15 January 1759, De Klerk to Van Eck. 75 Winius, Merchant-warrior pacified, 1. 76 Winius, Merchant-warrior pacified, 117. 77 NA, Van Eck, 26, 1, 1 January 1759, Canter Visscher to Van Eck, The aim of the French in conquering the fort was merely to avoid the English taking control of it. The French did indeed return the fort in 1761. coast of Pondicherry.78 During the war she was used to provision the French armies and the ship was only returned after the war. Even the principal fortresses of the VOC were not safe from foreign intrusion. When the French, in search of provisions landed before the gates of Nagapatnam on their way to Trichypoli and Tanjore, the incumbent Governor Steven Vermont opened his gate. He let in a 100 French hussars, accompanied by infantrymen, although protocol only obliged him to receive the commander and his guards. His action amazed the other employees on the Coast, since there were only 150 VOC soldiers garrisoned there. The French army was also granted such special concessions as free and uncontrolled entry to the city even during the night.79 The French bought up all available provisions and as a result made life very expensive for the inhabitants. 80 The situation even induced intimidation and violence by the French against the citizens and the Company servants.81 After the French army left, Vermont asked to be relieved of his post in order to preclude the embarrassment of dismissal. The High Government clearly found Vermont’s behaviour reprehensible, damaging to the reputation of the VOC and more importantly a danger to neutrality. Vermont returned to Batavia, but he was never penalized for the incident. By them electing Van Eck, the High Government aimed at avoiding embarrassing incidents in the future and Van Eck promised not to follow his predecessor’s bad example.82 In 1765, however, his successor disobeyed orders again by 78 NA, Van Eck, 19, 57, 13 September 1758, Pfeiffer to Van Eck and NA, Van Eck, 19, 54, 8 September 1758, Vermont to Van Eck. The master was accused of carrying English goods. The ship was taken together with a privately owned ship of one of the servants, called the Experientia, which had arrived from Batavia. The Governor protested against the taking of the Haarlem, and sent word to the Republic, omitting the fact that a private Dutch ship had also been taken. Before the crew of the Haarlem was released, thirteen of them had already gone over in the service of the French company. The rest of the crew was sent to Batavia. 79 NA, Van Eck, 20, 48, 28 July 1758, Van Eck to Vermont. 80 NA, Van Eck, 20, 49, 26 July 1758, Van Eck to Van Teylingen. 81 The situation deteriorated further when the French commissioner was called ‘insolent’, because he was claiming to be an official ambassador of the King of France. According to the servants, he had never shown proof of his official capacity, so instead of calling him ambassador, they called him a purchaser of proviands. The French took this as an insult to the King, transposed into violence against citizens and VOC-personnel.82 NA, Van Eck, 20, 289, 15 April 1759, Van Eck to Van Rheden. Although employees found it hard to adjust, the VOC clearly wanted to uphold neutrality. A few years previously, when a French army wanted to enter Porto Novo, Lubbert Jan van Eck, at that time chief of Porto Novo, showed his worth as an employee by keeping the French out of the city and not giving into their demands. This decision meant Van Eck had proved himself to be able to protect the Company’s interest and it made him a logical next helping an English fleet land their army in front of Nagapatnam, assisting them on their way to Trichypoli. Although the High Government was worried by the intrusions made on its power, most of its attention was still directed to trade. Every year the local employees of the Indian establishments received their orders about the kinds of cloths expected next year. The Governor of the Coromandel Coast divided the Eijsch between the different settlements on the Coast. The next year the cloth was gathered and sent to Batavia. Most of the correspondence between the Coast and Batavia is on this subject and, as long as the Eijsch was met at a reasonable price by the Coast settlements, Batavia was satisfied. Unfortunately, the protracted war had negative effects on trade, even though the Company tried to preserve its neutrality. The Eijsch was still met, but the quality did not always meet with approval in Batavia and the cloth often did not pass muster with officials in the Republic.83 3.1 A furtive response to fundamental dangers The fundamental danger to the VOC was not the war between the French and the English, but the threat of subjection to another European power. The situation which might result from dominance of another European company was felt to be of life-threatening proportion to the Company. In that event, the Company would no longer pay tribute to an independent indigenous ruler but indirectly, or even directly, to a European rival who would also dictate trade. Such a situation was unacceptable and would have had enormous consequences for the VOC trade. Before the siege of Madras (1758), the employees on the Coast observed that the English only had Madras and Trichypoli left, while the French were besieging Tanjore. If the French had succeeded in capturing this Governor of the Coast. His resolute behaviour had even been applauded in Holland as the best way to act in the interests of the Company. 83 NA, Van Eck, 24, 1, 30 November 1755, Teijlema to Vermont. While Vermont was Governor, he received a letter from a warehouseman representing the VOC in the Republic, indicating that he had not seen such a bad quality of cloth in forty years. The quality of some of the cloth proved too poor to be offered for sale, the loss obliterated profit for the company. city and subduing the King of Tanjore, the VOC and Nagapatnam would have become a tributary to the French. Fortunately, the actions of the King of Tanjore had averted this threat. In Bengal, the situation was even worse, since in the aftermath of Plassey such a situation existed with the English. The new state of affairs in Bengal was a threat to the VOC and forced it to react militarily. The real possibility of living under the indirect rule of the British spurred the VOC to take action. Van Eck hoped that Batavia and the Gentlemen Seventeen would not accept this situation and would consider the struggles for power in India of prime importance. 84 Soon after Plassey, it was rumoured that the English in Bengal were encountering growing problems in their efforts to impose their rule. There was also a rumour that the army of an indigenous ruler supported by French troops was approaching Bengal, and this news presented an opportunity for the VOC to intervene. Batavia had plans to enlarge the garrison in Hughli to 3000 men, in order to create an alternative power centre to counter the rising English influence. It was assumed that such a force would tempt those who wanted to oppose the English to the Dutch side. This plan had priority, because it was believed that the moment the English on the Coast had their hands free, they would send their troops to Bengal to take full control (a foreboding which proved correct in 1765). Under such English political control, an end to the trade of the VOC in Bengal was anticipated. This led to the decision of the High Government to send an expeditionary force, which would be reinforced by the 900 soldiers destined for the Coast.85 In order to avoid being drawn into the Seven Years’ War, the VOC played the card of manoeuvring only to limiting the power of the indigenous ruler of Bengal. Although the expedition was, unofficially, devised to destabilize the newly won English influence after their victory at Plassey, officially it was specifically aimed at the newly inaugurated English-orientated Nawab and his ‘unreasonable’ behaviour. Although the 84 NA, Van Eck, 20, 591, 7 February 1761, Van Eck to Schreuder. The Governor of Ceylon, Jan Schreuder, agreed that the policy of neutrality of the VOC maintained was detrimental to its position. NA, Van Eck, 20, 56, 1 August 1758, Van Eck to Bisdom. Van Eck hoped that troops would be sent to effect a change. The hazardous predicament of the VOC was, according to Van Eck, attributable to one man: Adriaan Bisdom, the Director in Bengal. He had not been resolute enough when he declined a reinforcement of 2,100 men for his forces after the Battle of Plassey. And even before Plassey, he had not handled negotiations with the indigenous rulers well, leading to a loss of face for the VOC. 85 NA, Van Eck, 20, 302, 30 May 1759, Van Eck to Bisdom. VOC maintained this behaviour was the reason it attacked, its neutrality would be protected as it would not be breaching its peace with the English. In the end, the Company planned to send 1500 troops from Batavia.86 The only problem the authorities in Batavia foresaw was the fact that they had to use their own ships, which were no match for the larger Royal Navy ships sent from England as warships.87 The VOC was not totally confident about what results could be achieved in a battle on land either and decided caution would be advisable. It was reasoned that the time was ripe for military action since the main English preoccupation was still the French presence on the Coast. This would keep the English fleet busy, while the VOC focused on Bengal. When the calculation of the expenses of the expedition was made, it was estimated it would cost around 360,000 rds, which was almost the same amount as the Nawab exacted from the Company two years earlier. In the long run, this policy of war was deemed to be less expensive than allowing the situation to drift on in its current state. Unfortunately for the VOC, all assumptions of success proved completely wrong. 88 The English were forewarned and waiting for the expedition, since one of the Dutch ships had arrived six weeks before the others, betraying their plan. Even before any ship had arrived news must have leaked out, since the French already knew of the proposed expedition.89 The expedition was a military debacle for the VOC, because it simply did not possess the European resources of its competitors.90 The first stage of the Battle of Bedara was fought at sea. On its arrival in Bengal the Dutch fleet captured two English ships. Then three English ships came down the river and joined battle with all seven VOC ships, confirming the High Government’s worst fears. Before the VOC ships were taken, 86 NA, Van Eck, 20, 307, 5 June 1759, Van Eck to De Jong, to the highly placed servants in the neighbourhood, the two De Jong’s of Malabar and Jaffna. To them he indicated that he was convinced that the troops he had send would not only safeguard the VOC’s possessions and commerce, but would also be the precursors of better times ahead. NA, Van Eck, 20, 361, 18 October 1759, Van Eck to Faure, 2/3 Europeans and 1/3 Malayans. 87 NA, Van Eck, 20, 364, 15 October 1759, Van Eck to Van Rheden. 88 NA, Van Eck, 20, 364, 15 October 1759, Van Eck to Van Rheden. Now that Batavia was responding, the servants were happy with their augmented offensive power. The attack was expected to be a success. Van Eck was convinced that once the expeditionary force showed up in Bengal, the English and the French would give up.89 NA, Van Eck, 26, 60, 15 August 1759, Sutton to Van Eck. Before this, the French were already wondering about the large amount of troops arriving on the Coast from Batavia. NA, Van Eck, 26, 63, 5 November 1759, Dumont to Van Eck. They even offered to organize a joint attack in Bengal, stressing the importance of secrecy, NA, Van Eck, 27, 16, 18 January 1760, Nicolas to Van Eck. and they wanted the VOC to bring French troops to Bengal from the Coast. 90 J.P. Lawford, Clive, Proconsul of India, A Biography (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1976). they had already unloaded an expeditionary force, so the next phase of the battle took place on land. A VOC detachment armed with cannon had been sent out from Chinsura, the VOC settlement in Bengal, in order to join up with the expedition force. On the way, this detachment ran across an English garrison, on which it launched a surprise attack.91 This created disorder in the English ranks, but they recovered and inflicted heavy losses on the VOC detachment, which was forced to return to Chinsura, leaving all its artillery behind.92 The next day, the English army targeted the expeditionary force. After this force had been cut off from sea, for four days it tried desperately to reach Chinsura ploughing along the muddy banks of the river. An English force was send out to tackle the expeditionary force head on. Consisting of 900 Europeans, 75 volunteer horsemen, 500 indigenous Cavalry and 2000 sepoys with four cannon, it far exceeded the VOC force of only 500 Europeans and 600 Malays without cannon, as the rendezvous with the artillery from Chinsura had failed. The English mounted their cannon and fired, which caused the majority of the Malays the VOC had brought along to flee and caused the defeat of the remaining soldiers. Four hundred troops were captured and 300 went over to the English, according to the Company because they felt they had been poorly led.93 Negotiations commenced and it was agreed that the captured ships would be returned, but it was also stipulated that from that time on the VOC was only allowed to quarter 120 soldiers in its compounds in Bengal. Apart from the humiliating military defeat, the VOC was forced to pay 16 lakhs of rupees to the Nawab, although it was later denied that any money had been paid.94 After its defeat by the EIC, the VOC hid behind the excuse that it had merely set out to embark on a conflict with the indigenous ruler. The Dutch were convinced Robert Clive should have acted more moderately, instead of pretending to be an auxiliary of the Nawab. Van Eck, at that time Governor of the Coromandel coast, claimed it was Clive who made war under this pretext and not the VOC. When the next year the English were 91 NA, Van Eck, 20, 432, 12 March 1760, Van Eck to De Jong. 92 NA, Van Eck, 20, 410, 21 January 1760, Van Eck to Schreuder. 93 NA, Van Eck, 20, 425, 5 March 1760, Van Eck to Van Teylingen and NA, Van Eck, 20, 432, 12 March 1760, Van Eck to De Jong. The basis of the English success was the firing of grape, to which the Dutch troops were unaccustomed and to which they were unable to reply as they had no artillery (As the rendezvous with the expedition from Chinsura had failed). 94 NA, Van Eck, 20, 410, 21 January 1760, Van Eck to Schreuder and NA, Van Eck, 20, 425, 5 March 1760, Van Eck to Van Teylingen. afraid that Batavia was planning another invasion, Van Eck quickly refuted this saying that Batavia had no such plan and would leave it to the Gentlemen Seventeen to negotiate a solution to the troubles in Bengal.95 The attack gave the English the opportunity to punish the VOC for its audacity. They denied it the right to trade freely in valuable goods. Its supply of saltpetre was strictly limited, leaving barely enough gun powder to fire salutes for foreign ships.96 In the long run, the Battle of Bedara woke the VOC to the realization that direct confrontation with English forces on land and at sea should be avoided. On the Coast things matters a different turn as the VOC did not seek open conflict with the English. While the VOC still squabbled with EIC over war-related issues,97 the French were devising schemes to force the Dutch into the Seven Years’ War. When the fortunes of war turned against the French, they sought a rapprochement with the VOC. The Dutch, however, were wary of French intentions and hinted that French behaviour in the past had introduced a coldness into their relationship.98 In a final effort, the French commander Lally planted letters supposedly exchanged between the French and the Dutch, containing incriminating information about the latter, which were discovered by the English. The Dutch were quick to deny the charges and repaid Lally for his trickery: they handed over a recent letter from Lally in which he scolded the VOC for not helping the French. In this letter, Lally labelled the non-existent help from the Dutch the main reason for the fall of the French nation in India. Other pretexts and ruses were devised to 95 NA, Van Eck, 20,414, 29 January 1760, Van Eck to Du Pré & Ross and NA, Van Eck, 20, 532, 15 September 1760, Van Eck to Sutton. 96 NA, Van Eck, 20,415, 29 January 1760, Van Eck to Van Teylingen and NA, Van Eck, 27, 5, 10 January 1760, Van Teylingen to Van Eck. 97 NA, Van Eck, 20, 590, 5 February 1761, Van Eck to Sutton and NA, Van Eck, 20, 716, 30 July 1763, Van Eck to Van der Parra. Being a neutral party in the Seven Years’ War also entailed receiving war­related requests. The English also ordered some of the prisoners-of-war from Pondicherry to go to Nagapatnam, but the VOC refused to let any Frenchmen into the city, since they had orders to not let them in because of Sadras and because there was no official English request to do so. 98 NA, Van Eck, 20, 289, 15 April 1759, Van Eck to Van Rheden and NA, Van Eck, 20, 260, 5 February 1759, Van Eck to Van der Parra. Their arrogant tone towards the VOC changed. Suddenly the opinion of the VOC counted again: the French commander Lally asked Van Eck to honour the friendship between the two nations by the installation of a new French Resident in Nagapatnam. The answer from the VOC was that it would no longer be a one-sided friendship, had the French side honoured it earlier. They had promised to return the fort in the state in which they had taken it, when the English threat to the fort had passed. When the siege of Madras collapsed, the French left in the middle of the night without notifying the VOC chief. NA, Van Eck, 27, 41, 18 February 1760, Mme Boyelleau to Van Eck. In 1760, during the siege of Pondicherry the French in their turn deposited their valuables with Van Eck. NA, Van Eck, 20, 590, 5 February 1761, Van Eck to Sutton and NA, Van Eck, 20, 716, 30 July 1763, Van Eck to Van der Parra. involve the VOC, as it stoutly maintained its neutrality. As the French saw their power on the Coast slipping away, they decided to raid Benkulen in Sumatra and succeeded in capturing it. Afterwards these possessions were offered for sale to the High Government in Batavia, which gently declined the offer.99 3.2 A failed design to emulate The indigenous civil strife and the Anglo-French struggles in India caused the employees to consider new strategies to safeguard the position of the VOC. As stated earlier, the primary aim of the expedition to Bengal was to reinforce Chinshura. Similarly, propositions were made to make the VOC position on the Coast more readily defensible, by stationing a larger garrison there. Caught up in wars elsewhere, the English and the French had focused on one single stronghold each on the Coast: Madras and Pondicherry respectively. The Dutch contemplated emulating the French and English and taking on board a similar strategy of having one stronghold which could be held against all costs, instead of the old policy of dividing resources between several small fortresses to stimulate trade.100 With a garrison of at least 1200 to 1500 European and 1000 Malay soldiers in Nagapatnam, Van Eck hoped to secure the VOC position by instilling respect in the native rulers and the other Europeans.101 When reinforcements finally arrived on the Coromandel Coast, they did not reach the requirements and they were, moreover, lost not long afterwards as a result of the expedition to Bengal. Focusing on one stronghold also meant augmenting the cost expended on fortifications so that it could withstand an attack by an European army.102 The importance of fortifying Nagapatnam was further championed by stressing its function as the gateway to Ceylon. There was however a problem in signalling the bad state of the 99 NA, Van Eck, 20, 488, 27 June 1760, Van Eck to Schreuder, NA, Van Eck, 20, 501, 24 July 1760, Van Eck to Van Teylingen and NA, Van Eck, 20, 592, 16 January 1761, Van Eck to Stevens. 100 NA, Van Eck, 26, 42, 25 Mai 1759, Cordua to Van Eck, such as Sadras, Bimelepatnam and Jagernaykpoeram.101 NA, Van Eck, 20, 260, 5 February 1759, Van Eck to Van der Parra. 102 NA, Van Eck, 20, 155, 8 October 1759, Van Eck to Mossel. defensive works of Nagapatnam. Nobody dared to write about the lamentable state of the fortifications because Governor-General Jacob Mossel was the last Govervor to have made reinforcements during his term of office on the Coast. Asking for repairs could be interpreted as suggesting he had not done his job adequately.103 Since the situation was alarming, Van Eck took a gamble by asking Mossel directly for funding to repair the fortifications. He estimated the costs at a ‘mere’ 670,000 pagodas, but later ran into trouble when he commenced construction too soon and at too great an expense without official authorization.104 In emulation of the English, the VOC expected that its increased military presence would be partly paid for by local income, but the idea of increasing the taxation on the local population proved illusionary. In Madras, the English had successfully instituted a tax on houses, but so far in Nagapatnam such amounts of tax had not been levied. The VOC tried to follow the English example and was successful initially in raising the taxes on the indigenous inhabitants, but soon these began to leave the village to escape the burden.105 In comparison with the success of the English raise in exacting taxes in Madras, the VOC had more trouble in convincing people of the benefits to be derived from such taxes. If the English had not done so, there was a high risk of Madras being destroyed again, but no such a threat was imminent in Nagapatnam, since the VOC scrupulously guarded its neutrality. Admittedly, simultaneously, the English garrison brought plenty of money and commercial opportunities to Madras, offsetting the increase in tax. 103 NA, Van Eck, 20, 278, 15 April 1759, Van Eck to Van der Parra and NA, Van Eck, 20, 289, 15 March 1759, Van Eck to Van Rheden. 104 NA, Van Eck, 20, 480, 6 June 1760, Van Eck to Mossel. NA, Van Eck, 20, 739, 25 April 1763, Van Eck to the High Government and NA, Van Eck, 20, 495, 17 July 1760, Van Eck to Van Teylingen and NA, Van Eck, 20, 554, 20 October 1760, Van Eck to Mossel. He thought he had obtained permission. However, later he was accused of having started constructions without permission as he was following his own plan instead of the plan sent from Batavia. He had reinforced parts of the fortress, although he reduced the cost to 250,000 pagodas. 105 NA, Panthaleon van Eck, 55, 34, 31 January 1760, Van der Parra to Van Eck. 3.3 Negotiating with indigenous rulers The relationship between the VOC and indigenous rulers sometimes verged on violence. Van Eck argued it was hard to continue the old policy of reasoning with the indigenous rulers and violence was the only alternative. ‘Let us cure ourselves of the misplaced illusion that we may win something from the rulers of the West through courtesy as in former days. It is violence or power they fear, that keeps them within the bounds of reasonableness and nothing else, certainly if we do not show our teeth, it will not be long before this will lead to the total ruin of the interests of the Company.’106 Troops were needed not just to repel the English and the French, but also to command the respect of indigenous rulers. At all times, it was normal in India to avert violence by bribes, which also proved a effective method of indirect taxation. Every time a local ruler needed money, he would physically move his army around his territory to collect. When the King of Tanjore arrived in the vicinity of Company territory, he asked for the usual gifts. The VOC decided to present him with these gifts, as had been done in the years 1753 and 1756, to a value of 300 to 400 pagodas. To a certain extent, this tax depended on his actual presence: if he was not physically present, subjects did not feel obliged to pay. This was also the case for the VOC. When Van Eck was summoned to pay tax by a local ruler, he prepared himself to see the ruler and pay. When he had arrived, the ruler had already left, which prompted Van Eck to decide that no tribute had to be paid. How often such a bribe had to be paid depended on the perceived power-relationship. When the Nawab of Bengal tried to obtain a bribe from the VOC again in 1758, this was related to his shrewd assessment of the weak position of the VOC throughout the whole of India.107 Prince Ananda Rasoe tried the same tactic on the Coromandel Coast, although the VOC had already paid the normal sum. He insisted on another 20,000 rupees, but the VOC declined, saying that there was no more room for expenses for the prince.108 At the same time, the relatively strong financial position of the VOC guaranteed independence and yet offered room to 106 NA, Van Eck, 20, 638, 24 May 1761, Van Eck to De Klerk. 107 NA, VOC, 20, 167, 8 August 1758, Van Eck to Van Rheden. 108 NA, Van Eck, 26, 58, 9 August 1759, Bronsveld to Van Eck. manoeuvre in dealings with indigenous rulers. The fact that indigenous rulers obtained loans from the VOC provided the VOC with leeway to negotiate more favourable trading privileges.109 When bargaining proved of no avail, the VOC considered violence an appropriate instrument by which to obtain trading privileges. The chief of Bimilipatnam, for example, was ordered to investigate if he could accede the local ruler to new trading concessions with a force of 500 to 600 soldiers. Of course, the costs of military intervention had to be transferred to others. The Company needed local allies who would pay for the military action and wanted to profit from the military might of the VOC. In return, the VOC would be granted new territories and sovereignty over the village.110 Conclusion Initially, the power of the VOC had been based on its initial large share capital and its profitable intra-Asian trade, which ensured it with a stronger economic and military position than its competitors. Later, the superiority of the VOC’s position in comparison to that of its competitors declined. This decline was attributable to unfavourable trade conditions and increasing European competition. Both developments, the decline in trade and rising costs, forced the Company to economize in order to survive, a policy which was continued until the end of the VOC era.111 Another factor which contributed to the change in the balance of power between the European Companies was the steadily increasing amount of military State support European competitors received. Unless it had received reinforcements from home on terms similar to those of the English, the VOC would never have been capable of competing militarily with the English.112 At 109 NA, Van Eck, 26, 61, 18 August 1759, Bronsveld to Van Eck. In Bimilipatnam, the VOC gave up parts of the territory outside of the city in order to claim the city as the property of the VOC, also promising the local ruler more gifts. This would have to outweigh the return on investment by higher taxations, which could mean the VOC did not lose any money on the agreement. 110 NA, Van Eck, 20, 321, 10 July 1759, Van Eck to Bronsveld. 111 ANRI, VOC, 4516, “So many regulations, stipulations and cutbacks have been made, that should people continue making such inroads, the tree they want to prune would consequently die.”112 ANRI, VOC, 4516, (..)absolutely no parallel can be made between us and the English and, should there be a breach of the peace, we can never hope for the requisite assistance from the Netherlands, because we shall be left wanting, and no possibility exists of obtaining or keeping such power in India (…) and (…) In the same time, the augmented power of its competitors forced the company to increase its military expenditure leading to increasing costs. The situation became critical during the fourth Anglo-Dutch Sea War (1780-1784).113 Although operating on a lower level of military and political involvement than its competitors, the Company assessed the potential gains from trade in India surpassed the potential gains from territorial expansion. Since the Company sought neutrality, its main aim was to uphold the old status quo. This was reflected in the way it dealt with the indigenous rulers on the Indian Sub-Continent. While the English and French became partners of the most powerful rulers, the Dutch never reached the same level of involvement and declined offers of co-operation with local rulers. The VOC still believed that the main aim of the Company was trade and that war was only a tool by which to obtain new trading privileges or to safeguard trade. The directors of the VOC believed that their competitors would have to come to terms with the war debt after the Seven Years’ War in Europe had ended. It was hoped that the English and French military efforts would be engulfed in the enormity of India. Nevertheless, the English and French chose territorial expansion in order to fuel their war efforts with an increasing income from tax. This difference in the home-support accorded European companies was also revealed in the behaviour of the servants. Having received reinforcement because of the wars in Europe, the English and French servants acted without worrying about the consequences of their warlike behaviour. They hoped to present the home country for a positive colonial ‘fait accompli’ before they could be recalled. When a battle was lost, they were certain the home country would bail them out or had already sent new troops. In search of territorial expansion and the fulfillment of their private ambitions, the French and English servants juggled dexterously with State and Company priorities. Without the the previous century we were able to maintain the balance with our competitors, but since at the least sign of rupture these competitors are immediately supported by a squadron of doughty ships of the line and other ships and frigates, I no longer believe in any concept of balance and consequently of offering any offensive power, unless we also are supported from Europe. (…). 113ANRI, VOC, 4581, It is known that in the last forty years during the succeeding reigns Governors-General Mossel, Van der Parra, Riemsdijk, De Klerk en Alting more than ever has been busy to obtain redress of the situation: In these times, several ‘memorien Bedenkingen en Consideratien’ have seen the light, in order to improve trade in general, especially to decrease the big turn over, and also to inquire within the high rising costs. power on hand in India to act offensively against the stronger indigenous powers, the VOC possessed neither the power to fight the other Europeans in India to which the Battle of Bedara bears witness. Even when Batavia was willing to send reinforcements, the VOC forces could not rival the newly established English power at sea or on land. The loss of initiative on the Dutch side is exemplified by the servants’ eagerness to emulate English and French tactics. The VOC had always preferred spreading its interests over trading possessions instead of limiting its presence to a few military strongholds. Squeezed by increasing political and military tension, the servants in India proposed a change of tactics, focusing on one big stronghold per region and an enlargement of its garrisons. Only with this new tactic could the Company hope to remain on a par with the French and the English. The complete lack of State support from the Republic and the declining intra-Asian trade, however, made all these plans uncertain. In the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War the lack of support from home was palpably felt and the VOC had to depend on the naval power of its French ally. When a State sponsored naval squadron from the Republic arrived after the war, it was too little too late. The debts incurred during the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War were already pushing the VOC to the brink of bankruptcy. In the shadow of the company : the VOC (Dutch East India Company)and its servants in the period of its decline (1740-1796) Nierstrasz, J.C. Citation Nierstrasz, J. C. (2008, November 5). In the shadow of the company : the VOC (Dutch East India Company) and its servants in the period of its decline (1740-1796). Retrieved from https://hdl.handle.net/1887/13267 Version: Not Applicable (or Unknown) License: Licence agreement concerning inclusion of doctoral thesis in the Institutional Repository of the University of Leiden Downloaded from: https://hdl.handle.net/1887/13267 Note: To cite this publication please use the final published version (if applicable). Chapter 2: Ceylon, a cinnamon paradise in jeopardy Introduction The VOC had sole access to several spice-producing islands in Asia which were considered the foundation of the Company’s prosperity. Although there were no European competitors present in these islands, after the VOC had lost its naval superiority,114 the VOC monopolies in these exceedingly prosperous areas of production were in potential jeopardy. In contrast to its situation on the Indian Sub-Continent, the complete hegemony of the Company over these islands gave it more time and power to react towards the mounting power and the insidious intrusions of its competitors.115 Although the Moluccas in the Indonesian Archipelago did not feel English infringement until 1780, Ceylon had already had to counter this new threat twenty years earlier. In the conflict with the king of Kandy, who already had been weakened by internal troubles in the island, for the first time the VOC also faced external challenge to its position. This was a new experience, because until that moment, the presence of the Company in Ceylon had to confront only internal challenges in the island, more specifically its relationship with its indigenous subjects and with the king of Kandy. Both the internal and external challenges converged in the resulting conflict. 1. Enforcing a monopoly The complexity of the Indian Sub-Continent in the eighteenth Century, compounded by its breakaway peripheries, and the commercial and military rivalries which seethed there, provides a real contrast to the less complicated situation on Ceylon. In the seventeenth 114 See Chapter 1 on the Battle of Bedara. 115 In the first chapter, we have seen how the Battle of Bedara (1759) had taught the VOC to avoid seeking any further direct military conflict with its European rivals. From that time the Company, when necessary, focused its military power on preserving its position in relation to the indigenous rulers. century, the VOC slowly had built up its power in the island and had steadily been able to obtain control over all trade to and from the island. The main reason spurring the Company to aspire to entrench itself in Ceylon in the seventeenth century was to achieve a monopoly on cinnamon. Other regions also produced cinnamon, but that from Ceylon was of superior quality, making it more suitable for shipping to Europe. Although the cinnamon trade to Europe was the main aim of the Company, the island possessed such other valuable commodities suitable for trade as areca nuts, elephants and pearls. The island itself was a market for the import of Indian textiles. In short, by conquering several coastal areas in Ceylon, the VOC obtained a monopoly on the best cinnamon plus new assets to add to its intra-Asian trade network. Apart from securing new trading concessions, it also wanted to gain a foothold in Ceylon at the cost of its mortal enemy: the Portuguese. Cannily, the VOC was not planning to tackle the Portuguese head on; instead, the official policy adopted after its arrival in the seventeenth century was to help the king of Kandy. This king was constantly at war with the Portuguese and provided a natural ally. On the arrival of a Dutch expedition in the island in 1638, a treaty was signed between the king of Kandy and the commander of the newly arrived Dutch forces. The balance of power quickly tipped to the detriment of the Portuguese. The expulsion of the Portuguese started when a small VOC fleet took Batticaloa and Trincomalee on the eastern coast of the island (1638). The alliance between the king and the Company completed the process of removing the Portuguese from the island with the capture of their last stronghold, Jaffna, in 1658.116 When the VOC had assured its position as the sole European power in the island, it pursued a monopoly position in trade by maintaining its territorial presence. After 1658, the king of Kandy and the Company were the only powers remaining in the island, but it was not long before relations between the former allies grew disturbed as they disagreed about the form the continuing Dutch presence should take. As was stipulated in his version of the treaty signed before the expulsion of the Portuguese, the king demanded the VOC return him the former Portuguese coastal fortifications it had conquered with his help. In the Dutch version of the treaty, however, there was no mention at all of returning 116 Lodewijk Wagenaar, Galle, VOC-vestiging in Ceylon, beschrijving van een koloniale samenleving aan de vooravond van de Singalese opstand tegen het Nederlandse gezag, 1760 ( De Bataafsche Leeuw: Amsterdam 1994), 13. any conquered fortifications. It was made clear that the Company was only planning to respond to this demand after the king had repaid the military expenses incurred in expelling the Portuguese. As discontent seethed, this conflict erupted into a war between the former allies which lasted almost forty years. A truce (1680) was established and, although they had not been victorious, the Dutch insisted on the possession of parts of the former Portuguese territories as a guarantee of the repayment of their war expenditure. Consequently, the Company retained most of the coastal forts as well as the districts along the south-western coast, plus the Jaffna Peninsula. Although the areas the Dutch acquired were smaller in size than the former Portuguese possessions, they were nevertheless the most fertile parts of the island.117 These forty years of warfare ensured the VOC of an exclusive trading presence in the island. The Company entrenched itself, since the king was not powerful enough to oust it without help from another European power. In the truce, the Company strongholds on the coast were diplomatically presented as essential to the defence of the king against his foreign enemies. It was stipulated that the VOC would remain in Ceylon until the king had paid off the costs made in removing the Portuguese and those incurred in protecting against an invasion by other potential enemies of the king in the future. Until that moment, the Company would retain its monopoly on cinnamon. In the final treaty (1680), the VOC insisted on a monopoly on the whole of the external trade of the island rather than just on the monopoly on cinnamon. This meant it obtained a stronghold on such valuable items such as areca nuts, elephants and pearls, although these were always cast in the shade compared to cinnamon. As the Dutch grew more confident of their local power, they argued that the lands of the Portuguese had never actually been in the possession of the king of Kandy, and as it was the Company which had conquered the lands from the Portuguese, the king did not have any legal claim to these territories. Although the new European power had been vague at first about its long-term intentions, this new position it adopted implied an indefinite stay. 117 Alicia Schrikker, Dutch and British Interventions in Sri Lanka, 1780-1815: Expansion and Reform (Brill: Leiden, 2007), 21. 1.1 Status quo With a monopoly on trade and only one indigenous ruler in the island, the VOC tried to bend the situation to its will. The king of Kandy was not in a position to question the Dutch presence and a situation of status quo which lasted almost a century gradually evolved. Without an income from trade, the king was deprived of the financial capacity to take military action against the Company. He held no income other than what he could tax from his farmers, and that while the most fertile farmlands lay in the VOC controlled areas. This absence of trading possibilities also delivered the Company the means to ensure the loyalty of the King, since it was in control of all goods and information he received from the outside world. For instance, it was fairly easy to cut him off from such coastal products as salt and to control his correspondence. The VOC aspired to attain control of all trade with the island, while the king simply wanted to be acknowledged as the supreme sovereign of the island. As sovereign, the king was certainly not completely powerless and had his ways to pressurize the company into giving in to his wishes. Chief among these was that the cinnamon growing in VOC territories was insufficient to fulfil the Company’s requirements, but in order to obtain cinnamon from the king´s territories, it needed to ask his permission. In return for the Company harvesting cinnamon in his territories, the king of Kandy demanded he be visited by a yearly embassy bearing gifts. The Company acquiesced in the demand for embassies, which became institutionalized from 1688.118 The annual Dutch embassy dispatched to the King contributed to his status. In Asian cultures, such gifts were, as we have seen in the chapter on India, perceived as a token that the giver accepted the sovereignty of the recipient and the king did not perceive it otherwise. This emerges more obviously, when we examine the symbolism involved in the annual royal ceremony, which was performed at a time when other subjects also brought gifts to honour the king. 119 The king would be seated on a dais raised above the heads of the VOC 118 Schrikker, Dutch and British Interventions, 37. 119 Tikiri Abeyasinghe, “Princes and Merchants: relations between the King of Kandy and the Dutch East India Company in Sri Lanka (1688-1740)”, In Sri Lanka Archives 2 (1984), 35-60. ambassadors, who had to kneel before him and were only allowed to speak when addressed by the king.120 As Europeans, the Dutch, took a different view of the sovereignty and gifts, seeing them as a necessary evil, essential to acquiring commercial profits. In order to obtain what they wanted –trade - they consented to participate in what they perceived to be the annual ‘charade’ of the embassy or to put it in the words of the High Government in Batavia; “(…) You have learned by experience that you will find the court no better disposed, than by flattering its grandeur and excellence, because without this, however distasteful in itself, we think it is almost impossible to obtain a satisfactory conclusion of 121 affairs, and since this is not expensive, it can be acquiesced in on all occasions (…)”. Officially, the only contract the Company acknowledged was the treaty of 1680. The VOC vociferously claimed it had built fortresses and maintained garrisons at the expense of the king’s treasury, but this was for his own protection. In return for the costs incurred during the war, plus the money lent to the King during same period, and the expense of maintaining a defence for the king, his Majesty rewarded the Company by granting trading concessions and the right to collect cinnamon from his domains. This puts the relationship in a more economic perspective.122 The VOC was in a position to determine its relationship with the king, but assiduously avoided open conflict in order to avoid damage to its commercial position. The Dutch were afraid that confronting the king would drive costs up, since he had a strong say in determining the harvest of cinnamon. The king’s power was reinforced even more by the influence he exerted on the special caste of cinnamon-peelers, who could be made to vanish at will to sabotage the harvest.123 Moreover, the king was not without prestige among the inhabitants of the VOC territories as well, as he was regarded as the religious leader of the island. This idea was reinforced by the revival of Buddhism by King Kitri Raja Sinha (1747-1782), when he reinstated the Sangha, the Buddhist monastic order, and renovated monasteries in an effort to revive popular Buddhism.124 By stirring up the religious fervour of the VOC subjects, the king wielded an instrument to 120 Wagenaar, Galle, 17-20 and Schrikker, Dutch and British colonial interventions, 37-38. 121 SLNA, VOC, 4931, 2, 14 April 1761, High Government to Van Eck. 122 SLNA, VOC, 4931, 2, 14 April 1761, High Government to Van Eck. 123 P.E. Pieris, Ceylon and the Hollanders, 1658-1796 (Tellipalai: American Ceylon Mission Press, 1918). 124 Wagenaar, Galle, 20. prevent the company from obtaining what it was desirous of acquiring: cinnamon. The situation of status quo was maintained as long as both parties were comfortable with the situation and did not attempt to initiate changes. The power of the king resulted in occasional undesirable troubles, which sparked off a discussion about whether the Company should try to establish full colonial control over the whole island instead of just controlling trade. In heated debates, the question of whether a more aggressive policy was warranted was raised. Rijckloff Van Goens senior (1660-1663 and 1664-1675), had already written to the High Government in Batavia before 1680 intimating that the Company had either to conquer the whole island and attract European settlers in order to exploit its full potential or limit itself to the cinnamon-producing regions. The VOC decided to limit itself to trade and eschew the path of conquest and colonization.125 In practice, this meant that although, the Company held territories in the south east and north of the island, it did not harbour plans to expand these possessions, nor did it nurture the ambition to usurp the king’s power. The continuing preference for trade over colonization was in line with the strategy of a trading company and calculated costs against potential investments and benefits. The Directors thought that the costs of a military confrontation or colonial control would not surpass the benefits, at least as long as the existing status quo could be maintained. This idea was supported ideologically by the conclusion that the wars between the Portuguese and Kandy before the Dutch arrived in the island had been not only costly in financial terms, but also in terms of lives. The king had succeeded in inflicting great losses on the Portuguese, partly aided by natural circumstances. Such obstacles as impenetrable forests and untraversable mountains meant that pursuing war in the king’s territories was a very difficult undertaking.126 Indeed, it had been an unsuccessful attempt by the Portuguese to invade successfully Kandy which had caused the Company to intervene successfully, ousting the Portuguese with the help of the Kandyans. The Company did not wish to fall victim to such a situation itself and was careful not to be caught in the same trap as the Portuguese, thereby avoiding conflict with the king. As long as the status quo was maintained, this was deemed the best and the most profitable policy. 125 Schrikker, Dutch and British Interventions, 22.126 NA, Van Eck, 33, 5, 10 June 1761, De Klerk to Van Eck. 2. Estrangement and conflict The status quo was perceived to be the most profitable way to ensure the transportation of the cinnamon to Europe, but had unforeseen, or probably simply ignored, long-term consequences. In the eighteenth century different Governors, just as was Van Goens earlier, were dubious about the policy and considered in the long run it would prove unsustainable: they did not want to have to beg the king for cinnamon. With Batavia standing firm on a monopoly on trade and in view of the king’s ‘misconceptions’ (the king decided that the VOC should be grateful it was allowed to harvest cinnamon in his territories)127 Van Imhoff, at that time Governor of Ceylon (1736-1739), was confident that the outcome of any conflict would always be in the favour of the Company.128 The reforms Van Imhoff wanted to institute during his term of office were along the same lines as the plans Van Goens had once devised. According to Van Imhoff, one swift military action designed to conquer Kandy would end the power of the king over the supply of cinnamon. His plan was not approved by Batavia, so he proposed to upset the status quo by granting the king trading privileges in a bid to create a bond of mutual interest to serve as a basis for further negotiation, but this was again rejected. The divergence in perspective between the king and the Dutch was not considered to be a problem as long as the status quo continued. Nevertheless, in the middle of the eighteenth century short-term problems remorselessly exposed the differences and simultaneously a new, menacing external threat loomed on the horizon. The seeds of conflict sprouted as much internally within the territories of the king as externally in those of the VOC. In Kandy, many of the problems besetting the king had their roots in the fact that he was a foreigner and had been summoned from Madurai on the Malabar Coast by the Sinhalese nobles when the old Sinhalese monastic dynasty became extinct. When he acceded to the throne, the new king had employed his own 127 SLNA, VOC, 4930, 7, 2 May 1761, Schreuder to Van Eck. 128 Sinnappah Arasaratnam, “Baron van Imhoff and Dutch Policy in Ceylon” , bijdragen tot de taal-. Land- en volkenkunde, 1962 (118), 454-468. circle of relatives in the power structure, bypassing the older established, now consequently begrudging Sinhalese nobles. In his conflict with these Sinhalese nobles, the king was not convinced that the VOC was not rousing its weight strongly enough to support him. Internally, he tried to balance his loss of influence with the Sinhalese nobility by enlarging his influence among his ordinary subjects by patronizing Buddhist religion. Paradoxically one side-effect of this policy was that the Sinhalese VOC subjects began to see the King’s religious authority as a substitute for the power of the VOC. Unquestionably the king’s policy of promoting Buddhism among his subjects was successful in garnering their regard, but ultimately it led to a deeper estrangement from the Sinhalese nobles. The Sinhalese nobles and Buddhist monks each attempted to appropriate religious fervour as a shield to protect their own positions. The king failed to temper the criticism in his own circle and consequently his position grew precarious. There was even an assassination attempt plotted by the most powerful noblemen of Sinhalese origin. Tragically for the king, the conspirators found ready allies among the Buddhist priests from Siam whom the king had recently brought to the island in order to stimulate Buddhism among his subjects through their reforms. This party planned to attempt to murder the king and to install a Siamese prince, who had been brought along with them, as the new king. They set a trap by digging a hole under the king’s throne and filled the hole with sharpened wooden stakes. Just as the king was about to sit down and fall through the textiles covering the throne, the plot was discovered when the King pulled back these draperies and saw the hole. Several noblemen were put to death and the Siamese prince was departed. After the failed coup, tension between the VOC and the king mounted. Having no means to rid himself of the Siamese prince, the king handed him over to the Dutch at Trincomale, asking them to banish him. Unaware of the attempted coup, the local employees responded that the VOC was an ally of the king of Siam and therefore refused to remove the prince from the island against his will. This displeased the king, who roundly stated that he was more important to the VOC than the Siamese king. 129 Governor Jan Schreuder later apologized, referring to the incident as a mistake in translation and stating that the VOC had not been aware of the crimes the prince had 129 SLNA, VOC, 4930, 9, 26 January 1761, Schreuder to King of Kandy. committed against the king. This excuse was not accepted and the incident fuelled the king’s belief that the VOC had been involved in the assassination attempt, lending the plotters its support. This unjustified accusation was aggravated by some more minor issues.130 The conflicts with the king assumed even larger dimensions when the cinnamon policy of the VOC caused its alienation from and incited conflict with its own subjects in the island. Never for a moment did the Dutch lose sight of commerce, even in their obligation to govern justly. In the coastal regions it would be fair to say that the VOC relatively neglected its governmental tasks, preferring to keep the profits from cinnamon on a high level. To spare expenses, its aim was to limit its governmental involvement in its territorial possessions on the South-western coast of Ceylon to a minimum. Owing to the long period of peace, the population grew, partly because of an increased number of births, but also partly because of the return of people who had fled before 1680. The growth in the population in the lowlands of south-western Ceylon was disadvantageous to the VOC, because larger tracts of land had to be brought under cultivation. In order to meet the growing demand for food, the cinnamon which only grew in the wild had to be replaced by food crops. As its cinnamon acreage shrank the VOC was made even more dependent on the cinnamon from the king’s territories. Inevitably, this lead to a tension between commercial priorities and governmental commitments but, given that ultimately the strategic decisions were made in Batavia and the Republic and not in Ceylon itself, the problem was resolved in favour of the cinnamon.131 This alienation from and conflict with local subjects was palpable at different levels of society. Often these problems had been smouldering for a long time. The greatest stumbling-block was that most inhabitants did not profit from the trade in cinnamon, so these cinnamon trees were the least of their worries, they preferred growing 130 SLNA, VOC, 4930, 9, 26 January 1761, Schreuder to King of Kandy. for instance when the VOC had not responded to the request to rescind the banishment of Leander de Saram, a ‘modliaar’ or lower ranking nobleman, who had displeased the VOC. The king questioned the swiftness of this overhasty judgement against Leander de Saram, as this had only taken two to three days. This was considered excessively short for a man of high birth, as the conviction of a murderer usually took fifteen days to a month. The King wanted him to live in the Company’s territories in or out of the service of the VOC. Schreuder said he did not understand why the king was so interested in a servant of the VOC and that, in future, people committing crimes similar to De Saram’s would be condemned to death.131 D.A. Kotelawelle, “Agrarian policies of the Dutch in South-West Ceylon, 1743-1767”, In AAG Brijdagen 14, (1967), 20-23. fruit trees which yielded them both nutritional and economic benefits. Since the VOC was focussed on cinnamon trees and their concomitant profit, it often ordered that these fruit trees be cut down. A second problem was that the desire of the VOC to protect cinnamon trees often conflicted with local customs. For instance, the fertilisation of land by practising swidden agriculture, a local custom since time immemorial, was forbidden, because such drastic methods would inevitably kill all the young cinnamon trees. Yet another bone of contention was that the VOC policy was enforced locally by indigenous leaders, but since a village had various leaders, the imposition of this blanket, unnuanced policy led to conflicting authorities and outbursts of violence. This situation was aggravated by the privileged position held by the Chaliassen or the caste of the cinnamon-peelers. Assured of the VOC’s protection, they abused their position and terrorized the other inhabitants. The tension between castes mounted to a higher pitch, when other high castes were forced to do the work of lower castes, such as transporting cinnamon, wood and lime.132 Apart from these chronic problems, just at the time the rebellion erupted, new rules had been introduced. A new policy of licensing the collection of taxes on rice to third parties led to an estrangement between the VOC and its subjects, the new taxes were considered not only too exacting, but even unlawful. The VOC ignored the warning signs emitting from the population and declined to seek, let alone offer any solution; the inevitable outcome was an outbreak of violence. In another unremitting struggle, the king sought for trading concessions in return for granting his permission to peel cinnamon in the royal territories. Every now and then, the Governor forwarded the king’s requests for trading privileges to the High Government in Batavia, which deferred the matter to the Directors in the Republic. The request was normally returned with a negative answer.133 In 1761 Governor Schreuder (1756-1761) indicated to Batavia that another rejection of the request had displeased the king. The additional gifts with a value of ƒ24,000 offered to console him were refused.134 The King later acknowledged that “the Dutch, who had been settled upon this island for many years, had till recently behaved themselves well towards the King, and complied with whatever he had recommended to them, That within this Year and a half or 2 Years 132 SLNA, VOC, 4931, 2, 14 May 1761, High Government to Van Eck. 133 Wagenaar, Galle, 18-19.134 SLNA, VOC, 4930, 7, 2 May 1761, Schreuder to Van Eck. they had observed a very different conduct, and shown no regard to the King’s orders or Advice; whereupon he had commenced a War against them, and sent his armies by Land to punish them, which he was sufficiently able to do.” 135 2.1 Negotiating internal conflict When rebellion did eventually break out against the VOC, for political reasons the Company publicly denied the king’s involvement.136 This prevented the Dutch from having to address the mounting problems structurally. The rebellion was ascribed by Governor Schreuder to a group of troublemakers, who were well known to the VOC. The inhabitants of the VOC territories had been urged by these rebels to unite under the authority of the king. Those who failed to rally to the cause would be demoted to the lowest caste.137 Schreuder stated that fear was the only reason so many people supported the claims of the rebels.138 A number of the inhabitants turned to the Governor for protection, while the other inhabitants were forced to join the rebels because of threats, arson, murder and other sorts of violence.139 The king secretly supported the rebellion, but denied any official connection. In reality, the king was actually merely profiting from discontent instead of instigating it. Asserting his assumed sovereignty over VOC territory, he announced that a royal investigation into the complaints against the Company would be appropriate. Although the king had not openly declared himself to be on the side of the rebels, several members of the Kandyan court were indeed to be among their ranks, vitiating any denial of the king’s involvement. Despite the evident problems, the VOC was not prepared to declare war on the king and tried to solve the crisis through negotiations. The High Government was reluctant to move against the king and ordered that the policy of conciliation be maintained, that the servants in Ceylon act defensively and the king be indulged by 135 R. Raven-Hart, The Pybus embassy to Kandy, 1762 (Colombo: Government Press, 1958), 64. 136 NA, Van Eck, 20, 604, 12 March 1761, Van Eck to Schreuder. 137 SLNA, VOC, 4930, 9, 26 January 1761, Schreuder to King of Kandy. 138 SLNA, VOC, 4930, 9, 26 January 1761, Schreuder to King of Kandy. 139 SLNA, VOC, 4930, 10, 28 February 1761, Schreuder to King of Kandy. giving into his demands.140 As Reinier de Klerk, member of the High Government, put it: The lasting presence of the Company should be sought mainly in securing a good harmony between the King and the Company; such a relationship would mean the VOC need not fear the intrusion of any foreign power. This would require the VOC relinquish financial benefits, although it has been noticed that in this respect the Malabar Kings are very different from the Sinhalese Kings, in wanting everything from the other, which the VOC has had to refuse. ” 141 The solution to the rebellion proposed by the High Government was to negotiate a larger share in trade for the king. The rebellion was already costing too much, and making concessions and re-establishing trade was considered the cheaper alternative. Therefore, Schreuder was given permission to offer the king half of the profits the VOC made on the trade in areca nuts and elephants; which it was calculated would amount to 25 to 30,000 rds. a year. In return, the Company wanted a free rein to peel cinnamon in the king’s territories and the right to transport elephants through the king’s domains. If the king disagreed, a further concession could be made. The king could be given the right to send a ship to the Coromandel Coast every year, on the condition that the Company had the right to search its cargo for cinnamon. If all this failed to achieve the desired result, Schreuder had to protect the cinnamon­producing areas and press for peace by cutting the king off from the salt from the coast, which was the only source of supply of this indispensable mineral for the inhabitants. Schreuder however was unable to transmit the message as the king of Kandy stonily ignored his letters. The Company was bent on pursuing a policy of charming the king and alleviating the strain caused by its top-heavy, trade-focused policy. By instituting reforms, the VOC wanted to show it took the inhabitants’ complaints about its policy to heart. Taxes were lowered, hence forward only the old services and the old taxes would be demanded. The tax on seeds was abolished and the taxes were no longer collected by tax-farmers, but as had been the custom in the old days, directly by the officials of the Company. The villagers were to receive protection against violence perpetrated by the Chaliassen, the cinnamon-peelers, and the higher castes would no longer be forced to turn their hands to 140 NA, Van Eck, 20, 604, 12 March 1761, Van Eck to Schreuder. 141 NA, Van Eck , 33, 5, 10 June 1761, De Klerk to Van Eck. manual labour. 142 The VOC promised to stop cutting down fruit trees. When it was all said and done, this measure had never resulted in any increase in the harvest of cinnamon. The Company made sure orchards of fruit trees were established under the supervision of the chiefs. The slash-and-burn agriculture was tolerated if carried out under supervision of the chief of the village in order to avoid damage to cinnamon trees. It was admitted that regulations for the protection of cinnamon trees had been implemented too harshly and too chaotically. Finally, the inefficiency created by over-government was cut down by stipulating that every village or gamme, was to be ruled by one chief or vidaan, thereby excising the extraneous bureaucracy.143 For the first time, the VOC considered the establishment of cinnamon plantations, although these would only be introduced after 1780. 144 The idea was to have special cinnamon plantations, which would obviate conflicts between the VOC cinnamon policy and indigenous farmers. Despite the best efforts of the Company, the king was not inclined to negotiate and the VOC was forced to search for other ways to re-establish contact. Since communication with the king was non-existent, the king’s uncle in Nagapatnam was offered 5,000 pagodas for his help in building bridges.145 It was deemed perplexing to make promises to the king, since he was said never to have voiced complaints. In the meantime, Batavia realized the animosity between Schreuder and the king might actually pose an obstacle to negotiations and decided to recall the former to Batavia. The official reason given for his recall was that when an oriental ruler took a dislike to a employee on personal grounds, the situation was untenable. This is illustrated by the fact that the king refused to hear, let alone answer, Schreuder’s pleas. The High Government in Batavia attributed the behaviour of the king to personal animosity felt towards Schreuder146 and stated that Schreuder had offered his resignation, although he denied this.147 142 SLNA, VOC, 4931, 2, 14 April 1761, High Government to Van Eck and SLNA, VOC, 4930, 10, 28 February 1761, Schreuder to King of Kandy. 143 SLNA, VOC, 2231, to Van Eck. 144 Kotelawelle, “Agrarian policies”, 24-25. 145 SLNA, VOC, 4930, 7, 2 May 1761, Schreuder to Van Eck and 10, 26 January 1761, Schreuder to King of Kandy. 146 SLNA, VOC, 4931, 2, 14 April 1761, High Government to Van Eck and SLNA, VOC, 4930, 10, 28 February 1761, Schreuder to King of Kandy. 147 SLNA, VOC, 4931, 1, 9 june 1761, High Government to Van Eck and Schreuder. Servants were often given orders which dovetailed what the VOC desired and it was the servant’s own responsibility to make these desires a reality with the resources put at his disposal. The Company often attributed success or failure to the performance of individual servants, while in actual fact the servants were the inescapable victims of having to follow orders. Since Schreuder never acted in any way offensively towards the king, he is sometimes depicted as having been blinded by a policy of appeasement and therefore unable to cope with the situation.148 From his personal correspondence, we learn that Schreuder was forced to acquiesce in the Company’s peace strategy. Personally, he clearly harboured military ambitions, but he did not have the reinforcements necessary to pursue such a policy. The minute the king’s involvement with the rebels became undeniable, Van Eck privately voiced his opinion to Schreuder that it was time to act. Schreuder agreed, but replied he was hampered by orders from Batavia which left him no option but to negotiate. The Directors in the Republic were the people, who determined the degree of conflict as it was they who decided upon the military reinforcements made available. If Schreuder had wanted to use military force, he could only have done so with reinforcements from either Batavia or the Republic. Batavia simply did not have the capacity to supply the reinforcements needed as it was struggling itself to keep its soldiers alive as they showed a marked propensity to succumb to malaria.149 Therefore real reinforcements depended on the supply from the Republic. At the beginning of 1761, Schreuder complained about receiving only 200 men as reinforcements from Batavia. The troops arriving from Europe in 1760 were normal replacements and in 1761 only 200 of the promised 300 soldiers arrived in Ceylon. The others had died or fallen ill and had been left behind at the Cape. Even so, Schreuder’s position improved slightly after receiving 145 European and 312 Asian soldiers and some French officers from the Coromandel Coast.150 148 J.H.O. Paulusz, secret minutes of the Dutch Political Council, 1762 (Colombo: Government Press, 1954), 6.149 P.H. van den Burg, Malaria and Malaise. De VOC in Batavia in de achttiende eeuw (Amsterdam; De Bataafsche Leeuw, 1994). 150 NA, Van Eck, 20, 604, 12 March 1761, Van Eck to Schreuder and SLNA, VOC, 4930, 6, 25 March 1761, Schreuder aan Van Eck, “(…) We are obliged for your very willing assistance in supplying 145 European and 312 Eastern soldiers, who have already arrived for support. From our side, we shall not abstain from returning your troops the moment this is possible.(…).” And NA, Van Eck, 20, 638, 24 May When a servant was too assertive in proposing an alternative strategy, this was interpreted by Batavia as admitting failure. Schreuder complied with his orders from Batavia but kept the possibility of a frank dialogue with the king open. When he requested more room to take military action to quell the rebellion, the High Government interpreted this as a request to be relieved, because he was unable to maintain peace in the manner the High Government desired. Batavia hoped that a new Governor would be able to re-establish contact with the king and resolve the conflict peacefully. Only two candidates were considered capable of handling the crisis. The first was dexterously, Casparus de Jong, Governor of the Malabar Coast, who had just been granted permission to return to the Republic.151 Consequently, the second candidate, Van Eck, was selected. According to the High Government Van Eck was known for his “notorious indulgence of the indigenous people, his generosity, and for his principles devoid of personal interest. It was hoped that he could make peace with the King”.152 It was expected he would accept his new job “willingly and cheerfully”.153 The High Government assessed why its orders had not been complied with and sought a man with a personality deemed best suited to its predetermined policy. The virtues the High Government attributed to Van Eck were a projection of the kinds of policies the Company wanted him to pursue. In actual fact, Van Eck held completely different views on the conflict to those which the High Government hoped or assumed he had. When Van Eck took over, he, as Schreuder had, felt trapped in a dilemma between Company demands that the former situation be restored, perhaps gaining some advantages on the one hand, and the lack of support for a more aggressive policy on the other.154 Reconciliation was still considered the best policy, but Van Eck personally deplored his forced indulgence towards an enemy which had dragged the VOC into such 1761, Van Eck to De Klerk, SLNA, VOC, 4930, 1, 16 January 1761, Schreuder to Van Eck and 6, 25 March 1761, High Government to Council of Ceylon. 151 NA, Hope, 88, 29 May 1761, secret resolution. 152 SLNA, VOC, 4931, 1, 9 June 1761, High Government to Van Eck and Schreuder, (…) To select his honorable successor, as we shall now appoint, the Governor of the Coromandel Coast Lubbert Jan van Eck, proven by the commission bestowed on His Honour, with confidence that His Honour will take upon him this burden not only cheerfully and willingly, but also will be able to manage with his acknowledged benignity and his desinterested and generous principles towards the indigenous people to achieve the peace and so greatly desired with the king of the lands and the very alienate subjects of the Company.(…).153 SLNA, VOC, 4931, 1, 9 June 1761, High Government to Van Eck. 154 NA, Van Eck,20, 721, 21 March 1761, Van Eck to Samlandt. an unreasonable and murderous conflict. The High Government had over-estimated the power of the king and left to face the consequences Van Eck thought the official policy was erroneous: “Because the indigenous people have such a disposition that when they perceive that people fear and ponder to them, they degenerate from bad to worse”. He balanced that the VOC would be better off forcing the king of Kandy to surrender, and he was convinced that this would gain the Company the respect of the neighbouring indigenous rulers too.155 Van Eck’s plan was to try and persuade the king to contemplate peace, but to be ready for an armed conflict if this failed.156 2.2 Increasing pressure on the king With its change of governor, the High Government in Batavia at least acknowledged the crisis by installing a Secret Council to monitor the situation. As this was close by, capable of judging the situation in the strictest secrecy, quick decisions could be reached and drastic measures taken when the Company’s position in the island was in jeopardy, with a limited risk of secret orders leaking out either to the public or the enemy.157 A small alteration in the official policy came with a change in Governor-General, after which the High Government was more inclined to resort to arms to solve the conflict.158 Shortly after Van der Parra (1761-1775) took over, Van Eck thanked him for sending a ‘more liberal designation’ towards resolving the conflict by military force. It was considered only a minor change and Van Eck reassured Van der Para he would 155 NA, Van Eck, 20, 693, 8 September 1761, Van Eck to Van der Parra. 156 NA, Van Eck 20, 693, 8 September 1761, Van Eck to Van der Parra and NA, Van Eck 20, 694, 8 September 1761, Van Eck to De Klerk.157 SLNA, VOC, 4875, 5, Van Eck to Van der Parra. (…) The Secret Committee consisted of the meest ervaren en getrouwste employees, Van Eck at first appointed, Hoofd-administrateur De Lij, Major Bisschoff, Hugonis, the secretary of police Hugonis as secretary, and as clerk, the sworn clerk of police, Muller. Houting, Commander of the Naval Power of the VOC in Asia, was sent to help him, indicating the naval dimension of the conflict. 158 Governor-General Mossel died in 1762 and A. Van der Parra (1762-1775) was elected as his successor. In Batavia, the High Government had always acquiesced in Mossel’s preference for peace. In the last resolution on Ceylon under Mossel’s ruler, his successor, Van der Parra, for the first time stated that the VOC had to adopt violent measures if the pursuit of peace was unsuccessful. still opt for compromise rather than war.159 The greater liberty of action was seen as a tool by which to respond more swiftly to possible attacks by the king. The VOC could not ignore the rebellion as it was imperative to restore peace in order to obtain cinnamon for trade. When there were signs that the rebellion had begun to subside, Van Eck tried to damage the king’s authority in the Company possessions and to restore Company rule by military means. If action was to be taken against the king’s territory, it was necessary to ensure the VOC districts were pacified first and to alienate the inhabitants there from the king. By order of the High Government, the inhabitants of the Galle Corle and Matura districts were promised fair treatment on their return under the authority of the Company. Those who obeyed this order were exempt from tax contributions for a period of five years and were promised a remuneration if they provided commercial and military goods.160 In 1762 the regions where the revolution had originated had been brought back under VOC control.161 In the Jaffna area, the chiefs were surveyed and forced to declare themselves vassals or subjects of the Company in order to prevent them from going over to the side of the king.162 After restoring order in the VOC regions, the Company carried the war into the territories of the king. VOC detachments started making incursions into Colonna and the Mendez Corle as well as into Oeva (provinces on the king’s eastern flank).163 This tactic proved successful thanks to the collaboration of indigenous chiefs, who were afterwards rewarded for their co-operation.164 Several Sinhalese nobles were willing to change sides too.165 When sallies were made against the rebels it was publicly stated that submission to VOC rule meant that no harm would come to them. In the event of resistance, the 159 NA, Van Eck, 20, 719, 15 March 1762, Van Eck to Van der Parra. 160 SLNA, VOC, 4873, 1, 6 August 1762, High Government to Van Eck, (…) In the meantime, Your Honour will have to assure all the inhabitants of the Gale Corle and those of the Matura district, in the ola already mentioned, through all channels of all reasonable and fair treatment, and to warn the first­mentioned particularly, not to answer to any degree the tempting solicitations of the Matura Command and the Adigar over the king’s people. Also, you will have to contribute according to your means in encouraging the people of the Colombo, Gale, Matura districts, to distance themselves from the king and to come to our side, under a final assurance, that Your Honour will spare those who will heed the call within a certain amount of time, for the next five years from paying obligatory contributions, money and goods, and that during this time the funds inevitably needed will be paid for to the suppliers by the Company (…). 161 NA, Van Eck, 20, 742, 29 April 1763, Van Eck to Van der Parra, the fortresses of Catoene, Hakman and Tengale had been reconquered and were firmly in the hands of the VOC.162 SNLA, VOC, 4873, 1, 6 August 1762, High Government to Van Eck. 163 NA, Van Eck, 20, 742, 29 April 1763, Van Eck to Van der Parra. 164 NA, Van Eck, 20, 755, 8 July 1763, Van Eck to unkown. 165 NA, Van Eck, 20, 719, 15 March 1763, Van Eck to Van der Parra. Company threatened massacre. Fighting on enemy territory was expected to fuel discontent towards the king and, in fact, this assumption proved partially correct. When one of the Dutch detachments reached the Caimelle river, on the border of the king’s territories, it was helped to cross this stream by the subjects of the king and fifteen villages showed up to register their support.166 This was also palpable evidence that the indigenous farmers were pragmatic in the way they dealt with the conflict. When war threatened their own homes, the Kandyans sought for peace on the same terms as those before the rebellion. In 1763 the Company maintained its momentum and ignored a royal embassy’s plea for peace when it demanded the return of Puttalam and Chialouw. 167 In further negotiations, the promise of an answer from the High Government within three months pleased the Kandyans. They considered the peace already signed and opened their borders, allowing the peelers access to the cinnamon trees in the king’s territories. Such products as areca nuts, coffee and pepper were brought to the warehouses again.168 At the same time, ambassadors from the king tried to assess if the VOC was preparing to attack Kandy, attempts interpreted by the servants as prompted by fear.169 Van Eck had to wait for the High Government to decide on a policy for Ceylon: should the Company accept the proposal of the King to return to the previous agreement or should a more advantageous peace be insisted upon?170 Van Eck himself had no doubt that the war would continue, since the king refused to contemplate any compensation for the damage he had caused. Given that Batavia was not able to supply troops, the ultimate decision in favour of war lay in the Republic. 2.3 External factors From the beginning it had been clear the King needed outside help to defeat the Company. Consequently the Company strove with might and main to keep external influence at bay. The High Government was aware that negotiations between the king of 166 SLNA, VOC, 4864, 1, 2 December 1762, Resolution by the Council of Ceylon. 167 NA, Van Eck, 20, 727, 20 March 1763, Van Eck to Weyerman. 168 NA, Van Eck, 20, 746, 27 May 1763, Van Eck to Van Teylingen. 169 NA, Van Eck, 20, 751, 10 June 1763, Van Eck to Van der Parra. 170 NA, Van Eck, 20, 742, 29 April 1763, Van Eck to Van der Parra. Kandy, the king of Tanjore and the nawab of the Carnatika, two of the more powerful indigenous rulers on the Coromandel Coast, had been unsuccessful.171 The nawab had refused to come to the aid of the king of Kandy, explaining that to aid the Kandy ruler was really below his dignity – since the new Dravidian ruler [the king of Kandy] was merely an aldear, or country gentleman, from Madurai.172 During the rebellion, the Company sent an expeditionary force to the other side of the Pambe channel. The theuver, an Indian king of lesser stature on the other side of Adam’s Bridge, had seized opportunity to cast envious eyes at the island of Pambe. VOC intelligence claimed the theuver was even prepared to supply the uncle of the king of Kandy with 6000 men and send them over to Ceylon.173 Later, it became clear that the theuver had intended this army to fight against Tanjore.174 The communication of the king of Kandy with these Indian rulers aroused the VOC suspicions about the King’s professed desire for peace, which in its eyes was not genuine and no more than a ploy to buy time to negotiate outside help.175 The Company wanted to prevent foreign support for the King and prepared itself militarily by occupying strategic positions. In order to counter the Indian threat, occupation of the strategically situated island of Pambe was considered, even though an earlier occupation under Van Imhoff had been a disaster because of extraordinarily unhealthy living conditions. This was partly solved in 1763 by sending indigenous soldiers, who were considered more resistant. Finally, the problem was completely solved when the expansionist theuver died soon afterwards and was succeeded by an infant son; under these circumstances peace returned. Soldiers were sent to force the theuver to hand Pambe over to the Dutch under the pretext of war-reparations. The troops were recalled in 1765 as the Company had conquered Puttalam in 1763 and could prevent any attempt to cross from India from there.176 If the theuver harboured any fresh plans towards the island, however, new troops could be dispatched quickly. 171 SLNA, VOC, 4930, 6, 25 March 1761, High Government to Council of Ceylon. 172 Winius, Merchant-warrior pacified, 137.173 NA, Van Eck, 20, 742, 29 April 1763, Van Eck to Van der Parra. 174 NA, Van Eck, 20, 751, 10 June 1763, Van Eck to Van der Parra. 175 NA, Van Eck, 20, 742, 29 April 1763, Van Eck to Van der Parra. 176 SLNA, VOC, 4938, 18, 25 February 1764, Van Eck to Secret Council. Until the middle of the eighteenth century, the Company had always possessed sufficient sea power to ward off any outsiders and the question of sovereignty over the island played only a minor role. From the time of the Seven Years’ War, the English not only became the predominant power on the Coromandel Coast, they also literally ruled the waves. This was partly because the Royal Navy sent warships out to India to help the English against the French. The Company never at any time received similar support from its home country, nor was it equipped to fight the larger English warships. Initially, the VOC remained unaware of the potential magnitude of the new English threat to its position in Ceylon. The Company thought it was safe from English intrusion, because the latter were still too preoccupied in Bengal and with an expedition to Mauritius which eventually turned out badly.177 When the king’s advance was halted, he realized it was impossible to oust the VOC from the heavily fortified, sea-supplied strongholds of Colombo and Galle on his own. To get rid of the Dutch, he needed European help.178 The reason the King had avoided contact with the Company for a long time was his hope of an alliance with the English. The king had sent messengers to the English inviting them to court to discuss the possibility of help. The Company was aware that these Kandyan messengers had been sent to the Coromandel Coast, and ordered that a close watch be kept on the king’s uncle in Nagapatnam. The same precautions had been taken in the case of two EIC servants who were active in Madurai, since contact between Ceylon and Madurai was easy. The king succeeded in handing a letter over to an English ship from Malabar passing off Matara.179 When the extent of the imminent external involvement in Ceylon dawned on the Company, it decided to pursue a more aggressive policy. Although the Dutch were not unaware of a possible threat from the English, at first they had been ignorant of the English embassy to the king. This embassy under the leadership of Pybus, member of the Council of Madras, commenced badly.180 After a couple of days a new meeting was set 177 NA, Van Eck, 20, 719, 15 March 1763, Van Eck to Van der Parra. 178 NA, Van Eck, 20, 694, 8 September 1761, Van Eck to De Klerk. 179 NA, Van Eck, 20, 636, 21 May 1761, Van Eck to Mossel. 180 Raven-Hart, Pybus, 54-60. Pybus was told to kneel in front of the king in order to hand him his letter. Refusing, he was forced to comply, only complaining afterwards about the treatment. Raven-Hart, Pybus, 60-61. He continuously stressed he came on different terms from those of the Dutch, as he had been invited by the king. He told the king the English would never comply with the ceremonies, but was still promised a new meeting with the king in two or three days. up and the English were asked how they were prepared to assist the king against the Dutch. Although Pybus indicated he was powerless to promise or actually engage anything, he had demonstrated the EIC was inclined to enter into an alliance. He raised the matter of the privileges the king would be willing to grant them in return.181 In the next meeting, Pybus stated that the English should be allowed the same privileges of Trade, in every Respect as the Dutch enjoyed.182 Later, he stated the costs of any future war would have to be borne by the king. In the end, the alliance proved fruitless, because the English insisted on the same rights as the Dutch. Entering into an alliance with the English would have just meant trading one European power for another. Retorting, the VOC explained that in comparison to its policy of peace, the king had nothing to expect from the English.183 The VOC was temporarily saved from the English threat because of the excessive demands the latter made and because of geopolitical reasons. When the Dutch found out about the English plans, the EIC was directly confronted with its alleged intrusion into VOC territory. The English countered arguing that the king of Kandy was a sovereign ruler and there were no treaties extant excluding contact between the king and other countries. Van Eck was very relieved when the English fleet which seemed bound for Ceylon was diverted to Manila. It was destined to fight the Spanish who had just entered the Seven Years’ War on the side of the French.184 When paper cartridges were found covered with writing in English, this gave the Company time to come to its senses about the nature of the relationship between the king and the EIC. As soon as peace was signed in Europe, there was apprehension the EIC would certainly direct its attention towards Ceylon. This anxiety was reinforced by rumours of a possible rupture between England and the Republic.185 The English plans to sign a contract with the king made it untenable for the VOC to accept peace on the previous terms, because it was feared that once a 181 Raven-Hart, Pybus, 66. 182 Raven-Hart, Pybus, 70 and 72. 183 SLNA, VOC, 4930, 7, 2 May 1761, Schreuder to Van Eck. 184 SLNA, VOC, 4875, 4, 10 January 1763, Van Eck to Van der Hoop. 185 SLNA, VOC, 4875, 2, 12 August 1762, Secret Council to High Government, NA, Van Eck, 20, 747, 2 June 1763, Van Eck to Van Teylingen, War was anticipated since the Republic launched an ambitious plan to fit out forty-six ships of the line and to build thirty-six new ones armed with forty-two cannon each. NA, Van Eck, 20, 749, 10 June 1763, Van Eck to Cordua & Faure, That this is not just rhetorical question framed to elicit reinforcements is proved by the fact that Van Eck truly feared war and ordered his agents in Batavia to sell all his goods in order to send his money home as quickly as possible. peace treaty was signed the English would obtain a settlement in the island. The Company had to hasten to resolve the issue of sovereignty to assure its monopoly on cinnamon before the Seven Years’ War ended.186 Reinforcements from the Republic were indispensable to such an offensive.187 With the permission of the High Government, Van Eck sent a letter to the Directors in the Republic asking for reinforcements in view of the English threat.188 3. Solving dilemmas by war Fear of English involvement in the island prodded the VOC to consider war against the king. The decision to go to war was not taken out of fear of the Kandyans or for any nascent colonial design. It was taken purely and simply to keep the English out of Ceylon.189 The fear of English naval power encouraged the Gentlemen Seventeen to give this order two months later, when they gave the green light for war against the king. The Directors urged their servants in Ceylon not to use violence against the English unless the latter disembarked troops. Under all other circumstances the Governor should restrain himself to protesting in writing.190 This order came too late, as two English ships had already been denied entry to Trinconomalee. 191 The king neither acknowledged the Company’s sovereignty nor did he abandon his demand for direct open trade. From the point of view of the VOC, this only added to the ‘sinister and treacherous’ behaviour of the court assiduously searching for foreign aid. The idea of reaching a compromise vanished from that very moment, since possession of all the coastal areas was deemed essential to a sustained and profitable Dutch presence in the island. The Company was 186 NA, Van Eck, 20, 761, 30 July 1763, Van Eck to Van der Parra. 187 Van Eck, 20, 761, 30 July 1763, Van Eck to Van der Parra, 400 soldiers died of sickness in 1763, so Van Eck asked for more reinforcements. Van Eck, 20, 764, 30 July 1763, Van Eck to Schreuder, Van Eck followed the High Government’s orders to send expeditions from several sides of the island into the king’s lands. 188 SLNA, VOC, 4873, 1, 6 August 1762, High Government to Van Eck. 189 SLNA, VOC, 4873, 1, 6 August 1762, High Government to Van Eck. 190 SLNA, VOC, 4873, 4, 20 October 1762, High Government to Secret Council. 191 SLNA, VOC, 4873, 6, 12 November 1762, High Government to Secret Council. not willing to give up what it considered its lawful legal possession. For his own good reasons, Van Eck decided to pretend to be inactive, postponing any plans to attack the king until after the arrival of reinforcements from Europe.192 Hence the new as yet covert plans supported radical intervention, militarily and politically, including the conquest of Kandy to enforce demands. The High Government conceived a strategy in which one main army should invade Kandy from Puttalam. The task of the auxiliary forces, scheduled to leave Trincomalee and Baticaloa, was to create chaos in the king’s territories. Initially Van Eck was ordered to manage with the 7 to 8,000 troops who were already in Ceylon at the outbreak of the conflict, plus the reinforcements already received.193 As a consequence of the structurally high mortality there, Batavia194 could send only 300 slaves to be used as coolies. While Van Eck was waiting for reinforcements from Europe, the king made a renewed attempt to seize the area around Matara, which failed to succeed.195 Meanwhile the rebels were again quickly brought under the rule and authority of the Company.196 Van Eck wanted to sow discard against the king at the Sinhalese court, in order to force him to accept the peace proposal. Pursuing this strategy, he aimed his next attack on the lands owned by the higher-ranking nobles, who in their attempts to safeguard their lands were expected to force the king to bow to Dutch demands. Van Eck was convinced some of the higher-ranking nobles would join the Dutch, since they had been unhappy with the king’s policy. This was deduced from the attempted assassination of the king the year before the rebellion, when the Sinhalese nobles had planned to replace the sovereign with a Siamese prince. Nothing was expected from the nobles of Malabar origin as it was assumed they would never change their negative attitude towards the Dutch. 192 He had asked for 2000 troops. 193 SLNA, VOC, 4873, 6, 12 November 1762, High Government to Secret Council, 282 Europeans and 1854 natives from Batavia and 600 to 700 Europeans from a total of 2136 men from the Cape of Good Hope.194 P.H. van den Burg, Malaria and Malaise. De VOC in Batavia in de achttiende eeuw (Amsterdam; De Bataafsche Leeuw, 1994). 195 SLNA, VOC, 4875, 4, 10 January 1763, Secret Council to High Government, (…) The Royal adigar who was in command since our soldiers have retaken the position at Matura has been thoroughly exasperated. He has spared neither any effort nor men to disperse our troops from their fortifications, which he has not succeeded in doing, but as a consequence has also had to retreat and flee to the borders of the king’s land after several severe defeats. Various indigenous chiefs and subjects of the Company seeing his lack of power, left his side and have returned to subject themselves to the Company (…). 196 SLNA, VOC, 4875, 4, 10 January 1763, Van Eck to Van der Hoop. The Sinhalese noblemen at the court were said to be still in favour of replacing the king with the Siamese prince, but because they feared that the Company would be the only party to profit from the change, they were planning to send a mission of their own to Siam.197 These fears of the nobles were not unfounded, since the High Government had sent a guideline for a contract with the Siamese prince,198 who was to replace the King and reign with the assistance of the Sinhalese nobles. If the contract was observed to the satisfaction of the Company, his royal status would become hereditary. Both parties, the Company and the Siamese king, would be recognized as sovereigns of their respective territories, the border of the two being the same boundary which had existed between the Portuguese and the king, plus the addition of the whole coastal strip of the island to the Dutch. The future king would have to cede several provinces to the Company, 199 although the Sinhalese nobles could keep their positions by changing their allegiance to the Company. The new king should pledge himself not to allow other Europeans into Ceylon and he was expected to marry a Sinhalese princess. The king would share in the profits of trade under terms set out in a financial contract.200 When the search for the Siamese prince proved unsuccessful, Van Eck was instructed to declare war without reflecting any further on the deceitful expostulations of the perfidious and unruly court.201 Van Eck finally received reinforcements in 1764 and the first campaign against Kandy was planned. The High Government warned Van Eck that it was aware that he wanted to make the king a tributary of the Company, but they believed this was too extreme. It was essential to strike a deal with the king as soon as possible, since the Company could not afford a long war.202 At the same time, Batavia realized that the present situation was also 197 SLNA, VOC, 4875, 3, 25 September 1762, Secret Council to High Government. 198 SLNA, VOC, 4873, 5, 19 November 1762, High Government to Secret Council. 199 3,4 and 7 and Puttalam provinces. 200 SLNA, VOC, 4873, 2, 6 August 1762, concept contract of ideal peace with Siamese Prince.201 SLNA, VOC, 4873, 3, 14 September 1762, High Government to Van Eck, (…) Without in the future reflecting in any way on the deceitful expostulations of the perfidious, and in all respects unruly court, however beautifully and radiant it may be dished up, in this case we are still and unchangeably reserved to continue as powerfully as possible a war of so many done injustices and deceitful doings against the earlier mentioned court and its followers from the Malabar (…).202 SLNA, VOC, 4873, 13, 11 July 1763, High Government to Secret Council. detrimental to the position of the Company. As long as he kept the interests of the Company in mind, Van Eck was given plenipotentiary power to act as he saw fit.203 3.1 Military intervention The Dutch had waited to go to war, but the 1764 military campaign against the king of Kandy was as a complete failure. The VOC army entered enemy territory on the 16 February and met with no resistance up to Wisenewe. There the Kandyans made a stand against a forward detachment. After coming under fire, the VOC forces formed up in European-style and wasted their ammunition, firing into the bushes at random. Having squandered their twenty-fore cartridges per person and all their extra ammunition, the troops had to retreat to the main body of the army.204 After this strategic failure, a more fundamental problem presented itself when in a meteorological abnormality for that time of year it started raining. Because the small number of coolies available, aggravated by their desertions, which caused transportation problems,205 the Dutch retreated, ending the first major excursion of the Company into enemy territory of the war not so glorious. The VOC detachments dispatched from other sides of the island also decided discretion was the better part of valor in engaging the enemy. Moreover, the tactic of attacking from different sides had overstretched the meager resources and led to nothing. Now it was the turn of the Kandyans to respond.206 They captured Appretotte and Jaliput, but soon had to beat a hasty retreat from VOC territory.207 203 SLNA, VOC, 4874, High Government to Secret Council, (…) the orders incorporated in the messages of this Government of the 5th of May and 14th of June 1763 are so liberal that Van Eck and his Council have received plenipotentiary power to act as they deem right according to the circumstances (…).204 SLNA, VOC, 4938, 18, 27 February 1764, Leaving behind them seven dead, and one soldier unaccounted for. Fourteen people were injured of whom four seriously. Van Eck did not spare the dead a second thought, just giving order so that their name be taken off the payrolls, a normal procedure, which shows us the accuracy of his body count. 205 SLNA, VOC, 4983, 6, 16 February 1764, Van Eck to the Secret Council, the desertion was caused by hunger, since the coolies were unable to buy rice with the money they received as pay. 206 SLNA, VOC, 4865, 9 , 16 February 1764, Van Eck to Secret Council. To stop them, soldiers were sent to strengthen parts against intrusions. Van Eck told indigenous chiefs not to yield to the pressure of the Kandyans and to respond aggressively. If they could not stand their ground, they should request military The 1764 campaign against Kandy had been a defeat, so a decision had to be taken about whether a new campaign would be mounted the next year.208 The final decision to continue hostilities, was made by the High Government in Batavia.209 The Council was divided between supporters of war210 and doubters who insisted that peace had to be pursued. The supporters were eager for a full-scale continuation of the war as long as the Gentlemen XVII in Holland agreed to this and were convinced that unity was of the utmost importance. 211 As the acknowledged expert, Jan Schreuder, who had returned to Batavia to take his place in the Council of the Indies, did not believe in negotiations. He argued strenuously that the king be deposed. The Company should return to its former contract plus obtain an assurance against foreign intrusion. The doubters wanted to seek peace on the Company’s terms.212 Nevertheless, mindful that war was too expensive, they argued for peace.213 Councillor Pieter Haksteen, maintained a more neutral stance and proposed waiting for the reports of the Secret Council in Colombo. Eventually it was decided by seven votes to four, with one undecided, that Van Eck should continue the war and attempt to establish peace on terms favourable to the company when the opportunity presented itself.214 assistance. If they surrendered the VOC positions too easily, Van Eck threatened to degrade them to the lowest caste and to withhold a second pardon from them. 207 SLNA, VOC, 4865, 11, 16 February 1764, Van Eck to Secret Council. 208 The answer to this question if he should be continuing the war was dealt with by the High Government on 4 June 1764 in the document SLNA, VOC, 4874, 4th of June 1764, “(…) In order to obtain the desired durable guarantee of security of the Company possessions and its exclusive trade, if possible protect the shores or at least those which are most highly coveted and wanted, [they are] namely the means to keep our competitors off the island during peacetime. Through the appeal to rights obtained, we now see other means to assure this than by taking up arms (…).” 209 SLNA, VOC, 4874, 4 June 1764, High Government to Secret Council, “(…) That the extraordinary as well as the ordinary points in the present matter dealing with the continuation or discontinuation of a war, will be given a conclusive voice in the advice following the order of the Directors in the year 1742.(…)”This meant that Van Eck had a double role in the decision-making process. In his capacity as a member of the council he had the right to vote and in his capacity as Governor of Ceylon, he was the chief supplier of information to the High Government in Batavia. Another problem was that because Van Eck was in Ceylon, he was not able to be present at the meeting. In decisions of sufficient magnitude, members of the council were allowed to make their opinion and vote known on paper. 210 Schreuder, Van Riemsdijk, Van Basel, De Klerk, Alting, Van der Parra, and Van Eck. 211 In this respect, the appointment of Van Angelbeek to the Secret Committee had to be supported since Van Eck had to appoint people who were willing to work with him.212 Although Van Eck was absent, the Governor-General summarized Van Eck’s point of view from his private correspondence, demonstrating Van Eck’s inclination to pursue war. The Governor-General had the final word and said that Van Eck should be given all possible room to maneuver.213 Harting, Taillefert, Hilgers, and Romp. 214 SLNA, VOC, 4874, 4 June 1764, High Government to Secret Council. Before the decision of Batavia reached Colombo, the Secret Council had met to debate the same question, but with even more divergent views on the conflict215 were proposed advocating tactics to force the king to make an advantageous peace with the Company and suggesting ways and means to remedy the shortage of coolies.216 Renewed intervention was deemed inevitable: it was absolutely essential the VOC have possession of and sovereignty over all the coastal areas. The Company could not afford to lose its invincible reputation with indigenous powers all over Asia.217 The fly in the ointment was that the Council was wracked by personal tensions, since several members of the Secret Council had played a somewhat dubious role in the previous campaign. For instance, Major Bisschoff, leader of the expeditionary force in the south, had not been able to make his way into enemy territory and had retreated, greatly to Van Eck’s amazement. The personal tensions in the Council erupted in discussion of the question of whether the war should be continued. Several members opposed Van Eck and defied him with arguments concentrating on alternatives for a new campaign, disagreeing with the assumption that war was in the interests of the Company. They asserted that if the Company was incapable of forcing the king into signing an advantageous peace treaty, war would ruin the Company as it had ruined the Portuguese.218 The tactic of terrorizing enemy territory must be continued, since the Portuguese had also used this tactic successfully.219 The prospect of a sustainable peace would only be feasible by displaying the Kandyans generosity.220 The newly conquered territories should be returned to the 215 At the end of 1764, this committee consisted of Van Eck, Bauert, Jacobus de Lij, Major Bisschof, Moens and Van Angelbeek. Van Eck had formed this committee shortly after his arrival in Colombo. 216 SLNA, VOC, 4865, 17, 5 April 1764, (…) At present we shall discuss what needs to be done in order to force the king of Kandy to a advantageous and reputable peace, in obedience to the special order of the High Government. More specifically this means it judges it necessary and will help us remedy the principal impediment, namely the lack of coolies, in the upcoming campaign.(…). 217 SLNA, VOC, 4874, 18, High Government to Secret Council. 218 SLNA, VOC, 4865, 29-31, 10 April 1764. 219 Channa Wickremesekera, Kandy at war: Indigenous Resistance to European Expansion in Sri Lanka, 1594-1818 (Colombo: Vijitha Yapa, 2004), 36. SLNA, VOC, 4865, When the weather was right, detachments should raid the king’s territories to frighten his subjects and to lure him into a confrontation in the vicinity of VOC strongholds, where circumstances were more advantageous to the VOC than in the mountainous areas. As it was highly unlikely that he would succeed in defeating the VOC, the VOC would be forced to accept a treaty advantageous to the VOC. The issue of the small numbers of coolies could easily be solved.220 In order to counter the ideas and assumptions of De Lij’s and Bisschoff, Van Angelbeek had researched the history of the Portuguese and come to three conclusions. Firstly, that the Portuguese had not been nearly as powerful as the VOC was at the time. Secondly, that they spoiled their position by not keeping their own pledges and promises, which had let to a general hatred of them. Lastly, that they would never king and more gifts than had been its wont in former days should be dispensed to please the king in order to restore trust and to avoid foreign intervention in the future.221 Peace was considered a better option than risking everything in war, at a time at which it was confronted by insoluble problems.222 By obstructing the supply of salt and cloth to the highlands, the king would be given a stern reminder that he also depended on the Company. The problem with the alternative plans was that they ignored changes in the balance of power at sea.223 A peace treaty would have to be framed to keep European competitors out, securing the possessions of the Company and its exclusive trade. The king would have to relinquish sovereignty of the coastal strips to the Company and renounce the right to contact other Europeans. If the Company were to sign a peace treaty over-hastily, it would be impossible to force these concessions on the king. Alternatively, the plan of harassing the king would take years of war and influence commerce negatively. Turning to the matter of the costs of a protracted struggle, it was judged that forcing the king to make peace with an expedition to Kandy would be the least expensive option. The costs of such an expedition were bearable, because the financial position of the Dutch had improved since the cinnamon sent to Holland in 1762 had yielded huge profits. Weighing all this up, Van Eck believed the VOC should obey the orders of the Gentlemen XVII to bring peace by war. 224 As it was conscious of the English threat, it was unavoidable that the High Government would resume the war with renewed vigour and more resources.225 Now that Van Eck had been assured of the support of the Gentlemen XVII and the High have left the island if the VOC had not helped. If De Lij’s plans were executed, it would give the king the chance to invite the other Europeans to his assistance, because he would have harbours open to him. He would no longer permit the VOC to conduct the trade in cinnamon. It was also proposed that the VOC should obtain a contract from the king, and not from his principal minister, which would be scorned by other Europeans. Van Angelbeek also stressed that the resistance by the Kandyans was a myth.221 In return for the elephant trade, the king would be asked to recognize the VOC as sovereign ruler over its territories and the coastal areas, plus allowing the VOC the access to cinnamon trees. 222 SLNA, VOC, 4865, 30-34, 10 April 1764. They also believed that, even if the war was continued, the problem with the coolies would prove insoluble. 223 Van Eck began by saying that nobody desired the restoration of peace as much as he did, as he longed to return to his fatherland and family. He simply desired a lasting peace, which he did not judge achievable on the basis of the alternative plans. 224 SLNA, VOC, 18, 31 July 1764, High Government to Secret Council. 225 SLNA, VOC, 4873, 17, 12 June 1764, High Government to Secret Council, (…) It has been approved and acknowledged that the earlier-mentioned expedition has to be continued with all possible vigour, also to enable the Lord Van Eck to make war on the king more successfully than today (…). Government, he still had to solve the problems which had emerged in the earlier campaign.226 In 1765, the Company took great care not to scatter its forces: the two columns it sent out to Kandy were to converge before the first mountains were reached. Along the route of the army, reinforced depots were built to guarantee supplies. The army advanced only after sufficient supplies had been brought in and the depot was secured. Although some resistance by the Kandyans is described in the literature,227 in the report of the campaign the employees were mostly relieved that the Kandyans had not made optimal use of the obstacles with which nature had provided them. Had they done so, it would have been impossible to conquer Kandy. On the actual battlefield, the Dutch did not fear the Kandyans as they never inflicted much damage. After loosing their first shots far too high, normally the Kandyan soldiers only fired at random. In every battle, the Dutch forces tried to outflank them, which normally put the Kandyans to flight without any great loss of men.228 The VOC campaign was gathering momentum and actually managed to penetrate the territories of the king. In order to halt the Company’s progress, the king decided to use alternative tactics, since this time the rain did not come to his aid. The king on a regular basis sent forth a messenger to initiate peace talks, also asking the VOC army to return to Colombo. The Company was dubious about the real objective of such messengers who did not carry royal credentials and were often sent back to the king without a reply.229 Other tactics to slow the Dutch advance down were also tried. For instance, the king decided to send a religious fanatic to kill Van Eck, but he did not even succeed in passing the guards.230 Only slightly discommoded by the Kandyan attempts at 226 SLNA, VOC, 4881, report military campaign 1765. Parts of the report of the campaign of 1765 have been preserved. Van Eck had only Portuguese maps and Valentijn´s words to ascertain where Kandy was located, but it was known that the road to Kandy was virtually impassable and wound tortuously across ranges of mountains. From Colombo, it was best to head north, where there was a slightly easier pass through the first two chains of mountains, before turning south again.227 Pieris, Ceylon and the Hollanders,112-115; Winius, The Merchant-Warrior Pacified,136; L.S. Dewaraja, The Kandyan Kingdom of Sri Lank 1707-1782 (Colombo: Lake House, 1988). 228 SLNA, VOC, 4881, Report of military campaign 1765. In the diary of the campaign, Van Eck ordered track be kept of the names of the soldiers killed in battle in order to scrap them from the payrolls as quickly as possible, giving an objective account of deaths. 229 When the campaign began to show signs of success, the Rijxadiagars, the two principal ministers in the Kandyan kingdom, started sending messengers to propose peace talks minus the condition of withdrawal to Colombo. The VOC indicated it would only to negotiate peace with an ambassador of the King bearing a letter of credence. When the Kandyan negotiators answered it would take some time to obtain such a letter from the king, the VOC was uncompromising and the campaign we continued in full force.230 SLNA, VOC, 4881, Report of the military campaign, 100-106. One day a Moor came to the Dutch camp carrying a white flag, indicating he had to speak to the Governor in person and would tell his story only to delay, the VOC army reached the capital. The city and the temple of the Tooth were pillaged, after which the same fate befell the temples close to the city. 4. A new status quo Since the Company did not succeed in capturing the King,231 the war had not been won decisively, but the will to pursue it to the bitter end was absent. It was decided to leave a garrison in Kandy and return next year after the monsoon season. The main army under the command of Governor Van Eck would withdraw to just beyond the mountains. This was not to be as on his return to Colombo, Van Eck felt ill and died. On his deathbed Van Eck recorded his final plan of his vision of the relationship with Kandy after the war. He was convinced it was impossible to work with the present king, because he was being influenced by his relatives on the Malabar Coast who wanted to obtain trade concessions, and as an outsider he would not be able to exert sufficient power over the Sinhalese nobles, who would not be happy about having to cede land to the VOC. To remedy this, external intervention was necessary and Van Eck wanted an expedition to him. Because they were suspicious, he was denied access to Van Eck and told Van Angelbeek his story. Having been born on the Coromandel Coast, he had been called to the island, to serve in a temple. There he had led an ascetic life, refusing normal food and consuming toxics materials which did not affect him because of the power of the god of Kattergamme who protected him and ordered him to drink some milk every couple of days. The king of Kandy had heard of him and summoned him to Candia in order to consult him about the war and ask his assistance against the Dutch. In return the king had given him a hundred pieces of fine cloth and a hundred silver-mounted daggers, but he had accepted only one piece of cloth and one dagger. Van Angelbeek, suspicious, feigned interest in the knife and asked him to hand it over, effectively disarming him. According to the man, the god of Kattergamme had revealed to him the king’s resistance was futile, because the VOC would conquer the whole kingdom as far as Battiacaloa. He had come to announce their imminent victory to the Dutch and if they would allow him to talk to the Governor in private, he would guide the whole army to Kandy unharmed. They had only to postpone their advance until he had designated the appropriate day. He declined to give more information about the enemy saying that if the VOC were to listen to him no army would be big enough to hold them back. Van Angelbeek and the other servants were not impressed by the story, trying instead to discover his purpose, but to their dismay he adhered to his story. Since they thought he was harmless after his knife had been taken away, he was quartered with the indigenous servants, where he was recognized by one of the indigenous chiefs as a man who had served him a year before and had stolen from him before disappearing. No long afterwards, several lascorins or indigenous soldiers, who had been captured by the Kandyans the year before found a way to flee back to the Company, and they reported that the man had been promised great riches were he to succeed in killing the Governor. 231 The story was that during one excursion the army had nearly captured the king, as an elephant bearing the coat of arms of the King had been seen fleeing over the hills. search for the Siamese prince, so as to bring him to Ceylon and put him on the throne as king, after he had signed a treaty acquiescing in everything the VOC wanted. The councilors agreed with Van Eck, but they thought it better to oust the king and install the Sinhalese noblemen as independent rulers. This would make it easier to set them against each other and none of them would be powerful on his own enough to threaten the VOC. The garrison left in Kandy was supplied with provisions, but mistakes were made in calculating the amount of rice necessary for the number of men present. They were undersupplied, leading very soon to a grave situation. The garrison had to make several attempts before it was able to inform Colombo of its desperate plight. In Colombo, it was decided to have a support party, commanded by Major Meddler, leave at once, despite insufficient time to make proper preparations. Meanwhile, decimated by disease and hunger and running acutely short of powder and bullets, the garrison in Kandy decided it could not wait any longer and fought its way back to Colombo. When the relief troops finally reached Kandy, they found the camp deserted and likewise returned to Colombo. After this campaign to Kandy had proved successful, the Company thought it best to press for a favourable peace treaty.232 The new Governor, Iman Falck, was ordered to confer on peace with the king. Negotiations followed and the Company obtained its goals in a peace treaty signed in 1766. Under its terms the Company expanded its control over the entire coastline and obtained royal acknowledgement of its sovereignty, ensuring the position of the Dutch until 1795. The treaty enabled the Company to continue to hold the monopoly on all trade from Ceylon and ensured it against foreign intrusion on its trade. The Company also disposed of some parts of the ritual to which it had objections during the annual embassy.233 The right to peel cinnamon in the territory of the king was traded against the right of the king to obtain salt in the VOC regions. The control over the salt production in the vicinity of the captured regions of Puttulam and Matara, which had been under the control of the King before the war, left the VOC more room to bargain. After the war, the Company succeeded in mending its relationship with the king to such an extent that he no longer contemplated seeking foreign intervention. At the time 232 SLNA, VOC, 4866, 27 March 1765, last resolution by Van Eck. 233 Schrikker, Dutch and British colonial intervention, 113-122 and Arasaratnam, “Dutch Sovreignty in Ceylon”, 105-121. The VOC representative was no longer obliged to kneel down, but was received on the same level as the king. Embassies also went back and forth between the King and the VOC of the English occupation of Trincomalee during the Fourth Anglo-Dutch Sea War (1781­1784), the king of Kandy declined an English proposal for an alliance against the Dutch. Ultimately, the Company was saved by a naval squadron under the French admiral Suffren, which chased the English from the island. After the Fourth Anglo-Dutch Sea War, the embassy to Kandy was reinstated and the king asked for the return of Puttalam. Since the king initially denied access to the cinnamon in his territory, the Company proceeded with its plan to established cinnamon plantations. This led to the involvement of Company servants in the plantation system. They worked together with the indigenous chiefs to supply the company with either cinnamon or coffee.234 The treaty of 1766 brought peace to the island, and the Dutch managed to safeguard their position in Ceylon for another thirty years. The Dutch presence in the island was safe as long as the Republic did not embark on a war with England. This had been made obvious in the Fourth Anglo-Dutch Sea War. When war between the Republic and England erupted again in 1795, the Dutch reign over Ceylon ended, since at that time the English were powerful enough to enforce a change of European regime even without the help of the king of Kandy.235 Twenty years later, the King suffered the same fate as the Company and was deposed: henceforth the whole island was controlled by the EIC. The situation in Ceylon was reproduced in the Indonesian Archipelago after 1780. In Java, the Company had already stepped up political activities in the 1750s in order to make sure that the indigenous rulers knew who was in charge. 236 When the naval superiority of the English was felt in 1784, the Company reacted similarly in the Spice Islands by multiplying military activities to keep the English country traders out. The extirpation of spice-bearing trees and shrubs outside the Company-controlled areas was vigorously pursued to ensure the English did not obtain spices anywhere outside of the VOC establishments. Politically, the Company was confronted by indigenous rulers skillfully navigating the shifting political balance. One such example was Prince Noekoe of Tidore who succeeded in leading a protracted and successful rebellion against the 234 Schrikker, Dutch and British colonial intervention, 116. 235 Schrikker, Dutch and British colonial intervention, 130-132. 236 S. Margana, Java's last frontier : the struggle for hegemony of Blambangan c. 1763-1813 (Leiden: Unpublished thesis, 2007). Company with the help of the English. 237 This mounting political instability led to increasing costs for the Company and when it failed to step up to the political challenge and assert its authority, its trade was in potential danger. Conclusion For almost a century, the VOC lived in an often turbulent state of peace with the king of Kandy, the last indigenous king in Ceylon. The combination of naval superiority and European-style fortifications on the coast made it impossible for the king of Kandy to expel the VOC without summoning outside help. With the eclipse of the naval dominance of the VOC, the threat of expulsion became reality as European competitors began to show an interest in the island, and the king saw an opportunity to set the European companies against each other. The relationship between the king and the Company became strained with the outbreak of an indigenous rebellion in the VOC-controlled areas, which provided an opportunity the king could not resist. In order to avoid military costs, the VOC tried to negotiate its way out of the crisis. As the negotiations failed and the threat of English involvement grew imminent, violence escalated when the Dutch waged war against the king. The upshot of this conflict was that the VOC enlarged its colonial possessions in the island at the cost of the king and secured its position by occupying the whole coastal strip of the island. Lacking naval superiority, the VOC knew that it was essential to conquer the entire coastline of the island so as to maintain its monopoly in the trade with Ceylon. As long as the Republic and England were at peace, the conquest of the coastline would guarantee the Dutch presence on the island as it obviated English intervention on legal grounds. The relative military weakness of the VOC was reflected in the relationship between Company and servant in Ceylon, limiting the liberty of the servants in their military endeavours. There was a big difference to indigenous rulers infringing on trade 237 M. S. Widjojo, Cross-cultural alliance-making and local resistance in Maluku during the revolt of Prince Nuku, c. 1780-1810 (Leiden: Unpublished thesis, 2007). between the Dutch reaction in Ceylon and the English reaction in Bengal. The English were sure of support from the home country in Europe, the VOC was not. This meant that the EIC servants could respond quickly since troops were at hand, albeit with the risk of being judged after the action. Even in a war situation, the Dutch Company servants enjoyed no such liberties and were obliged to wait for orders and reinforcements from Batavia and the Republic before they could react. This was a realistic policy and the servants had no option but to concede to this strategy which was based on the financial reality. In the shadow of the company : the VOC (Dutch East India Company)and its servants in the period of its decline (1740-1796) Nierstrasz, J.C. Citation Nierstrasz, J. C. (2008, November 5). In the shadow of the company : the VOC (Dutch East India Company) and its servants in the period of its decline (1740-1796). Retrieved from https://hdl.handle.net/1887/13267 Version: Not Applicable (or Unknown) License: Licence agreement concerning inclusion of doctoral thesis in the Institutional Repository of the University of Leiden Downloaded from: https://hdl.handle.net/1887/13267 Note: To cite this publication please use the final published version (if applicable). PART II Monopolies & Private trade Chapter 3: Deconstructing the intra-Asian monopoly of the VOC(1743-1796)238 Introduction In the existing scholarly literature, the VOC is seen as the very epitome of a monopolizing company, which did not allow either to its servants or its subjects freedom of trade in Asia. The lack of freedom to participate in intra-Asian trade for people falling under the authority of the VOC is often contrasted unfavourably with the freedom which the EIC allowed the country traders and is often used to serve as the explanation of why the VOC eventually lost out to its English rivals. In this scenario, the unwieldy Dutch Moloch was overtaken by the entrepreneurial English interlopers who were better able to adapt to the changes of the eighteenth century. The question is whether this starkly black and white opposition between the VOC and the EIC is completely correct. If private trade seems to have suited the EIC so well, why would the VOC not have considered a similar reform? Was the VOC truly a monopolistic company or did it also consider allowing its servants and subjects to undertake private trade? What goal would a liberalization of private trade have served and how did this develop long term? 1. Monopolies and trade: the VOC’s intra-Asian monopoly The main argument adduced for dismissing Dutch private trade as a significant factor in the European intra-Asian trade in the eighteenth century, is based on the way the VOC had organized its intra-Asian trade in the seventeenth century. At this time, the 238 Parts of this chapter have previously been published in a different form in Dutch in the Tijdschrift voor Zeegeschiedenis, October 2006, entitled ‘Reguleren of Corrumperen? De VOC en hervormingen in de Privé-handel (1743-1799). Company held a combined monopoly239 on all trade with and within Asia and its intra-Asian trade was very profitable. In the initial stages of the Company’s expansion into Asia, the spice monopolies not only put the European trade of the Company on a solid footing, they also facilitated and stimulated its involvement in the intra-Asian trade. For instance, the Coromandel Coast, served as supplier of commodities to the Moluccas, where textiles were traded for spices. The Company soon expanded its horizons and realized that entering the intra-Asian trade entailed an investment in material and money in regions not directly related to the production of spices. Trading settlements were established all over Asia, from the Cape of Good Hope to Japan and even regions without VOC posts, for example China, were indirectly included in this system through trading networks of indigenous merchants. It seems that in terms of its long-distance trade and knowledge of markets, the Company was breaking economic boundaries, and in the process making its intra-Asian trade highly profitable. Commendably, the by-product of trade and monopoly in Asia augmented profitability in Europe. In short, the combination of intra-Asian trade and trade with Europe paid off.240 Greatly to the advantage of the VOC, apart from raising profitability in the trade to Europe, its involvement in the intra-Asian trade also lowered the amount of precious metals required to be dispatched from the Netherlands. In order to procure the sought­after spices, the chartered companies were obliged to export precious metals, the only commodity available in Europe for which there was a guaranteed market in Asia. According to the mercantilist economic theory fashionable at the time, exporting wealth or sending out of bullion was deemed undesirable. When most of the trade in spices came firmly under its control, the VOC obtained a very advantageous position compared with its competitors. With a combination of the spice monopolies and a modicum of territorial control, it benefited from a demand and a variety of products to offer to different markets in Asia, thereby obviating the use of the precious metals. Hence, the profits from the ensuing intra-Asian trade enabled the Company to limit its need to export of precious metals; lesser quantities of precious metal were needed from Europe if the profits made in 239 The VOC tried to exclude commercial competition by controlling production of certain commodities and by excluding its servants and subjects from participating in trade by withholding the right to trade.240 The definition of monopolizing, just as in the case of trade with Europe, indicates a monopoly precluding people from the Republic and the employees of the VOC participating in such trade. the intra-Asian trade were invested in the trade to Europe. Consequently, involvement in the intra-Asian trade offered a double-edged advantage and provided greater facility in obtaining spices: the spices were more profitably obtained by offering merchandises procured in Asia itself instead of expensive precious metals. In comparison to the indigenous traders, the VOC in Asia specialized in long­distance trade. Although this required more initial investments, the efficiency and profitability of such a policy were most conspicuous in the trade to Europe. Needless to say, the irruption of such a well-organized force did not leave the trade in Asia unscathed and consequently fundamental changes were inevitable with the arrival of the European long-distance trade capacity. In a non-integrated market, long-distance trade proved very profitable.241 Focusing on long-distance trade in Asia, by transporting commodities over vast distances, outdistancing the indigenous merchants, who continued to thrive in and to dominate the regional trade, the Europeans were cutting out middlemen. Nevertheless it is important not to exaggerate the impact of European trade on intra-Asian trade. Investing money in all regions was neither politically nor economically feasible, so the VOC was forced to cut its coat to suit its cloths and leave parts of the intra-Asian to indigenous traders. Such decisions clearly delineate the boundaries of the Company’s economic power, bridled by the limited amount of capital it had its disposal. While the spice monopoly led to the heavy involvement of the VOC in the intra-Asian trade, other European companies had to conjure up other less capital intensive ways to participate in the intra-Asian trade. For a short period, the other European companies tried to emulate the VOC’s intra-Asian trade, but because of their lack of capacity to match its strength were soon forced to abandon this commerce to their employees in the form of private trade.242 Since the other companies mostly limited their orbit of trade to the Indian Sub-Continent and later in the eighteenth century extended to China, they focused on trade from these regions to Europe. In academic discourse, however, the fact is often overlooked that the other companies had not really relinquished their ambitions to set up intra-Asian trading links, a situation causing a conflict of interest. 241 Knowledge of local markets offered easy profit, for instance the simple act of exchanging gold and silver between Japan and China, which already yielded a tidy profit. 242 P.J. Marshall, East Indian Fortunes, the British Bengal in the Eighteenth Century (Oxford: Clarendon 1976), 20. Their servants were expected, indeed even ordered, to prioritize their company’s trade over their individual private trade. The differences in incorporating or excluding intra-Asian trade led the various companies to assume diverse organizational shapes to encompass their designs. In historiography, these differences are often treated as fundamental and static. Although at first matters went swimmingly, time and tide wait for no man, or even organization, and unfortunately even for the VOC the initial success of its intra-Asian trade faded, leading to its position being challenged and a change of course. 1.1 The limits of the intra-Asian trade of the VOC Throughout most of the seventeenth century the VOC-monopoly on intra-Asian trade flourished, but from 1680 cracks appeared in the smooth façade and the intra-Asian trade of the VOC stagnated as it became less profitable as a result of rising costs.243 This stagnation cannot be attributed to one particular factor; only to multiple causes. First of all, the VOC profits were inhibited by Asian political involvement in trade. This is most obvious in the case of Japan, where the Japanese authorities first forbade the export of silver and then lowered the gold content of the kobangs. The upshot of this was the Company had less spending power in India where it used gold to purchase textiles. These imposed a ceiling on the turn-over of trade in Nagasaki in 1680 and again in the 1720s. The decline in VOC trade with Japan led to a subsequent slump in the VOC establishments in Tonkin (suppressed in 1699) and Siam, which supplied goods for the Japanese market. In other words the Company’s South Asian trade decline considerably. 244 The second reason for the stagnation of the Company’s intra-Asian trade is the decline of the dominant empires, notably the Mughal and Safavid dynasties from the beginning of the eighteenth century, and the subsequent political unrest and civil war their loss of 243 F.S. Gaastra, De geschiedenis van de VOC (Zutphen: Walburg Pers, 2002), J.P. de Korte, De jaarlijkse financiële verantwoording in de VOC (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 1984) and Jacobs, Koopman in Azië, 230­253. 244 Gaastra, De geschiedenis van de VOC, 127 and T. Hoang Anh, Silk for Silver: Dutch-Vietnamese Relations, 1637-1700 (Leiden: Brill 2007). power generated. The political turmoil probably did not have a positive effect on trade: the Company had to withdraw from the Persian Gulf in 1756 having seen its trade diminish because of rising unrest and in the Red Sea too trade contracted and costs increased. Closer to Batavia, the company was also obliged to fight some expensive wars, mostly in the heartland of Java. Thirdly, there was growing stiff competition from the other European companies vying for goods, most notably the French and English in India. The introduction of new export goods for Europe was also at variance with the Company’s orientation towards spices: textile from India, coffee from Mocha, and tea from China now began to rise in demand. It proved impossible to open up bigger markets for spices in these areas, at least not to such an extent that it was more profitable to prioritise trade in these spices in Asia instead of to Europe.245 The writing was on the wall: money and only money was needed to grab a profitable share in these emerging markets in Europe, and this meant diverting investment away from intra-Asian trade. Other reasons for the decline of the Company in intra-Asian trade have been sought in the sometimes fraught relationship between the Republic and Batavia, but in the end it was the Republic which took the initiative for change. Since debts in the Republic had been rising after 1736, the decline in the profit of the intra-Asian trade could not fail to escape the notice of the Gentlemen Seventeen.246 As the Republic did not shun the necessity to make reforms, it stands to reason that most of the persistent problems arose from the VOC organization in Asia and eventually the directorate had to acknowledge the need for change. In 1741 Gustaaf, Baron Van Imhoff (1741-1750) was sent back to Asia in order to reform the Company’s intra-Asian trade.247 Van Imhoff diagnosed that the Company’s stake in the intra-Asian trade was too scattered thereby dissipating its impact. He proposed focusing the intra-Asian trade on the most profitable core activities thereby reducing costs by making cuts in the number of ships and material. The parts in which the Company was no longer interested were left to the private initiative of servants, free­burghers and subjects to exploit. They were free to build their own private trade from 245 Gaastra, De geschiedenis van de VOC, 129. 246 Jacob J. Steur, Herstel of Ondergang, de voorstellen tot redres van de Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie, 1740-1795 (Utrecht: HES, 1998), 38. 247 Van Imhoff had first been sent back to Europe by Governor-General Valckenier on charges of corruption. He succeeded in convincing the Gentlemen XVII of his innocence and even of the potential efficacy of his program of reforms which would return the VOC to its former splendour. He was sent back to implement his reforms and take the place og Governor-General Thedens. which the Company profited by levying tax. Van Imhoff’s reforms are judged very harshly in the literature, although the figures show that during his term of office costs were reduced.248 At that juncture, the Company was already facing potential cash flow problems and these were to become far more pressing after 1780, but it proved hard to address the problem structurally. The Gentlemen XVII and the High Government were fully aware of the problems facing the intra-Asian trade and considered steps to rectify matters. One alternative for simply reducing costs would have been to raise extra capital for investment in trade. Although a great deal of scholarly attention has been paid to the declining intra-Asian trade, little has been said about the role the shareholders played in trying to solve or alternatively complicate the credit problems of the chartered companies. One obvious possible solution to the credit problems was enlarging the capital of the Company by issuing new shares. This could have halted the rising spiral of debts and would have allowed more financial breathing space in which the intra-Asian trade could have been reformed. The Company never even considered augmenting the number of shares, but turned to alternative sources of capitalization. The VOC dividend continued to dwindle until 1770, when it stabilized at 12 ½ per cents. After the Fourth Anglo-Dutch Sea War, the financial position of the VOC was extremely parlous and the fixed dividend was no longer realistic, consequently payment was stopped completely in several years. When eventually the Company did undertake measures to swell its capital, by guaranteeing its dividend if the shareholders doubled their investment in the VOC in obligations, this was too little too late.249. 1.2 An alternative solution: Dutch private trade (1743-1796) After 1730, the financially strapped Company had to reassess the way it had organized intra-Asian trade. In 1743, the decision to focus on the core products was made with the 248 Gaastra, De geschiedenis van de VOC, 127. 249 De Korte, The annual accounting in the VOC, 68 tot 87. purpose of maximizing profits on a limited amount of capital and discarding less profitable branches of commerce. In relinquishing parts of its intra-Asian trade, the Company theoretically created room for its employees and subjects to fill the gap by embarking on private trade. In its turn, the Company would tax private trade and utilize private fortunes on remittance to Europe, which would generate capital to fuel its remaining trades. The discussion on private trade ushered in by Van Imhoff was not without precedent and in fact runs through the whole existence of the Company like a scarlet threat. Indeed, the pursuance of private trade had been considered a desirable change of course by various officials, but the Gentlemen XVII had done little or nothing with these earlier recommendations to reverse their rules on private trade.250 Batavia was not the only place where Company servants toyed with the idea of allowing private trade; in this context the plans of P. van Dam (1621-1706), the advocaat of the VOC in the Republic, are very significant . In 1662 this influential VOC servant wrote a tract in defence of Van Goen’s plans to liberalize trade.251 Van Dam was a vigorous supporter of private trade in Asia, but despite his eloquence and enthusiasm his plans were also shelved by the Gentlemen XVII.252 This focus on private trade as an integral part of the VOC’s operations is opting for a point of departure which is quite different from the view taken by most historians, who simply accept that during the reign of the Company private trade was regarded as illegal.253 In a humorous pun, the initials of the VOC are often interpreted as denoting ‘Vergaan onder Corruptie’ or ‘perished under corruption’. People who support this view argue that private trade was just one side of the illegal activities of employees. However, 250J.K.J. de Jonge, De opkomst van het Nederlandsch gezag in Oost-Indie : verzameling van onuitgegeven stukken uit het oud-koloniaal archief (’s-Gravenhage: N hoff, 1862-1909), Volume 10, xix. The idea of legalizing private trade within the VOC’s intra-Asian trade had already been proposed by Governor-General J.P. Coen (1619-1623 and 1627-1629). During the seventeenth century other advocates of private trade within the VOC had let their voices be heard, like J. Maetsuyker (1653-1678) and R. van Goens (1678-1681). Their plans were seriously considered again in the eighteenth century by Governor-General J. van Hoorn (1704-1709). Different Governors-General sent their plans to the Republic with suggestions for reforms in the intra-Asian trade. 251 J. de Hullu, ‘Een advies van Mr. Pieter van Dam, advocaat der Oost-Indische Compagnie, over een gedeeltelijke openstelling van Compagnie’s handel voor particulieren, 1662’ in: bijdrage tot de taal-, land-, en volkenkunde van Nederlands-Indië (’s-Gravenhage, 1918) volume 74, 267-298. 252 P. van Dam, Beschryvinge van de Oostindische Compagnie, uitgegeven door F.W. Stapel en C.W.Th. van Boetzelaer, boek I, deel I (‘s –Gravenhage 1927), xvii.253 E.M. Jacobs, Koopman in Azië, 17. even the literature stressing the illegality of Dutch private trade is strewn with contradictions because exceptions to the general rule are often mentioned. Every now and again, reforms which allowed private trade under specific circumstances and in specific regions are mentioned. These reforms are often qualified as independent incidents elicited by specific commercial and regional problems. The best known example is Deshima in Japan: private or kambang trade was allowed in Nagasaki by the Japanese authorities for political reasons.254 Another example is the shipment of certain prescribed amounts of cloth authorised to employees and free-burghers to Holland on VOC ships from 1771 onwards.255 There was even a separate trading company dealing with the trade to Sumatra (1749-1759).256 Ultimately, however, received opinion states categorically that private trade was never structurally allowed, but was a measure only adopted to solve temporary commercial hitches and certainly cannot be compared with the freedom of trade enjoyed by the English private traders. Nevertheless, there is acceptance that the idea of liberalizing trade won sufficient political support from the Republic during Van Imhoff’s term of office to allow him to introduce reforms in private trade.257 He spoke of re-opening trade routes from which the Company had withdrawn and of freeing the trade in certain goods. He was convinced, it would be beneficial to discontinue various branches of trade which were reserved for the Company, but where profits had dwindled and to leave them open to the private initiative of the Company servants and free-burghers whose trade would be liable to taxation. In short, the Company should limit itself to its most profitable core tasks, in order to cut down on costs. 258 Most historians give credence to the accepted wisdom that Van Imhoff’s successor Jacob Mossel (1750-1761), quickly abolished these reforms because of their poor success rate. Given their centricity to the whole debate, it is logical for this thesis to take Van Imhoff’s reforms (1743-1750) as the starting point for making an analysis of the probability and extent of Dutch private trade, since he has been generally 254 Ibidem, 120-122. 255 Ibidem, 111.256 Ibidem, 131. 257 J.E. Heeres, ‘De consideratien van Van Imhoff’, in: Bijdragen tot de taal- , land- en volkenkunde van Nederlands-Indië, 66 (1912). 258 Heeres, ‘De consideratien’, 444. acknowledged as the first (and often the last) Governor-General to depart from the VOC policy of strictly monopolizing Intra-Asian trade.259 1.3 A dual system of trade Using source publications, it is already possible to put private trade privilege in a long-term perspective.260 Under Van Imhoff, trade in Asia was opened up but certain items remained the preserve of the Company, among them spices, copper, tin, pepper and opium.261 Such exceptions were either the goods the Company normally sent to Europe (spices) or the most profitable items in the intra-Asian trade (opium, pepper and tin). The trade in other items was to be left to the private initiative of the servants and indigenous traders. In all other domains, employees could send out privately owned ships and trade in the goods the Company had relinquished at designated places. This trade was called the ‘free trade’.262 The idea was that the money the Company lost in relinquishing areas of trade would be regained by new ways and means. For example, income from toll would increase if there was more private trade and the private fortunes would have to be send to Europe through the Company. Another advantage was that the Company could reduce the number of ships to places which would no longer be advantageous to the 259 W.Ph. Coolhaas, ‘Zijn de Gouverneurs-Generaal Van Imhoff en Mossel juist beoordeeld?’, in: BKI. 114 (1958), 29-54, J.J. Steur, Herstel of ondergang, de voorstellen tot redres van de verenigde Oost-Indische compagnie, 1740-1795 (Utrecht 1984).260 J.A. van der Chijs, Nederlandsch-Indisch plakaatboek, Volume 1-Volume 17 (’s-Gravenhage 1885­1900). Since academic writing on Dutch private trade is not consistent, maybe such sources publications, as the ‘plakaatboeken’ may cast new light and be useful in assessing changes in private trade policy. The first decrees on private trade since Van Hoorn (1704-1709), the last of the Governors-General to have been interested in private trade, date from 1743 and confirm that reforms began in the term of office of Van Imhoff. The collection of VOC-decrees published by Van der Chijs: Affixing a ‘plakaat’ or placard was the official way by which the VOC administration used to proclaim its decisions. 261 Nationaal Archief (NA), Hoge Regering van Batavia (HR), 307, Extract Generale Resolutien, 20 September 1743. “Taken in the Castle of Batavia in the Council of the Indies, Tuesday the 24 September 1743. With the opening of free navigation and trade to and from this capital, to the East and West of India following the qualification of the Gentlemen Seventeen and the license for that purpose has already been granted to several citizens with the exception of the trade in spices, copper, tin and pepper, and in the import of opium, which the Noble Company will reserve for itself, as has been decided according to the proposal of the Governor-General.” 262 NA, Hoge Regering, Extract Generale Resolutien, 307, 259-261. Company’s trading operations. It was expected that in view of the wide spanning interests of the VOC in the intra-Asian trade, in a parallel the stake it held and infrastructure it provided all over Asia, would not only make Batavia the centre of Dutch private trade, but also of all private trade in Asia. In short, by focusing on certain branches of trade, expenses could be reduced and new income generated. Naturally, such a dual system of Company monopoly and freed private trade meant the VOC would have to regulate and organize private trade in such a way as to ensure that what was left of the VOC monopoly was respected. While executing his plans, Van Imhoff wrote to the VOC personnel in the various trading-ports all over Asia inviting them to think of and suggest possible reforms and regulations which would guarantee the interests of the Company.263 In return, he received reports assessing the possibilities of free trade in different regions.264 In order to guard the interests of the Company, it was suggested that control would be firmly exercised within the official VOC structure. To accomplished this, the High Government awarded servants in key positions prerogatives and privileges so that they would have a certain interest in catching offenders and controlling free trade. In plain speech, this meant that they had to be given a financial reward for maintaining order in the free trade. This should be under the control of the local governor and public prosecutor, as the highest authority and the legal official charged with supervising each establishment of the Company throughout Asia. They were given a percentage of the taxes on free trade and a proportion of the goods which were confiscated as an incentive to make people pay taxes and to ensure that no illegal free trade was indulged in. In the first sphere of free trade, regulations seem to have been made mainly on pepper, tin, and cloth, as they were more important to the VOC monopoly, and in order to maintain the trading network of the Company. In one of the reports on private trade 263 Volume 11, 31 December 1743, Batavia asks the opinion on the trade opened round the West of India or 91, Batavia wants to be informed as soon as possible about the manner in which the free trade to Persia can be organized and 133, 31 December 1744, In reaction to what Amboina has answered Batavia on the free trade around the East and West, etc. 264 NA, Collectie Alting, Consideratien , vrije vaart in Souratta, f38. This report on Surat written by Jan Schreuder can be found in many different places in the National Archives in The Hague: twice in the VOC archives and twice in private archives, one belonging to a VOC reformer, Nederburgh, and one to a Governor-General of a later date, Alting. The only report of this kind I have found so far is from Surat considering the ways free trade could be regulated in the manner most beneficial to the company. regulations, a division is made between two spheres of free trade; the goods coming dangerously close to the Company’s intra-Asian trade monopoly and the goods which were needed for the provision of the personnel in the various establishments. The idea of freeing any of the trade close to the core of the monopoly was seen as ‘dangerous’ by the VOC administration and consequently deserved to be paid more attention. The free trade in other goods was never regulated to anything like the same degree as the goods close to the monopoly and consequently in this domain the employees enjoyed more freedom to follow their inclinations. A pass-system was used to make sure that no ports other than those specified were visited; private traders would not be allowed the chance to escape control or taxation. Proof that this is how free trade functioned in Houghlij in Bengal can also be found in the Generale Missiven. 265 In order to protect the prevailing VOC monopolies, instruments were devised to avert any impertinent intrusion on its prerogatives by its own servants. Van Imhoff also shrewdly introduced other incentives in the form of employee participation in the VOC trade, even opening up private participation in the trade in monopoly goods. The Opium Society was founded to replace the VOC monopoly on Opium sales in the Archipelago. The Company imported the opium to Batavia from Bengal, where the Opium Society bought it and sold it on. The Opium Society was obliged to pay the Company a fixed price for the opium on delivery in exchange for obtaining the monopoly on its sale in the Archipelago, thereby transferring the costs of distribution and enforcing the monopoly on the new society. The profit generated from this sale was shared between the Company and its shareholders. 266 Instituting such societies seems to have been linked to the opening of free trade to Batavia, which meant the possibilities for smuggling were ample 265 J.E. Schooneveld-Oosterling, Generale Missiven, Volume 11, 166. Since the Governor received 1 per cent of the total 5 per cent of VOC tax on private trade, this would mean a total turn over of ƒ2,400,000 in private trade at Nagapatnam. And .NA, Collectie Alting, Consideratien: Free trade in Souratta, 38, §404, the toll on private merchants is no longer determined at 4 but at 5 per cent, and should be divided as follows: 21/2 per cent for the king’s tol 1 per cent for the Company 1 per cent for the Director ½ per cent for the Public Prosecutor 266 F.S. Gaastra, ‘De Amfioen Sociëteit. Een geprivilegieerde handelsmaatschappij onder de vleugels van de VOC, 1745-1794’, in M. Ebben en P. Wagenaar (eds), De cirkel doorbroken. Met nieuwe ideeën terug naar de bronnen, Opstellen over de Republiek (Leiden 2006) 101-115; F.S. Gaastra, Particuliere geldstromen binnen het VOC-bedrijf 1640-1795 (Van Gelderlezing 2002), 36-42. and therefore new measures were needed to stop it. 267 Opium was one of the products which could easily be smuggled, so measures were deemed necessary to protect the income of the Company from the monopoly on this product. The idea behind the way in which the opium trade was conducted was that the employees who were personally profiting from the trade would protect their own interests by tracking down smugglers, thereby obtaining a greater profit for the Company and, of course, for the Opium Society­stockholders. Both would profit, but it was the Company, which stipulated the rules in the contract. Although the Opium Society is the best known example of such a mechanism of control, there are other such examples. Other commercial activities were likewise organized in private companies or societies, for example the Pearl Fisihery Company at Workai on Banda. The High Government would later revoke this idea of a pearl fishery company, because the servants involved demanded the right to free trade without intervention of any society.268 Other examples are the societies active in trade in Sumatra, which had implications for the Company’s pepper trade. Other advantages of conceding trading privileges to societies was that such bodies were easy to control, they collected money owed immediately, and the Company did not have to wait for what trade or tax would happen to bring in nor did it have to invest its own capital. The collection of taxes was enduringly difficult to control and it was more convenient to collect the money at once from such a legally constituted society. Yet more structural changes were made to support private trade and to inspire confidence among the private traders. New institutions were created which lasted until the end of the VOC era, just as did the regulations on private trade. First of all, in 1745 the Bank of Lening was created, which after a re-organization in 1751 would continue its existence as the Bataviasche bank-courant until 1794. This bank was established at Van Imhoff’s instigation, but it was Mossel, as Director-General under Van Imhoff, who expanded its scope. The idea was to have a bank from which private merchants could borrow money and thereby stimulating trade. Director-General Mossel wrote a report and gave the first impetus for the Collegie van Commercie, an organization which would act 267 NA, Hoge Regering, 20 november 1745, Extract circulair missive, 307, f351-352. 268 J.E. Schooneveld-Oosterling, Generale Missiven (RGP), Deel 11, 33, 31 December 1743, betreffende de parelbanken, etc; 135, 31 December 1744, de vaart op de parelbanken, etc. as a broker in disputes between merchants.269 The continuation of both these institutions and of the Opium Society are unequivocal indications that the organization of the dual system endured until the end of the Company, even though internal and external influences exerted pressure on the system as it evolved to meet the challenges of the eighteenth century. The regulations on private trade originally conceived by Van Imhoff exhibit considerable continuity up to the end of the VOC era and in context remained surprisingly close to their original form. Normally, the first few articles stated the commodities in which trade was strictly forbidden: spices, opium, pepper, tin, coffee and indigo, although the goods on the list did change over time.270 Regulation was more precisely specified by region, indicating what was allowed where and what was forbidden. The regulations were extremely thorough in what they specified: the goods, the places where trade was allowed and the distinction to be made between employees, free­burghers and VOC subjects.271 One kind of trade or a single trading route could be barred for some years and then suddenly be thrown open again. It is clear that if such regulations are not considered as part of this a continuous whole and that the (false) impression may be created that they were abolished forever. Even worse, some historians have assumed all private trade was completely forbidden, because they were not aware that after Van Imhoff only some sections of trade were abolished or re-instated. In actual fact, the employees in India were stimulated to conduct private trade in the same manner as was generally introduced under Van Imhoff.272 Parts of the system have been described, 269 N.P. van den Berg, De Bataviasche Bank-Courant en Bank van leening 1746-1794 (Amsterdam, 1870), 4-7. 270 The repetition of and slight alterations to this list continued until Governor-General Alting (1780-1796), who published only the changes he had made to De Klerk’s regulations, just as had De Klerk himself on the basis of earlier regulations. As a result, this system of regulations initiated by Van Imhoff survived until the end of the VOC era. In the Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia, I found a document containing regulations of VOC establishments from the era of Van Imhoff up to 1771, clearly indicating that there was continuity until 1771. However, this does not mean that free trade was revoked in that year, as is convincingly shown by the existence of similar documents further specifying free trade after 1771. For example, in 1778 Governor-General De Klerk (1777-1780) published a new set of regulations, which referred back to the regulations of 1771 and were presented as an extension on these regulations. Van der Chijs, Nederlandsch-Indisch plakaatboek,Volume 10, 300-314.271 Sometimes trade in particular goods to specific regions was allowed only to one of these groups. This is probably why Colenbrander- mistakenly- assumed that free trade was only permitted to free-burghers H.T. Colenbrander, Koloniale Geschiedenis, Volume 2 (’s-Gravenhage 1925), 231. 272 NA, Hoge Regering, 310, Extract uijt de Generaale Resolutien, 173-177, 27 mei 1774, without authors being aware of the long-term implications or the consequences for other regions, for instance, in the case of free trade in Java round the year 1775.273 The moment the Company relaxed the rules on private trade privileges, it also commenced accepting more remittance money. The fortunes garnered by Company servants were temporarily used by the VOC in trade to Europe. Since the East India companies held a monopoly on all trade with Europe, the only possible way to transmit a fortune was through their services. Once it was in its hands, the Company used the money to be sent home as investment money for the purchase of goods for the European market, thereby avoiding the extra costs of purchasing and sending silver out from the Netherlands.274 Until 1743 the Company would only countenance its servants sending money home on their repatriation or to assist a needy family member in Europe, stipulations which can be construed as implying a certain amount of control. Van Imhoff, however, championed accepting all the money private individuals offered in Batavia without any strings attached. Logically, all official enquiries to discover if the fortune was made from private trade were also stopped.275 No more questions were asked and Van Imhoff calculated that the private fortunes remitted would yield a return of at least 7 to 8 per cent for the Company, unequivocal evidence that the Company profited from this privilege.276 In 1747, the Gentlemen XVII decided to double the amount accepted for Europe to 2 million guilders, slowly climbing to 3 million in 1771. This meant that in the eighteenth century 237 million guilders had been accepted, while in the seventeenth century only 30 million had been accepted. In the eighteenth century the total investments (…)success of the stipulations made, unreduced and accurate supervision that our concession are not misused for conducting of an illicit trade, we have judged it not inexpedient to prescribe some general rules, and these are, first of all, to persuade and encourage all well-off servants and all other subjects of the Company including the Moor merchants in Bengal and in Surat, who have some relations with the Company, to equip ships or other vessels for over there, or to other places where they will be admitted, secondly, to assist them with the necessary precaution. (…). 273 G.J. Knaap, Shallow waters, Rising tide: shipping and trade in Java around 1775 (Leiden: KITLV press, 1996), 75 and 77, the private trade around Java was regulated by the VOC, leading to the author’s assumption that this trade was allowed only to indigenous traders. In contrast, it was observed that senior servants owned ships, but it was not concluded that Company employees and free-burghers were included in this system of regulations. 274 Gaastra, particuliere geldstromen binnen het VOC-bedrijf 1640-1795, 16 275Ibidem, 26. 276 Ibidem, 18. of the VOC in trade to Europe did rise and bills of exchange played a relatively larger part in this investment.277 2. Freedom of trade and decline In documents on private trade of the first period (1743-1771), the limits of freedom of trade was summed up by the VOC in one phrase: ‘For the good of the Company’. Since the expression ‘For the good of the Company’ was conveniently rather vague and leaves room for interpretation, the Governor-General was the judge who decided what was good for the Company and what was not. This moralistic phrase was used to entrench the idea in the servants’ minds, but it is necessary to consult the regulations on private trade to obtain a good idea of the concrete VOC priorities. In the early period, they show the Company was mainly preoccupied with the internal management of private trade in its relation to the VOC monopolies.278 In allowing private trade, the Company balanced its own interests against the interests of its servants and subjects finaly, but the advantages for the Company outweighed those for all others. It helped the Company to exact an income from tax and allowed it to retrench on materials. As the VOC reached the limits of its financial capacity, allowing regulated private trade certainly brought down costs, but also financed the mounting demand of the rise in Exports to Europe. 277 F.S. Gaastra, Private Money for Company trade. The role of the bills of exchange in financing the return cargoes of the VOC, in Itinerario 13/1 (1994), 65-76. 278A change of Governor-General usually ushered in a certain amount of instability, as people could not be sure whether they would be able to continue their trade. When Mossel died, the employees were uncertain about the continuation of private trade, because Mossel’s successor, Van der Parra, was known to have his own ideas and the course he would choose was shrouded in mystery. At the same time, the political agenda of a Governor-General may have often been clouded by his own interests in private trade, although this is hard to prove.NA, archief van Lubbert Jan, Baron van Eck (1719-1765), number 28, letter 35, 22 May 1761, unanimous to Van Eck: (…) I have given orders to sell two vessels on the Coast the moment the occasion arises or else to set sail for Bengal in order to them there absolutely, thinking it will be the last venture I will make in equipping ships, not least because the death of our general father His Late Excellency Mossel will cause the mercantile side take a different direction, certainly since our General Van der Parra has a different system in his mind. (…) also see: Jacobs, Koopman in Azië, 125, “(…)De beweegredenen van Mossel om tegen de heldere instructies van de bewindhebbers in een nieuw avontuur te beginnen blijven duister. Het is denkbaar dat Von Kniphausen hem aantrekkelijke particliere handelsmogelijkheden heeft voorgespiegeld (…).” Over time, it was felt that Van Imhoff had been too liberal in his permission of private trade and his successor, Mossel, began to rescind the privileges. The main aims of Mossel’s policies were to avoid any long-distance free trade in products close to the VOC monopoly, as such commerce easily, albeit unwittingly, infringe on VOC trade. Free trade to Batavia, originating from Bengal, Coromandel, Malabar and Surat was banned, reserving the inter-regional trade to Batavia for the VOC, but the right to conduct free trade within these regions themselves was never abolished. Mossel left the societies created under Van Imhoff intact, probably because the rights to their commodities had been sold for a longer period of time. In fact, he even established more societies as an instrument to curb the power of private traders. 279 Although private trade privileges were cut back, the Company astutely made sure the senior servants kept a share. Later, Petrus Albertus Van der Parra (1761-1775) decided that even the privileges of the higher-ranked servants in the long distance trade in which the Company also was involved, were detrimental to VOC trade and stopped them. This brought the first period of private trade to an end, but it should be remembered that in the trades in which the Company was not active or trades to which the Company attributed less importance, private participation still existed without being subject to VOC regulations. In the first era, private trade regulation had been designed to protect the VOC monopolies (1743-1761); the second surge of regulations aimed at freeing trade (1771­1792), was prompted by the encroaching power of the English on the intra-Asian trade. In 1771, the Company enacted a strange reversal of policy by opening up the earlier forbidden long-distance trade to free trade. Van der Parra’s term of office is the pivotal point of these two eras and the reversal of policy. Taking one specific case and focusing on the reforms in the trade between the Coromandel Coast and Batavia, we see that initially he abolished all permitted trade to Batavia (1762), but in 1771 had to concede free trade rights to all servants, free-burghers and VOC subjects. Threatened by the rising power of the British Empire at this time, the Company was increasingly losing control over the intra-Asian trade it had once held. Before 1771 no European power completely 279 He also invested new societies with new privileges, for example the ‘commercie-sociëteit te Padang’ that was newly established in 1751 and was allowed to continue to operate later in 1753, when all other private traders in ‘Benzoë’ and ‘Kampher’ were banned.Van der Chijs, Nederlandsch-Indisch plakaatboek, Volume 6 (’s-Gravenhage 1889) 75-76 and 617. controlled the market on the Indian Sub-Continent. However, as the power of the British Empire began to consolidate, the EIC started controlling the market in Bengal and gradually expanded its grip to the other coasts too. Reluctantly the VOC was obliged to welcome English shipping to Batavia in order to retain its access to the Indian markets. Since English country traders had gained access to Batavia, the Company no longer saw any point in not allowing its own servants and subjects the same rights. After the Fourth Anglo-Dutch Sea War (1780-1784), the greater geographical expansion of freedom of private trade is conspicuous. Under the terms of the treaty of 1784, the EIC enforced free navigation to the Spice Islands and the English country traders availed themselves of the opportunity and sailed to these areas. Again, the VOC no longer saw any reason to exclude its own servants and subjects either, not long afterwards it simply decided to abandon all intra-Asian trade. When the Company incurred large debts in the wake of the disruption to trade during the Fourth Anglo-Dutch Sea War (1780-84) and sought for ways to alleviate its lack of funds, it allowed even more room to conduct private trade in order to generate capital which could be used in the trade to Europe. Now, even trade to Europe was also opened up under strict regulations and control very similar to privileges granted to senior servants in the long­distance trade fifteen years earlier. In 1791, all trade to Europe which was not seen as essential to the Company’s existence was opened up to private traders. 280The only condition was that private traders had to ship their goods on VOC ships and that no items still remaining under the VOC monopoly were sent. 281 This trade did not yield the expected financial fillip. The expansion of private trade rights to the whole intra-Asian trade and thence even to the European trade clearly shows that private trade reforms were strongly linked to the efforts of the Company to combat its declining power. 280 J. Landwehr, VOC, a bibliography of publications relating to the Dutch East India Company, 1602­1800 (Utrecht 1991), 720, lists the publication opening up trade to Europe for private traders and the conditions under which such trade was allowed, see also Gaastra, particuliere geldstromen, 40. 281 I.G. Dillo, De nadagen van de Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie 1783-1795 (Amsterdam 1992), 191­195. Conclusion The VOC did not maintain a static policy in monopolizing all trade, nor was it without a programme for private trade when changing circumstances in the eighteenth century placed constantly mounting demands on the VOC capital. Under these circumstances private trade was hailed as one way to solve this problem. In the first phase in which it was encouraged, an internal balance was sought between Company priorities and private trade privileges, close to the official intra-Asian trade of the VOC (1743-1771). In the second phase (1771-1796), a reversal of policy had to be effectuated as the amount of private trade was allowed was steadily expanded. This was strongly linked to the rise of the English country trade and the decline of the VOC. This second development can be illustrated geographically by the focal point of regulations, although an overlap existed between periods. First long-distance trade to Batavia was liberalized (1771-1780), and later this was extended to the trade in the Indonesian Archipelago (1784-1792). In its final years the VOC simply withdrew from competing in intra-Asian trade and its regulations concentrated on stipulating privileges in the European trade. The VOC reforms in private trade are as a barometer which bears witness to both the internal and external challenges the VOC faced as it sank into decline. In the shadow of the company : the VOC (Dutch East India Company)and its servants in the period of its decline (1740-1796) Nierstrasz, J.C. Citation Nierstrasz, J. C. (2008, November 5). In the shadow of the company : the VOC (Dutch East India Company) and its servants in the period of its decline (1740-1796). Retrieved from https://hdl.handle.net/1887/13267 Version: Not Applicable (or Unknown) License: Licence agreement concerning inclusion of doctoral thesis in the Institutional Repository of the University of Leiden Downloaded from: https://hdl.handle.net/1887/13267 Note: To cite this publication please use the final published version (if applicable). Chapter 4: Private trade with Batavia Introduction In the new dual system of trade, there was a danger zone where private trade and monopolies met. As a matter of course, most of the attention paid to regulation by the Company was directed toward this contact zone. The purpose of the regulations on private trade was not to ban all private trade; these were devised to protect the still profitable long-distance trades of the Company. A perusal of the regulations shows the Company’s long-distance trade was vigilantly protected. This is clearly exemplified in the trade link between the Indian Sub-Continent and Batavia, on which we shall focus in this chapter. These regulations also provide a map to help us trace the changes in the Company’s shifting trading priorities. We have already distinguished between two periods of VOC restrictions, each with a different dynamic. The first series of reforms was inspired by internal factors, but later in the eighteenth century external factors compelled the Company to reconsider its stringent attitude and allow its employees more freedom. This chapter sheds light on the interaction between company and servant in the embryonic phase of the decline of the VOC. How did the VOC envision this dual trade system functioning in reality? Was it able to enforce its will? What changed for Dutch private trade with the rise of the British Empire? 1. Private trade to Batavia When the VOC relinquished its monopoly on intra-Asian trade, it was not its aim to free this domain completely. Van Imhoff was convinced the Company should still continue trading and controlling the most profitable parts of its former monopoly. His thoughts turned largely to of the long-distance routes and the prized trade to the Spice Islands, but he also took the trouble to specify the most profitable goods. His train of thoughts reveals that the free trade of VOC subjects ran its own course alongside the monopolized part of the intra-Asian trade. The problem with this system was that it facilitated the smuggling of goods which the Company considered to belong fairly and squarely in its domain. Although Van Imhoff had already implemented measures to counteract smuggling, his successors found it necessary to turn towards finding a more structural solution to the unwelcome by-products of the reforms. Since its servants abused their privileges, the Company believed it had the right to secure its own interests and subsequently issued regulations to preserve its monopoly on the long-distance trade and on the trade to the Spice Islands. Van Imhoff’s reforms were considered a gateway to fraud, free trade between the Western Quarters and Batavia and the free trade to all the Spice Islands were abolished again. In a nutshell, free trade was reformed to encompass what could be considered permitted trade. Permitted trade meant a limited amount of private trade on VOC ships allowed to certain privileged persons, while all other forms of private trade on a particular route were banned. By allowing only permitted freight, private trade with Batavia was put securely under the strict supervision of the Company. The unequivocal message was that supervision was deemed necessary to protect the monopoly of the Company on certain local commodities in its intra-Asian trade: in the case of the Coromandel Coast, the axe fell on textiles for the Moluccas and Europe. This ban was a logical consequence of the monopoly the Company still held on several types of cloth, while other sorts were allowed for private trade. Given these circumstances, the private export in particular textiles under VOC monopoly remained forbidden and private trade in these items continued to be illegal. Alongside the proscribed varieties of textiles, there was indeed a free choice of a variety of textiles for permitted trade, although the Company always retained the right to include new types of textiles in its regulations. Much to the dismay of the employees, this was done once in a while, when trade in a particular textile had proved to be profitable in the permitted trade. Whenever prices and profits in trading a particular sort of textile rose sharply, the Company would hasten to reserve these items for its own profit.282 By constantly assessing the state of play, Batavia 282 NA, VOC, 4747, Memorie Mossel 1752, (…) Yet it hurts the burghers to see the Company taking back privileges by private auctions in those cottons which jump up in price (…). was involved in a never-ending balancing act between what it wanted to give to its employees and what it wanted to retain or regain for itself. The VOC had clear priorities and intentions, but the implementation of any of these could have unanticipated and unforeseen results. Its servants had no choice but to follow the rules and obey. Consequently, Van Eck’s private trade with Batavia developed fluctuating along the lines of the VOC policy. With a financial interest in a privately owned ship plying between Batavia and the Coromandel Coast, Van Eck initially profited from Van Imhoff’s reforms. The blow fell in 1752, when Mossel’s revised policy was implemented, leading to the strict prohibition of free trade between India and Batavia.283 All privately owned vessels wishing to sail this route were banned, including Van Eck’s ship. Although the limitations introduced by Mossel meant an end to free trade between Batavia and India, to foster their loyalty the more highly placed officials were compensated for their subsequent loss of income. This compensation is best exemplified by what happened to the Governors and Directors in India who were granted the right to send gepermitteerde lasten or permitted freight on every VOC ship from the Coast to Batavia. Pragmatically permitted freight on every VOC ship had always been a prerogative of seafaring officers in order to dissuade them from smuggling, and their options in goods to be traded had increased with Van Imhoff’s reforms. Now the Governors or Directors of other regions in India: Bengal, Surat, Malabar and the Coromandel Coast, obtained a similar right to send permitted freight on every VOC ship sailing directly from their regional headquarter to Batavia.284 Although the VOC concessions successfully combated smuggling, private trade privileges still occasioned problems in the official VOC trade. Although permitted trade solved the problem of smuggling, as time passed it was still considered detrimental to the Company, since the annual Eijsch from Batavia was often not met because employees had prioritized their private interests. The latter denied this and claimed the failure to fulfil the Eijsch was often attributable to unforeseen political or economic situation. Probably the truth falls somewhere in the middle as it stands to reason that employees 283 NA, Van Eck, 20, 261, 5 February 1759, Van Eck to Faure & Cordua, (...) I have a party of beautiful cotton ready, but because of the prohibition against sending goods on private ships, I do not dare expose it. (…).. 284 Van der Chijs, Nederlandsch-Indisch Plakaatboek, volume 7, 372, (...) Governor or Director on the spot from which the ship returns to Batavia…. 1 pack or load.(...) would have ordered cloth from the indigenous merchants who were involved in the VOC trade as well. In fact, the Company even ordered them to do so, because it feared the servants would otherwise order from the other Europeans. The VOC servants also enjoyed an advantage in buying cloth from the same local merchants as the Company, since this entailed cost advantages for their private trade. When the High Government found itself in the situation of not being able to fulfil yet another Eijsch, it banned the permitted freight to Batavia completely in 1762. The Company was only willing to reconsider the measure if the Eijsch were completely satisfied in the near future.285 In 1765 Governor of the Coromandel Coast, Pieter Haksteen, begged the High Government to reinstate the right to permitted freights, but there is no evidence the Company heeded his plea. In short, in this period the policy of the Company on private trade was determined by internal factors and priorities. From 1771, external factors, more specifically the increasing competition from the English country traders, usurped internal factors and began to determine the VOC policy on private trade. The situation in the intra-Asian trade had changed to such an extent, the VOC chose to open the trade to Batavia completely and allow the servants, the free-burghers and other VOC subjects free trade.286 It was hoped that by according the VOC subjects privileges they would cooperate and keep English competition at bay in the Indonesian Archipelago. At the very least, it was hoped that the English country traders would be forced to work together with the VOC subjects, allowing the Company more control over the influx of goods. In order to cement the position of the servants and free­burghers in relation to the English country traders, they were granted additional privileges. The Company allowed its servants and the free-burghers of Batavia to send textiles to Europe on the homeward-bound VOC ships.287 In the wake of the upsurge in English power after the Fourth Anglo-Dutch Sea War, the Company was forced to seek a 285 NA, Hoge Regering, 309, 253-254, 7 June 1763, permitted packages, (...) Not considering that from the missive of the Gentlemen 17 and from the 25th of October 1762, under the matters of the Coromandel with a certain probability could be seen that permitting private packs to the officials on the ships returning from the Coromandel and from Bengal are not considered negatively, it has been permitted to continue as has been made known in the resolution of the 18th and the resulting text of the 24th of December 1761, and thus not to tolerate any private import of cloth under whatever pretext (…) and NA, Van Eck, 27, br 86, 30 September 1760, Van der Parra to Van Eck. This decision coincided with the moment Van der Parra succeeded Mossel as Governor-general. 286 ANRI, VOC, 679, 193, 4 December 1770. 287 Jacobs, Merchants in Asia, 141-145. new balance with the English Country traders. In 1784 the EIC forced the VOC to allocate these English traders free trading rights. This seemed to presage that the influx of English county traders into the Indonesian Archipelago would be unstoppable. If it were to protect the trade of its subjects, the VOC had to hand its servants more trading privileges to Europe. Unfortunately, the result was disappointing but by that time the VOC no longer had the means to uphold Dutch private trade fully. 1.1 Negotiating private trade privileges As far as the servants were concerned, long-term policy counted only in as far as it affected the prospect of their own short-term profits. Although the VOC policy changed over time, individual servants made sure of optimizing the privileges they received. During Mossel’s term of office it was stipulated in the regulations that a Governor of the Coromandel Coast had the right to one chest permitted on every VOC ship sailing to Batavia. Van Eck’s most active period of private trade happened to coincide with the period when this regulation was in force and he claimed the right to two chests.288 Then, when Van Eck became Governor of the Coast he was placed in a dilemma as he had transportation space at his disposal, but no goods to trade in.289 This problem was partly solved when, on his advancement, his predecessor Governor Vermont offered him merchandise ready for shipment to Batavia. Since Vermont no longer possessed the right to send permitted freight, the goods he had ordered the year before were useless to him. This was an enormous stroke of luck for Van Eck who would otherwise have had to wait a full year before receiving the first consignment of ordered cloth. Accepting Vermont’s goods meant that Van Eck profited from his privileges from the outset, instead having to wait a year, while Vermont got the cloth he was no longer able to send to Batavia from his hands.290 288 NA, Van Eck, 20, 281, 15 April 1759, Van Eck to Joncheere. 289 NA, Van Eck, 20, 265, 16 February 1759, Van Eck to Vermont. 290 NA, Van Eck, 20, 262, 8 February 1759, Van Eck to Le Dean. The hand of the VOC was clearly visible in the choice of goods, and the rules had to be followed if the permitted trade was to be continued the next year. There can be no shred of doubt that the Company was able to assert its authority and dictate what servants could send. Goods sent to Batavia consisted of mainly luxury cloths, since cargo space was limited and luxury cloths were not bulky and earned the highest profit. There is ample evidence that the Company closely supervised what it was willing to allow and that servants had no choice but to obey. Initially, a kind of cloth called guineas was sent, 291 but from 1760 this was changed when it was included in the list of prohibited items and returned to the monopoly of the Company.292 Van Eck must have received this list about six months after it was published. Following the Company’s orders, he no longer sent guineas, indeed scrupulous in obeying the rules, he never sent any forbidden specimens of cloth. Rules imply limitations on trade, but even a limited trade such as the permitted trade was still substantial. The Company was forced to surrender parts of its intra-Asian trade to private trade, which means that in looking at the total Dutch trade we have to juggle with the loss of the official trade offset by the increasing private trade. The amount and value of the goods sent by Van Eck exceeded expectations: the permitted trade allowed considerable scope to export cloth to Batavia. The difference between the amount of permitted trade Van Eck was able to conduct at the beginning of his term and at the end was the outcome of his ability to appropriate a large part of all the permitted trade from the Coromandel Coast to himself; empty chests had to be handed over to the Governor. By applying such tactics, Governor Van Eck was able to monopolize the permitted trade from the Coast to a large extent. An examination of the invoices shows the number of ships on which Van Eck shipped his commodities increased over time.293 In 1758 Van Eck sent merchandise worth 10,593 rds; in 1759 this had risen to 37,606 rds; in 1760 it was 100,975 rds; and in 1761 it was worth 110,198 rds; an average of 18,527 rds per ship on a total of fourteen ships. The first sum is probably close to the amount of 291 In the invoices sent to Batavia, he mentioned mostly cloths in two colours; red and bleached. 292 Van der Chijs, Nederlandsch-Indisch plakaatboek (deel 7) , 357, 14 December 1759, Private trade in Guineas was no longer allowed according to a list published by the VOC. 293 In 1758 Kasteel van Tilburg, in 1759 Oud Carspel and, Leyde, in 1760 Elizabeth Dorothea, Mossel, De Wereld, Vredesteyn, ‘t Hoff d’Uno, Leyde, and the Prinses van Orange and in 1761 Neyenburg, Prinses van Orange, Luxemburg, and Leyde. trade that would have been possible if he had availed himself simply of a Governor’s privilege. The later sums probably approach the amount of trade which was conducted over and above the official VOC export from the Coromandel Coast of ƒ1,333,600 in 1752/1753. This means we can add almost 10 per cent to the total of the official VOC trade to work out the total of Dutch trade from the Coast.294 The covenanted servants were forced to let others share in their privileges as they did not control all aspects of trade. Since servants in the trading posts of the Company controlled the supply of cloths, they were in a strong position to bargain with the officers on VOC ships, who also had the right to conduct trade with permitted freight on every trip. These sailors had no difficulty to sell the goods brought from Batavia and elsewhere, but for a return cargo they depended on the offer of what was available at their place of arrival as they had neither the time nor the contacts to order cloth. It was easier for them to sell their cargo space or strike a deal with private traders on the Coromandel. The crates offered had to be put at the disposal of the Governor first because he served as the official VOC authority who redirected the crates to potential buyers. Van Eck was already acquainted with this practice before becoming Governor, having been disappointed when he had asked Governor Vermont to sell him four crates and six packages the officers had handed in, but met with refusal.295 During his term in office as Governor, Van Eck simply reserved all available freights for his own private trade, thereby claiming a substantial part of all the permitted trade from the Coromandel Coast to Batavia. The only exception Van Eck made in allowing to others permitted crates, was for higher ranking officials in Batavia who shared in the privileges. Consequently he was able to use the permitted crates of officers on VOC ships to send cloth to members of the High Government in Batavia. Of course, he avoided any official mention of their real names in order to avoid public embarrassment.296 Whatever may be presumed by historians, the permitted trade privileges were rewarding and servants cast about for more concessions, but the High Government had 294 Jacobs, Merchant in Asia, 237. 295 NA, Van Eck, 20, 48, 28 July 1758, Van Eck to Vermont. 296 NA, Van Eck, 20, 172, 10 October 1758, Van Eck to Faure & Cordua, For instance by addressing two packets for Councillor D. Van Rheden to the intermediary Dormieux. This was the case on the ship Kasteel van Tilburg. Van Eck bought two permitted chests from its captain, Bloeme, for 60 pagodes, and filled them with merchandise for Van Rheden. reached the bounds of its generosity. Unquestionably, even within the confines of what was allowed, Van Eck’s high turn-over in permitted trade is clearly at odds with the received wisdom that the permitted trade was an unrewarding and small-scale privilege. Van Eck personally viewed the permitted freight as one of the few ways by which the VOC helped servants to earn extra money. Despite our assumptions, he was not content with the quantities he was officially entitled to send. As did other employees, Van Eck judged the income from official privileges inadequate even to enable him to keep up appearances in front of the natives and other Europeans: a goal which was so much in the interests of the Company.297 His large turn-over was the consequence of Van Eck’s eagerness to enlarge the scope of his permitted freight. At first he tried to tread the official path, ordering his agent in Batavia to request more permitted crates. His agent was doubtful of the success of the request: (…) How much chance of success your Excellency’s proposal to obtain a guaranteed larger number of chests on ships leaving for Batavia for council members on the Coromandel Coast, I cannot yet ascertain, because the only answer I have received after lodging your plea that the Governor on the Coromandel Coast has no advantage other than his trade was laughter. I shall endeavour to keep your proposal alive (…). 298 His proposal met with laughter in the High Government because this body clearly did not share Van Eck’s views. The VOC was not willing to grant its servants even more ordinary privileges, but it was not so dogmatic when it came to handing out extraordinary rights under special circumstances as a sweetener. Apart from monopolizing the permitted crates offered, Van Eck was also a recipient of permitted freight by profiting from exceptional circumstances. For instance, he threw his whole weight behind the VOC campaign against the English in Bengal. Although the expedition ended in disaster when the VOC army was slaughtered at the Battle of Bedara, Van Eck personally profited indirectly from the catastrophe. The officers who participated in the disastrous expedition were each entitled to one or two chests of permitted trade goods in accordance with their rank. The last point in the instructions given to Roussel, the commander of the expedition, entitled the army officers 297 NA, Van Eck, 20, 359, 15 October 1759, Van Eck to Van der Parra, (…) Nowadays a Governor nowadays only has at his disposal what he earns by his own work in the trade, and from which he has to spent a large part to sustain his splendour (…). 298 NA, Van Eck, 27, 33, 31 January 1760, Faure to Van Eck. to permitted freight on the VOC ship which took them to Bengal and returned them to Batavia.299 With his eye firmly on the main chance, Van Eck seized the opportunity and bought a large number of chests for Batavia from the officers of the Bengal expedition. Similar exceptional opportunities to buy permitted crates presented themselves on other occasions. For instance, when the VOC ship the Haarlem was confiscated by the French, the officers where quickly released and sent to Batavia with permission to take permitted cargo on the ship on which they were given passage. 300 By utilizing such special opportunities, Van Eck purchased fifty-three chests and eight parcels in total for Batavia. The number of crates he obtained by purchase far succeeded his officially permitted freight.301 In actual fact, he craftily enhanced his permitted freight enormously without breaching any VOC regulations. Table : Number of chests and parcels sent by Van Eck to Batavia from 1758-1761 Permitted Van Eck Purchased from Third party Financial Deal Of Unknown Origin Total Chests 53 2 34 89 Parcel 9 8 19 3 39 Source: NA, 1.10.106, nr 20. 299 NA, High Government, 348, Instruction to Lieutenant-Colonel J.B. Roussel, (…) ‘Likewise it may serve to inform your Honour that we have given the right to a certain amount of permitted packs to the military officers being transported on your squadron, namely to Lieutenant-Colonel Roussel a double amount or as much as the captain, captain-lieutenant or the skipper. In line with the order it is permitted to the military captain to bring as much as the skipper. Also to give to the lieutenant and reserve officer candidate as much as is given to the lieutenants at sea and the mates.’ (…)300 NA, VOC, 2951, Council of the Coast to Mossel, 17 April 1759, 47. 301 NA, Van Eck, 20, 440, 29 March 1760, Van Eck to Faure & Cordua, (...) As a consequence of the permitted packages to the crossing officers, consist of 3 for Mister Roussel, 4 for the Captain Saint Etienne, 2 for Lieutenant Casemir, 2 for Van Gossling, 2 for Van Weesel, 1 for the general officer, 2 for the Malayan Captain Foersia Boegis. Since the officers in the expeditionary force have been granted permitted packages according to the resolution of the High Government, the same number as the naval officers and the Malayan officers also have right to a chest. We hope that it will not founder on any difficulties.(….) Table: Number of VOC vessels on which Van Eck shipped merchandise and the value of the cargo in Rix-dollars for the period 1758-1761 1758 1759 1760 1761 Total Number of ships 1 2 7 4 14 Value of cargo sent 10593 37606 100975 110198 259372 Source: NA, 1.10.106, nr 20. The limitations the Company imposed on free trade proved almost impossible to circumvent. It was illegal to send privately owned ships from India to Batavia, but this did not deter employees from trying to create pretexts in order to do just this. With the excuse of informing Batavia of the presumed sinking of a VOC ship at Bimilipatnam and about the siege of Madras, Van Eck chartered a privately owned ship from Bengal and asked for a pass for Batavia. In order to avoid confusion, this ship sailed without cargo, although Van Eck admitted to sending along some cloth, assuming this would be overlooked at Batavia and therefore slip through the net.302 The plan was thwarted when the pass for Batavia was refused and it proved impossible to extend the existing pass from Bengal. The plan was finally ruined by sheer bad luck, when the English confiscated the ship in Madras in order to use it during the siege by the French.303 Despite set-backs, Van Eck would not be deterred from the idea of taking the news to Batavia. The ship seized was replaced by Van Eck’s ship the Tartaar, which was chartered to the Company and he planned to send it to Batavia accompanied by a explanatory letter to Mossel.304 In the end, however for whatever reason, Van Eck decided not to send the ship. The only way to circumvent VOC regulations on permitted trade was by lodging a plea that this commerce was in the interests of the Company, but this was fraught with 302 NA, Van Eck, 20, 237, 10 December, 1758, Van Eck to Faure & Cordua. 303 NA, Van Eck, 20, 243, 27 December 1758, Van Eck to Van Teylingen. 304 NA, Van Eck, 20, 259, 5 February 1759, Van Eck to Mossel and 261, 5 February 1759, Van Eck to Faure & Cordua. inherent dangers if proven false. The pretext of sending a ship was repeated in 1762 when Van Eck heard of the relief of Galle and tried to utilize this opportunity. The relief of Galle was seen as a liberation and as proof that all was not lost in Ceylon, making it highly important to send word as swiftly as possible to the Council in Batavia. Again his plans came to naught as it was impossible to send the news, since the official VOC ships had sailed early so as to avoid the imminent monsoon. Still desirous of informing Batavia, Van Eck decided to charter a ship. Apart from the letters, he decided to dispatch some merchandise on this ship.305 With the vital information it carried, Van Eck had the interests of the Company in mind and in sending the goods along he was only trying to avoid losing money himself. Preening himself on his behaviour, Van Eck expected to be rewarded with the right to send the ship back loaded to the gunnels with merchandise, since he was paying for the ship without charging the Company.306 Nevertheless, in spite of his skills in persuasion even Van Eck feared being caught and in the end he was happy that none of the above-mentioned ships reached Batavia. The rest of his career, he decided to abide by the rules and refrained from sending ‘important’ information on a privately owned ship. 1.2 Guaranteed profit and extended benefits Adhering to and helping to enforce the rules guaranteed the privileged servants a profit. Certainly, a good profit on permitted trade was expected, but is hard for us to assess how much since the privileged persons had no interest in making their profits known. A good profit on the cloth sent to Batavia could be expected, since textiles were in high demand in Batavia owing to the annual arrival of two or three ships from Manila and, of course, the scheepsvrienden embarking for Europe, very happily filled their permitted chests with them.307 In 1760, however, the profits obtained did not live up to Van Eck’s expectations. Unfortunately, other trading options and profitable destinations had been rendered unsafe 305 A little parcel of cloth and some wine. 306 NA, Van Eck, 20, 645, 6 June 1761, Van Eck to De Klerk. 307 NA, Van Eck, 20, 477, 3 June 1760, Van Eck to Faure & Cordua. because of political problems. For instance, the direct private trade to Malacca and Manila had been temporarily cut off.308 By playing detective and assembling clues, there are several ways of estimating the exact profitability of the permitted trade to Batavia. One indication is the profit made on the cloth Van Eck had sent to Van Rheden. The intermediary acting on behalf of Van Rheden, Dormieux, was ordered to sell the goods for at least 4,125 rds. Dormieux, however, did not know the original price of purchase, since Van Eck made a conscious decision to share this information only with Van Rheden. Van Eck had actually paid 339 rds for the consignment, not specifying any additional costs.309 Thereby revealing the large profit margin. When Vermont returned to Batavia in 1759, he began to spread the rumour that cloth from the Coast had been excessively priced in view of how cheaply it was obtained on the Coromandel.310 This is another clue that the profit margin was higher than was realized in Batavia. The fact that the VOC limited trade also meant a guaranteed profit for the people the Company privileged. Another example of profitability is provided by a deal Van Eck made with a Captain called Bloeme, indicating a profit exceeding 20 per cent, which corresponds with other cases, and this is not the only indication of profit. When a French trading-partner with whom Van Eck had ordered merchandise died, the French authorities distrained the goods in order to establish clarity of the ownership. In his letters to the French authorities Van Eck indicates the cloth ordered was meant for Batavia. After waiting for months, Van Eck indicated what the delay was costing him: ”(…) I shall lose 30 to 40 per cent of profit on the merchandise if it is not delivered this month or at the beginning of the next, after which the season for sending merchandise to Batavia will have passed, and this will be a great loss to me(…)”.311 This suggests Van Eck expected a profit of between 30 and 40 per cent. Other sources indicate a similar amount. For one cargo, Van Eck indicated the invoice price (10,597 rds) and the sale price in Batavia (14,435 rds).312 This meant a profit of 3,856 rds or 37 per cent. Further indications are unavailable, but on the basis of what there is we can assume a profit of 30 to 40 per cent on the total value of what Van Eck sent to Batavia of 259,372 rds. After sale this would 308 NA, Van Eck, 20, 440, 29 March 1760, Van Eck to Faure & Cordua. 309 NA, Van Eck, 20 369, 5 September 1759, Van Eck to Van Rheden. 310 NA, Van Eck, 27, 33, 31 January 1760, Faure to Van Eck. 311 NA, Van Eck, 20, 137, 24 September 1758, Van Eck to Moracin. 312 NA, Van Eck, 20, 632, 24 May 1761, Van Eck to Faure & Cordua, shipment on board of the Nyenburg. have left Van Eck with the tidy sum of approximately 363,121 rds. The exact profit remains unknown, although the estimate approaches the amounts of money Van Eck had remitted to Europe from Batavia. Since privileged trade meant guaranteed profits, all senior servants were interested to share in such privileges and there were other privileges to be enjoyed as well. Members of the High Government were also interested in conducting trade in textiles and they used Van Eck to avoid the freight being linked to them. Although Van Eck did not share the purchase price with his middlemen, he was probably offering senior officials cloth at a concession. He extended a helping hand in the name of friendship and refused to conduct trade with them for profit, since his philosophy was friends should help each other without pursuit of gain. At different points in time, Van Eck did Van Rheden such favours as paying interest and bottomery on his money when this was not customary.313 In return, Van Eck suggested Van Rheden should help him to achieve promotions.314 We shall return to the social implications of this system in Part III. These officials also engaged their own special privileges in the trade to Batavia. Members of the High Government had a special privilege called Huijsgebruijk or ‘personal use’. 315 This stipulation entitled them to import any product imaginable from all over Asia to Batavia as long as it was for their own personal use, a self-limitation instituted in order to avoid excessive impartations. In order to obtain goods from the length and breadth of the continent, the members of the High Government needed the collaboration of local employees. As Chief of Palliacatta, Van Eck was approached for the first time to supply goods for ‘personal use’, following in the footsteps of former chiefs. This practice continued when on his promotion to Governor of the Coast, he was asked to provide for the needs of the Director-General and the Governor-General.316 Even when Van Eck was promoted to Governor of Ceylon, he continued to supply Huisgebruijck products.317 The 313 NA, Van Eck, 20, 289, 15 April 1759, Van Eck to Van Rheden. 314 NA, Van Eck, 20, 369, 5 September 1759, Van Eck to Van Rheden. 315 Chijs, Nederlandsch-Indisch Plakaatboek, VII, 755 13/16 April 1764, (...) the exception to this rule is the little the gentlemen of this government need for their household use. In the cloth settlements, it will be necessary for those given the commission to hand in the packages at the Company’s warehouse, to send them over with the Company’s goods and to make them known on the Company’s bill. (…) 316 NA, Van Eck, 20, 452, 6 April 1750, Van Eck to Mossel and 458, 10 April 1760, Van Eck to Van der Parra. 317 NA, Van Eck, 20, 763, 30 July 1763, Van Eck to unknown. For example in 1763, he dispatched over 50 chairs to Schreuder. supply of commodities for ‘personal use’ was just as much institutionalized as permitted freight and Van Eck was always extremely helpful in fulfilling commissions.318 Limitations on ‘personal use’ existed, but in reality it was often simply a cover up for covert commercial activities and this led to competitive advantages. The advantages of huisgebruick cloth were threefold: it was exempted from tax; it was not necessary to buy cargo space to ship it, and finally that the cloth was delivered without a commission being charged. A member of the High Government and later Governor-General, Reinier De Klerk, indicated he had sold his huijsgebruijck cloth at a profit, while the cloth of the same variety his mother-in-law had bought, had sold at a loss. The difference was that his goods had been bought under the pretext of huisgebruick, while his mother-in-law had obtained her goods differently and had among other inconveniences to pay tax. By exercising his privileges, De Klerk had done better than his mother-in-law, much to his own amusement.319 The scale of the trade for ‘personal use’ is hard to quantify, although goods in this category were shipped on every VOC ship sailing to Batavia. In the only known example of huijsgebruijck goods on a VOC ship, the consignment amounts to the far from inconsiderable sum of about ƒ 8,000 in total.320 The goods were either paid for in Batavia or money was sent over to the place of purchase.321 By handing out privileges, the VOC created room for further benefits after the trade had been conducted. After selling the permitted freight in Batavia, Van Eck’s money was put away at 3 per cent interest and was at his disposal to send to Europe.322 It was precisely the sending of money to Europe that the permitted trade provided additional advantages. Since the various European companies held a monopoly on trade between Europe and Asia, the transfer of capital from Asia to Europe was a problem all Company-employees faced. Companies had their own rules, but all prohibited remittances home by their servants except through their own Company. In the case of the VOC, in 1728 the restrictions on sending home money from Batavia were loosened. The Company wished to use this money to finance its trade to Europe and its intra-Asian trade. 318NA, Van Eck, 20, 764, 30 July 1763, Van Eck to Schreuder. 319 NA, Van Eck, 26, 6, 13 February 1759, De Klerk to Van Eck. 320 P. Groot, Accompaniments to letters from Negapatam (Madras: Government Press 1911), 184. 321 NA, Van Eck, 20, 635, 20 May 1761, Van Eck to Mossel. Mossel even sent over gold on VOC ships to pay for his ordered goods. 322 NA, Van Eck, 20, 454, 6 April 1760, Van Eck to Booms & P. Mossel. Consequently, in its pursuit of capital from that year a certain amount of money would be accepted for remittance to Europe every year subject to the status of a certain region in the trading structure of the Company and its connection to Europe. It is understandable that the opportunities for sending money home from the headquarters Batavia far exceeded the possibilities existing in the smaller trading settlements, as Batavia was the main shipping link to Europe. The permitted freight meant sending money to Batavia at a profit, while in Batavia the money could be sent to the Republic more easily and more anonymously than from other parts of the VOC empire. The privileges in trade to Batavia also attracted English money, as the VOC offered access to bills of exchange for Europe. EIC employees found it especially difficult to send money to Europe.323 It proved difficult for Van Eck’s English clientele in India to obtain VOC bills, but certainly it was easier to obtain bills for Europe in Batavia than on the Coromandel Coast. In Van Eck’s time, the normal pattern was to send the English money to an Englishman called Garden who was living in Batavia. In the earlier period, the VOC occupied a stronger financial position and had more room to pursue deals on its own terms in issuing bills of exchange on Europe, because either the VOC offered advantageous conditions or simply because not enough EIC bills were available in India, the English turned to servants with privileges to ensure their money found its way to Batavia. Van Eck used the money he had gained in the trade to Batavia to exchange for English money on the Coromandel Coast, this way obviating the need to send any money to Batavia. In this way, Van Eck obtained his money back to the Coromandel Coast cheaply if necessary.324 Van Eck also used English money to finance his permitted freight to Batavia.325 In this manner, the money financed Van Eck’s trade to Batavia, where Berg and Garden (two agents affiliated to the English) forwarded the money received to the Republic for their English clients.326 All these schemes demanded a great deal of work and sometimes the English rejected the conditions the VOC 323 F.S. Gaastra, “De VOC en EIC in Bengalen aan de vooravond van de vierde Engelse oorlog (1780­1784)”. In Tdschrift voor zeegeschiedenis; vol. 20 (2001), 1, 24-35 (12) / 2001, 10, Famous cases are those of VOC Director Ross in Bengal, who before 1780 helped send English money to the Republic. Another example is Clive, who sent a large part of his fortune home through VOC channels. 324 NA, Van Eck, 20, 442, 29 March 1760, Van Eck to Berg & Garden. 325 NA, Van Eck, 20, 210, 15 November 1758, Van Eck to Faure & Cordua. 326 NA, Van Eck, 20, 280, 15 April 1759, Van Eck to Faure & Cordua and 422, 29 February 1760, Van Eck to Du Pré & Ross. stipulated as they considered the fees the Company asked on the bills of exchange to Europe too high. In later times as its finances grew more precarious the VOC was quite eager to attract English money to keep its trade in India going and simply accepted English money in India. Even later, such VOC employees as Ross were more successful in their exploits because in a special stipulation pertaining to Englishmen the VOC changed the high interest to interest received on the money sent, instead of having to pay recognition.327 By then, the VOC was also more desperate to attract money and more likely to acquiesce in lesser terms. We often find proof of English money being paid out in Holland.328 2. Private trade from Batavia to the Coromandel Coast The trade from Batavia to the Coromandel Coast was much less regulated than the reverse trade to Batavia and provided the goods with which servants built their free trade in India. The principal purpose of this trade was to supply the European armies in India with their needs. The English and the French were not capable of supplying with sufficient alcoholic beverages for their troops and here Dutch private traders jumped in. This is illustrated in Van Eck’s instructions on what to do when one of his empty ships arrived in Batavia. Van Eck promised his agents in Batavia a 5 per cent commission if they succeeded in sending the ship to the Coromandel Coast loaded with 25 to 30 kassen of red wine and all the arrack the ship could carry.329 Unquestionably, Dutch private trade profited from the presence of foreign armies in India, but it is to be expected that English and French country traders profited to an even larger extent from the presence of their own armies. Some of the trade to the Coast from Batavia was arranged in the same way as the trade from the Coromandel Coast. First and foremost, the Governor not only had the right 327 Gaastra, De VOC en EIC in Bengalen, 2. 328 NA, Van Eck, 26, 80, 28 September 1759. Garden to Van Eck. NA, Van Eck, 26, 59, 13 August 1759, Van der Parra to Van Eck. The French also wanted Van Eck’s help to send money to Europe secretly, but Van Eck carefully calculated his risk and was less helpful to them.329 NA, Van Eck, 20, 237, 10 December 1758, Van Eck to Faure & Cordua. to permitted freights for Batavia, but also to permitted cargos on the VOC-ships sailing to the Coast. These freights consisted of sugar, rice, arrack or one of the other permitted trading goods.330 These products were in demand in India among Europeans as well among indigenous merchants, but there was competition and it was necessary to strike when the iron was hot. In 1760, Van Eck advised his English trading partners in Madras to sell his arrack before new VOC ships arrived from Batavia, since a new supply would mean a drop in prices.331 Again the privilege of permitted freight was not the sole prerogative of the Governor, since the officers of the VOC ships shared this right. For his part Van Eck sometimes profited by buying crates from such men in Batavia and sending them to the Coast filled with arrack, sugar and only now and then coffee.332 This last product was a little more problematic, and it was not long before coffee was placed on the list of monopoly goods of the Company.333 In fact it was already declared a monopoly when Van Eck was working in Palliacatta.334 Apart from permitted freight, it was possible to send a privately owned ship to the Coromandel Coast from Batavia. A good example is the Sara, which had first served as a privately owned vessel in the Archipelago, but on her final voyage was loaded with arrack and sugar. Such a trip required the special permission of the Governor-General or the Director-General. Van Eck’s supercargo, Laudea, and his agent Faure had obtained this permission for him.335 The High Government asked Van Eck to keep the permission a secret, in theory only vrijluiden or free-burghers were permitted to send such a ship.336 That same year four other ships also obtained the right to set sail for Coromandel.337 It was stipulated that no merchandise was allowed than sugar and arrack, but turning a blind eye to rules and reputation Van Eck’s ships sometimes brought sandalwood, coffee and camphor.338 On this particular trip Laudea took 25,000 to 30,000 bottles of wine with him. 330 Van der Chijs, Nederlandsch-Indische Plakaatboek, 1755 mossel, 94, § 6. 331 NA, Van Eck, 20, 463, 2 February 1760, Van Eck to Du Pré & Ross and 20, 325, 17 July 1759, Van Eck to Du Pré & Ross, Van Eck often indicated to his trading partners the possibility of obtaining new arrack on the arrival of VOC ships from Batavia. 332 NA, Van Eck, 20, 454, 6 April 1760, Van Eck to Booms & P. Mossel. 333 NA, Van Eck, 20, 644, 5 June 1761, Van Eck to Faure & Cordua. 334 NA, Van Eck, 19, 46, 7 August 1758, Captain Schreuder to Van Eck. 335 NA, Van Eck, 18, 7, 15 november 1757, Laudea to Van Eck. 336 NA, Van Eck, 20, 645, 6 June 1761, Van Eck to De Klerk. 337 NA, Van Eck, 20, 44, 20 July 1758, Van Eck to Van Teylingen. 338 NA, Van Eck, 20, 634, 20 May 1761, Van Eck to Faure & Cordua. Later, after having been appointed Governor of Ceylon, Van Eck still needed permission to send a ship to the Coast from Batavia and requested that he be allowed to send sugar and arrack. This permission depended on who was asking the favour. Since it was Van Eck’s request, the ship was allowed to load as much sugar and arrack as was desired and even the repairs of the ship were given priority. It seems therefore fair to assume that as Van Eck held an important position in the VOC hierarchy, it was easier to obtain the co­operation from the High Government.339 2.1 Protecting privileges Although the trade between the Coast and Batavia was seen as the prerogative of the VOC, a proportion of it was handed over to the senior officials, either in the form of permitted freight or in passes allowing them to send a private vessel. Quite obviously, this enabled the people in the higher echelons of the hierarchy to make a handsome profit at a low cost and with minimal risk. Profit was guaranteed and kept artificially high by the simple expedient of excluding competition. The Company was content to be in a position to control incoming and outgoing trade in Batavia so as to check if its interests had been secured and the qualified employees could be re-assured that their privileges were not being trampled on in their own regions, since this would have impinged on their personal profits. In Mossel’s regulations on private trade from the Coast to Batavia, it was stipulated that only free-burghers had the right to conduct free trade, but the qualified servants were jealous of their prerogatives and not keen on competition. In Van Eck’s case, one such free-burghers came to the Coast as his partner. This free burgher was very interested in setting up this trade route. In the presence of a notary, he guaranteed the officers on the ships to the Coast a profit of 60 per cent on what they sent to India and 20 per cent on what they would send back to Batavia. In the event they did not receive that amount of profit he would pay them the difference in goods or in money. This caused consternation among the employees on the Coast, because the officers of ships began 339 NA, Van Eck, 20, 723, 20 March 1761, Van Eck to Van Teylingen. demanding higher prices for their co-operation. The former refused to give in to their demands, since it would mean a cut of their share of the profits. Since the servants felt that only they and they alone had been accorded this privilege by the VOC, they jealously guarded what they had. The arrival of these intrusive free-burghers led to unrest on the Coromandel and caused disruptive ripples in the established trading patterns. The free burgher was bluntly told his presence was not appreciated: “First, you know all to well, that in the smaller VOC settlements almost nobody else but the chiefs and their deputies indulge in trade and that on the arrival of a ship there are almost never enough desired goods to satisfy their needs to send or to sell to friends on the ships to sell for a decent advance in cash or by exchange. You can easily understand that when I have assembled whatever kinds of goods, I have no intention at all of selling it for a trifle. And if you were to be charged in the same manner as we would sell, you would pay 20 per cent over and above that price, therefore your profit would be piddling so you would not profit much, since people charge an extra 5 per cent on commission in Batavia, apart from charging you tax and other small sums, above and beyond there. If you want to engage in such a project, you will have to promise the friends on the ship 60 per cent on what they bring, because should you not do so you will take the bread out of their mouths and you shall readily comprehend that you will not find people who will want to engage in such a commission and those who may want too will be prevented by others from doing so. So as a good friend, I advise you to relinquish your plans which many people will deem very strange and, if the truth be told, will be judged much too greedy and the news has already spread through the Coast like wildfire.”340 2.2 Social exclusion All the evidence points to one conclusion: the trade between the Coast and Batavia was monopolized by senior officials. To quite a high degree this was entrenched within the VOC structure and where no regulations existed, the higher-ranking officials 340 NA, Van Eck, 20, 152, 8 August 1758, Van Eck to Faure. enforced their rights on the basis of their place in the hierarchy. For those within the Company’s power structure, this was an easy matter, but other European or Asian private traders who felt excluded or frustrated in their ventures could sabotage the system. In order to prevent private trade by any such enterprising people outside of the Company, the High Government assiduously wielded its authority and influence in the regions under its control. In a private letter to Van Eck, we see that Director-General Van der Parra was adamant about denying private trade in Batavia to merchants outside the Company. He prohibited trade in cloth to Batavia by Armenians from Madras, Muslim traders and other people from Malabar, in order to “clear a path for those, who otherwise are denied or have difficulty in finding a permissible profit because of the competition of these heathens.”341 English private traders had difficulty buying goods in Batavia too. On the arrival of an English ship in Batavia in 1759, she was denied trade. In the end, the English ship was allowed some sugar, but only enough to remunerate the costs incurred in to sailing to Batavia and only after Garden, a resident of Batavia, had intervened on her behalf. He seems to have been some kind of agent of the English in Batavia and also had mutual commercial interests with some of the senior employees.342 Van der Parra even officially stipulated that foreign ships should be accorded the least possible help.343 The market for goods from Batavia on the Indian Sub-Continent was essentially to be found in the settlements of the other Europeans, which can be reduced to the fact that the VOC never did at any time control the market on the Indian Sub-Continent. In their endeavours to sell the Batavian goods, the VOC servants could not have operated without other Europeans and indigenous middlemen.344 Arrack found a ready market in both Pondicherry and in Madras, where the French and English required large quantities to keep their ever growing armies and fleets content.345 Van Eck’s quest for profit from Batavian goods was concentrated on other Europeans factories on the Coromandel 341 NA, Van Eck, 18, 9, 17 November 1757, Van der Parra to Van Eck, (…) It is essential not to concede the request of the Armenians of Madras, and if possible also to achieve the interdiction on the sending of cloths by the Moors and merchants from the Malabar. In order to make way for those, who otherwise would be prevented from making a permissible profit, and who would be given a hard time because of these heathens. (…) 342 NA, Van Eck, 26, 66, 9 November 1759, Van Teylingen to Van Eck. 343 Van der Chijs, Nederlandsch-Indisch Plakaatboek, 1761 Van der Parra, 514, 14 August, (…) Regulation, that the foreign ships on the roadstead of Batavia should be accorded the least possible help. 344 NA, Van Eck, 20, 181, 17 October 1758, Van Eck to Du Pré. 345 NA, Van Eck, 20,1,1 June 1758, Van Eck to Laudea and 315, 12 June 1759, Van Eck to Du Pré & Ross. Coast.346 Sugar and arrack were brought from Batavia, and rice and other grains from Bengal and sometimes wine from the Cape. The production of arrack and sugar in and around Batavia was concentrated in the hands of the employees. Around 1775, the total export of sugar from Batavia amounted to approximately 11,500 pikul in total, of which more than 7,500 was destined for the Coromandel Coast, mostly in Dutch ships. The bulk was sold in other European settlements. 347 Even then, in 1775, half of the private trade shipments of the sugar to India was in the hand of foreign European traders, a definite indication of a decline in Dutch trade over time.348 As long as the Company held the political control in Batavia and in its possessions in India, this situation was unswerving and immutable up to the point when colonial control of the market in Bengal by the EIC and the primacy of English power at sea altered the rules of the game. Initially English settlements were not the only market for Dutch arrack, but their increasing power gradually left fewer alternatives, eroding the position of Dutch private traders. Around 1760, the interference in the trade in sugar by other Europeans must have been less marked than it was to become in the 1770s; most of the trade was then still in the hands of the VOC and its employees. Lucrative alternatives to the English settlements still existed, exemplified by the evidence that Van Eck made arrack arrangements with the French, at a high fixed price.349 Occasionally, the English had to be conceded part of the trade of arrack at Batavia, but the VOC was determined to maintain control.350 At the time of Van Eck, the VOC made sure that the English would not get their hands on more arrack than the amount which could be loaded in one ship in a move obviously design to protect Dutch private trade. When the EIC was in as position to cut off all VOC trade to Bengal after its conquest there, it was possible to use this as an instrument to cleave a way to English access to Batavia. As it is undisputed that the English Country traders took over part of the trade from Batavia, the position of Dutch 346 NA, Van Eck, 19, 35, 7 June 1758, Laporterie to Van Eck. 347 NA, Van Eck, 20, 476, 2 June 1760, Van Eck to Booms & P. Mossel. As seen in the previous chapter, at an earlier stage Van Eck obtained sugar through the permitted freight on VOC-ships and also by sending privately owned ships.348 Knaap, rising tides, 88.349 NA, Van Eck, 26, 86, 30 November 1759, Dumont to Van Eck. 350 NA, Van Eck, 20, 506, 30 July 1760, Van Eck to Van Teylingen. Obtaining a share was only authorized by the intervention of a trusted Englishmen, as Garden who lived in Batavia. For example, he had sent a brigantine to the Coast in 1761 filled with arrack for the English army. private trade in India must have deteriorated. The VOC and its servants were steadily forced to surrender parts of trade as the English power in India grew and the British sent even larger numbers of their own ships to Batavia to buy arrack. Under the treaty of 1784, free trading rights throughout the whole Indonesian Archipelago were given to English country traders, which made it impossible for the VOC to enforce its authority as it had done in the days of its glory. Not unnaturally as the position of Dutch country trade was declining on the whole, the VOC servants were not overly delighted with increasing but rather spoiled private trade privileges. The senior servants on the Coromandel Coast weighed up their privileges in relation to those of servants in other regions. It had always been accepted that on reaching a higher position in the Company, a VOC employee would have the opportunity to conduct private trade and be assured of a fairly handsome profit. However, Van Eck was not at all satisfied with the privileges granted to the holder of the position of Governor of the Coromandel Coast. Assessing the other VOC Governors and Directors in the vicinity, Van Eck judged his own position very weak. His perceived inadequacy of income as Governor on the Coromandel Coast was illustrated by the ‘douceur’ or remuneration received by his colleagues in Bengal and in Ceylon, whereas a Governor on the Coast had to content himself with trading privileges. He had to work hard on building up his private trade to make his fortune and the VOC policy of allowing him to send a few parcels free of tax, was judged only a slight amelioration of this situation.351 The senior servants were not backward in comparing their privileges in relation to those enjoyed in former days. The power of the position of Governor of the Coromandel Coast diminished from what it once had been. Previously, a Governor of the Coromandel Coast received an emolument of ƒ24,000 from the taxes on the free trade with Batavia. In addition to this douceur, the Governor could send as much freight as he wanted on VOC­ships without paying tax in Batavia.352 Since the reforms of Mossel, his position had deteriorated, compelling Van Eck to ask for more freight and more privileges. The request Van Eck had made to the High Government for more permitted parcels in 351 NA, Van Eck, 20, 452, 6 April 1760, Van Eck to Mossel. 352 NA, Van Eck, 20, 451, 6 April 1760, Van Eck to Van der Parra. exchange for stricter taxation on free trade on the Coast was refused.353 When Van Eck submitted a plan to end abuse and evasions of tax by the servants on the Coast in exchange for untaxed permitted freight for the officials, Van der Parra dismissed the plan as unfeasible, since this would be openly stating that free trade in cloth was permitted.354 Conclusion Before 1771, the main preoccupation of the VOC had been keeping a strict surveillance on the private trade of its servants and subjects. The vexed question of private trade presented the VOC with two problems in the long-distance trade between the West and Batavia. The principal worry was smuggling of goods under monopoly, and secondly the immersion of the servants, so engrossed in prioritizing their private trade, rather than directing their attention to taking care of the annual VOC Eijsch or the official demand for all trade within Asia and to Europe. Governors-General Van Imhoff, Mossel and Van der Parra all had their own opinions about how to tackle these two problems, but during their respective terms of office repressive rules governing trade to Batavia slowly multiplied. Van Imhoff simply allowed free trade and decided to concentrate on taking action on opium, since this was the most likely commodity to be smuggled. In order to halt contraband, he sold the right to sell the opium in the Indonesian Archipelago to the Opium Society. After Van Imhoff, there were undisguised intimations that the VOC also had problems with imposing its authority in the trade in cloth. Desirous of protecting all its monopolies, the VOC brought all the trade from the West to Batavia back under strict central control. This was done by dividing the private trade for its servants into two separate spheres: one to the West and one to the East with Malacca as its centre. The main problem encountered by the VOC in this period was to keep the trade between these two regions under its control, ensuring its mastery over all long-distance trade to Batavia and the Spice Islands, thereby precluding infringements. The Company 353 NA, Van Eck, 20, 452, 6 April 1760, Van Eck to Mossel. 354 NA, Van Eck, 27, 34, 31 January 1760, Van der Parra to Van Eck. was determined to exert growing control on what was brought into Batavia and by whom. In a first move free trade was exchanged for a system of permitted trade, meaning private trade was only allowed by a privilege granted on VOC ships and only in goods not under the VOC monopoly.355 By allowing those holding certain senior positions within the VOC hierarchy to trade a certain number of crates, the High Government hoped to limit trade to Batavia to the senior officials, who could be held responsible if trade was not working to the advantage of the VOC. Ship’s officers had also always had this right to trade a certain number of crates and their privileges were similarly widened by giving them the right to send cloth, which had not been allowed before. The people who received these trading rights, enjoyed a virtual monopoly on the private trade to Batavia. They made more money than they had before and this made them eager to protect their interests against outsiders. With so much of their own at stake, they functioned as a protection against any intrusion on the VOC trade, since this would be just as detrimental to the VOC as to private trade position. Allowing this trading privilege to a small group of people also made it easier to hold this group responsible for upsets and infringement on trade; the withdrawal of privileges being the word of Damocles held above their heads. The Company had fewer objections to private trade to the West from Batavia, leaving it as free trade to the free-burghers of Batavia and often authorizing servants to send privately owned ships. In this trade, servants sold sugar to the English and French armies, a trade increased by the growing number of European armies whose presence as required by the number of wars which proliferated. 355 Van der Chijs, Nederlandsch-Indisch Plakaatboek, volume 7, 358, (...). Art 4 Trade in coarse, rough, bleached, red and blue cottons is forbidden, also all silk cloths from Surat and all cottons, bought for the Company. Art 5 The import of the following cottons is forbidden in this port on company ships or in any other fashion upon penalty of confiscation and fine of four times its value. To be known (...) Cormandelse: Guinees Salempoeris Parcallen Dongrys And all comparable species, bei t common or English or companies variety, being of 12 caal inclusive of 2880 treads and beneath, and all silk cloths and cottons from Surat Between 1761 and 1771 the VOC shifted from complete freedom of private trade to a complete VOC monopoly on trade from India to Batavia, but in 1771 the prohibition on free trade to Batavia was annulled again, and this trade was allowed to servants, the burghers of Batavia and the indigenous traders on privately owned vessels. This policy was not structurally changed until the end of the Company’s existence, nor did it come under debate after 1784. At that moment, the EIC forced the VOC to allow free trade in the Indonesian Archipelago to the English country traders under the terms of the peace treaty of the Fourth Anglo-Dutch Sea War. Unquestionably the reforms of 1771 were also linked to the expanding English country trade, which the VOC did its utmost to control by political means. By allowing free trade to Batavia from the West to its subjects the VOC hoped that they would able to keep the English private traders at bay. While the VOC had a certain amount of power over the private trade of its employees, it had much less say about the increasingly assertive English country trade. When it was forced to allow English country traders into the Indonesian Archipelago, there was no reason to deny its own subjects the same rights. Instead of controlling the intra-Asian trade, the aim of the VOC now switched to keeping as much of the intra-Asian trade in Dutch hands, Company or private trade as possible. After the Fourth Anglo-Dutch Sea War, when the EIC forced the VOC to concede free trade in the Archipelago to the English country traders, any illusion of keeping them out of the Archipelago was shattered. In the shadow of the company : the VOC (Dutch East India Company)and its servants in the period of its decline (1740-1796) Nierstrasz, J.C. Citation Nierstrasz, J. C. (2008, November 5). In the shadow of the company : the VOC (Dutch East India Company) and its servants in the period of its decline (1740-1796). Retrieved from https://hdl.handle.net/1887/13267 Version: Not Applicable (or Unknown) License: Licence agreement concerning inclusion of doctoral thesis in the Institutional Repository of the University of Leiden Downloaded from: https://hdl.handle.net/1887/13267 Note: To cite this publication please use the final published version (if applicable). Chapter 5: Country trade on the Coromandel coast Introduction While most VOC regulations monitored those sort of trades close to the remaining VOC monopoly, the Company freed trade on the Indian Sub-Continent completely to its subjects. In contrast to trade with Batavia, the country trade within the Western sphere was left virtually unregulated.356 The Company had weighed up the pros and cons and decided that trade with the Spice Islands and long-distance trade were its most profitable pursuits. The commodities which had to face stiffer competition from indigenous and other European merchants were less interesting, the upshot being that the trade in the Western sphere or the areas west of Batavia was liberalized. Instead of focusing on regulations, this chapter will devote a case study to the Dutch country trade from the Coromandel Coast. An analysis of this trade will show the background behind the rhythm of the unregulated trade. Participation in this trade Dutch country traders had to combat direct competition from the other European country traders, although co-operation was also not out of the question. This co-operation was linked to the institutional advantages the different Company servants enjoyed, and shifts in power occasioned changes in the existing patterns. This chapter will deal with the question of how the servants organized their private trade in the Western sphere and what caused the VOC subjects to lose out against the English private traders. 1. The VOC Empire and country trade The private trade of the Company servants on the Indian Sub-Continent was based mainly on imports from Batavia, a circumstance which gave the VOC a degree of control over this private trade. Apart from serving the daily needs of the servants, the goods 356 The only exception was free trade to Ceylon, which had several monopolies in need of protection, which meant a ban on free trade from 1754 until 1771. brought to the Coromandel Coast from Batavia also provided the servants there with the resources for private trade opportunities. Several mechanisms existed to offer such goods as provisions, sugar and arrack on the market. First of all, the Company sold these products itself. Secondly, the highest officials in a VOC settlement were allowed to take in supplies from the Company to provided for warehouses what they needed for huysgebruik (household use) at the wholesale price plus a surcharge for the VOC of 50 per cent of the added value for goods from Holland and 30 per cent of the added value on goods from Asia. This privilege was allowed as long as the officials used it sparingly.357 Thirdly, permitted trade also brought in quantities of products from Batavia. Above and beyond the normal supply from official VOC sources, privately owned ships could be sent to the Coromandel Coast filled with non-monopoly goods. Free-burghers could send such vessels without permission, but servants needed official permission to do so (see previous chapter). Because of enforced competitive advantages, the Company could first sell what it wanted to trade, before those privileged to do so could sell goods more cheaply than the provisions brought in on privately owned ships. In a nutchell, these privately owned ships could not compete on the same level with the permitted trade nor with the privileges granted to the senior servants, since the senior servants were not required to pay the full price for the goods as the free traders had to do. The higher ranking officials made good use of their privileged trade (see previous chapter) and of their right to buy provisions at concession rates. Since this privilege was an important instrument by which to increase their income, they did not hesitate to resort to it when an opportunity for making a profit presented itself. A good example of such behaviour was when Governor Vermont let the French army enter the town of Nagapatnam. He sold all the official stocks of provisions in the city to the French and by doing so he allegedly made his personal fortune in one fell swoop. The inhabitants of Nagapatnam were less happy with his actions, since it caused a shortage of stock and a rise in prices. When the presence of French troops led to tension and blatant problems, Vermont realized that he had underestimated the consequences of his decisions. Before Batavia dismissed him, he decided to request for his recall to Batavia. His main patron, Governor-General Mossel, made sure that criticisms of Vermont’s actions were not 357 Van der Chijs, Nederlansch-Indisch Plakaatboek, Mossel 1755, 93-94. linked to his pursuit of private fortune and focused instead on his political failure to uphold neutrality. As luck would have it, this served Mossel too, since some years later he was a beneficiary of part of Vermont’s fortune.358 There was always an uneasy tension in the balance between private and Company interests, and the High Government often wanted to revise certain privileges with a view to obtaining more profit for the Company. At the time of Van Eck, the Company and its servants were profiting from the demand for sugar in India, as Batavia was the only possible supplier of large quantities.359 The area around Batavia was absolutely littered with production sites of sugar and most of these sugar-mills were owned by the more higher placed officials.360 The sugar-producers sold their sugar to the Company, but were also entitled to sell sugar to private traders or send their sugar to India through the offices of the free-burghers.361 The Company made sure that no competition threatened the sugar it still traded in India by forcing reasonably favourable contracts on the sugar-producers. If the latter did not honour these contracts, the Company would forbid the sale of sugar until it had been supplied in full. The permitted and free traders bought sugar at higher market prices, ensuring the Company sold its sugar obtained at fixed lower price first. In turn, the bulk of the sugar trade on the Coast was left to private trade, since the Company was only interested in trading in sugar to fill up empty cargo space, guaranteeing there was still a market left for private trade.362 Jacobs says that private trade in sugar to Malabar was banned around 1764, when the Company imposed a monopoly on this trade. We argue that private trade in sugar continued until the end of the VOC era, since neither the Heeren XVII nor the High Government felt that all the sugar could be traded by the Company at a satisfactory profit.363 The plan to revert the whole trade of sugar to the hands of the Company was impeded by a lack of capital and the interest in the sugar trade of the most powerful servants. 358 NA, Van Eck, 27, 36, 2 February 1760, Van Teylingen to Van Eck. 359 Jacobs, Merchant in Asia, 275. The peak in the production of sugar round Batavia lay around 1767. 360 Jacobs, Merchant in Asia, 275; De Haan, Oud Batavia, 324; Raben, Batavia and Colombo, 62. 361 Jacobs, Merchant in Asia, 275. 362 NA, High Government, 27, “ (…) Even though the sugar trade has been left to the private traders, the Company still filled the empty cargo space to the West with sugar.(…)”363 In the official catalogue of the VOC archives this document is dated as 1765, yet in the article itself reference is made to the war with the English in 1780, so the document must be of a much later date. The less the VOC was interested in a product, the greater the opportunity given to private trade. One product closely related to sugar was arrack, a distilled alcoholic beverage much sought after by the Europeans in Asia. Batavia was the main supplier of arrack to the European settlements on the Indian Sub-Continent and Dutch private traders built at least part of their trade on the demand for this commodity. Prior to 1790, a large proportion of the arrack drunk by English troops in India was either Dutch or Portuguese in origin.364 Most of the Dutch arrack was sent from Batavia, and in 1775 the arrack exports from that city amounted to about 15,000 kelder. The official VOC export of arrack was much smaller than that of the private sector, almost 3,000 against 12,000 kelder for the private sector.365 Within the private sector, the most important destination was India, with more than 6,500 kelder. The Company was less preoccupied with the trade in arrack than in the trade in sugar. These figures show that in their export of arrack Dutch private traders were given almost free rein. Viewing Van Eck’s day, it would be an anachronistic mistake to overemphasize the competitive side of the relationship between private traders of different nations. The Company servants catered to the Europeans, and servants of various VOC settlements helped each other in meeting the European demand. 366 When the French from Pondicherry asked for arrack and Van Eck had nothing left, he referred them to Van Teylingen and Vermont, who still had arrack in storage.367 When Van Eck received the Sara from Batavia, he did not want to wait for English ships to come to Palliacatta, but decided to dispatch the arrack to Madras as quickly as possible.368 If employees did not succeed in selling arrack in their port of residence, English or French merchants were promised a commission for selling the goods which were left.369 English country traders were very eager to make deals on arrack.370 For example, a merchant from Madras offered to buy all the Dutch arrack arriving on the Coast in 1760 if Van Teylingen 364 Furber, Rival Empires of Trade, 181. 365 Knaap, Rising Tides, 92. 366 NA, Van Eck, 20, 468, 7 May 1760, Van Eck to Schreuder. When Ceylon needed rice, Van Eck asked Schreuder if the VOC would accept trade in kauris too, because he wanted to send a ship to the Maldives in order to obtain arrack and areca nuts from Ceylon in exchange. 367 NA, Van Eck, 20, 196, 4 November 1758, Van Eck to Berthelin. 368 NA, Van Eck, 20, 73, 12 August 1758, Van Eck to unknown. 369 NA, Van Eck, 20, 51, 10 August 1760, Van Eck to Du Pré & Ross. 370 NA, Van Eck, 20, 457, 10 April 1760, Van Eck to Van Teylingen. supplied it at 53 pagodas per legger. This price was higher than the norm, but Van Eck estimated it reasonable since the English had not sent any ships to Batavia to obtain arrack for their armed forces that year. These kinds of schemes were easier to think up then to execute, since on the arrival of VOC ships everybody would simply sell to the highest bidder. No individual VOC servant would have been able to keep the promise of supplying all the arrack.371 The plan fell through completely when Van Eck himself started selling his arrack to the Englishmen for 63 pagodas.372 Large profits could be made in this trade and the war between the French and English offered plenty of possibilities to exploit the VOC´s neutrality.373 When the French besieged Madras in 1758, Van Eck had his wine sent to Madras for it to be sold it to the French army. This was a highly profitable venture: Van Eck received 6 rupees per bottle instead of the usual 2 ½.374 The VOC servants held a strong position in the wine trade, since wine was also brought from the Cape by VOC ships.375 1.1 Institutional advantages The profit obtained from selling the Batavian goods in India enabled the VOC servants to establish and finance free trade in their own establishments. Just as the other European private traders, Dutch country traders were active all over Asia: from Persia to Manila, in Jeddah, Mocha, Surat, Malabar, the Coromandel Coast, Bengal, Pegu, and China. Apart from the general trade destinations, every nation had its own specific preferred ports, corresponding to its territorial presence. French country traders, for instance, often diverted from the main route to visit Mauritius, while the English visited Bengkulu in Sumatra, before continuing to China or Manila.376 The Dutch private trade 371 NA, Van Eck, 20, 460, 15 April 1760, Van Eck to Du Pré & Ross. 372 NA, Van Eck, 20, 481, 8 June 1760, Van Eck to Van Teylingen and 20, 485, 10 June 1760, Van Eck to Du Pré & Ross. 373 NA, Van Eck, 20, 162, 8 August 1758, Van Eck to Bottinger. Van Eck managed to obtain more wine from the Cape by hiring a Danish ship. 374 NA, Van Eck, 20, 241, 14 December 1758, Van Eck to Dietloff. 375 NA, Van Eck, 35, 7, 1 May 1763, Reede van Oudshoorn to Van Eck. 376 Arvind Sinha, The politics of trade (New Delhi: Manohar, 2002), 104. also had its preferred places spread out along the ubiquitous VOC intra-Asian trade network. The most difficult part of the operation was organizing this trade, and there was a strong pragmatic side to the pursuit of profits. Some of the organizational questions to be solved were how to return profit to the home-port by using bills of exchange. Of course there were promising markets for merchandise in other European ports, such as Madras and Pondicherry.377 As we have seen, the servants profited from the upsurge in activities of the English armies and troops, which meant an assured market for such goods as arrack and food. As part of an integrated process, the servants’ trade was also linked to indigenous commerce and markets. The hinterland of Nagapatnam, the headquarters of the VOC on the Coast, was one such market.378 Substantial trade was carried on with indigenous ports, for example, timber and ivory were brought from Pegu. The guiding rule for ships of the free trade was to seek profit wherever possible. As in the nature of things, the political situation strongly influenced trade: not always detrimentally but sometimes presenting opportunities for more profit. The choice of supplier of goods was quite irrespective of nationality, and depended on who was able to supply at the right price and at the lowest risk. Before 1759, Van Eck had mostly ordered textiles from French merchants, but after 1759 he switched to English suppliers. By that time, there were undeniable signs the French were losing the Seven Years’ War, and the element of risk involved in ordering from the French merchants loomed too large.379 This danger was emphasized by the warning issued to all servants to hasten to dispose of merchandise of French origin in the VOC trading-ports, as the English were sending an army to seize all French possessions.380 This war also undeniably presented opportunities, as Van Eck profited from the neutrality of the Company by continuing to 377 NA, Van Eck, 20, 431, NA, Van Eck, 20, br 463 and 26, br 40, where Van Eck sold wood to the respective companies. 378 NA, Van Eck, 20, 436, 22 March 1760, Van Eck to Du Pré & Ross. 379 NA, Van Eck, 2, 1, 27 May 1758, Van Eck to St. Verquet. Within Asia, the servants capitalized on the neutrality of the Netherlands. When Pondicherry was under siege, Van Eck sent English money to the French, receiving a commission for helping out. After 1759, trade with the French private trade became more difficult as financial difficulties troubled the French government. With the French losses in various military battles, even the French private traders had problems of liquidity and this caused unwanted delays and damage to Van Eck’s business. At first, the shortage of funds was said to be because the governor was so preoccupied by the arrival of a fleet of French ships, leaving him no time to process bills of exchange.380 NA, Van Eck, 20, 169, 8 October 1758, Van Eck to Ditloff and 20, 414, 29 January 1760, Van Eck to Du Pré & Ross. sell textiles for the French merchants at his place of residence. 381 He acted as an intermediary between the French and the English merchants, who wanted to secure goods from the territories of their enemy, all for a share in the profit.382 Employees from Bengal likewise capitalized on the unrest on the Coromandel Coast by sending profitable shipments of provisions.383 The negative consequences of the war were felt in the impact of the political dominance of the EIC in Bengal which discommoded the free trading servants. After the Battle of Plassey, Robert Clive not only instituted measures to prevent official VOC trade with Bengal, he also did his best to impede Dutch country trade. Van Eck’s ship, the Sara, was forbidden access to Bengali ports.384 This ban on Dutch private trade was lifted in 1759, and Van Eck began to send ships to Bengal again. By that time, his trade was redirected away from the Dutch settlement at Houghly to Calcutta, clear evidence of the increasing English influence on trade.385 The profit made on products from Batavia was supplemented by profits from free trade, which gave the servants on the Coast purchasing power to buy up textiles.386 These textiles were a luxury commodity intended for overseas markets, for instance Batavia and Manila.387 The expedient of ordering in bulk by extending the official VOC order for the Eijsch388 simply meant more cloth for the same price. This fraught link between the official VOC trade and private trade orders is illustrated by the measures taken by the High Government to ensure the Eijsch of the Company was met before any permitted trade was embroiled upon.389 Apart from fulfilling private orders, Van Eck sometimes 381 NA, Van Eck, 20, 192, 4 November 1758, Van Eck to Moracin; and 194, 4 November 1758, Van Eck to De Boisset. 382 NA, Van Eck, 20, 198, 6 November 1758, Van Eck to Villeneuve and 20, 202, 7 November 1758, Van Eck to Delamotte. 383 NA, Van Eck, 20, 55, 1 August 1758, Van Eck to Zuydtland and 20, 384, 29 November 1759, Van Eck to Bisdom, employees from Bengal normally sent rice, grains and silk and they wanted salt and textiles in return. 384 NA, Van Eck, 20, 207, 16 November 1758, Van Eck to Morse. 385 NA, Van Eck, 20, 293, 3 May 1759, Van Eck to Bisdom. 386 NA, Van Eck, 20, 79, 30 April 1758, Van Eck to Dulaurence, NA, Van Eck, 354, 1 October 1759, Van Eck to Van Teylingen, sugar for cloth at Madras. NA, Van Eck, 20, 354, 1 October 1759, Van Eck to Van Teylingen.387 NA, Van Eck, 20, 438, 28 March 1760, Van Eck to Du Pré & Ross and 20, 439, 28 March 1760, Van Eck to Van Teylingen. 388 The official demand of VOC-goods the VOC send out to meets its requirement in trade. 389 NA, High Government, 204-205, (…) missive of the High Government to the Government of the Coromandel, 21 December 1761, permitted packages, We are sending you with this an extract from the minutes of the 18 of this year, according to which content Your Honour is seriously ordered to ensure it also used these foreign merchants to procure cloth for the official VOC trade.390 At the same time, it was specified that the Company expected money earned by private trade to be invested with people who had some relationship to the Company. Although the privileges on trade in cloth were held by the senior servants, other employees also profited indirectly from the trading privileges of higher-ranking employees as suppliers.391 The demands for textiles for Batavia were met mostly by other employees on the Indian Sub-Continent.392 The suppliers of textiles were remunerated for their efforts by a 6 per cent commission or a share of 25 per cent in the profits.393 An apt illustration of how the advantages of trading privileges given to the highest-ranking servants were difussed throughout the hierarchy. This aim was even specified by the Company in its regulations, which let it be known that cloth should be bought from the indigenous merchants who supplied the VOC. Only when there was not enough cloth to be had within the VOC community, was it considered reasonable to search for outside suppliers. 1.2 Unregulated control The most profitable private trade was the long-distance intra-Asian trade carried out by the senior Company servants. The private trade to Batavia was extremely strictly regulated during Mossel’s term of office (1750-1761), but despite such rigour other long­distance free-trading voyages were not forbidden for servants. In comparison with regional trade, long-distance trade was tended to concentrate on specific destinations and goods. Instead of selling permitted cloth to the Chinese intermediaries in Batavia to be that in the next year and thereafter too, that no so-called permitted packages with cloth are permitted to the naval officers at their departure for this capital, or that no servants under your Government who have been permitted to do so, until the demands for both patria and for Asia have been completely delivered and accepted, under punishment of confiscation and fine of four times its worth.(…)390 NA, Van Eck, 20, 51, 10 August 1760, Van Eck to Du Pré & Ross. 391 NA, Van Eck, 20, 185, 19 October 1758, Van Eck to Dietloff. Van Eck traded sugar against cloth with Dietlof at Masulipatnam. 392 NA, Van Eck, 20, 705, 30 September 1761, Van Eck to Des Granges and 26, 99, 12 December 1759, Bronsveld to Van Eck. he obtained textile from his fellow servants from Bimilipatnam and from Palliacatta. 393 NA, Van Eck, 20, 187, 21 October 1758, Van Eck to Delamotte. resold in Manila,394 Van Eck devised a plan to send cloth directly to Manila in order to cut out middlemen and generate more profit. By extending the existing regular voyages to Pegu, technically it was not difficult for free-trading ships to sail to Malacca or even Manila.395 Apart from free trade to the east of the Coromandel Coast, Van Eck was also interested in trading opportunities in the West. Contacts with VOC merchants along the Malabar Coast already existed.396 Van Eck also had plans to send a ship over to Bassoara and Jedda, proving that Dutch free trade extended quite some distance beyond the Malabar Coast.397 Even if servants decided not to conduct any trade themselves, they could personally profit by letting indigenous traders conduct trade under the flag of the VOC in return for a fee to the Governor. Problems arose when such an enterprise collided with the commercial plans of other Company employees. In order to make the Sara expedition to the Indian Sub-Continent profitable, Supercargo Laudea asked Governor Vermont not to grant any Dutch commissions for the trip to Bassora to the Armenian merchants present on the Coromandel Coast. Laudea enforced this point by describing the reaction of Batavia if it were to discover Vermont’s existing commission to the Armenians. If this were made public, the situation would become very problematic, since European private traders were just waiting for an opportunity to conduct this trade too.398 In the long-distance intra-Asian trade, it was impossible for servants to bypass their colleagues in other regions in their private trade. In the trade to Manila, the nub of the matter was that the free-trading ship would have to pass Malacca.399 The VOC directorate in Malacca had its own privileges in trade to the overwal or to Manila, and zealously guarded these against other servants´ aspirations. Free trade to Manila which 394 See chapter on Van Eck’s permitted trade. 395 NA, Van Eck, 20, 347, 7 September 1759, Van Eck to Du Pré & Ross. 396 In 1760 the Adriana Johanna of Casparus de Jong, the VOC commander of Malabar, visited the Coast, while the ship of Van Coeverden, a employee from Jaffna, returned to Malabar with the change of wind. NA, Van Eck, 20, 490, 13 July 1760, Van Eck to C de Jong; 33, 18, 28 July 1761, Sweepe to Van Eck; 33, 20, 6 December 1761, Zeeman to Van Eck and 20,494, 15 July 1760, Van Eck to unknown. Sweepe regularly sent his ship to the Coast from Tutucorin. Employees from Malabar were mostly interested in textiles. 397 NA, Van Eck, 20, 465, 2 May 1760, Van Eck to Bisdom and NA, Van Eck, 20, 666, 12 July 1761, Van Eck to J de Jong. The ship intended for Muscat first had to be repaired on the Malabar Coast because she had sprung a leak. Another example was the arrival on the Coast of the Sara, which had instructions to sell the goods from Batavia, before picking up new merchandise in Bengal and on the Coromandel and leaving for Bassora. 398 NA, Van Eck, 20, 1, 1 June 1758, Van Eck to Laudea. 399 M. Jacobs, Merchant in Asia, 207-209. did not involve the servants in Malacca or allow them a share in profit would not be tolerated by them. 400 Well aware of the pitfalls, Van Eck sought contact with the Governor of Malacca, proposing a trading partnership and co-operation in a trading adventure to Manila. When Van Eck’s ship De Waarheijd arrived in Malacca in 1759, newly appointed Governor Boele was offered a share of a half or a third in the ship to seal the foundation of a trading society. Anxious to promote the co-operation Van Eck even offered to pay the insurance on the goods in the first voyage back to the Coast. Nothing eventuated as pirates were busy harassing shipping around Malacca at that juncture and it proved too dangerous to proceed to Manila.401 The plans were suspended until the Company swept the straits clean in 1760. Keeping in mind the first offer and the good price textiles from the Coast fetched in Malacca and Manilla, in 1761 Boele made a new proposition, which Van Eck had to hand over to his successor to work out as he was on the point of leaving for Ceylon.402 European ships were better equipped for long-distance trade than their Asian counterparts, but the financial co-operation of Asian merchants was often still essential to any successful European trading venture. Assured of the co-operation of VOC employees in Malacca did not mean people on the Coast were out of the wood. Except for the Spanish and Portuguese, no Europeans were allowed to trade in Manila.403 To circumvent this restriction, plans were made to include Armenian merchants on the Coast in the venture. The Armenian involvement made it possible to pass the ship off as non-European, and the Armenians profited by investing their money in the argosy.404 The advantage to the Armenians was to have access to a neutral European vessel, guaranteeing a safe passage and secure investment.405 Van Eck’s plan to trade to Manila interfered with the plan hatched by English country traders also desirous of sending a ship to Manila. When the English heard of the Dutch voyage, having weighed up the pros and cons, they preferred to be included in the deal. From their point of view, sending a 400 NA, Van Eck, 28, 17, 7 February 1761, Boele to Van Eck. 401 The pirates even took a VOC Brigantine. 402 NA, Van Eck, 28, 18, 22 February 1761, Marchand to Van Eck. 403 Jacobs, Merchant in Asia, 207-209, Handel op Manila verboden voor alle Europeanen tot 1789, over Engelsen op deze vaart, Malakka overslagplaats. 404 NA, Van Eck, 20, 430, 12 March 1760, Van Eck to Van Teylingen. 405 NA, Van Eck, 27, 94, 6 December 1760, Klem to Van Eck and 20, 437, 22 March 1760, Van Eck to Van Teylingen. Once the pirate problem had been solved, the Armenians were still willing to join. Dutch and an English ship simultaneously would mean a cut in profits for both. Trade to Manila was only considered profitable if it was limited to one European ship from the Coast a year. Greatly to the wrath of the English Governor of Madras and the leading English merchant with interests in Manila, Pigot, Van Eck declined this offer. With the Seven Years’ War still raging, it was considered too dangerous to take English goods along. 406 This refusal offended the Governor of Madras and he tried to force the Armenians not to accept Van Eck’s offer. Threatening them with exclusion from Madras, he used his political power to promote his private interests and endeavoured with all his might to compel the Armenians to join him. At the time Van Eck was in charge of the Coromandel, it was still possible to ignore English claims to the trade with Manila, but in the end military might settled the final score. Instead of being intimidated by the English threats, the VOC employees saw this as an excuse to invite the Armenians to come and live under VOC rule. Nor were the Armenians impressed by Pigot’s threats. The fact that Dutch private traders and the Armenians were able to shrug off the English pressure refutes Furber’s assumption that, from 1737, the VOC was no longer able to compete with English country traders.407 It shows that the dominance of English country traders was still less marked than it was later and it also proves that Dutch private traders were able to hold their position in an arena of international competition. Ultimately, the position of Dutch private traders in the trade to Manila was threatened by the expedition of the English (1762) against the Spanish in Manila. It was one of the first British plans executed in Asia after Spain had declared war on England (1761) and as may have been expected the thwarted Pigot was a staunch supporter of the expedition to Manila.408 This expedition to Manila prompted so far away from the actual theatre of war opened trade for English country traders, freeing them from the need either to involve Armenians or to consider collaborating with the VOC employees. A similar development unveiled itself at exactly the same moment in the permitted trade to Batavia. Even without sending ships directly to Manila, the Dutch VOC employees had always participated in this trade indirectly, certainly if we consider 406 NA, Van Eck, 20, 425, 5 March 1760, Van Eck to Van Teylingen. 407 Furber, Private Fortunes, 113. 408 S.D. Quiason, English “country trade” with the Philippines 1644-1765, (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1966), 153. This Governor and country trader from Madras is the same man who had tried to prevent Van Eck’s planned excursion to Manila. the permitted trade to Batavia part of this trade.409 The fact that permitted trade to Batavia was put on hold in 1762 is probably not unconnected to this event, as the English competition adversely affected the cloth markets for Manila in Batavia and Malacca. 1.2 Use of VOC facilities Dutch country traders depended heavily on the VOC and Batavia for their supply of the products they needed and for the privileges given to them. As shown, the Company determined the amount of trade and strenuously enforced its restrictions designed to keep the privileges within the group of higher-ranking officials. The basis of Van Eck’s free trading networks was composed of his colleagues in the Company. Employees already had reciprocal contact for the official part of their activities and in principle they were civil towards each other in private trade as long as everybody abided by the unwritten social rules. For instance, when Schevichaven, a employee in Bengal, had difficulties unloading his ship at Madras, since a naval squadron in the harbour had been given priority, Van Eck intervened and had the shipment of rice unloaded in Palliacatta.410 Since rice was sold at a lower price in Paliacatta, Schevichaven would have lost money because of the unexpected change, if Van Eck had not nullified these costs by cutting the usual taxes.411 Just as Van Eck helped the private trade ventures of employees from Bengal, he asked them to assist his ships on their arrival at Hughli in Bengal.412 The VOC employees of the various establishment had to co-operate out of sheer necessity as they each held regional monopolies on production. Co-operation with local servants was needed to gain access to goods. Outsiders who did not acknowledge the privileges of the higher-ranking officials were excluded. As we have seen, when a free­burgher from Batavia wanted to buy textiles from Van Eck and then sell them in Madras, Van Eck refused. Rumours of his selfishness had already spread along the Coast, 409 See chapter on Van Eck’s permitted trade. 410 NA, Van Eck, 18, 11, 24 September 1757, Zuijdtland to Van Eck. 411 NA, Van Eck, 20, 52, 1 August 1758, Van Eck to Schevichaven. 412 NA, Van Eck, 20, 128, 21 september 1758, Van Eck to Bisdom; and 20, 180, 15 October 1758, Van Eck to Appengh & Bloem. dissuading the burgher from pursuing the plan.413 In a letter to an associate from Batavia, Van Eck stated that it was important to maintain the status quo and to reserve free trade on the Coast for the higher-ranking officials. Lower-ranked servants had to content themselves with the role of supplier for the privileged trade. The status of Dutch free­burghers and the treatment meted out to them probably resembled the way English free merchants were treated.414 Before Plassey, they were granted freedom as long as they complied with the wishes and interests of the higher-ranking EIC officials. All the evidence points in the direction that although Van Eck preferred to work with VOC settlements and servants, his main aim was to sell his merchandise as profitably as possible and if the opportunity presented itself he was quite prepared to bypass the VOC structures.415 The senior servants used their privileged position to enforce advantages in the free trade. On the Coromandel Coast, the Governor, the secunde and the opperhoofden416 were secure in their control of the most profitable parts of the Dutch free trade. The plans hatched by Schreuder for Dutch private trade in Surat were executed by and large, leading to a situation in which the highest authorities controlled the taxation on private trade. Often VOC employees informally let slip to their superiors in Batavia that other servants were not paying any tax on their cottons. Bronsveld, who was VOC chief of Bimilipatnam, painted out the financial damage of such behaviour. In 1760 he gave an account of the amounts of cloth sent and the money lost at the VOC trading-post of Bimilipatnam. Employees had been exporting 350 bales of textile without paying any toll, leading to a loss of income of 4,000 pagodas for the Company. He asked Van Eck for instructions and wanted clarification on how much the different ranks were entitled to 413 NA, Van Eck, 20, 152, 8 August 1758, Van Eck to Faure. 414 Watson, Foundation of Empire, 62, Another group of lesser overall significance to our discussion, but whose activities are readily discernible were the free merchants resident in the East. Most often ex­employees, these men could carry out a trade provided they did not encroach on the Company’s monopoly. After 1665 they were encouraged to participate in the country trade, but were not eligible to enjoy the benefits of the Company’s treaties and protections, except when employed on the Company’s business, abiding by the regulations set by the Company, residing under the Company’s protection and government, and generally behaving themselves as the Company insisted they should. Their presence in the East was circumscribed by the Company’s right to restrict the number of Englishmen and its right to exercise control over their activities in the East. By the beginning of the eighteenth century, free merchants were required to lodge a security of 2000 pounds with the Company before receiving a licence. 415 NA, Van Eck, 20, 465, 2 May 1760, Van Eck to Bisdom. 416 The chiefs and their deputies. send toll-free.417 The control of taxation had drastic consequences for the competition in trade. The senior employees had a considerable advantage over their subordinates. The employees lower in the hierarchy needed support from those in charge in order to be able to compete and send ships toll-free. Employees on the Coast had to wait patiently until they had risen in the hierarchy, or be introduced to and protected in private trade by one of the senior officials. Once introduced, they played only a secondary role investing money or supplying goods. The consequence was that private trade depended as much on commercial acumen as it did on the respective position in the VOC hierarchy, and a rise on the promotion ladder equalled access to profitable private trade. The higher-ranking officials availed themselves of the time and effort of lower placed officials to stimulate their trade. By utilizing the less profitable trading possibilities of those higher in the hierarchy, the more lowly employees at least had some share in the trade and profit. Even a lower administrative position could be profitable, given the institutional advantages it entailed. There is no shortage of evidence that the main goal of promotion was to gain more opportunities in private trade. It also worked the other way around: as a consequence of a promotion, commissions were given, since an employee was in a position to carry them out successfully.418 Van Eck had appointed Van Nes as a resident in Masulipatnam with the specific brief to buy textiles for the Company. There was also a unofficial side to this, since Van Nes had made clear that he wanted to make money by private trade. Sometimes a position was not as rewarding as expected and, to a certain extent, success depended on personal ability and a good head for business. Van Nes´ ambitions in private trade were frustrated, since the English Resident brought provisions from Madras without paying toll, which, as an outsider, Van Nes had to pay. Van Eck was also involved in Van Nes’ trade, since it is mentioned that his merchandise also remained unsold.419 The use of VOC facilities helped to enforce the hierarchy even more, but this advantage was gradually lost with increasing VOC cutbacks. There is ample proof that employees made extensive use of the facilities offered by the Company’s intra-Asian trade to promote their private ventures. The employees used every possible space 417 NA, Van Eck, 27, 50, 3 April 1760, Bronsveld to Van Eck. 418 NA, Van Eck, 26, 13, 13 March 1759, Trembley to Van Eck. 419 NA, Van Eck, 27, 89, 7 October 1760, Nes to Van Eck. available to stow their private trade goods.420 When VOC couriers were not needed for official VOC business, servants used them to perform private trade errands. Unfortunately for Van Teylingen, Batavia considered the number of couriers in service to be disproportionate to the trade conducted on the Coast, and forced him to cut this number down. Since the Company was still active in regional trade, private trade also profited from the presence of smaller vessels and small transport ships. On the Coromandel Coast, Van Eck used the smaller Company-owned ships 421 to ship merchandises to bigger VOC ports, from where it could be shipped off on privately owned ships.422 Even private trade commodities and money from Bengal were conveyed on VOC chialoupes423 and VOC East Indiamen.424 For example, Van Eck received wine and other commodities on VOC ships coming from the Cape.425 He availed himself of the opportunity, even then it was illegal to send private trade goods on VOC ships.In 1762 the High Government was obliged to reprimand its servants as these ships were only meant for official VOC trade.426 This censure fell on deaf ears as it was impossible to eradicate this practice; the High Government was far away and could do nothing but issue warnings. The comparative advantages for servants are obvious, since other companies did not have such an extensive intra-Asian trade network as the Company, their servants 420 NA, Van Eck, 26, 31, 19 May 1759, Van Teylingen to Van Eck. When Van Teylingen replaced Van Eck as Chief of Palliacatta, he wanted to park his carriage in the stables built by Van Eck, but was stopped by the deputy, Joncheere. Although Van Teylingen had Van Eck’s permission and insisted, Joncheere replied he had paid to use it as storage room and that Van Eck had nothing to say on the subject. When Van Teylingen insisted again, Joncheere used a different tactic, stating that Van Eck had placed arrack in the stables. In actual fact the arrack belonged to Joncheere, since Van Eck had only sugar in Paliacatta, stored in the three rooms in a warehouse in the garden. NA, Van Eck, 26, 20, 11 April 1759, Van Teylingen to Van Eck. Because Joncheere refused to move his goods without offering an alternative storage room, Van Teylingen moved his rice from the sjauwderij, so Joncheere could move his goods there, thus clearing the stables. 421 Such as chialengs and chialouppes. 422 NA, Van Eck, 20, 324, 15 July 1759, Van Eck to Weydom. For instance, Weydom sent private trade cloth over for judgement by Van Eck on a VOC chialoupe. 423 NA, Van Eck, 20, 345, 7 September 1759, Van Eck to Morse. 424 NA, Van Eck, 20, 338, 21 August 1759, Van Eck to Middelmeer & Dupré. For instance, Van Eck asked Captain Middelmeer to take goods with a total value of 2,023 Pagodas to Palliacatta on his VOC ship. 425 NA, Van Eck, 20, 640, 26 May 1761, Van Eck to Ross and 20, 676, 11 August 1761, Van Eck to Sweepe. 426 NA, High Government, 224-225, 9 July 1762, General resolutions, (…) ships and their shipments, so it is, keeping in mind the absolute necessity and usefulness of this attention has been understood and permitted, as a consequence of the honourable order of her honourable circular to seriously recommend the high-ranking servants of the respective outer trading-posts to remain vigilant , that the ships have to be loaded with goods of the Company and not with those of the private traders, and to recommend seriously the same to the commander and the chief of equipment (…). did not have access to a similar free supportive infrastructure. However, as the VOC was beset by mounting financial difficulties the increasing cut-backs in costs made by the Company, over time the position of its servants slowly deteriorated too. There was yet another avenue open to them: Private ownership of ships enabled the servants to pursue profits without having to be bothered with VOC interests. Van Eck owned several ships, among there the Tartar and Postiljon, the latter one of 150 tons.427 Another of his ships, the Prinses Carolina, was described by Van Eck for insurance purposes. She was a 200 ton ship, which required an insurance of 6000 pagodas on its merchandise for Pegu.428 Another example is the Waarheijd of which the cargo was estimated at 4500 pagodas.429 Van Eck was tireless in his search for investors in his ships. The English were most sought after clients and also supplied insurance for the longer trips. But the Armenians were also eager to invest money on Van Eck’s ships. 430 Privately owned ships of other servants on the Coast were also employed in bringing goods to the market.431 These ships were sometimes used in a manner interpreted as damaging to the Company.432 Militating against the neutrality of the VOC, Keller used his privately owned ship to bring Moracin, the commander of a French army, and a party of his men to Nagapatnam after their retreat had been cut off by land.433 Employees obtained their ships from different sources, but certainly made good use of their connections in the VOC. Their greatest advantage was that the VOC sold off some of its ships. We know, for instance, that an employee from Bengal tried to buy a small yacht from the Company, but Governor Vermont refused to sell for less than 1,800 to 2,000 pagodas.434 From 1761 it was forbidden to sell VOC ships to private traders, stated reason being that the Company was too often not properly reimbursed.435 There are 427 NA, Van Eck, 20, 347, 7 September 1759, Van Eck to Du Pré & Ross, NA, Van Eck, 20, 381, 26 November 1759, Van Eck to Van Teylingen; and 20, 347, 7 September 1759, Van Eck to Du Pré & Ross. 428 NA, Van Eck, 20, 339, 23 August 1759, Van Eck to Bonsack. 429 NA, Van Eck, 20, 342, 1 September 1759, Van Eck to Boelen. 430 NA, Van Eck, 20, 355, 1 October 1759, Van Eck to Du Pré & Ross and 20, 360, 15 October 1759, Van Eck to Bolwerk. 431 NA, Van Eck, 20, 471, 25 May 1760, Van Eck to Du Pré & Ross. For instance, cloth was sent from Bimilipatnam on a ship owned by Keller.432 NA, Van Eck, 26, 85, to Van Eck. 433 The commander of the French army on the northern part of the Coromandel Coast. 434 NA, Van Eck, 26, 13, 13 March 1759, Trembley to Van Eck. 435 Van der Chijs, Nederlandsch-Indisch Plakaatboek, 1761 Van der Parra, 514, 14 augustus, verbod tegen den verkoop van compagnie’s schepen aan particulieren. also references to the Company chartering its ships to private traders. No proof has been uncovered Van Eck ever did so, although he did charter a Danish ship. Their second source of purchase was indigenous merchants or they bought craft constructed in indigenous shipyards under the supervision of European ship wrights.436 Van Eck who had extensive business contacts with Pegu437 sent over a shipwright to construct his ships there and to assist the king in shipbuilding.438 In the wake of a revolution in Pegu, one of Van Eck’s ships had been lost and the king built a replacement for Van Eck as a gift. When Van Eck was promoted to Governor of Ceylon, he asked Van Teylingen to sell it for him for 10,000 pagodas, a clue to the value of the gift.439 In fact, most of the ships owned by Van Eck were built in Asia, although the designs were European. This pattern was repeated for most of the European traders.440 The control over VOC facilities was vested in the highest VOC official present, giving him a handy tool to enforce his authority in private trade. When Vermont was Governor, Van Eck’s plans to use VOC facilities were often thwarted by him. For instance, Vermont, who was often hostile towards Van Eck, refused Van Teylingen use of a VOC chialoupe, even though Van Teylingen insisted that he needed it to unload goods for Van Eck.441 When Van Eck became Governor, he could rejoice in having the authority over these ships, which greatly facilitated his private trade much easier to execute. Although normally there was enough shipping capacity, his use sometimes prevented the VOC access to its own vessels. Should no VOC ship be available because they were commandeered for his private trade, Van Eck chartered vessels to ship Company goods and paid for these out of the Company treasury.442 If the VOC wanted to protect its interests as an inducement, the servants had to be offered an alternative source of income to offset their losses on private trade. Although propositions were made to improve the supervision of taxation, the higher-ranking VOC employees stressed they would not be happy this was to cause a decline in profit to their 436 NA, Van Eck, 20, 419, 27 February 1760 Van Eck to J de Jong and 20, 434, 15 March 1760, Van Eck to De Jong. 437 A port in present day Myanmar. 438 NA, Van Eck, 19, 15, 1 March 1758, unknown to Van Eck. 439 NA, Van Eck, 20, 715, 15 February 1762, Van Eck to Van Teylingen. 440 Furber, John Company at work, 187. 441 NA, Van Eck, 19, 40, 1 July 1758, Van Teylingen to Van Eck. 442 NA, Van Eck, 20, 363, 21 October 1759, Van Eck to Bronsveld. trade. Van Eck stigmatized not paying taxes as an abuse, although he himself had profited highly from the existing situation of non-payment. The reason he particularly wanted to raise the tolls was that at that juncture he had to finance the defence and protection of Nagapatnam against the French and English. Yet if employees were forced to pay taxes, Van Eck reasoned that the more highly placed among them had to be reimbursed by allowing them to ship kisten or chests on every VOC ship to Batavia in accordance with their rank. He simply held the Company responsible for ensuring the senior servants had sufficient private trade opportunities. Eventually the Company repudiated this proposition, although Van Eck tirelessly insisted there was enough room in the VOC ships for the extra chests.443 2. Long-distance country trade Most servants confined their participation in free trade to their own region, but it was possible to cross the borders of these regions, in particular for the more highly placed servants. Investment of capital in private trade ventures was always welcome. This is illustrated by the Sara: Van Eck only invested money in the ship and absolved himself of its management by teaming up in partnership with Van Rheden a member of the High Government, with Faure, a vrijburger or free merchant of Batavia, and a further unspecified fourth partner called Van Hellen. This team of four opened up free trade to the other members of the group in many different areas. Wherever the Sara sailed, she did so freely protected by the privileges of Van Eck, Van Rheden and Faure. Trading operations in the Indonesian Archipelago were best managed by the people closest by, in this case by Faure. Although impossible to pinpoint exactly, the involvement of Van Eck in the Sara seems to date from the time he worked in Batavia. So this ship plied the waters of the Indonesian Archipelago for several years, making a profit for Van Eck without costing him much time. His degree of involvement in the ship changed in 1758 when the Sara was allowed to make a trip to the Coromandel Coast, taking arrack and 443 NA, Van Eck, 20, 260, 5 February 1759, Van Eck to Van der Parra. sugar. Van Eck took a more active role and found himself in charge of helping the crew collect their merchandise and keeping his co-owners informed about the decisions he made in conjunction with the supercargo of the Sara.444 Trade outside the partnership was rejected. On the Coast, the other partners profited from Van Eck’s privileges and work, and Van Eck kept a watchful eye to avoid any usurpation of his privileges by his partners. As long as a mutual interest persisted, Van Eck co-operated, but when Faure wanted to send another ship to the Coast in which Van Eck was not involved, Van Eck made clear that only the higher-ranking officials on the Coast conducted private trade and that not involving them would be greedy and an infringement of their privileges. Such an invasion on the privileged position of servants on the Coast was unacceptable even for a free­burgher to contemplate. 2.1 Financing trade On his appointment to Governor of Ceylon in 1762, Van Eck ended both his structural and active engagement in free trade, but still retained a keen eye for exceptional circumstances to make a good profit in private trade. Save for some minor exceptions, in Van Eck’s era free trade was not allowed in Ceylon. However, the VOC was not always in a position to supply enough of certain essential goods required by the inhabitants of Ceylon, employees were asked to take on the role of private trader and supply these goods. For instance, during the Kandian War, Van Eck imported rice into the island to end a shortage. In Ceylon a practice resembling the Huijsgebuijck or Household use to Batavia also prevailed (see previous chapter). Goods could be imported for personal usage and Van Eck used his former contacts to obtain such provisions as wine. In this part of the VOC territory, while private trade for employees was severely restricted, indigenous traders enjoyed considerable opportunities for trade. Allowing the employees some possibility for indirect trade. Van Eck was known to send an indigenous 444 NA, Van Eck, 20, 160, 8 October 1758, Van Eck to Van Rheden. ship to the Coast to exchange his wine for wine of better vintage.445 On another occasion he sent a small ship carrying red wine and areca nuts to settle his debts on the Coast.446 In no way do these instances of incidental private trade equal the structural private trade in which he indulged during his period on the Coast. Quite apart from sporadic excursions into free trade from Ceylon, Van Eck had withdrawn from conducting his own trade indirectly, by participating financially in privately owned ships in the other trading zones. These ventures resembled Van Eck’s activities in the Indonesian Archipelago previously described. In co-operation with other owners, free-trade ships sailed without Van Eck being actively involved in the management. It is hard to estimate the level of the amounts of money invested. As Van Eck was only involved financially in such endeavours and they barely ever rated a mention in his letters. There are only some hints dropped as in June 1764 there were plans afoot for a voyage to Mergui and Malacca from the Coromandel Coast.447 Other high-ranking employees were also involved in trade in various regions. For example, when a privately owned Dutch ship was taken by the English in 1760, the VOC Resident in Madras tried to intervene on behalf of the interested employees. The Dutch Resident took pains to stress no Frenchmen were involved in the ship, as the ship belonged to Loovenaar and Vermont. Vermont had already left the Coast for Batavia a year earlier, but he was still indirectly involved.448 Loovenaar, his son-in-law, was conducting his remaining business. It was seen as normal to participate indirectly in trade in areas were one was no longer active as employee, but there were always social implications. 2.2 An international community of trade European trading communities dotted the far-flung coasts of the Indian Ocean which needed to obtain the products the VOC could not supply; a happy hunting-ground for those with the means to exploit the situation. Apart from working with colleagues, 445 NA, Van Eck, 20, 792, 12 September 1764, Van Eck to Felitas. 446 NA, Van Eck, 20, 715, 15 February 1762, Van Eck to Van Teylingen. 447 NA, Van Eck, 20, 767, 15 June 1764, Van Eck to Van Teylingen. 448 NA, Van Eck, 27, 79, 9 September 1760, Sutton to Van Eck. Van Eck was heavily involved in trade with other European merchants in India. Within this European community of traders, consisting of English, French, Danish and Portuguese merchants, hierarchy was non-existent and relations were more volatile. The merchants simply depended on mutual interest as the key to control. Such a system required foreign agents who were often officially appointed.449 These agents were living in different parts of the Coast and functioned as commissioners. In return, from the heights of his official position Van Eck helped his agents if their ships came to his port or when a money transaction had to be made. Commissions always implied a financial compensation of approximately 5 per cent of the total turn-over. It was also a network through which information was exchanged between correspondents with a mutual interest in trading opportunities.450 The partnership between Europeans exceeded the role of commissioners, since they even clubbed together to charter ships. In 1761, Van Eck made a voyage in partnership with the Danish East India Company, for which the Danish Company chartered one of its own ships.451 Others also invested in Dutch free-trade ships: English country traders sank their money in Van Eck’s ship in return for an interest of 18 to 20 per cent, giving an indication of the profits made on such a privately owned ship.452 The amounts invested varied between 500 and 5,000 pagodas.453 Pragmatic consideration prevailed in the choice of trading partners. The positive side of this international co-operation was that those who participated had access to the markets of their partners. Although Van Eck allowed foreigners access to his market under a partnership agreement, he made sure he guarded his privileges by stipulating he and his partner each paid the tax in their respective homeport. In fact, as a higher­authority he was not required to pay tax in his home port and guarded this privilege for himself. Profiting from this construction he and he alone and none of his partners, benefited mightily from his privileges. In trade between VOC employees, the necessity of resorting to such a condition was not stipulated, indicating that employees did not pay tax 449 COAM, Pondichéry, P84, 24 mars 1758, quittance Denoüal et Van Eck. 450 NA, Van Eck, 19, 36, 15 June 1758, Demartene to Van Eck. 451 NA, Van Eck, 4, 1, 10 March 1761, Abbestee, Falk & Labeaume to Van Eck. For a voyage to the Nicobar islands, Pegu, Bengal and from Bengal back to the Coast, Van Eck invested half of the money, 15,000 rupees, while the Danish company and a Danish private trader both invested a quarter of the necessary capital. 452 NA, Van Eck, 20, 58, 3 August 1758, Van Eck to Mackay. 453 NA, Van Eck, 20, 75, 15 August 1758, Van Eck to Ross. on either side. When it became apparent that the French at Pondicherry were beset by financial problems, Van Eck immediately ordered his captains no longer to trade with them, because they would risk losing money. Instructions were issued to give Pondicherry a wide berth, because private ships ran the risk of being taken by the French and could be forced to sell them their goods as they were in desperate need of supplies. Instead of Pondicherry, sugar and arrack were to be sold in Masulipatnam and Sadras.454 The French had also taken the cloth from one of Van Eck’s ship to use in their field hospital, and as Van Eck felt that he had not sufficiently been remunerated, he wrote an angry letter to Lally, the commander of the French army.455 In this period, English country traders have often been seen as thriving, untrammelled by the interference of the companies, but most certainly the power of their East Indian Company was wielded to obtain competitive advantages. In 1759 Van Eck sold wood in Madras, but encountered problems about the measurements. The Council of Madras did not want to pay for the timber which had been unloaded there. Van Eck heatedly averred that the Council misused its power to force a lower price on him.456 The measurements were always those of the place of origin, and not of destination, which was what Madras was trying to overturn. Ultimately, however, Van Eck had to give way.457 Just as the free-burghers had to play second fiddle to the employees, who saw private trade as remuneration for the work done in the service of their employer, the English free merchants were also-rans to the EIC servants. In many cases there is an obvious link between free merchants and the senior servants, as merchants were often either retired or dismissed employees, as was Morse who was summarily dismissed after selling Madras to the French in 1749. EIC employees were not happy with the competition of these free­merchants and seized every opportunity to prosecute them, which often led the latter to re-apply for a position in the EIC or drove them to seek official protection.458 454 NA, Van Eck, 20, 95, 31 August 1758, Van Eck to Laudea. However, some trade had already been conducted and Van Eck was forced to accept French bills of exchange on Paris. These letters were smuggled to Holland illegally on a VOCship and it took his brothers years to have them converted to money. 455 NA, Van Eck, 20, 271, 21 February 1759, Van Eck to Moracin. 456 NA, Van Eck, 20, 300, 23 May 1759, Van Eck to Du Pré & Ross. 457 NA, Van Eck, 20, 316, 18 June 1759, Van Eck to Du Pré & Ross. 458 Watson, Foundation of Empire, 139, 140, 141 and 180. The VOC factories were not scattered settlements isolated outposts with their backs firmly towards the land and the eyes fixed externally on the sea. Merchandise for export was produced by local indigenous people in the area around Van Eck’s residence. Conversely, the import commodities of the VOC servants found indigenous markets. It was common place for olas (or proclamations) to be written to the indigenous merchants to announce sales of commodities,459 although complaints were often heard that trade with them was proceeding at a snail’s pace.460 Normally trade with the local people was carried on through the intermediary of European or indigenous merchants on the spot. It was absolutely imperative that a certain amount of trust existed. At least, Van Eck trusted non-Europeans enough to make them supercargoes on his ships, as in the case of his servant Consiong Chity, who sold sugar to Moors for textile.461 The indigenous traders were also extremely experienced traders and such skills were exploited, as in the case of a Frenchman who used an Armenian ship to bring his tobacco over from Madras.462 The VOC’s tenant Moetemare Chity send his son on a ship from Malacca to the Coast to pick up thirty-two bales of textiles to bring to Malacca. When Van Eck discovered the son was not on board, leaving no representative of the VOC client, he decided to seize the bales, since he harboured a suspicion of an attempt to make an illegitimate voyage beyond the reaches of VOC control. Only when the son returned from Galle were the bales given back, hinting clearly at the Company’s influence in and power over such trade, which must have been conducted under the Dutch flag. 463 Indigenous vessels were also chartered for shorter voyages, for example to take timber to Madras.464 We have already seen how Vermont sold the trade to the West off to indigenous merchants, illustrating servants indirectly profited from their efforts. Co-operation with and trust in indigenous traders was essential and without them trade would have been impossible. As we have seen Armenian co-operation was essential to a voyage to Malacca in 1760. The Armenian merchants wanted to send goods with a total value of around 30,000 to 40,000 pagodas, unequivocally exhibiting their 459 NA, Van Eck, 26, 90, 15 October 1759, Van Teylingen to Van Eck. 460 NA, Van Eck, 19, 33, 15 May 1759, Meijer to Van Eck. 461 NA, Van Eck, 20, 342, 1 September 1759, Van Eck to Boelen and 20, 354, 1 October 1759, Van Eck to Van Teylingen.462 NA, Van Eck, 19, 35, 7 June 1759, Laporterie to Van Eck. 463 NA, Van Eck, 20, 331, 1 August 1759, Van Eck to Samlant. 464 NA, Van Eck, 20, 542, 27 September 1760, Van Eck to Du Pré & Ross. independence. Unfortunately Van Eck had to pull out when he was promoted to Governor of Ceylon, whether the voyage was eventually made in co-operation with the new Governor has to remain shrouded in mystery. One indisputable fact is that it was essential for a VOC employee conducting private trade to have dependable supercargos and captains. He himself was tied to his post, and this lack of freedom of action made it necessary to establish contacts in different ports and leave to supercargoes and captains to bear the responsibility of the trade. Van Eck trusted his servants with his money and merchandise in the hope that they would make the right and most profitable decisions in the different ports to which they were sent or decided to go. By and large Van Eck mostly employed Dutchmen, but there were several exceptions to this rule. Although it is a matter of record the captains Van Eck employed were of Dutch origin, for example Zeeman, De Lange, Bartels and Beeman,465 Supercargo Laudea was part Dutch and part French who had a relation, a certain Le Blanc in Batavia. He also employed the above­mentioned Indian supercargo. There is only one instance of Van Eck talking of an Irishman, a sailor called Halfort. This man is mentioned because Van Eck had to ask the French for an exemption during the war to provide safe passage for his ship. Had he not done so the presence of a ‘British’ sailor would have led to the confiscation of his merchandise. Laudea, being French, needed English exemption for the same reason. In order to be assured of honest dealings, Van Eck let the supercargo and the captain share in the profits. Captain De Lange received a commission of 5 per cent on sales,466 and there were other ways of paying VOC employees. The contract between Van Eck and the Danish East India Company specified that nobody could carry their own goods on the chartered ship, but that all the officers would receive compensation depending on their position in the hierarchy, the captain earning 1800 rupees.467 In other cases, captains and supercargoes were allowed to take some goods along themselves. This practice was probably very lucrative. In a letter to a friend, Van Eck stated that one of his captains, Bartels, was carrying many more commodities than Van Eck had permitted. Bartels had no intention of returning to the service of the Company after his contract with Van Eck terminated, a fact which reveals that VOC captains were used in 465 NA, Van Eck, 25, 3, 2 November 1758, Beeman to Van Eck. 466 NA, Van Eck, 1, 1, 8 March 1758, Van Eck to Kroesse. 467 NA, Van Eck, 4, 1, 10 March 1761, Abbestee, Falk & Labeaume to Van Eck. private trade. Rather than return to the Company fold he preferred to buy his own ship and, as a captain of a private vessel, Bartels became financially independent of his former boss.468 With the exception of the officers, the crews on these private ships were of Indian descent. Normally it would be difficult to tease out any information about this, but when it so happened that Van Eck’s merchandise had been damaged on a private ship of another employee, the whole crew was summoned before the notaries to testify, and, with the exception of the captain and the supercargo, all twenty of them were of native descent. 469 Conclusion The trading position of VOC servants in the Western Quarter depended heavily on imports from Batavia. The presence of large European armies in India offered a splendid market for sugar, arrack and provisions from Batavia. Cloth was traded in return. At this period, although the VOC still traded in sugar to India, using it as ballast on the ships, most of the sugar trade was left in private hands in permitted trade or free trade. The trade in arrack was left to servants in a similar construction. These items of the private trade were the provisions the Company brought to India. The VOC servants could buy these from the Company and resell them to third parties. At first, servants monopolized the trade in sugar and arrack from Batavia, but with time as their position grew stronger the English claimed a share in this trade. Since dominance in the market meant power, the VOC had to concede to the wishes of the English to an ever-increasing degree, until in 1775 the English country traders carried half of the Javanese sugar to India. It stand to reason that, as the English country traders increasingly thrust themselves into the trade with Batavia, the position of the VOC servants on the Indian Sub-Continent must have deteriorated as they were gradually being cut off from trading opportunities and potential 468 NA, Van Eck, 20, 151, 8 October 1758, Van Eck to Rooseboom. 469 NA, Van Eck, 27, 64, 19 June 1760, Taijlor & Stone to Van Eck. trade capital. Even though the position of the Dutch private traders worsened even more, Batavia remained the chief supplier of sugar and arrack until 1796. Since the amount of private trade was limited, servants in the various regions vigorously protected what they had in their regions against outsiders. This meant that local co-operation was essential to the servants. The superlative method for creating new markets was contacting local servants and arranging an agreement. Bypassing the local VOC servants was unacceptable and was a sure ticket to social and commercial exclusion. Confronted by outside threats, the Company servants united, but within local government, private trade was organized along hierarchical lines. Imitating the way that the VOC organized permitted trade according to the echelons in the hierarchy, the Company servants applied the same strictures to free trade. Private trade was reserved as a privilege of the senior officials, who in turn allowed the lower-ranking servants and other Europeans to participate as they saw fit. Since senior servants had first access to the goods brought from Batavia boosted by first access to the VOC facilities and privileges, it was hard to compete with them. Unquestionably at all times, in all places the activities of the VOC in the intra-Asian trade made it easy for servants to use the company facilities. In the shadow of the company : the VOC (Dutch East India Company)and its servants in the period of its decline (1740-1796) Nierstrasz, J.C. Citation Nierstrasz, J. C. (2008, November 5). In the shadow of the company : the VOC (Dutch East India Company) and its servants in the period of its decline (1740-1796). Retrieved from https://hdl.handle.net/1887/13267 Version: Not Applicable (or Unknown) License: Licence agreement concerning inclusion of doctoral thesis in the Institutional Repository of the University of Leiden Downloaded from: https://hdl.handle.net/1887/13267 Note: To cite this publication please use the final published version (if applicable). PART III Profits & Fortunes Chapter 6: Company profits and servants fortunes Introduction Company profits and servants fortunes were not seen by the VOC as two mutually exclusive entities, but rather as reinforcing each other. This antithesis is difficult for modern people to comprehend, because the definition of what constitutes corruption has changed significantly over time. What is called corruption today may have often been a commonplace and acceptable custom in the past. The first step towards understanding what is now frowned upon as corruption is to acknowledge that we call corruption need not be a debilitating factor, but through its power to remove obstacles may indeed actually benefit an organization because it serves a specific function within it. In other words, it can lubricate policies or practices which might otherwise stick, and make them work. Armed with this change in definition, as historians, we must take a step back and view corruption in former times without exercising too much moral judgement. By doing so, we open up the possibility of a more constructive approach. In other words, if we wish to understand how the company functioned, we must first historicize the definition of corruption. One fact is patently obvious, high officials in the Company continuously redefined corruption as it fell into a decline in desperate attempts to repair an increasingly dysfunctional machine. The best illustration of their chosen solution is the changes the Company made in accommodating private trade. Initially private trade was considered harmful and consequently deemed corrupt, but as shown, from 1743 it is simply impossible to label all private trade a corrupt practice. As the Company was assiduously searching for ways to stave off decline, the understanding that what was considered corrupt in earlier times may just as well have been an effect of the decline of the VOC, instead of making it the scapegoat for decline. In this chapter we shall produce evidence to reveal the relativity of the VOC definition of corruption as it slid to decline by putting various developments in a long-term perspective. What means did the VOC have and even resort to allow its servants to garner themselves a fortune? 1. Structural use of informal institutions The plain, unvarnished goal of the VOC was to trade as profitably as possible to Europe and to achieve this purpose the whole organization in Asia was geared to play a facilitating role. The VOC was well aware that the only way to extract structural profit out of Asia was by the expedient of investing as much capital as possible in trade. Therefore, the institutional form of the VOC in Asia was inexorably influenced by the necessity of prioritizing trade over organization. The Company was built on the perceived principle that a strict organisation was less cost effective than leaving its servants in Asia room to resort to methods to make things work. This makes even more sense when we recall the sheer distances and long, tedious lines of communication between the Republic and Asia. These circumstances gave the servants in Asia a high degree of responsibility and power. They were expected to and did indeed bring their privative initiative to their work and used it to consummate their own and the Company’s interests. The upshot was that the performances of the chartered East India companies, and this applied to all of them, were governed as much by formal institutions as they were determined by such informal institutions as private trade, corruption and networking. It is perfectly feasible to distil a negotiation process on the basis of how much Company and servant needed each other to attain their respective goals. The saga of how the EIC succeeded in striking a remarkable balance between its own interests and those of its servants is well known. The Canadian historian Pierre Boulle argues that the French Company was actually ‘devoured’ by its own personnel as it pursued war instead of trade.470 The VOC was unquestionably aware of the need to allow its servants a certain amount of leeway in what they did, but it did naturally set limits which were determined by its own particular 470P.H. Boulle, “French Mercantilism, Commercial Companies and Colonial Profitability”, In L. Blussé and F. Gaastra, Companies and trade: essays on overseas trading companies during the Ancien Régime (The Hague: Leiden University Press, 1981). interests and tempered by its own strength. This thesis has already presented an analysis of how this worked for private trade and now we shall search for analogies in other informal institutions. As did private trade, corruption and networks functioned as informal institutions assisting the effectuation of the servants’ as well as the Company’s needs. Under these circumstances the first priority of the VOC was to keep outsiders from encroaching on main target of potential profit in Europe. The greatest danger to Company profits was seen in those people working for the Company who were interpreting their brief liberally and claiming too large a share. Consequently, the Gentlemen XVII constantly devised methods to keep the share of their servants as far removed as possible from this objective. Over time, as decline set in, the regulations issued to govern on private trade provide a clear indication that the VOC was increasingly obliged to grant privileges which impinged ever more closely on its core businesses. These steadily mounting number of privileges wrung from it encapsulated an inherent danger and they graphically reflect the spectacle of a weakening company becoming more dependant on its servants. Paradoxically, these shady businesses kept the Company afloat, but also mercilessly reveal its structural weaknesses and shortcomings. In allowing its servants to fulfil some of their personal wishes, the company had always sought for mutual benefit, but as it sank into a financial morass, this situation was inevitably reversed. Even before the decline set in as already intimated, the VOC had had a certain interest in allowing a degree of acquiring freedom in the pursuit of private fortunes. Company servants had always been permitted to amass considerable wealth by recourse to informal institutions, since such a splendid prospect attracted new employees to sign up for a career in the East which was never without a grave element of risk. In view of the acknowledged unhealthy conditions in Asia, it was the prospect of making a more than decent living which lured enterprising men to take service. Van Eck is a fine example of a VOC servant who wanted to restore his family’s fortunes by taking service with the Company. Many eventually successful servants had initially fled Europe hounded by debts or were recalcitrant sons sent to Asia to learn about life the hard way.471 Earning enough riches to ensure a future easy life in the Republic even stimulated 471 Kegan Paul, Memoirs of William Hickey (London: Routledge, 1975). most of such lower ranked servants such as soldiers and sailors. Their ultimate aim was to return with their hard-earned savings, however little these may have been. The prospect of making a fortune abroad figured in the minds of many people in Europe, but the reality must have been a rude awakening on their arrival in Asia. Illusions were shattered as making a decent living was not as simple as it had seemed from Europe and it took years to acquire a private fortune; a situation which the VOC manipulated to serve its own needs. In Asia, servants’ fortunes were used directly to offset the needs of the Company itself. It was thought to be part of a Company servant’s job to sink his personal capital into whatever way possible to serve the needs of the Company. The employees were expected to stand on their own two feet. Instead of having to bother about or wait for an answer from Batavia or the Republic on every small detail, this opportunity for initiative gave servants the financial leeway to solve trifling problems quickly or provide a temporary solution before the higher management had to step in. On the financial front it was even part of the official policy to let senior servants contribute personally to the costs of maintaining the Company’s affairs. The best example of this is the annual embassy to the king of Kandy. The Governor of Ceylon was expected to contribute personally to the costs of mounting this and to the gifts given to the king. This certainly alleviated the burden of cost for the VOC, but it also imbued the position of Governor of Ceylon with a personalized aura of power. Even more modest affairs, such as an embassy from Nagapatnam to the English in Madras, servants first had the task of working out the financial side of the expedition themselves. Even if the servants reclaimed part of the money they had spent to serve the Company, they would have first had to advance money, often aware they would be only partly reimbursed afterwards. Apart from helping to conceal structural weaknesses in the organization, private fortunes also supplemented the capital the VOC had available for its own trade. The prime consideration was that by allowing servants the opportunity to acquire private fortunes, only a small-scale investment in wages was needed to persuade potential employees to join the Company. In this complicated construction keeping the books was itself a gigantic bureaucratic operation which caused the Company many headache quite apart from the essential goal of making money from trade. Because of its very nature as the first joint stock company, the shareholders demanded profits in Europe to accrue to them, instead of any being ploughed back into the remuneration of the servants. Relieved of having to juggle the finances too much the directors tolerated fortunes made in Asia if only to alleviate the costs of payment in Europe. Allowing private fortunes in Asia had another additional advantage, since one day those fortunes had to be sent home. These remittances have had to be made through the Company, which used its authority to use them temporarily to finance its trade to Europe. By setting a ceiling on the amounts of the fortunes it accepted in view of its priorities, the Company wielded a very crude device to limit servants from pursuing their efforts to acquire fortunes too enthusiastically. When the VOC first experienced a need for capital, one possible solutions would simply have been to accept more fortunes. In several ways private fortunes served to augment the capital basis of the Company without it having enlarged the number of shares, greatly to the advantage of the existing shareholders. There was of course, a limit to the amount of money the VOC could use for its trade to Europe. When Van Imhoff proposed leaving the amounts of assignations accepted open to what was offered in Asia, adhering to their well trod path the Gentlemen XVII did not heed his advice.472 They continued to accept only limited amounts of assignations to be drawn on them, but as decline set in during the eighteenth century they had to revise their ways, which often did more harm than good. The negative consequences of accepting too many assignations is best illustrated by extreme development spurt the EIC went through after Plassey. As possibilities of acquiring a personal fortune proliferated with conquest, it was impossible for the EIC to absorb the new fortunes. In their efforts to remedy this, the EIC servants tried to boost its trade and consequently the possibilities in sending home money. The upshot was that every piece of cotton of whatever quality and price they could lay their hands on in India was dispatched. This lack of discrimination had negative consequences for the EIC’s business and for the payment of the bills of exchange. Since much cloth was sent, the market in Europe was saturated, leaving merchandise unsold. When the Company could not sell these textiles at an adequate price, it was unable to repay the bills. Payments had to be 472 Gaastra, Particuliere Geldstromen, 22-30. postponed, to such an extent the threat of bankruptcy began to loom over the EIC.473 Since it was not able to accept more bills and there was an inherent danger of losing money remitted if such an eventuality were to occur, the VOC seized the opportunity to lure EIC employees to transfer their money to the Republic. Initially the VOC was reluctant to accept English money, but in the years preceding the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War, as its financial situation worsened the VOC policy in Bengal and other parts of India was to obtain as much English money as possible. A clear demonstration that the extent of leniency extended towards accepting assignations depended on the exigencies besetting the Company. In view of this hard evidence there can be little doubt that the VOC fully acknowledged an interest in its servants obtaining fortunes by orchestrating informal institutions and often encouraged its servants to return rich. As long as fortunes were considered to have been made during a long and arduous career without harming the interests of the Company, the VOC saw no reason to intervene. During the Company’s 200-year existence, servants were able to make substantial fortunes, although it seems the eighteenth century offered increased opportunities for those seeking to profit from the riches of the East. Van Eck was able to send home ƒ600,370 and in the second half of the eighteenth century there are other examples of employees doing just as well.474 It was impossible for the Gentlemen XVII to assess exactly how wealthy these servants were and how they had made their money. With full knowledge of the fortunes being made, they had no qualms about inviting some of them into the service of the VOC in the Republic after their return.475 Apparently, there was a tacit agreement that a fortune could be made as long as the interests of the VOC were not impaired and such a pursuit of riches was indeed often even perceived as beneficial to the VOC. 473 Later this problem was circumvented somewhat by using this capital for the purchasing of Chinese goods for the European market in Canton. 478 After his return to the Republic in 1771, Pieter Cornelis Hasselaer enjoyed a fortune of ƒ800,000, while the heirs to the estate of Van Rheden received ƒ332,139. Eyso de Wendt took ƒ333,000 in assignations with him on his return, while Roelof Blok, the former Governor of Makassar and director of the Chinese trade, took ƒ88,615 in cash with him on his return. For more examples see Gaastra, Particuliere Geldstromen. 475 Gaastra, Particuliere Geldstromen, 22-30. 1.1 Balancing interests Even though a balance had to be struck with the servants’ interests, the VOC was not without the means to assert its interests in Asia. Giving too many opportunities to make fortunes too quickly was unequivocally felt to be a potential threat to the profitability of the Company. If a servant returned too rich too quickly, suspicions were rife that he had done so at the expense of the Company. People at home began to toy with the idea of mismanagement in Asia. The best remedy was thought to be to have a tight grip on what servants earned. The best illustration of this principle is Mossel’s regulation on private trade, above all his newly imposed restrictions. He was convinced Van Imhoff had squandered the interests of the VOC by giving up too many privileges in the intra-Asian trade. Too much of potential profit had been conceded to the servants, although the VOC was still capable of conducting parts of these liberated branches of trade. This also threatened the profitability of the remaining monopolies. With this in mind, Mossel wanted to reclaim some of the existing privileges, leaving what he termed the trash to the servants.476 As we have seen in the chapters on private trade, he had the power and determination to do so. The servants grudgingly accepted his regulations, albeit always searching ways to circumvent them. The VOC considered it had only to allow leeway if the servants honoured the interests of the Company Granting too many privileges for making fortunes, without paying scrupulous attention to the hierarchy among the personnel also interfered in the way the VOC functioned. An increase in fortunes could upset the apple-cart and lead to a destabilization of the Company hierarchy. In the case of the EIC, the increased possibilities of making a fortune not only made the employees unmanageable, they also led to earlier returns home leaving a large hole in the number of the experienced staff in 476 W.Ph. Coolhaas, ‘Zijn de Gouverneurs-Generaal Van Imhoff en Mossel juist beoordeeld?’, in: Bijdragen T.L.K.V. 114 (1958), 29-54, J.J. Steur, Herstel of ondergang, de voorstellen tot redres van de verenigde Oost-Indische compagnie, 1740-1795 (Utrecht: HES 1984), N.J. Krom, Gouverneur Generaal Gustaaf Willem van Imhoff (Amsterdam: Van Kampen 1941), 115 and J.L. Blussé, Strange Company, Chinese settlers, mestizo women and the Dutch in Batavia (Dordrecht: Foris 1986), 33. India.477 Again, the experience of the VOC was less extreme, but in a more subdued manner are echoed in what happened when Van Imhoff liberalized the intra-Asian trade. Van Imhoff´s reforms were a real departure from the Company policy prevailing before 1743. Until then, the only way to make a fortune was to share in the VOC trade. This may not have excluded corruption, but obviously employees did have more opportunities to share in the riches when the Company was making a decent profit. Mossel’s reforms in private trade were accompanied by stricter regulations on emolumenten and fit in with the social policy described in his reglement ter beteugeling der pracht en praal .478 This document reveals explicitly that remuneration was linked to upholding the hierarchy and the principle of seniority. These two elements were seen as supporting the interests of the Company and imbued with a strong moral connotation specified the amount of splendour appropriate to each position by setting out in black and white, rights and privileges pertaining to it.479 Mossel wanted to put an end to the recent rise in the splurging on the exhibitions of wealth and status indulged in by the servants. He deemed such behaviour un-European and stigmatized it a perversion of Asia, but a causal relation to Van Imhoff’s reforms is a more likely to have been his basic motivation. Bringing the hierarchy and remuneration into line was essential to the VOC if it were to control its employees. In order to regain control over its servants’ actions, the VOC tried to impose the hierarchy stringently by linking remuneration to positions and by regulating in fairly explicit terms what social status a position entailed. Later Mossel, again expressed his feelings about similar issues in Bedenkingen over den intrinsiquen staat. 480 The main point of the Mossel policy was to make the employees feel that they depended on the VOC for their fortunes. This dependency had been somewhat obscured 477 Sutherland, East India Company in Eighteenth Century Politics, 81, These two factors combined to catapult the Bengal servants into a sudden affluence which made them, as Sulivan had already discovered, quite unmanageable. Moreover, their mass return to England with their wealth only raised dangerous enemies in the Company at home without improving the situation abroad for they left no one suitable to replace them. 478 J.A. van der Chijs, Nederlandsch-Indisch plakaatboek, Volume 1-Volume 17 (’s-Gravenhage 1885­1900). 478 Nationaal Archief (NA), Hoge Regering van Batavia (HR), 307, Extract General Resolutions, 20. 479 For instance, it was stipulated that only the Governor-General could have a glass coach pulled by four horses. 480 NA, VOC, 4747. ‘Bedenkingen over Den intrinsiquen staat Van de g’octroijeerde Nederlandse Oost Indische Compagnie, ten dienste van de Heeren Principalen bij een gebragt, ter vertoning van dies ware dog sorgelijke gesteldheid’. when Van Imhoff’s freedom in trade potentially offered the opportunity to make a fortune outside of the confines of the hierarchy. By relating fortune to rank, the Company bought itself time to guide employees to work for the ‘benefit of the Company’ and servants were once again forced to acknowledge the interests of the Company. From that time, the privileges of the employees would be adapted to the needs of the Company. Naturally there was a negative aspect to the fact that employees were completely dependent on the VOC for a fortune. Deprived of what was essentially an enormous fringe benefit, the servants felt the Company was responsible for providing them with an adequate remuneration with all the inherent potential negative consequences. 1.2 The paradox of less to offer but more to take As it battled with damaging external and internal circumstances, the VOC was increasingly thrown back on the fortunes of its servants to finance its trade. Over time the Company was forced to raise the amount of the money it accepted for bills from 1 million in 1740 to 3 million in 1771.481 “According to both sources, no less than 237 million guilders were transferred, 30 million in the seventeenth and 207 million in the eighteenth century. These sums were considerable when compared to other parameters of Company trade. For instance the total amount of the value of the Asian products exported to Europe (invoice value) was 251 million in the seventeenth and 678 million guilders in the eighteenth century.” 482 Until the Fourth Anglo-Dutch Sea War, the Company was financially stable, but the war triggered various detrimental consequences which obliged the Company to look for alternative sources of capital. The parlous state of its finances assumed frightening proportions and new means were sought to finance the Company’s trade. We have already seen one measure was to force obligations onto the shareholders in return for a State guarantee of a 12½ per cent, which was a distortion of the real 481 Gaastra, Particuliere Geldstromen, 20-21. 482F.S. Gaastra, “Private money for Company Trade, the Role of the Bills of Exchange in Financing the Return Cargoes of the VOC”, In Itinerario XVII, 1/1994, 68. profitability.483 In its search for capital, the VOC paid special attention to determining what it wished to accept in Asia each year. The rising trend in accepting more fortunes, is paralleled in an upsurge of what would have been called in earlier days the corrupt behaviour of the servants. Certainly part of the explanation, this behaviour can be traced to the changes in policy the VOC made in defining the role of its servants. I would like to suggest that in comparison to the seventeenth century, in the eighteenth century a career in the VOC offered more opportunities to make a fortune, and the inevitable corollary was that more money was being sent to Europe.484 The ailing VOC was less able to curb corrupt behaviour and had to stand impotently by and allow its servants more freedom in their pursuit of fortunes. The inescapable consequence was it was caught up in a cycle of ever-growing dependency on its servants and on their fortunes. Apart on relying more on its servants for capital, it began to lean heavily depend on the private initiative of its servants directly in its trading activities. Desperately aware of its debilitated state the VOC was exploring for new ways to produce and obtain export goods for Europe in Ceylon and eventually it was decided to turn to a plantation economy. In view of the bad financial state of the VOC, it was decided to build this system on the servants, who simply became its suppliers. They were enabled to fulfil their new role by the privileges the conferred on them by the VOC and by building up partnerships with the indigenous chiefs. Although heavy initial investments were needed, both the servants and the chiefs relished the rewarding prospect of selling to the VOC. If the VOC was not able to supply the hoped for remuneration, now with the upper hand the servants were also in a position to find alternatives outside of its confines. On the Malabar Coast, the servants decided to lease new lands from indigenous rulers and made a living from these lands by renting them out to the indigenous population, charging the VOC for the lease money.485 Although there was an upward swing in what could be earned and sent home for servant as the VOC declined, the direct participation of the servants in the trade of the VOC also had a shadow side. Instead of regularly receiving a direct share from VOC trade, the servants had to invest more time and capital if they were to cash in on the 483 See Chapter 3. 484 Gaastra, “Private money for Company Trade”, 68. 485 Schrikker, Colonial Intervention, 52-76 and A. Sing, Fort Cochin in Kerala 1750-1830, The Social Condition of A Dutch Community in an Indian Milieu (Leiden, unpublished PhD-thesis, 2007). privileges and consequently felt entitled to a larger personal share. Since most servants came to Asia poor and determined to make money, it is not logical to assume that they brought with them substantial amounts to invest with them, so their starting capital had to be sought in Asia. The most obvious possibility was to make a deal with people who had money to invest. The best example of this solution is the afore-mentioned partnership between servants and local chiefs in the exploitation of plantations in Ceylon. It was also possible for an impoverished young men to marry into a family in Asia which had investment money at its disposal. The second option was to ‘borrow’ money from the institution which was handing out privileges without first considering the practical implications for the privileged servants. In other words, the privileges received were worth nothing without capital and goods to trade in. To a certain extent, the profitability of these privileges in private trade or direct participation in VOC trade depended on the acumen of the servants to capitalize on them. This attitude of holding their employer responsible for their situation partly explains why so many VOC and EIC servants felt obliged to ‘borrow’ money from the Company coffers or to steal shamelessly from their employers. The burden of the decline of the VOC was thrown onto the shoulders of the servants, and they were painfully aware of their ambiguous role. Employees were dependent on the VOC privileges to make money but they discontentedly felt their position was weak compared to that of VOC servants in the past. They were given once lucrative privileges which now had to be supplemented by the hope of a reasonable potential profit, but the servants had to bear all the risk and leave their backs exposed. In order to seize the mounting opportunities for self-enrichment and avoid the risk involved in sending home money, the servants and their families felt a greater temptation to remain in Asia, although there it required more financial and social capital to cash in on the new opportunities. This provides an alternative explanation of why servants were more inclined to organize themselves in networks and remain in Asia at the end of their careers. There was a strong sense that it was simply no longer possible to rely entirely on oneself, but the actual prospect of a fortune was better than ever. This development was reinforced as the VOC steered an inevitable course towards bankruptcy. In such a situation, it was less tempting to send money home, as the servants could run the risk of losing their hard-earned money before it reached Europe. Astutely, many servants opted for a longer and more profitable stay in Asia with their family, which also offered them opportunities to keep profitable positions over generations. 2. Hierarchy as a tool of control The manipulation of hierarchy was essential in controlling the behaviour of servants as it bought time to correct the unruly conduct of recalcitrant servants and to profit from their services. Therefore the Company had an interest in assuring the hierarchy functioned according to its own priorities. The main priority was for a servant to start at the bottom of the VOC ladder in order to learn through experience. In a world without diplomas, learning equalled experience. Consequently seniority was the principle on which such promotions were based and employees had to wait their turn to achieve a higher rank. Other companies also adhered to this principle of having their servants climb the levels according to experience.486 As men of their time, the servants also acquired in the virtues of embracing seniority and experience as a principle in promotions. When Van Eck became Governor of Ceylon, he thanked the High Government for bringing to his attention an old gentleman who could still counsel him drawing on his years of experience. Van Eck depicted himself as someone who readily accepted the advice of those who had acquired more knowledge because of their greater expertise, which they had built up empirically.487 By adhering to the principle of seniority in promotions, the VOC allowed itself ample time to teach its servants how to play the game and to adhere to its priorities. The employees were expected to remain steadfast to the principle ‘For the benefit of the Company’ and the same principle was applied to the system of appointments. The directors would occasionally bypass employees for promotion as a disciplinary measure. After complaints from the Ceylonese population who objected to his unacceptable behaviour during an inspection tour, Dessave Le Beck’s reputation was damaged. Van 486 Marshall, Fortunes, 10-11, although he also admits that more seniority points could be obtained with powerful friends. 487 NA, Van Eck, 20, 693, 8 september 1761, Van Eck to Van der Parra. Eck warned Le Beck that in his case seniority did not automatically mean promotion. Should he persist in his greedy behaviour, a promotion to commander was out of the question. After several severe warnings, Le Beck was bluntly informed that a change in behaviour was essential if he wished to avoid future confrontations with indigenous chiefs. For the time being, the blame for the current problems was officially transferred to his wife who had accompanied him on the journey. In order to give him a second chance, the Dessave was ordered to leave his wife at home on work-related travels and to keep her from interfering in his work. If he succeeded in improving his behaviour, a promotion would be reconsidered.488 The vast geographical spread of the VOC meant its structure was composed of a long chain of positions, guaranteeing its servants a variety of careers over a longer period. There was a hierarchy in the VOC factories, which forced the servants to bide their time in less profitable settlements, until they attained a post in a more profitable region. There is plenty of evidence that the establishments where the VOC gained little income, exhibit changes in remuneration earlier, an indication that the servants ran more risks and were forced to invest their own capital and time at an earlier date. The regions in which the VOC exercised more power were only affected by structural change around 1780 as the Company’s financial position grew desperate and the English inched in ever more closely. As the VOC declined, the remuneration of servants continued to be tied to hierarchy, but an increasing personal responsibility was thrust upon them to make their fortune, causing structural organizational weaknesses to come to light. Well aware of the ominous threat of the low survival rate, every employee was bent on climbing the ladder as quickly as possible, since it would hopefully allow them to escape an early death and return to Europe at an earlier date. Games were played in order to eschew the cumbersome principle of seniority. One prime example is when Van Eck left for the island of Ceylon and Van Teylingen realized Vick was senior to him and was first in line to become Governor of the Coromandel Coast.489 Van Eck reassured Van Teylingen that more was needed than just seniority to make a career, or to put it in the words of Van Eck: 488 NA, Van Eck, 20, 784, 12 Augustus 1764, Van Eck to Le Beck. 489 NA, Van Eck, 27, 36, 2 February 1760, Van Teylingen to Van Eck. ‘Survivanse’ (the principle of ‘survival’) was not something immetuable.490 When Van Teylingen eventually was appointed, the Gentlemen XVII criticized the High Government for ignoring the principle of seniority. Similar games, such as waiting for a suitable job in buitenemploij, or outside service, were also frowned upon by the Heeren XVII. In order to force the High Government to adhere to seniority, they decided not to approve any promotions until the practice of buitenemploi had been ended.491 2.1 Personal interest in appointments In Holland and in Asia, the battle for positions and influence in Asia is best exemplified by the informal system of recommending people. In this recommendation system at least lip-service was paid to the interests of the VOC. In order to obtain promotion through the Gentlemen XVII, company servants, had to pay a modicum of attention to honour the ‘interests’ of the Company. Although the Gentlemen XVII were ensconced far away, they still regulated abuse and exerted influence simply by blocking undesired promotions. Sponsorship of a powerful patron was not enough, as a servant thus recommended had to prove himself worthy by showing he shared common values and ideas. The most important and worthiest characteristic a capacity to see beyond personal interest, thereby displaying an attachment to the ‘good of the Company’.492 This kind of irreproachable behaviour (‘Onbesproken gedrag’) was applauded and in theory should have sufficed to win promotion without any recommendation. Van Rheden put this into wirting when he tried to have his protégé Felitas promoted, although shrewdly he simply recommended him by pretending not to do so.493 His statement on good behaviour gave the recommendation the appearance of a piece of advice, couched in such terms as to attract attention to a person who deserved protection. Of course, such a situation was not foolproof. The power-that-be were not blind and it was acknowledged 490 NA, Van Eck, 20, 784, 12 Augustus 1764, Van Eck to Le Beck. 491 NA, Van Eck, 27, 36, 2 February 1760, Van Teylingen to Van Eck. 492 NA, Van Eck, 38, 8, 20 January, 1764, Van Eck to Rien van Citters. 493 NA, Van Eck, 26, 35, 1 June 1759, Van Rheden to Van Eck. that even persons with a bad reputation were recommended and had a chance of succeeding if a powerful patron endorsed them.494 Astutely the Company management tried to regulate such excesses.495 In order to avoid acts of recommendation which were too opportunistic, it was expected those who wrote such a commendatory letter would have had a personal relationship with the person when they were sponsoring. Any follow up on letters of recommendation was taken into consideration only after a personal relationship with the person recommended had been established. When Governor-General Mossel received a recommendation from the Republic referring to a VOC employee serving on the Coromandel Coast whom he had never set eye on, the recommendation was passed on to Van Eck, who had the task of assessing if the person lived up to the laudatory words.496 Another example of this caution occurred when Van Eck judged a man who had just arrived in Ceylon very positively after talking to him. 497 Logically, the person recommended also had to be physically available on the spot where he was needed. After Van Eck recommended a ship’s captain to some highly placed friends in Zeeland, they were very surprised that this sailor did not bother to visit them in person.498 When the ship captain failed to make an appearance, Van Eck’s friends decided it was impossible to pay attention to the recommendation, even though they needed captains.499 A recommendation was considered tantamount to a guarantee of good behaviour from the person who had given it, in other words, the sponsor was held responsible for the acceptable conduct of his protégé.500 How this worked out in practice is illustrated by the story of Captain Lochman. After he had been provisionally promoted him to the rank of captain in the army in the field until approbation of this promotion was received from 494 NA, Van Eck, 27, 33, 31 January 1760, Faure to Van Eck, It is very honourable of Your Honour that you have not made mentioned anything to Batavia about this case, certainly since I was the one who recommended him to you. But I had hoped to receive as answer that this man would have possessed a better character (:but this remains between the two of us:).495 NA, Van Eck, 26, 35, 1 June 1759, Van Rheden to Van Eck. 496 NA, Van Eck, 28, 20, 31 March 1761, Mossel to Van Eck. 497 NA, Van Eck, 20, 761, 30 September 1763, Van Eck to Van der Parra. 498 NA, Van Eck, 36, 7, 28 December 1764, Hoiret to Van Eck. 499 NA, Van Eck, 36, 5, 31 October 1764, Rien van Citters to Van Eck. I have not received any notice. I would have wished he had presented himself, certainly since our Chamber has a great lack of captains and knowledgeable naval officers.500 NA, Van Eck, 36, 6, (…) It has been said here that he possessed many capacities and the desired art, as well as many other qualities, Since I have later received less favourable reports of this man after, I have asked mr Schreuder to inform me on behalf of the person. (…) Batavia, Van Eck changed his mind about this advancement. After certain facts had been brought to his attention he no longer supported the promotion. Two days after the provisional promotion, Van Eck learned the captain had married a ‘black woman whose first husband had died on the scaffold’. Anxious to ensure that this misjudgement might blemish his own reputation, Van Eck decided to counter mand the promotion. He shifted the blame to Schreuder who had recommended the captain to him. 501 In his turn, Schreuder withdrew his recommendation and blamed a major for recommending Lochman to him (although the major denied having knowledge of the case). Lochman had to step down and with this reversal in his fate all the nice words spoken about his character were revoked.502 The train of thought common at that time was that good behaviour had to be supported by and was inevitably related to a good background. Van Eck was blatantly predisposed to people of aristocratic descent with powerful friends.503 The principle of descent is best expressed by Van Teylingen’s father who recommended his son to follow in the footsteps of Van Eck as Governor of Coromandel Coast. He spoke of Van Eck’s known good character, which was to say his habit of behaving well towards everybody possessed of distinction of good behaviour and impeccable descent. 504 If a VOC employee’s family background had been accurately assessed, this obliged others to help him. Van Teylingen’s father was very pleased that this patronage had been bestowed on his son, who was helped to a higher position.505 When a patron helped, he normally did not confine his efforts to assisting in a career. Van Eck often advanced the people who had been recommended to him with money to launch their enterprise and only expected them to pay the loan back when they had earned enough money.506 A recommended employee was often proposed as the most logical choice to fulfil the interests of the VOC, but behind promotion lurked personal interest. All servants had 501 NA, Van Eck, 20, 779, 12 November 1764, Van Eck to Ooster & Bordes. 502 NA, Van Eck, 20, 719, 15 March 1762, Van Eck to Van der Parra, it was also said that half a year earlier Lochman had been nothing mere than a sergeant, further discrediting any future promotion. 503Frank Lequin, Het personeel van de Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie in Azie in de 18e eeuw : meer in het bijzonder in de vestiging Bengalen (Leiden: , 1982), 164, According to Stapel, two types of career existed, one based on family relationships and one on climbing the ladder to success. 504 NA, Van Eck, 34, 2, 22 March 1762, Father of Van Teylingen to Van Eck. 505 NA, Van Eck, 35, 17, 5 July 1763, Father of Van Teylingen to Van Eck. 506 NA, Van Eck, 10, 2, 3 September 1765, Falck to heirs. a personal interest in every promotion as they were highly conscious of the fact that networks partly determined their future prospects of fortune. Behind one particular servant, a whole group of servants had an interest in helping their own protégés to a profitable position as soon as possible. One crucial decision was made in determining a servant’s career even before he ventured forth to Asia. The first divide was between the people designated qualified, those suitable for government positions, and those who would play such supporting roles as soldiers and sailors. If a person candidate aspired to belong to the first category which offered the best opportunities of a successful and profitable career, during the eighteenth century it was advisable to sail out with the rank of onderkoopman (junior merchant). If their pupil could reach a higher rank, this also served the interests of that employee’s patron. Sometimes patrons had their eye on a certain position for their protégé and they waited for this position to fall vacant. When Faure was helping Van Eck in private trade as his agent in his capacity of a free-burgher, he was temporarily not in the service of the VOC or buiten emploi, in his own words ‘under the pretext of an indisposition’ and without pay or gagie. This had two advantages, firstly, as a free-burgher he could help others with their private trade, but more importantly he enjoyed a strong position with important patrons and this allowed him the possibility to wait for a suitable job to turn up in the VOC. These patrons, including the Governor-General, had their sights on a certain position for Hugo Faure. The problem was that the position was still occupied. 2.2 From nepotism to redistribution of wealth However devoid of personal interests the VOC employees endeavoured to make their decisions appear, often very different principles lay behind recommendations. Personal advantage to ‘friends’ of the people involved in appointing invariably played a part or as Mr De Witt from Dordrecht remarked to Van Eck: (…)I sincerely wish, and by no means doubt, that you will thrive to the benefit and advantage of your good friends, and those who make your favour worthwhile, may this also befall upon my good friend, who will hand this letter over to you (…).507 Meteoric careers of employees have often been explained by the presence of a family-based system. One basic assumptions about the VOC and the family system in Batavia, has been that it revolved around women.508 By recommending a person, employees often made the servants they helped seem like their friends and this concept can fundamentally be explained in terms of reciprocity. Friendship in practice meant family or at least a person over whom one had a certain degree of control.509 The sheer fact of belonging to a influential family gave access to wealth, status and positions. ‘The glue that held this society [Batavia] together was the family system.510 The VOC has been seen as evolving towards a colonial state or perhaps more aptly ‘a colonial society that was formed in Dutch settlements on the coasts of Asia and that evolved for a brief period into a ruling caste in the Indonesian archipelago.’ Taylor argues that this gave ‘white women’ a privileged place in society, especially when they were daughters of or related to powerful men.511 These women could be named the sole heir to a man’s property, so widows were also sought after for the fortune they could bring into a marriage.512 For the Company elite in Batavia marriage was of paramount importance in sealing relationships and securing investments. The key proof of the significance of the family system in Batavia is found in the early years of the eighteenth century with three successive directly related Governors-General: Willem van Outhoorn, Joan van Hoorn and Abraham van Riebeeck. Of these a central role was played by Joan van Hoorn, who succeeded in keeping the position of Governor-General within the family. This is also appositely illustrated by the people named in the will of Abraham Patras, showing the links between highly placed men. An elaboration is provided by the Van Riemsdijk clan, 507 NA, Van Eck, 34, 9, 2 December 1762, De Witt to Van Eck. 508 G. Taylor, The social world of Batavia, European and Eurasian in Dutch Asia (Madison: The University of Wisconsin press, 1983). 509 L. Koomans, Vriendschap en de kunst van het overleven in de zeventiende en achttiende eeuw (Amsterdam: Bakker, 1997).510 J.G. Taylor, The social world of Batavia, 71.511 If we look at the origins of the society in the seventeenth century we see that, as a colony, Batavia had to import Dutch people, but these were mostly men. Consequently, Batavia developed into a colony with a shortage of women and this led to a patronage system with certain specific characteristics. 512 The daughters remained in Batavia and hence these women are supposed to form the heart of the Indies clans. This, in turn, was intensified by the fact that mortality rates were very high, which made remarriage attractive and caused spouses to circulate. For more details on this phenomenon, not always to the advantage of women. See Taylor, Social World. which demonstrates the political importance of family alliances and the contribution of Asians to colonial culture.513 This irrefutable evidence still begs the question if such an analysis does not overemphasize the role of women in the VOC system in order to dispel a perceived absence of women, white and native, in earlier works. However important these women were in creating alliances, they were not making the actual decisions; neither concerning the policy of the VOC nor about promotions. Again caution is advised and we have to guard against exaggerating the role of family in view of the fact the relations between employees have to be examined without a great deal of any other corroborative information. The concept of friendship/family has been applied particularly to Batavia and such a blanket assumption makes it seem as if politics has been reduced to the sphere of family rivalry. Without denying that family was important to eighteenth century VOC employees, too much focus on the information available from a genealogy may easily lead the researcher to overestimate the importance of family. Certainly some questions marks need to be set against the concept since non-family members were also included in a network. There is ample evidence that employees were also included on a the basis of conceived shared values, and Van Eck is a good example of this. Van Eck acknowledged a man claiming to be related to him, even though he only knew of family-members carrying his name in the Netherlands, which he had left at a very young age. His case demonstrates that although he had no contact with family members in Asia, he was quite successful in using other means to advance his career. In this respect Van Eck is interesting as an ‘outsider’ from the family system of Batavia. His career reveals very plainly how an alternative system of mutual favours functioned. When a person had to invest time and energy in a non-familial relationship, it is only to have been expected that the reciprocity underlying the system would have been less hidden and more conspicuous. The functioning of the system of recommendation is more understandable if we take in account that positions with the VOC simply represented a certain value in monetary terms. When Van Eck was promoted to Governor of the Coromandel Coast, he ordered his agent in Batavia to pay a commission of 600 rix-dollars to the persons who had appointed him. Though small, this was thought to be a sufficient amount, since the 513 Taylor, Social world, 72. Government of the Coast of Coromandel was at that time ‘not the most pleasant or the most profitable one’. The position itself did not bring in much money even when the incumbent was given freedom to conduct private trade.514 The High Government had unofficially institutionalized such commissions. The historiography teems with many examples of bought promotions. Certainly there was gossip had it that Schreuder had paid ƒ70,000 for the position of Governor of Ceylon. This was not paid directly to a commission but to a person in Holland who pushed the promotion through from there.515 In view of the expected return on investment, the difference in amount paid by Schreuder and Van Eck for their respective positions shows Ceylon was a more coveted position than the Coromandel Coast. The Company servants quantified the value of every position and therefore networks can be viewed as systems of the redistribution of wealth. It was, however, an investment in future wealth as it took time for the investment to solidify and bear fruit. This is best exemplified by the way clients repaid their patrons after they died. When Van Rheden passed away in 1760, he left substantial sums of money to powerful people. Salomon Dedel, alderman of the city of Amsterdam and director of the West India Company, was bequeathed ƒ10,000 and Johan Hudde Dedel, mayor of The Hague, ƒ5000. De Klerk, the later Governor-General, received 4000 rix-dollars,516 Van Rheden’ s debt to these men is an unmistakable clue to this custom. Such conduct between patron and client was not uncommon; as we have seen Vermont left his whole estate to Mossel.517 Rather than depending on commercial acumen it was possible to attain a quicker return on investment by building a barter trade with other powerful patrons on this virtual value of positions and the indebtedness of protégés. Since both the Company and patrons had their sights fixed on a share in private fortunes by assessing the financial condition of employees and protégés, it was in the 514 NA, Van Eck, 20, 279, 15 April 1759, Van Eck to Faure. 515 A.J.C.M. Gabriels, heren als dienaren en de dienaar als heer: het stadhouderl k stelsel in de tweede helft van de 18de eeuw (1989 non-published thesis), 106. 516 NA, VOC, 6849. Will of Van Rheden of 2 December 1760, (…) To the Honourable mr Saloman Dedel, former alderman of Amsterdam, as well as Director of the West India Company, I leave a sum of 10.000 holland guilders, to the Honourable mr Johan Hudde Dedel, mayor of The Hague, a sum of five thousand holland guilders, to the Honourable mr Reynier de Klerk, extraordinary council of the Netherlands East Indies a sum of four thousand rix-dollars of 48 pennies. (…)517 NA, Van Eck, 27, 36, 2 February 1760, Van Teylingen to Van Eck. interests of the employees to be coy about their income. When an employee made too much money, regardless of its origin, it was seen as stealing. As long as employees were pursuing a career in the VOC, they were very careful about concealing the amounts remitted to Europe.518 Money was not sent and received in one’s own name, but through officially appointed agents. As did many other servants, Van Eck was prepared to pay unrelated middlemen in Asia and Holland to receive and send his money, in order to disguise any links from it to him. He sent money in his own name only sporadically. If the amount were to be deemed to be too excessive, this would have damaged his career or his patrons may have demanded a larger share. The VOC management was quite capable of retracting privileges and if an employee sent home too much money, this form of sanction might be wielded to discipline them. Needless to say, a permanent stay in Asia made it much easier to hide income from the eagle eye of the VOC, as the money was not going to Europe through the hands of the Company. Conclusion Throughout its history the VOC had always used the individual initiative of its servants to solve certain structural organizational problems. As its ineluctable decline set in this interaction between Company and servant changed to such an extent that the Company used its servant to ward off decline. This is illustrated by the increasing number of remittances accepted for Europe and their increasing role in financing the returns of the Company. In order to safeguard the interests of the Company, the VOC devised a system of relating fortune and the chance to procure it to the Company hierarchy. The inevitable outcome when the Company linked remuneration to hierarchy was that the servants also held the Company responsible for supplying them with adequate means of remuneration. The decline of the VOC brought the sea change of allowing more freedom to its servants 518 Most of the examples of Dutch fortunes mentioned above date from during or after the return of servants to Europe or after death. Still, lists of the names people sending money from Asia to Europe can be consulted in the NA in the Hague. The lists do not contain names of many high-ranking officials, so it is almost impossible to track them. in their pursuit of fortune. This was partly attributable to the financial problems the Company faced, but it was also linked to the to the fact that the old ways of remunerating servants grew less attractive since they were predominantly linked to the declining intra-Asian trade of the Company, pressuring the VOC to allow new privileges on top of the old ones. Although more freedom entailed a possible greater personal fortune, there were various risks, which the Company servants were only willing to take if they had something to gain. They had to invest more of their own time, energy and money into making a fortune, and there was far more risk involved. From a situation in which they simply shared in the Company profits, they were transformed into providers of capital. Indeed they even participated directly in the official VOC trades, VOC monopolies and colonial exploitation. As the Company had to concede more freedom, it became increasingly dependent on its own servants, tipping the balance of power in their favour. As the Company grew more demanding, they countered strategies to cope with their changing role. Since they needed more capital and larger networks they were increasingly forced to depend on family networks. The fact that larger numbers of servants chose to remain in Asia after service also gives a cogent indication that they clearly saw their future lay in Asia. In the shadow of the company : the VOC (Dutch East India Company)and its servants in the period of its decline (1740-1796) Nierstrasz, J.C. Citation Nierstrasz, J. C. (2008, November 5). In the shadow of the company : the VOC (Dutch East India Company) and its servants in the period of its decline (1740-1796). Retrieved from https://hdl.handle.net/1887/13267 Version: Not Applicable (or Unknown) License: Licence agreement concerning inclusion of doctoral thesis in the Institutional Repository of the University of Leiden Downloaded from: https://hdl.handle.net/1887/13267 Note: To cite this publication please use the final published version (if applicable). Chapter 7: Remuneration and corruption Introduction As a commercial enterprise the VOC had always pursued a policy of limiting its costs in order to free capital for trade. This cost-cutting mentality is also reflected in the way the Company paid its employees, who only received a basic salary with which they could barely make ends meet. For a very long time, this meagre remuneration had been offset by a policy of allowing the employees have a direct share in Company profits, in the expectation of guaranteeing their loyalty and dedication to their employer. This was an efficient way of organizing labour, since it was neither very capital intensive nor heavily bureaucratic. In their turn, employees knew that by serving the Company, they could make their fortunes. With the financial problems which marred the eighteenth century and the various solutions which were proposed to reverse indeed the declining trend in the Company’s profits, employees were increasingly seen in the light of and were used as providers of capital. The increasing pursuit of fortune initially was not an unmitigated blessing for the servants. Whereas the fortunes of Company servants had initially been linked to VOC profits, dwindling profits meant that they had to make their own money by private trade or other personal endeavours. This required an investment of the employees’ own money and time, in contrast to their previous situation, in which they had simply to sit back and profit from the investments of the VOC. The decline of the VOC was to some extent alleviated by placing the burden on servants, but as their situation deteriorated they became increasingly inclined to follow their own path as they held the VOC responsible for their worsened situation. The time has come to assess to what extent this change affected the relationship between Company and servants. 1. A troubled relationship If we accept the assumption that making a fortune depends on freedom in trade, the VOC servants were certainly worse off than servants of other European companies. At the same time, the historiography also stresses that reality had strayed from the perceived paradigm, since it proved impossible to divert a VOC servant bent on pursuing private trade and consequently defrauding the VOC. The general occurrence of fraud and private trade, thus –because inconsistent with the patent of the Company- illegal trade have been marked by some historians as one of the causes of the decline of the [Dutch East India Company] in the eighteenth century 519 There has tended to be a heavy emphasis placed on the costly nature of maintaining the VOC monopolies. The monopolies were also seen as hindering Asian merchants from identifying with the fortunes of the VOC.520 In a nutshell, many of these assumptions have proved to be too simple. The purpose of this chapter is to point a fresh picture extrapolating on what we have already found in our chapters on Dutch private trade and of informal institutions. A more symbiotic image of the relationship between companies and their employees has already emerged and originates from the servants themselves. In the primary sources, the relationship is often seen as reciprocal, both profiting fairly and entitled to their share. “(…) It is also well understood that it can be left to the care of the Director General [De Klerk] to load the ships properly, so that neither the Company nor the sailors fall short, but both are given what they deserve –In these duties he has shown himself a honest servant - To take nothing for oneself, but to allow a reasonable profit to the industrious sailor, and other servants of the Company, is allowed and is no more than just, and should not be held against them in a country where one is daily exposed to sickness and death, and where also many, in the hope of making a fortune, end up stifled. (…)”521 This line of thought did not diverge greatly from a mentality which prevailed in 519 Bayly, Imperial Meridian, 66 and F.S. Gaastra, ‘Constantijn Ranst en de corruptie onder het personeel van de VOC te Bengalen, 1669-1673’, in: Bestuurders en geleerden (Amsterdam : De Bataafsche Leeuw 1985), 126. 520 Watson, Foundation for Empire, 17. 521 Ary Huysers, Het leeven van Reinier de Klerk, Gouverneur Generaal van Nederlands Indie (Utrecht: Van Paddenburg 1783), 52, (…) Niets voor zig zelve te neemen, en egter toe te laaten, dat een matig the Republic or from that in the rest of Europe. Profiting personally from an official position was a normal state of affair, although a Company career presented relatively quick access to a fortune. From this perspective, we should be careful in questioning the conduct of VOC servants in Asia.522 The VOC management was prepared to balance its own interests against the acquisition of personal fortunes by its servants as long as its servants acknowledged the supremacy of the Company. The VOC used to control its greedy servants by citing the moral adage: ‘For the good of the Company’. As shown in the previous chapter, this gave the VOC a means to survey and control the behaviour of its servants. The best way to assess the honesty of servants was considered to be to assume that servants who made too much money too quickly must have done so at the expense of the Company. At this stage, the monopoly on the transaction of money to Europe served as a safety valve for all the Companies; a very crude and not very efficient brake on excessive money-making. Even if the Company servants succeeded in making a large fortune, they would always be faced with the problem of sending a fortune home. The relationship between Company and servant was to a certain extent based on the level at which the Company was able to provide for its servant. When we bear in mind that its prime aim was trade, the VOC was logically organized. Salaries were kept low in order to keep costs down. In turn, to lure competent people the VOC had to provide alternative sources of income, preferably those beneficial to its trade. Obviously the best way to approach this was to strengthen the common interest of Company and servant. In other words: the alternative sources of income had to be linked to the profitability of the Company. Another possibility to link the benefits of Company and servants was by allowing the servants to acquire an income in fields other than trade. Of course, the VOC was in a position to do so only in those regions which were under its direct control. In the hierarchy of VOC regions, those which seemed to offer the greatest winstje aan den nyvren zeeman, en andere Dienaren van de maatschappij, werde toegestaan, is niet meer dan billijk, en kan in een land, alwaar men dagelijks blood staat voor ziektens en sterftens, en daar ook veelen, in de hoop fortuin te maaken, koomen te smooren, niet kwalijk geduyd worden.(…) 522 Gaastra, Constantijn Ranst, 127. freedom, were in general the least coveted, although Bengal was an exception which proved the rule.523 1.1 A legal share The directors could not ban what they chose to view as ‘wrongdoings’ unless they remunerated the costs made by servants sufficiently. The VOC was under a moral obligation to allow its servants to amass a fortune, since the splendour which would accompany this radiated on the VOC and lubricated VOC policy. The prime substantiation of this statement is Ceylon. If a Governor did not have supplementary revenues, the costs made on behalf of for the VOC would have bankrupted him. In plain unvarnished terms, he needed extra income. Governor Falck (1765-1785) offers proof of this by dismissing the wages, subsistence money and allowances the VOC officially paid its servants as mere trifles, amounting to almost nothing. The expenditure a Governor of Ceylon had to produce from his own pocket for the Company were said to amount to a total of 20,000 rix-dollars a year. He specified an extra income of around 20.000 rix­dollars a year officially allowed in privileges by the VOC.524 The VOC granted this bonus to balance the expenditure Governors were obliged to make on behalf of the Company, among these paying for costs in his household, alms for the needy, the Kandian Embassy and the military, to name just a few. Extraordinary income was bound up with the profits the VOC made and as such it is wrong to see servants as victims of the VOC monopoly. Since a monopoly then as now is based on enforcement, it was vital to the VOC that loyal servants on the spot scrupulously upheld it. This share in the monopoly was regulated by the VOC and was described in great detail in order to ensure that the boundaries were unequivocally 523 In three years in Ceylon, Van Eck also sent home more money than he had done in the preceding eighteen years. This emphasizes the fact that although private trade was not allowed, a position on Ceylon was coveted much more than a position on the Coromandel Coast. Van Eck was more than happy to postpone his return home in order to swap the position of Governor of the Coast for the position of Governor of Ceylon. 524In a good year this could even rise to 25,000 rix-dollars. circumscribed. In Ceylon, for example, the benefits deriving the cinnamon monopoly were strictly reserved for the Company and was rigorously guarded against any infringement. By allowing senior servants a share in the monopolies in the intra-Asian trade, mutual interest was created to serve the Company’s needs. One such perk was the right the senior servants to share in the harvest of areca-nuts in different regions. The VOC sold these for their account.525 This benignity ensured that the Company and the senior servants had a mutual interest in upholding the intra-Asian monopoly against third parties; the same mechanism applied as in private trade to Batavia and the Opium Society. If the cinnamon monopoly were trespassed upon, it could be protected by withdrawing he profitable privileges in the intra-Asian trade. Apart from a share in the VOC monopoly on trade, the Governor also participated in the income the VOC enjoyed from government. The higher-ranking servants in Ceylon were allowed a share of the taxes and profits from the sea.526 This extraordinary income had been agreed to in the official code and was meant to alleviate cost of living.527 The best known example of this income from government are ten villages known under the heading the Governor’s dispens-dorpen. The Governor used the income from these villages, mainly from taxing fishing, orchards and rice cultivation, for the expenditure on his representative banquets.528 As may inexitably have been expected the amount of money taken from the local population exceeded the official specifications. The administration of indigenous people provided excellent opportunities for supplementing income without Batavia noticing. Since the indigenous people fully accepted such behaviour, Ceylon was teeming with possibilities to engage in all sorts of corrupt 525 On every ammonam (measure of 24,000 nuts) of areca-nuts from Colombo the Governor took a share of 2 ½ rix-dollars and on areca-nuts from Kalture he took 2 rix-dollars. Normally this would yield 8 to 10.000 rix-dollars, but before the war with the king of Kandy it had brought in twice as much. A second source of income was the excess on the purchased areca-nuts from the Colombo district, which could sometimes be 30 of 100 nuts, depending on size. In former days this was 15 on 100, so Falck restored his percentage and sold nuts for his own account. 526 This had been agreed by the code on the provisions of the servants of 31 May 1755. The Governor had the largest share (about a quarter of the total) and other highly placed officers also shared commensurate to their rank. According to Falck this yielded about 4 to 5000 rix-dollars a year. 527 Falck claimed his predecessor Van Gollonesse had accrued enormous wealth in the pearl fishery, but he wanted to avoid requiring similar ill-gotton gains by giving up part of his income. 528 This is exactly what Falck estimated as the income derived from these rights. He probably obtained his information from the estate of Van Eck. This brought in 2,500 to 3,000 rix-dollars a year and was closely linked to the income enjoyed by Van Eck by renting out land for 2,500 a year. This was referred to as part of this dispens-rights. behaviour. ‘No land better to skim off. People dare to offer money for anything, because of their depraved, inveterate habits. As the uncovering of many cases has revealed, many things are for sale. Kustumado on Ceylon, as is Hadat with the Javanese are highly significant words.’529 Despite their proclivity for such practices the servants liked to portray themselves as ‘righteous’,530 by underlining the principle of not making money at the expense of the Company and indigenous people.531 Different situations in the regions where the VOC was active meant different solutions had to be sought to find a balance between Company and the servant. As already remarked upon, on the Coast, the VOC had much less to offer to its servants since it had neither a monopoly on trade nor territories to govern. Therefore, the main benefit permitted the servants was to allow them to take part in the intra-Asian trade of the Company. Later they had to conduct this trade themselves through private business. This transaction meant a deterioration in their situation as they had to invest their own money and time, and they now also ran the risk of losing their investment. Luckily, the link with the VOC meant its servants occupied a strong position and profit was almost certainly guaranteed along hierarchical lines. In the domains where the VOC was more lenient and less involved, the higher-ranking servants themselves exerted their power and position to take what was considered rightfully theirs. Broadly speaking, it was thought best to play along with the rules of the VOC. If something illegal happened, servants tried to hide their behaviour behind the creed of the Company: ‘For the benefit of the Company’. Another way to make a quick fortune at the cost of the Company was profiting from war. The military power of the French and English companies exceeded that of the 529 A.K.A. Hodenpijl, de inkomsten van een rechtschapen Gouverneur van Ceylon in den Compagniestijd in Indische gids, 42, 192, (…) Geen beter Land anders om te schrapen, daer men door de verderfelijke en ingekankerde gewoonte, voor alles geld durft bieden gelijk ook volgens dese en gene ontdekte stukjes, veele zaaken te koop zijn geweest, Kostumado op Ceylon, Hadat bij de Javanen zijn woorden van betekenis. (…)530 The data on Falck have been retrieved from an article by A.K.A Hodenpijl, De inkomsten van een rechtschapen Gouverneur van Ceylon in den Compagniestijd, in Indische Gids, 4, (1920). Arriving in Asia in 1757 only as onderkoopman above the normal formation with the mediation of Hope. He swiftly made his career, outdistancing such members of the High Government, as Hilgers, Taillefert and Alting, although he himself was a mere secretary in the High Government, Falck was appointed Governor of Ceylon in 1765, much to his own surprise. 531 Although Falck gave assurances that he stood by this principle, he had been mocked for it in Batavia. There, his friends had been assuring him that when he reached the stage of actually making money, these principles would evaporate like snow before the sun. To prove the contrary to his mighty protector in Holland, Falck showed to which guidelines he wanted to adhere. In order to define what he considered pernicious customs, he first focused on what he thought servants on the Ceylon were entitled to. VOC and their servants had better opportunities to profit from war, just as much as European conflicts enabled them to abuse this newly acquired power for self­remuneration. Clive profited personally from the military success of the EIC in Bengal. In one fell swoop he made his fortune and other Europeans succeeded in enriching themselves by vastly resorting to similar behaviour. A French commander called Conflans wanted to repatriate on a VOC ship as he was afraid to return to Pondicherry. When he did not obtain permission to sail to Batavia on an East Indiaman, he even went as far as to buy a ship to go to Batavia. Rumour had it, he had accepted 10 lakh of rupees for handing Mazulipatnam over to the English and then made a run for it with the money.532 In order to avoid repetition of such behaviour, the Gentlemen Seventeen and the High Government showed a blatant distrusted of their employees when war loomed. At all costs, the management wanted to avoid giving in to warlike sentiments too quickly, since it was convinced its employees had a pecuniary interest in pursuing war. When Van Eck was pressing for war against the king of Kandy, one of the hurdles he had to overcome was to put forward a convincing argument showing the war was in the interests of the Company. In his efforts to convince his superiors, he promised not to profit personally or to pursue a protracted war. Only after this promise had been obtained did the High Government in Batavia fall in with his plans. Even though Van Eck lived up to his promise, he was not left empty handed when the booty was shared.533 He gave some of his loot away to his most powerful friends in the Republic, among them the Duke of Brunswick.534 532 NA, Van Eck, 26, 46, 27 June 1759, Van Teylingen to Van Eck. 533 NA, VOC, 3200, 262, According to the official VOC archives, Van Eck’s family ended up with the following items which had been plundered during the sacking of the palace of the king of Kandy: a statue of a Buddha made of copper mixed with gold, a machine of ivory, with a disc of metal engraved with a nicely decorated bow in gold at the bottom, an engraved quiver and arrows in gold, a sword with golden hilt and scabbard with gold mounts, yet the hilt of metal gilded with gold, a red lacquered command baton fitted with gold at both ends (…).534 This is not all Van Eck plundered, he had already sent home the earlier-mentioned ornamented cannon, which had been presented as a gift to the Duke of Brunswick. 1.2 Down the hierarchy The VOC granted the bulk of its privileges to the senior officials, whereas a governor on the spot had to make sure that other servants also profited according to their place in the hierarchy.535 The responsibility for upholding the peaking order was borne by the highest local VOC authority. Since private trade was seen as a reward or privilege, the highest official in the hierarchy was entitled to the most privileges. The same was true of income not related to trade. This practice was stimulated by the regulations and was adopted by the servants in the domains relatively unburdened by official regulations. In order to be effective as governor, it was essential to let the lower servants share in the remuneration in order to be assured of their loyalty. In return for the authority and the largest share of the privileges, the governor had to exert himself to see that everyone in the administration obtained his due proportionate share. The commensurate share of every servant was judged by the highest authority on the spot. Even when the highest authority had already made his own fortune, he would not take it lightly if servants took a larger part than that to which the hierarchy entitled them. The Governor of the Coast always had to ensure receiving his part, a principle we have seen in the chapters on private trade. A prime example of this was when Clive dismissed EIC employees in Madras who had grabbed too large a share, denying Clive his cut. Clive castigated them for not honouring the ‘benefit of the Company’, although he had already taken a large sum for himself. 536 Even when new opportunities of enrichment presented themselves, the governor or director had to step in quickly to claim his rightful share. As an instrument to keep the hierarchy intact, it was considered his 535 Falck shared the money he gained in the pearl fishery, round 15 to 20,000 rix-dollars with such other servants, as the Governor of the Coast Haksteen, the Chief of Tutucorin and the three delegates, Rose, Frankena and Van Angelbeek, in the hope of buying their loyalty. After buying off the other servants, everything left in his account was used to help fishers in financial problems because of the high lease money demed. His final conclusion was that the greed of those involved had spoiled this branch of acquiring an income. The Governor for his part had to pay a quarter to the commissioner, the two delegates and the indigenous servants of the areca-storehouse, keeping 4 to 6,000 rix-dollars for himself. In the Kalpetti region, the Governor received half of the excess on the nuts, bringing in 700 to a 1000 rix-dollars. A quarter went to the chief of that region, while the remaining quarter was split up between the lower­ranking servants at Kalpetti.536 Sutherland, The East India Company. bounden duty to seize and divide new opportunities of income as quickly as possible. Content with this laissez-faire attitude the VOC management decided to leave this responsibility to the senior officials posted overseas and intervene only in the case of excess. In normal times, this system functioned quite well and suited trade as it was neither capital-intensive nor energy-extensive to sustain. 2. Corruption The gaining of illegal income, or what the Company termed corruption, was of course considered contrary to the interests of the Company. The main difference in definition was that in opposition to the allowed remuneration, illegal income would have entailed damage to the position of the Company. The problem in fighting illegal income was that it was by no means invariably detrimental to the position of the VOC and that generally only came to light if it did cause problems. Aware of the unwritten protocol, the servants walked a thin line between being caught and making a fortune. Sheer luck sometimes determined which side the coin would fall, but in most cases such transactions simply led to the servants growing rich. Even if they were discovered, punishment could be avoided because the High Government in Batavia could interfere and offer the culprit protection. The division of illegal income was split up in accordance with the sharing out or commensurate to the extraordinary income. The highest authority wanted the largest share and lower-ranked officials could claim a share commensurate with their position. The more powerful a company was, the greater the possibilities to extort money from its indigenous subjects. In their administration, servants adjusted to local habits and asked remuneration from the indigenous people on this promotion to a senior position. This was a custom to which the indigenous rulers in India subjected the VOC in return for extending existing trading rights. In the political section of this thesis we have seen how when he succeeded his much esteemed grandfather as Governor of Bengal, Siraj-ud-Daula demanded the recognition of his authority in money. The English ignored his traditional demands for a large present in cash, whereas both the Dutch and the French paid him Rs 450.000 and Rs 350.000 respectively.537 The insult of the English refusal was not taken lightly and prompted Siraj-ud-Daula to capture Calcutta. After having retaliated at the Battle of Plassey, the English supported a new Nawab, Mir Jaffir. In return for the acknowledgement of his assumption of power in the place of Siraj, he privately offered the leading English commanders lavish bribes.538 Clive laid his hands on these ‘gifts’ and, in order to avoid detection by his own company, tried to send the money home through the VOC in Bengal so as not to attract attention. Illegal income could be generated by the abuse of authority and power. Nevertheless, the power of the VOC was such that it only allowed its servants to succumb to such temptations on a smaller scale and at the expense of the indigenous subjects. It was the custom when a new Governor was appointed in Ceylon, the indigenous chiefs had to visit to perform paresse. This paresse symbolized submission to the personal power of the Governor by the swearing of an oath of obedience and the offering of gifts. The word is of Portuguese origin, indicating that the custom had already been accepted in the Portuguese era. In former times, the gifts had been small, perhaps chickens, eggs or fruit, sometimes small gifts of silver. Later, demands for gifts displayed a strong inflationary tendency and donations of cash were expected. For Jaffnapatnam, the amounts of cash changing hands are said to have amounted to 10,000 guilders, but often actually brought in six to seven times as much for the Governor. A similar branch of hidden incomes was the gifts of paresse which newly appointed indigenous chiefs had to pay in order to be recognized by the governor. This had been outlawed in Mossel’s code of 1757, but such legal niceties did not deter Van Eck and other servants. A widow of a Singhalese nobleman by the name of Don Gasoar Nellepane wanted to be installed in her husband’s rights as Wania. A gift of 2000 pagodas was thought by Van Eck to be very reasonable in view of the 6000 rix-dollars paid by their predecessors to former Governor Looten (1752-1757). And since she had not paid any paresse after being invested with the administration of the province of Meelpattoe, 100 pagodas had to be added.539 The official VOC hierarchy also offered opportunities to sell VOC positions to indigenous servants. Only two months after the death of Van Eck, six Ceylonese men 537 Winius, Merchant-Warrior, 124-125. 538Ibidem, 126. 539 NA, Van Eck, 20, 730, 25 March 1763, Van Eck to Van Coeverden. visited newly installed Governor Falck and told him that they were submitting a petition to the Governor-General in Batavia. In this document they were lodging serious complaints about extortions (knevelarijen, extorsien en afpersingen) of large amounts of money by the Late Governor Van Eck. They demanded restitution to the total sum of 50,933 rix-dollars. Anxious to keep any escalation in check, Falck manoeuvred carefully, hoping not to attract attention. 540 In fact, the complaints were levelled at the late­lamented Van Eck, who had forcibly sold VOC positions to unwilling buyers. Van Eck had coerced contracts on two indigenous men, ordering them to pay up immediately.541 Under threat of being summoned before the court, they were forced to raise the money by taking out a loan with interest. In another case, a translator had been imprisoned in order to extort 4000 rix-dollars from him for his freedom and social and professional rehabilitation, but after payment he was never restored to his former position as translator.542 The main danger of any misuse of the power of the VOC against its indigenous subjects was the risk of damaging one’s reputation. Fortunately, or perhaps advisedly, servants tried to keep matters among themselves and a remedy was often concocted out behind the scenes. After having investigated the case, Falck was sad to have found the tenor of the issue so opposed to what he had hoped, with many witnesses hastening to testify against Van Eck. Although Falck wanted to save Van Eck’s reputation, he could not deny the supplicants justice or satisfaction.543 The latter’s family in Holland was asked how these problems should be solved. In the negotiating process which followed a solution to everybody’s satisfaction was eventually worked out. The heirs answered that the claims had to be settled, but as advantageously as possible to the estate. A new investigation brought to light that the demands had been increased by the interest. 540 SLNA, VOC, 3194, 1, 3 February 1767, Secret Resolution by the Council of Ceylon. Falck sent this petition to Batavia through his private correspondence instead of with the official mail. He also assessed whether the people demanding satisfaction were suffering from pecuniary difficulties, so that, if they were, he could help them, again in order to stop them from voicing their complaints publicly. Van Eck’s heirs had to pay two of them immediately, because the men were being hounded by creditors. 541 Respectively 1100 rix-dollars for the first and 540 rix-dollars for the second. When two indigenous posts fell vacant, Van Eck drew up contracts for two persons, intending to receive money for the privilege. 542 NA, Van Eck, 40, 7, Brother Van Eck to Falck. 543 SLNA, VOC, 3194, 1, 3 February 1767, Secret Resolution by the Council of Ceylon. The people who had financial problems were paid out of Van Eck’s estate, the rest had to wait what the heirs had to say. The papers were kept in a secret vault until the answer was received. Consequently, the demands were considered too high and the claimants were reimbursed to the tune of only 17,300 rix-dollars, considerably less than what had been demanded at first. The fact that all the petitioners agreed indicates that it was a quite acceptable deal.544 A contract in which they renounced any further claims was signed.545 Since the case was settled behind closed doors, no public investigation was deemed necessary. The VOC was not in a position to stop its servants pursuing illegal income, but it did have the authority to regulate these incomes in order to prevent its servants from eroding the interests of the Company and creating trouble. These instruments lay in the domain of trade and politics and the Company wanted to avoid trouble in these fields. When a servant sinned against this rule, he was in deep trouble. Although Van Teylingen had often been accused of conducting illegal private trade, it was actually his greed which brought political troubles crashing down on his head. The VOC almost went to war with the king of Tanjore, after a high-ranking nobleman in the king’s service had complained of extortion. 546 The subsequent investigation brought to light that Van Teylingen violently extorted 39,500 Pagodes, 1,500 Ducats and thirty-two bars of gold from the nobleman by exerting violence. The nobleman had fallen into disgrace with the previous king of Tanjore, who had accused him of stealing goods and then hiding his booty in Nagapatinam.547 By order of this previous king, Van Teylingen had extorted the goods in order to satisfy his Late Majesty, keeping some profit for himself. The events took a dramatic turn in 1765 when that king of Tanjore died at the result of poison. His disgraced son succeeded in seizing power after poisoning his nephew, who had been designated as successor to the throne by his father. On the disgraced son’s accession, the nobleman was restored to grace. 548 As an unforeseen consequence, the new king demanded retribution for the wrongdoings perpetrated towards one of his subjects, and if his demands were not met, threatened to go to war. 544 SLNA, VOC, 3194, 2, 26 January 1769, Secret Resolution by the Council of Ceylon. 545 SLNA, VOC, 3194, 3, 5 May 1769, procuration signed by Aresegere Modeliaar, Sittiaar Wiatelingen, Waari Tambi Modeliaar, Michiel Jurre Ondaetje and Ratnagigne. 546 Hodenpijl, Christiaan van Teylingen, 138-139. 547 NA, Hope, 94, 3, (…) 39500 Pagodas, 32 bars of gold, 1500 ducats, 4 bangles, 2 chains of ducats, 2 chains for the waist, 15000 Pandauws in 30 bags and bags with gold and silver ornaments among which 2 nose rings, 1 or 2 jewels for the chest with various fine stones (…). 548 NA, Hope, 94, 24, 20 December 1763, Van Teylingen to his brother, (…) Had been poisoned, but his brother’s son, the good-natured king presumes to be his successor, has suddenly died ten days ago, so the present king had no competition in his climb to the throne (…). The adverse consequences of irritating an allied native ruler on whom the trading privileges of the VOC depended forced the Company to take action. Van Teylingen’s conduct was seen as highly regrettable.549 In order to defuse a confrontation, the VOC was forced to compensate the king of Tanjore. Although Van Teylingen was alleged to have extorted 2,158,295 guilders,550 he personally averted any public clash by paying the king an indemnity of 62,000 rix-dollars.551 Bad luck indeed, since corruption normally had less dramatic consequences. During the investigation, however, one of the nobleman’s servants pointed to Van Eck’s term of office as the starting point of a harsher and more exploitative regime. It was specified that during Van Eck’s term of office, 24,210 pagodas had been extorted.552 Under Van Teylingen, this had increased sixfold. There is no doubt about the truth of the accusation, since Van Teylingen admitted having simply emulated the behaviour of his predecessor. In attempts to explain the corrupt behaviour of VOC servants, it is all too easy to project the supremacy of the English of later time back to an earlier period. Having played under one guise with the English country traders, Van Teylingen fled and was very hospitably protected at Madras. He was allowed to return safely on board an English ship and continued to live the life of a man of means in England.553 This circumstance has led to the assumption that Van Teylingen had made a big fortune in illegal private trade with the English. In view of what we have said on private trade, this seems implausible. His fortune must have depended more on his relationship to Batavia than on the English. Since the English country traders were unquestionably on the rise, it is too facile to connect every case of corruption to the rise of the English. It is true that Van Teylingen had always been well disposed towards the English. He helped them 549 NA, Hope, 94, 23, De Klerk to Haksteen. 550 NA, Hope, 94, 11. 551 NA, Hope, 94, 25, 8 December 1765, Haksteen, In return for solving the issue, Van Teylingen’s wife was released from VOC custody. (…) thereupon I have reached an agreement with her on the 19 September as is shown from the certificate given by the local servants and according to which the court has conformed. It declares that it has nothing to claim on the Company, and has been completely satisfied by Van Teylingen. This act and all other paperwork concerning this matters, as well as the copies are forwarded to you. They do no want to say how much Van Teylingen has paid, but some Englishmen as well as indigenous aristocrats say he has paid 62,000 rix-dollars. (…). 552 NA, Hope, 94, 3. 553 A.K.A. Gijsberti Hodenpijl, De Gouverneurs van Koromandel: Christiaan van Teylingen (1761-1765) en Pieter Haksteen (1765-1771), in Bijdragen voor Vaderlandsche Geschiedenis en Oudheidkunde, 5th Series, 10, 130-134. disembark a military expeditionary force for Madurai at Nagapatnam, lending them VOC lighters to perform the operation. If Van Teylingen had not given this order, the English success against Madurai would have been delayed at least. Van Eck thought that the damaging effect of Van Teylingen’s conduct would depend on the outcome of the English campaign. If the expedition proved successful, problems with the VOC seemed unavoidable, but as long as it was unsuccessful Van Teylingen could acquit himself with an apology.554 In actual fact, he escaped from the consequences of his mistake scot-free. In its trade, the VOC was not particularly worried by the competition of English country traders, as it was far more concerned by internal intrusions on its trade. Company servants exerted extensive power over local merchants working for the VOC, as they often depended totally on the Company’s orders. This was their achilles’ heel which exposed them to extortion. As Chief of Palliacatta, Van Teylingen constantly had to ride out confrontations with local merchants. Van Eck was caught in the middle, inundated with reports from Van Teylingen and complaints detailing harsh treatment from the traders. In protest against this treatment, the merchants decided to leave the city and set up residence just outside its periphery in a wood beyond VOC jurisdiction. In a letter to Van Teylingen, Van Eck indicated that he had solved similar problems with the indigenous merchants when serving as Chief 555 in Porto Novo. By confiscating the merchants’ belongings in the city he had forced them to return. Van Eck discouraged Van Teylingen from notifying Batavia, since the first duty of a Company servant was to try solving his problems single handily. To help Van Teylingen out, Van Eck ordered the merchants to return immediately and desist from their unreasonable behaviour. At the same time Van Eck advised him not to give much credance to the merchants’ reports, which were written with their own interests in mind and at the instigation of jealous servants.556 Van Teylingen was then given some time to sort matters out himself. The VOC also had problems with illegal income effecting up its profits. Extorting money from the merchants indirectly impinged on the profits of the VOC. There was yet more to the financial side of the story, as the merchants had a great deal to complain about. Van Teylingen had extorted 13,533 pagodas from the merchants in Palliacatta and 554 NA, Van Eck, 20, 786, 25 August 1764, Van Eck to Van Teylingen. 555 Opperhoofd. 556 NA, Van Eck, 20, 573, 29 December 1760, Van Eck to Van Teylingen. in Porto Novo, after having already extracted 14,474 pagodas at an earlier date.557 The problems with these custumados 558 was that they were forced upon the indigenous merchants for the personal gain of individual servants, but not to be outdone the merchants would charge the VOC more for their cloths. In their official capacity the extortionist servants obtained instructions from Batavia to keep the price of cloth down. So a paradoxical situation evolved where the servants forced low prices on the merchants and at the same drove prices up by asking for custumados. Logically, this policy sparked a revolt the moment the merchants were no longer able to make any profit. As a consequence it was judged that if the ‘bad’ custumados were abolished, the annual eijsch could be easily fulfilled.559 The words ‘bad’ custumados implied that servants acknowledged that there were also ‘good’ custumados. In making such a distinction, the servants were acknowledging the existence of custumados as a normal practice in India. It even had some congruence with indigenous law and was practised with permission of the local authorities as long as certain rules were observed.560 Servants always had to watch their steps and be careful not to overreach their demands. A presumably somewhat uneasy Van Teylingen felt a constant urge to explain himself to his superiors in Batavia and for a long time they supported him. 561 The pernicious effects of individual greed did , however, have consequences for a VOC servant’s career. Likewise, Indian subjects of the VOC acknowledged the same distinctions and protested only in cases of rapacious extortion. 557 NA, hope, 94, 3, In a request from the Company’s merchants in Porto Novo, they complain about having been subjected to extortion by Van Teylingen and they request these 14474 ¼ pagodas be restituted. In two separate notes, it is said that Wenaygom Poele had taken 860 from them and Tragappa 320 pagodas. The Company merchants from Palliacatta complain that they have been extorted by godless tricks played by Van Teylingen and his servants for an amount of 13533 pagodas.558 The financial remuneration for being invested with authority and the acceptance of the people placed under your supervision of that authority. 559 NA, Van Eck, 20, 348, 14 September 1759, Van Eck to Bronsvelt, (…) Abolishing all bad custumados and the private sale of the most wanted goods above the official Company prices, as has been the custom until now, will without any doubt lead to better commerce.(…).560 H.W. van Santen, VOC-dienaar in India, Geleynssen de Jongh in het land van de Groot-Mogol (Franeker: Van Wijnen 2001), 153, taking somebody hostage for longer than one day was not allowed. 561 When the crisis with the indigenous merchants continued, Van Teylingen grew a little desperate, being afraid that his superiors in Batavia and Holland might begin to notice. He asked Van Eck to make sure that this episode did not tarnish his good name, as he was most afraid of rumours in Europe. Later he was firmly convinced that people would not believe rumours without proof. Just as Van Eck, at that time the High Government supported Van Teylingen and ordered the merchants to return. In the end the merchants did go back with Van Teylingen still in power and without their well-founded complaints being heard. What should be considered normal in the range of custumados was common local knowledge. For instance, on his arrival in Bimilipatnam, Chief Loovenaar enquired the normal level of custumados, usually 50 pagodas per merchant. Unfortunately, unbridled greed inflated this custumados and Loovenaar convinced himself that 200 pagodas was customary. In order to obtain this sum, he abused his position and accused the merchants of failing to supply the VOC goods ordered. Since it was too late to have them made, he demanded to be compensate for the failure. Although merchants had actually been more deeply indebted to the VOC in the past, their debts had been balanced by goods already produced; ignoring this Loovenaar imprisoned different merchants who owed outstanding debts. He kept them goaled under harsh conditions until they all agreed to pay 200 pagodas in order to escape the brutalities to which they were being subjected.562 The sharing of this tacitly acknowledged illegal income followed the same rules as official income and was divided along hierarchical lines. Indeed if the system were to function effectively the lower-ranking servants had to share the largest part of what they had extorted with their superiors, just as much as their superiors had to share with their subordinates. All more highly-placed servants had an interest in the custumados and much of the money thus gained, siphoned upwards to the more highly placed officials who clamoured for their share. Even such an adversary of Loovenaar as Vrijmoet, his second-in-charge, thought of demanding money as quite normal. Murmurs of corruption only began to circulate when people became too greedy and asked too high an amount which is what happened to Loovenaar. Of course, the Governor always made sure that the largest share was acquired to him. Loovenaar and Vrijmoet had no choice but to share part of the money extorted with Van Teylingen.563 Some of these schemes were contrived to satisfy the seemingly unquenchable greed of Loovenaar’s boss, Van Teylingen. The nephew of former Governor-General Mossel also found himself obliged to pay 100 pagodas. If a Governor was too obsessed with his own profit, this inevitably had a general impact on his relationship with his subordinates and subjects. Van Teylingen monopolized private trade to such an extent that indigenous traders had taken to their 562 NA, Van Eck, 20, 348, 14 september 1759, Van Eck to Bronsvelt. 563 Loovenaar had to pay 15,000 and 13,000 pagodas to Van Teylingen and Vrijmoed had to pay 7,300 pagodas. heals and sought fresh pastures, which meant a loss of income from tax.564 The total sum of money extorted by Van Teylingen, from indigenous people and Company servants is estimated to have been in the region of 235,500 Pagodas or 1,059,750 rix-dollars.565 The reforms introduced by the VOC to shore up its foundering business activities, inexorably forced the Company servants to pay mounting attention to their private dealings if they were to acquire the riches they so coveted. Haksteen, Van Teylingen’s successor as Governor of the Coast, claimed that the custumados was only partly to blame for the rampant problems and for a quarter of a century servants had been demanding more money in exchange for the merchants and weavers obtaining contracts to provide the goods required for the Eijsch. The nub of the matter was the Company servants were busy making their own private fortunes and left the real work for the Company to middlemen, who took care of themselves and added a few percent to the price of the cloth. This benefited both parties, since they retained the best cloth for themselves at the expense of that supplied to the VOC. Even with the 25 to 30 per cent levied on private freight on VOC ships, they were able to sell their superior cloth in Batavia more cheaply than the Company could its own textiles.566 Some of the old Governors recorded that the situation was much more complex. They sang the same old litany of interminable troubles on the Coast, including such as expensive living conditions, severe illness among the weavers and the violent behaviour of the English.567 564 NA, Hope, 94, 1, (…) Commerce and all that flows from it, concerning the tolls, the Company had been dealt a relatively greater blow, since Van Teylingen and his people have used violence to monopolize all trade. By the excessive rise in passes, all commerce to places close by had failed, which has had a perceptibly adverse effect on the Company’s income (…).565 NA. Hope, 94, 11, (…)The Company servants have extorted from the inhabitants as made known and demanded for restitutions so far a sum of 235,500 pagodas or rix-dollars 1,059,750 (…).566 NA, Hope, 94, 23, (…) Most of the servants let their work be done by others, who have an inborn aptitude for disloyalty and, depending on the ability or ignorance of their masters, burden the purchase of textiles by several percent. This is also the reason the private merchants can pay 25 to 30 per cent on freight and still compete with the Company, apart from the fact that the privately imported textiles are often 15 to 20 per cent better in quality than the Company’s bales (…).567 NA, Hope, 94, 23, (…)The old litany of interminable troubles, expensive and high cost of living, severe illnesses among the weavers, violent treatment at the hands of the English, and all sorts of other reasons (…). 2.1 Up the hierarchy As far as opportunities for making a private fortune was concerned, the servants on the Coast were worse off than those in Ceylon, largely because their corrupt behaviour had more direct consequences for the VOC. Even more importantly, the servants on the Coast strongly felt they had been heavily disadvantaged in having been stationed on the Coast. In Ceylon the Governor was able to make a living from income put at his disposal through privileges by the VOC. On the Coast, privileges were indeed likewise handed out, but these were inadequate the servants still had to make money in private trade. Because of the uncertain situation, success was by no means guaranteed as it was in Ceylon. Although the Company offered its servants the possibility to conduct private trade, they were not satisfied. The burden of their song was that it took more time and effort to make money in private trade than through government and a share in the monopoly; they felt they were saddled with arduous work in insalubrious, unpromising conditions and it was the VOC, which profited from the fruits of their labours. This feeling of being cheated by their own Company, engendered a robust feeling of cantankerousness and contrariness among the servants disgruntled by having been posted there in the first place. It is not surprising that around the time Van Eck left the Coast a big case of corruption, involving his successor Van Teylingen erupted. When this man was accused of wrongdoing, in his defence he claimed that he had merely followed the same principles as his predecessors Vermont and Van Eck and was unaware of having made any mistakes.568 The VOC instigated a thorough-going investigation on the Coast to identify and eradicate all corruption. During the investigation, in a blatant face-saving exercise Van Eck’s involvement in corruption was deliberately brushed under the carpet in order not to blemish his and his next of kin’s reputations. Consequently most of the cases were linked to Van Teylingen or were follow-ups on the Van Teylingen case.569 568 NA, VOC, 11286, 2, 28 May 1765, Van Teylingen to Van Eck, (…) I am sure Your Honour, after your extensive investigations, will only find that I have done nothing differently from my illustrious predecessors the Honourable Messrs Vermont and Baron of Eck (…). 569 NA, VOC, 9734 and 11286. like the cases of Loovenaar, Hagemeyster, Haselkamp, Maudave, Loman and Keller. They leave us with the impression that corruption was endemic on the Coast.570 As it depressed commerce, Custumados were judged indirectly harmful to the VOC trade. There were also blatant cases of undisguised corruption. Van Teylingen charged the Company for the recruitment of a company of 401 Sepoys, but he had only signed on 179 men, including children of between thirteen to fourteen years old, pocketing the rest of the pay himself; amassing a total of £6,000 to line his own, by no means empty, pockets.571 To pull this off Van Teylingen had exerted undue influence on Luitenant Bonte, who had put some six to ten non-existent soldiers on the pay-rolls in order that Van Teylingen might enjoy their pay, he managed this by transferring the pay over to himself as a sweetener.572 Another method by which VOC-money was embezzled was by lending small sums from the petty cash. Servants were notorious for ‘borrowing’ money from the petty cash of the VOC, but this misdemeanour normally only came to light after a crisis. When Director Bisdom was dismissed after the fiasco of the Bengal Expedition, his goods were constrained and he was held accountable for the shortfall in the petty cash of the VOC on the Coromandel Coast.573 There was also a discrepancy in the money in the cash-box of the VOC on the Coast, for which Van Teylingen and some of the others servants were held responsible. Such a shortfall had often been forced upon a successor, indicating endemic malpractices. When Mossel’s nephew accepted his posts as keeper of the petty cash in Palliacatta, he was promised a shipment of wood in order to recompense him for this shortfall, but the timber never materialized. This is evidence that in times of crisis, individuals were saddled with the blame, but there was more to it than that. Batavia was far away and without any means of control, seizing the main chance Company servants in outlying factories therefore also charged the VOC for maintenance costs although no actual work had been done. Availing himself of the opportunity, Van 570 Hodenpijl, “De Gouverneurs van Koromandel”, 134, (…) Maar dient eerder als een op zichzelf staand geval beschouwd te worden (…). 571 NA, Hope, 94, 11, (…)That the corps of indigenous sepoys, for whose pay the Company had been charged for 401 heads, in reality consisted of only 179 heads. The pay of the missing men, as well as for their maintenance paid at the expense of the Company had been received by Van Teylingen. Furthermore that with the signing on of European soldiers and naval personnel, several children of thirteen to fourteen years had been included, as officers and as soldiers. This had been done on the orders of Van Teylingen, and their pay amounted to about 6000 guilders a year. (…)572 NA, Van Eck, 26, 31, 19 May 1759, Van Teylingen to Van Eck. 573 NA, Van Eck, 28, 21, 5 April 1761, Feriet to Van Eck. Teylingen had been charging funding for the maintenance of the fortification of the castle in Nagapatnam to the VOC account.574 A perusal of the reports shows this must have been a custom for the last twenty odd years. This also implies Van Eck, who obtained large amount of money for supposed work on fortifications575 and who brushed aside the accusations of the High Government after being arraigned for embezzlement, was also busy indulging in such fraudulent practices. 576 Even in the area of the protected commodities, Batavia was often not able to protect its goods from the greedy gaze of its servants. In 1757 the High Government warned Vermont to check for malpratices in the packing or emballagie of the cloth. The High Government was not happy with Vermont’s written reply in which he claimed that he had found no wrongdoing, and subsequently demanded an official report. Apparently it was quite normal to steal VOC goods during the packing.577 These kinds of fraud were difficult to track down, and the VOC could not do much to prevent them. Conclusion In order to strike a balance between Company profits and servants’ fortunes the VOC ruled that the accruing of private fortunes was only allowed if this did not obstruct the Company’s profits. The first step was to set rules on what the VOC judged essential and it was made absolutely clear that servants were not allowed a share in this area. Afterwards, one level down, the servants were allowed a share in VOC profits on trade or 574 NA, Hope, 94, 11, (…) Furthermore that with the counting of the petty cash, a considerable sum was found to be missing. (…), (…) Concerning the maintenance of the fortifications and buildings of the Company, this has been greatly harmed, since most of the forts and all other have been neglected and with a lack of good maintenance have been found to be so decayed, that many of them are on the brink of collapse, although yearly large amounts of money have been put on the bills of the Company, being very prehudical to the Company’s income (….)575 NA, Hope, 94, 23, (…) That considering the amounts invested over twenty years the fortifications should have been made out of copper, but in reality barely consist of sand and clay mixed with little lime (…).576 NA, Van Eck, 20, 555, 22 October 1760, Van Eck to De Klerk. 577 NA, Hoge Regering, 309, 63-64, 24 June 1757, (…) Those and others, who will want to pursue such self-interested actions, will be learned not to put their hands on their master’s possessions and to enrich themselves at the expense of the Company in such a punishable manner (…). government. When the VOC lost its monopoly in the regional intra-Asian trade, to recompense them for their pains the servants received remuneration in the form of private trade privileges. Before 1743, servants had simply shared in the VOC profits, but this situation had to change as the VOC began to incur loss in the intra-Asian trade. Where the VOC held territorial possessions and spice monopolies, the servants never shared in the goods sent to Europe as a monopoly. In Ceylon profiting from cinnamon was categorically denied the servants, but they did obtain a proportion of the local monopolies used in the intra-Asian trade, for example, areca-nuts. When this trade was lost after the VOC relinquished intra-Asian trade in 1792, many Company servants had already evolved into plantation owners and suppliers to the VOC trade to Europe. Left largely to their own devices to fulfil their dreams of riches servants had to team up with the local elite to make the system work. In private trade, the mechanism was similar. Allowing private trade privileges replaced the share in the VOC profits from the intra-Asian trade with privileges in a trade which the VOC only partly or no longer controlled at all. Under such conditions, private trade was a step back for the servants. They now had to square up to competition; they had to invest their own money and time if they were to earn money, while the VOC reaped most of the rewards through taxation and its stranglehold on the trade to Europe. Since the VOC used the servants to help counter its decline and the servants were fully aware of this, they were more apt to resort to corrupt behaviour as they held the Company responsible for the relative decline in their position, although the new situation also offered them possibilities and empowered them. Institutionally, the changes in remuneration put servants in a difficult position and disgruntled they did not respond positively to these changes. Since capital precedes trade, they expected the VOC to step in and solve the problem. They began borrowing money from the official VOC funds or stealing it outright to gain a financial foothold to launch their own trade. Since profit in private trade was not assured, this meant that occasionally trouble flared up over missing VOC funds. There were many ways to embezzle funds and the servants used all off them to make their fortune. One of the tactics was to extort money from those lower in the hierarchy or indigenous subjects, mostly the indigenous weavers and merchants. This had a knock-on effect and caused prices asked of the VOC to rise. In all, the reforms undermined the VOC as an organization and contributed to its decline. As the servants were given more privileges and the VOC relied ever more heavily on their private fortunes and activities to function, it could exert less power over what they did. The servants even felt they had a moral right to take more and it was exactly this behaviour which failed to guard the VOC against its final demise. In the shadow of the company : the VOC (Dutch East India Company)and its servants in the period of its decline (1740-1796) Nierstrasz, J.C. Citation Nierstrasz, J. C. (2008, November 5). In the shadow of the company : the VOC (Dutch East India Company) and its servants in the period of its decline (1740-1796). Retrieved from https://hdl.handle.net/1887/13267 Version: Not Applicable (or Unknown) License: Licence agreement concerning inclusion of doctoral thesis in the Institutional Repository of the University of Leiden Downloaded from: https://hdl.handle.net/1887/13267 Note: To cite this publication please use the final published version (if applicable). Chapter 8: Promotions and Patronage Introduction For the sake of convenience, largely owing to a lack of sources, networking within the VOC has often been simply equated with kinship ties and traced solely through family­trees. Without denying the family element in networking, this thesis concentrates on a different conspicuous aspect. Networking will be seen as a system for the redistribution of wealth and power with an inherent tendency to reproduce itself.578 Social reproduction is often defined as the processes which sustain or perpetuate characteristics of a given social structure or tradition over a period of time. The family element can also be traced to the servants’ desire to reproduce the prevailing system in order to preserve privileged positions within a particular social group. This corresponds to the servants’ view of this position as their personal possession, from which as much personal benefit as possible should be squeezed. Since income and social position were strongly linked to hierarchy, servants used nepotism to ensure prosperity for their offspring. Such tactics had to be adapted if a servant did not have any family in Asia, in which case they were probably less preoccupied with social reproduction in the East and more with earning money which would ensure his fortune and consequent social position at home.579 1. The supremacy of the Republic The supreme power over all promotions in Asia lay with the Gentlemen Seventeen in the Republic. The Directors decided on appointments to the highest positions, those in the High Government and through this power influenced all promotions. Competition in the race for a seat on the High Government was fierce, as such a position once gained spelled 578Alan Smart, Gifts, Bribes, and Guanxi: ‘A Reconsideration of Bourdieu’s social Capital’, in cultural Anthropology 8 (3) 388-408; Pierre Bourdieu, Raisons pratiques, sur la théorie de l’action (Paris 1994); Marcel Mauss, The gift, forms and functions of exchange in archaic societies (London 1954). 579 Van Eck and Van Teylingen seem to fall more into this group of servants. power, fortune and an increased opportunity to exercise the lucrative pursuit of patronage. Newcomers on the Council were initially appointed to the position of extraordinary councillor, which gave them less power than that wielded by an ordinary member. The Directors naturally also appointed the second-in-charge of the High Government, the Director-General, who would normally be promoted to be the next Governor-General when the present incumbent retired or passed away. Through their power of appointment of the members of the High Government, the Gentlemen Seventeen in the Republic influenced the allocation of all other positions in Asia. Since they decided on the top positions in Asia, they had direct access to the patrons in the High Government and used their influence to gain positions in Asia for their protégés from the Republic. The powerbrokers in Asia could only ignore such a call at their peril since their own further advancement depended on the Directors. Secure in this power, the Gentlemen Seventeen probably profited from their position just in the same manner as much as their servants in Asia did. Nevertheless, the margins of acceptable personal profit seem to have been smaller in the Republic. The whole progress of Van Eck’s career shows that the influence of directors in the promotion process was dispersed and divided between institutions and powerful patrons in Asia. In the Republic itself, the organization of the VOC power of appointment was cut up along the lines of the Chambers, which each had its own commensurate share of a say in every decision. Amsterdam was by far the largest Chamber, but the opinion of the other Chambers, certainly that of the Chamber of Zeeland was not to be ignored. When a position on the High Government was at stake, it was important to canvas sufficient support in the Chambers. These regional and family loyalties played a not negligible role in the final choice, and politics in the Republic was also influential in the eventual decision. Via his relations in Zeeland, Van Eck received support from the representative of the principal nobleman of Zeeland, Jonker Jan van Borsselle van der Hooghe (1746-1806). Both Van Eck and Van Borselle were related to the most powerful family in Gelderland, the Van Lynden clan.580 Heartily endorsed by Van Borselle, Van Eck enjoyed strong position in Zeeland and obtained help from different highly placed 580 NA, Van Eck, 9, 15 November 1760, brothers to Van Eck. Van Borselle’s help is proven by a letter to Van Eck recommending the brothers Charlet and by the fact that in his reply Van Eck thanked Van Borselle for his help in having Van Eck elected as extraordinary councillor. officials, who in their turn asked him to help Adriaan Moens.581 As long as Moens’ good behaviour merited his position, Van Eck intimated steady support in return for their help.582 Van Eck assigned him new tasks by appointing him to the Secret Council and naming him President of the Court of Testamentary Matters and the Civil Council, although this promotion did not pass undisputed. 583 By helping Moens, Van Eck cemented his link in Asia to Governor-General Van der Parra, who was also connected to Zeeland and its Chamber.584 Extenuated lines of communication demanded a compromise be made in attributing power over the other promotions. Decisions about promotion in the levels below the High Government were left to the discretion of the High Government in Batavia and only in exceptional cases did the Gentlemen Seventeen intervene. Consequently, with occasional exceptions, most promotions were decided in Asia by the High Government and a VOC servant was actually installed long before the formal approval arrived from the Republic. This set-up was prompted by sheer common sense leaving a position open and awaiting a decision from Holland for more than a year would have crippled the effectiveness of the VOC. This offers an explanation of why during the largest part of his career, Van Eck’s main efforts were devised for the purpose of gaining help for enhancing his career from Batavia. None the less, the wily Directors made sure that their power was felt when the most important decisions had to be taken. As a matter of course, distance also limited the possibilities open to a VOC servant in Asia to exert any influence on the decision-making process on promotions by the Directors. Obviously 581 NA, Van Eck, 9, 11, 27 November 1762, brothers to Van Eck. Even Moens’ father recommended his son to Van Eck. He wrote to Daniel Radermacher, Elector of the city of Middelburg and Director of the VOC. He did the same to Cornelis Rien van Citters, alderman and councillor of the city of Middelburg and Director of the VOC. Gabriels, 167, The family Van Citters was the most powerful family in Middelburg and consequently in the whole province. At this time it was a strong supporter of the Orangist Stadholder clan. The fourth VOC director of Zeeland who supported Van Eck was David Grenier Verwout Noiret (1747-1778). Van Eck also thanked him for his help in helping him to seat on the high Government. 582 Meanwhile Moens continued his work as paymaster. 583 NA, Van Eck, 38, 9, 20 January 1764, Van Eck to Noiret. Van Eck thought Moens would have his hands full, since he also had to supervise the Secretariat of the Police. NA, Van Eck, 20, 757, 25 July 1763, Van Eck to Diderich. Favouring Moens in his occupancy of multiple functions was not undisputed in Asia as another servant claimed one of the positions assigned to Moens. He was denied on the ground that Moens was only holding two positions at the same time provisionally, which did not contravene official regulation. 584 Gaastra, Zeeuwen in de VOC in de tweede helft van de achttiende eeuw, 10; NA, 20, 761, 30 July 1763, Van Eck to Van der Parra. Van Eck thanked Van der Parra for the support he had received from Samuel de Jeune in Amsterdam in his promotion to the High Government, showing a clear link between Zeeland and Amsterdam. servants working far away in Asia could not represent themselves personally in the Republic and had to rely on their friends and family at home to undertake this for them. After his appointment as Governor of the Coromandel Coast, Van Eck felt secure enough to set his sights on the High Government and began to plan for this eventuality. The friends of Van Eck in Batavia lost no time in alerting him when a seat on the High Government fell vacant.585 In 1760, when two came up for grabs simultaneously Van Eck informed his friends and family in Holland to throw themselves into having him appointed to one of these, but on this occasion they were unsuccessful.586 Obviously, although Van Eck did not have recourse to any kinship ties in Asia, his position in the Republic was quite strong. In Gelderland, Van Eck enjoyed the support of his cousin587, Andries Baron Schimmelpenninck van der Oye van de Pol (1705-1776) who was a leading figure and nobleman. 588 Around 1760, Schimmelpenninck had found favour with the faction of the future Stadholder, Willem IV and consequently controlled the distribution of the most coveted official positions in Gelderland. It stands to reason that this man must have helped Van Eck at some stage in his career.589 Those in the Republic who had supported Van Eck’s quest for a position in the High Government, whether family or not were determined that their support did not go unrewarded. Consequently, they showered him with congratulations, while swamping him with requests for favours, giving a textbook example of reciprocity at work.590 Since the system was complex and spanned the globe, it essentially had to be based on trust in the reciprocation of favours. With his links to the aristocracy in the Republic, Van Eck was inevitably linked to the Stadholder’s entourage. In actual fact, the 585 NA, Van Eck, 27, 33, 31 January 1760, Faure to Van Eck. Faure pointing out that two empty seats had to be filled. 586 NA, Van Eck, 20, 357, 15 October 1759, Van Eck to father and NA, Van Eck, 9, 1, 5 November 1760, brothers to Van Eck. One brother indicated he had remained in Amsterdam for a fortnight to plead Van Eck’s case at length, adducing is merits and long service with the Company. Although the Gentlemen XVII found the request reasonable and well founded, it was turned down. His brother claimed he had done his utmost. The reason for the failure was a letter to the Gentlemen Seventeen, which his brother supposedly had read, in which Governor-General Mossel indicated that in these difficult times he preferred Van Eck to remain in his post on the Coast, instead of returning to Batavia. 587 NA, Van Eck, 9,14, 1 November 1764, aunt to Van Eck. The fact that Van Eck was related to this family is confirmed by one of his cousins, also bearing the surname Van Eck, who assured Van Eck of the respect of their mutual cousins the Schimmelpennincks. 588 Gabriels, Dienaren, 184-185. 589 NA, Van Eck, 9, 11, 27 November 1762, brothers to Van Eck. since he recommended Pieter Schuijling in a letter to Van Eck. 590 NA, Van Eck, 9, 11, 27 November 1762, brothers to Van Eck. Stadhouder’s support came in return for Van Eck’s help to Van Teylingen. When the news of the death of the mother of the future stadholder Willem V (who now came under the tutelage of his mentor Van Brunswick) reached the Coast in 1759, Van Eck paid his respects and offered his condolences to Van Teylingen on the death of his patroness. He intimated that he hoped this would not mean a change in fortune.591 Van Teylingen had earlier boasted that the Princess of Orange, the wife to the deceased Willem IV and mother to Willem V, had sent a letter of recommendation to Governor-General Mossel on his behalf. Van Teylingen’s cousin Van der Mieden, President of the Court of Holland and Zeeland,592 had persuaded her to do so. Even after the Princes of Orange died, Van Teylingen still retained the support of such influential men as the Duke of Brunswick and the Count of Wassenaar, as his family was in favour with both them.593 Van der Mieden even indicated to Van Teylingen’s father that he had not understood why his son had not been promoted to second-in-charge of the Coast directly after Van Eck was promoted to the office of Governor.594 With the support of Twickel the Count of Wassenaar, Van Teylingen was assured of the help of various gentlemen in Amsterdam. Van Eck’s link with Secretary of the Council in the Republic, Pieter Steijn, gave him entree to the Hasselaars, Steijns and Mossels. With the support of Van Teylingen’s network, Her Royal Highness had sent a letter to Mossel which led to Van Eck’s promotion to the position of Governor of the Coromandel Coast. 1.1 Investing in ‘friendship’ From the point of view of Batavia, family networks were certainly important, but their principal use was as solid indicators of trust, social and financial involvement. Obtaining patronage by marrying into an established and powerful VOC family in Batavia unquestionably helped to build a successful career in Asia. Such as step ensured 591 NA, Van Eck, 20, 327, 17 July 1759, Van Eck to Van Teylingen. 592 NA, Van Eck, 26, 47, 1 July 1759, Van Teylingen to Van Eck. 593 NA, Van Eck, 26, 50, 6 July 1759, Van Teylingen to Van Eck. 594 NA, Van Eck, 26, 52, 14 July 1759, Van Teylingen to Van Eck. social standing, enhanced career opportunities and provided capital for private ventures. The few women with the desired descent available played a pivotal role in this process. In order to marry a potentially influential bride, employees were willing to pay massive amounts. Unquestionably, the financial advantages accruing such a marriage for a employee far outweighed the importance of love.595 Women only had the freedom to choose when their choice happened to match the political preferences of the pater familias and this oldest male in the family jealously guarded the family’s social position.596 Marrying into a powerful family network acted as an insurance, providing protection against unforeseen and potentially harmful incidents.597 Apart from providing protection, everybody was well aware that if a employee had a powerful patron, family or not, and it was from this perspective that he was judged.598 Sometimes, having powerful protectors obviated the necessity of employees having to depend on their direct superiors. In such an invidious situation, if these superiors were to retain control they had to seek the support of their own patrons.599 595 For example, when a former VOC chief in Japan visited Batavia he bought off the previous engagement of the Widow Van der Does for 30,000 rix-dollars, in order to be able to marry her himself NA, Van Eck, 26, 3, 12 February 1759, anonymous to Van Eck. (…)596 NA, Van Eck, 27, 17, 20 January 1760, Riemsdijk to Van Eck. When a niece of Van Riemsdijk (at that time member of the High Government and later on Governor-General 1775-1777) wanted to marry a ‘mere’ captain, Van Riemsdijk quietly intervened. He succeeded in preventing the engagement by instigating the transfer of the captain to a distant VOC settlement. He then professed his preference for a suitable replacement. Unfortunately, the candidate himself had no intention of marrying Van Riemsdijk’s niece, as he had set his sights on an alliance with an even more powerful family. He later married the daughter of Vermont, thereby securing an alliance with Mossel and De Klerk. 597 NA, Van Eck, 35, 33, 15 September 1763, Van der Spar to Van Eck. After several garrisons had been slaughtered in Ceylon at the beginning of the Rebellion, the High Government was looking for someone to blame. In an official report sent to the Gentlemen XVII they pointed finger at the Commander of Gale, Abraham Samlant, for having handled the situation inadequately, as he had not employed proper strategies nor had he coordinated the retreat from the forts. Nevertheless, the correspondence of Governor Van Eck, who had been charged with conducting the official investigation into the affair and subsequently writing the official report, offers another perspective. Even before the investigation commenced, Van der Spar, member of the High Government, had asked Van Eck to blame Samlant. The reason was to protect the reputation of Van der Spar´s nephew who had been the commander of one of the murdered garrison. NA, Van Eck, 38, 28, 1 April 1764, Van Eck to Van der Spar. Van Eck promised to do what Van der Spar asked of him and subsequently blamed Samlant. 598 NA, Van Eck, 26, 36, 1 June 1759, Mossel to Van Eck. As soon as word had come that Canter Visscher ignored official VOC instructions and let French soldiers enter into the fort of Sadraspatnam, resulting in its loss, Mossel intervened and asked Van Eck not to be too severe. Canter Visscher enjoyed the support of a VOC Director who in turn was a good friend of Mossel. Before an enquiry had even been started, Mossel had already instructed Van Eck on the desired outcome. 599 NA, Van Eck, 26, 54, 28 July 1759, Van Teylingen to van Eck. After encountering problems with Vlaming, Van Teylingen did not dare correct him since he had been recommended by Mossel and asked Van Eck to do so on his behalf. NA, Van Eck, 20, 333, 20 August 1759, Van Eck to Vlaaming and 20, 335, Kinship ties certainly helped and having family in the upper echelons made life relatively easy, but it was not all plain sailing and it also meant that individual success depended on the success of the entire family. Individual prospects of success could quickly fade with the loss of familial protection. As Governor of the Coast, Van Eck had been ordered by Governor-General Mossel to give his nephew a good position. Conscious of what was riding on his success, Van Eck put enormous effort into finding him a suitably good position.600 The combination of finding a position which combined safety and the promise of fortune was essential to Van Eck’s decision, but he was also fully aware that appointing an inexperienced VOC servant to a senior position created problems.601 As he was handicapped by his lack of experience, the position of the nephew was not as strong as presumed, since it had certainly not escaped anybody’s notice that he had prevailed through his family’s connections. As long as the nephew’s patron was in power, the other employees had a vested interest in helping him. Van Eck claimed they all clearly realized that a helping hand was tantamount to helping their own fortune.602 After his uncle and patron died, and his influence was buried with him, the nephew was no longer considered a worthwhile investment. The period of protection had been too short for him to acquire the necessary skills and experience to take care of himself and his career suffered a severe setback.603 Trust was reflected not only in family networks and attributed to friendship, but it was also repaid at different levels of reciprocity. It is a tremendous task to measure the reciprocity of favours as they were played out at different levels exactly. Both Van Eck and Van Teylingen strove to keep their relationship as cordial as possible. A good illustration is that they refused to charge each other commission on private business 20 August 1759, Van Eck to Van Teylingen. It also reflected badly on a superior, if his subordinates behaved in a manner thought unbecoming for a servant. 600 NA, Van Eck, 20, 664, 7 July 1761, Van Eck to Mossel. Van Eck made up his mind to send Mossel’s nephew to Sadras. Despite pressure from Mossel to make his nephew Chief of Palicol, Van Eck decided that the position of second-in-command at Sadras was the best option, since it was still open as a consequence of several promotions and the political situation on the spot was more tranquil than that in Palicol. 601 NA, Van Eck, 20, 659, 3 July 1761, Van Eck to Mossel and NA, Van Eck, 20, 555, 22 October 1760, Van Eck to De Klerk. To remedy his inexperience in the service of the VOC, the nephew was put under the guidance of an old and very senior employee. With his guidance, the nephew would be able to cope with his task and learn to deal with the indigenous rulers. 602 NA, Van Eck, 20, 522, 25 August 1760, Van Eck to Bronsvelt. 603Perhaps the fall of Van Teylingen can be explained by a similar loss of power of his family in the Republic. transactions. Van Teylingen declined a commission of 5 per cent after he had taken care of some business for Van Eck during a trip to Madras, because `Van Eck had always given him what he wanted in a gracious and a generous way`. Obviously, he wanted to keep this balance by not being paid for his work.604 Van Teylingen’s father talked of the affection and esteem, which Van Eck had shown for his son and for his family.605 He hoped to respond on an appropriate occasion by unfeigned acknowledgement and indebted gratitude.606 When success was the servant’s portion, family and friends were entitled to a share. Van Eck’s success in the war against Kandy attracted enormous attention and the door to the most powerful people in the Republic was opened. Van Eck was very pleased to hear of the approval of the Prince of Orange and his mentors Brunswick and Willem Bentinck for his work. He received letters from the Duke of Brunswick recommending people in his service. One such case concerned a certain Captain-Lieutenant Von Arnhim who was serving in Ceylon.607 Van Eck did his utmost to comply with what was asked of him by promoting Von Arnhim to Chief Adjutant in the planned campaign against the king of Kandy.608 Van Eck stressed that this was naturally attributable to the good behaviour of the person involved. Another indication of Van Eck’s gratitude to Brunswick is the fact that he sent the latter a present.609 Attaining a higher position opened up new opportunities and attracted friends, to whom it was necessary to reciprocate. In Van Eck’s case his attainment of the position of 604 NA, Van Eck, 26, 90, 15 October 1759, Van Teylingen to Van Eck. 605 NA, Van Eck, 36, 3, 9 October 1764, father of Van Teylingen to Van Eck. 606 NA, Van Eck, 38, 6, 20 January 1764, Van Eck to D van Eck. 607 And who according to the letter, had served under the brother of Van Brunswick. 608 NA, Van Eck, 20, 800, November 1764, Van Eck to Van Brunswick. (…)Uw Hoog wel Geborene bij desen ook dienden kennisse te geven, van zeker kleijnaardig dog fraaij van boven tot onder gewerkt en uijtgebeeld stukje verzilverd kanon, van omtrent twee voeten lang, door zijn Hoog wel Geborene onder andere, dan ook mede aangebragt, en door ons in den boedel gevonden, welk kannonnetje, zijn Hoog wel Geborene integenwoordigheyd van veele heeren zo in Candia als hier, eens en andermaal en zelfs aan ons wel verhaalt heeft, geschikt te hebben, om present te doen, aan zijne Hoogheijd, den Hertog van Wolfenbüttel van wien zijn Hoog wel geborene verleden Jaar een zeer complisante brief erlangd had, ter recommandatie, van een dit jaar uijtgekomen Capteyn Luijtenant, thans capitain d’Heer van Arnhem; en welk canonnetje, benevens nog eenige andere dingen /: als min of meer criticq en volgens ’t gemeen gerugt, zo niet tot de kroon, ten minsten tot de goederen van den Koning van Candia behoord hebbende, dus door ons met intentie om dezelve zo ’t mogelijk en gepermitteerd was, successive aan Uw Hoog wel Geborene: zo tot aardigheijd als gedagtenisse van zijn Hoog wel Geborene in natura toe te zeden (…).609NA, Panthaleon Van Eck, 60, 1, 10 November 1765. A little ‘sierkanoonetje’ captured during Van Eck’s last campaign against Kandy. Councillor in the High Government in 1762 seems to have been a watershed: he now also attracted the attention of people not related to him. In return for their help, Van Eck was obliged to reciprocate favours. Apart from concentrating on the Stadholder’s entourage, Van Eck’s efforts were directed towards the most esteemed members of the Amsterdam Chamber. From this juncture, Van Eck was most staunchly supported in the Chamber of Amsterdam by Director Hope. 610 Van Eck thanked him for his help in having him promoted, indicating it was impossible to return the favour requested since the person Hope recommended had never arrived in Ceylon.611 Hope then recommended a man named Philyn Bath, a rich man’s son, who had made himself impossible in Holland and was subsequently sent to Asia.612 This was a more difficult recommendation to comply with since Bath’s character was far from praiseworthy. Another man whom Van Eck became involved with was Jan Agges Scholten van Aschat, an important figure in the Amsterdam Chamber.613 Scholten van Aschat had given a certain Lannoy the position of assistant. This man claimed that he was related to Van Eck.614 Scholten´s help had already been an outcome of Van Eck´s assistance to De Bordes. His agent Cordua, had indicated to Van Eck that if he were to help De Bordes, in the future Scholten would lend Van Eck his assistance. This alliance was substantiated when Van Eck later became Councillor Extraordinary.615 This gentlemanly ideal of friendship had to be personally enforced, before any exchange of favours took place. In order to help Van Eck to achieve a higher position, his brothers had to vouch for him personally in the Republic. They did so in order to prove those invested with the power to appoint that their help would not pass unnoticed. Van 610 Gaastra, in Blussé en Ooms, kennis en compagnie, 66, (…)The most known and most influencial among them was Thomas Hope, banker and merchant, and from 1756 until 1770 Director of the VOC. His position with the VOC was strongly reinforced by the fact that the stadholder Willem V, who turned into chief-Director in 1766 and in doing so had enourmous influence on the VOC and who named Hope to the man representing him on the Company Board. In doings so, Thomas Hope had been put in a position in which he was able to claim the chair of both the meetings of the Gentlemen XVII as of the Chamber of Amsterdam , although he wisely refrained from executing this (…).611 NA, Van Eck, 38, 5, 20 January 1764, Van Eck to Hope. 612 NA, Van Eck, 34, 10, 4 December 1762, Hope to Van Eck. 613 NA, Van Eck, 37, 6, 16 December 1765, Scholten van Aschat to Van Eck. 614 NA, Van Eck, 37, 3, 8 December 1765, Lannoij to Van Eck. This is supported by the fact that Lannoy’s father also sent a letter to Van Eck, indicating that he wanted some help, since they were related. 615 NA, Van Eck, 26, 42, 25 May 1759, Cordua to Van Eck. Eck’s brothers not only talked with all the Gentlemen Seventeen,616 they also took the trouble to speak with the Hoofd-participanten or main shareholders in the VOC.617 A Committee of Hoofd-particpanten had the right to attend the meeting of the Heeren Seventeen, in which they had an advisory vote on promotions.618 Sweers, a Hoofd­participant in the VOC, also threw his weight behind Van Eck.619 If favours could be distributed, potential friends were easy to find. De Witt from Dordrecht was thanked for securing the seat on the High Government for Van Eck.620 De Witt was an alderman and former mayor of Dordrecht, which probably gave him some leverage in the VOC Chamber of Rotterdam. He recommended Garlacius Rosier and in his response Van Eck stated that he was happy to honour this recommendation.621 Van Eck received letters from all over Holland from persons with unclear connections to the VOC. For instance, Daniel Depus, a prominent Amsterdam merchant, was thanked by Van Eck for his help in having him promoted to councillor.622 Jan Lambers and his son, Albert Nack, and Jan Lollings, all merchants in Amsterdam, were likewise thanked for their congratulations and Van Eck promised them that he would see what he could do for them in the future.623 All in all, we can say that by retaining the right to make decisions on the top promotions in the Republic, the Directors and politicians held a strong card in influencing promotions in Asia. Borne aloft on all this support led Van Eck to the position of Councillor 616 NA, Van Eck, 9, 11, 27 November 1762, brothers to Van Eck. 617 NA, Van Eck, 9, 11, 27 November 1762, brothers to Van Eck, (…) the ‘wealthiest’ gentlemen of Amsterdam, who had something to say in this affair. 618 NA, Van Eck, 37, 8, 18 December 1765, Sweers to Van Eck. 619 NA, Van Eck, 9, 20, 16 December 1765, brother to Van Eck. In exchange, Sweers recommended Etienne Magert, Van Haemsteede and Van Otte, all of them from the city of Amsterdam. NA, Van Eck, 26, 35, 1 June 1759, Van Rheden to Van Eck. Van Eck was obliged to honour the recommendation of Boreel, public prosecutor of the Admiralty in Amsterdam, who had recommended Louis Fellitas through Van Rheede. 620 NA, Van Eck, 9, 11, 27 November 1762, brothers to Van Eck. 621 NA, Van Eck, 38, 4, 20 January 1764, Van Eck to De Witt. Van Eck promoted Rossier to public prosecutor of Jaffna. He added that this was the best occupation for an onderkoopman in the Government of the island. 622 NA, Van Eck, 38, 10, 20 January 1764, Van Eck to Depus. 623 Merchants from Amsterdam were not the only parties to send Van Eck congratulations, these also poured in from the former Governor of Macasser, Roelof Blok, who at that moment was living in Enkhuizen. Another letter of congratulation came from Van Westhoven, who had been a neighbour of Van Eck on the Herenstraat in Batavia eighteen years earlier. He now lived in Alkmaar, and decided to send Van Eck some salmon, in order to renew their old friendship. Extraordinary and according to his brother, he was the first to be appointed Councillor Ordinary; taking precedence over Haksteen and future Governor-General Alting.624 1.2 Persuading patronage in Asia Without the help of a powerful patron in Asia, it was impossible for a tyro employee to pursue a successful career in the East. However, a patron was not omnipotent, promotions depended on other factors and others persons as well. The patron held an interest in speeding up the career of his protégé as his investment would pay off earlier, as a consummation devoutly to be wished in such an unhealthy environment. Van Eck had a well-disposed patron in Van Rheden, who looked kindly upon him and succeeded in helping him make his career. As a member of the High Government in Batavia, Van Rheden could exert his influence on the Governor-General in order to obtain promotions for his protégés.625 In another incident, he tried to exert his influence by writing the Governor of the Coast, Vermont, asking him to promote two of his protégés. After Vermont declined to help, Van Rheden’s patience with him was exhausted because all his earlier requests had also been in vain. In 1756 Van Rheden wrote Vermont a letter stating he would no longer bother him with useless, vain solicitations, but find other ways to improve the position of his friends Van Eck and 624 NA, Van Eck, 9, 6, 15 November 1762, brothers to Van Eck. 625 Although it is possible Van Eck was related to Van Rheden, a more probable link between the two men is the Chamber of Amsterdam, where both of them began their careers. Whatever the reason, the strong mutual involvement of the two men is underlined by a partnership in a privately owned ship plying the waters of the Indonesian Archipelago. On their possible family relationship: NA, Van Eck, 9, 19, 28 November 1764, Brother of Van Eck to Van Eck, (...) Wat de familie aangaat sijn welvaarende, suster van Lijnden heeft reets ses kinderen twee soons en vier dogters, den oudste soon legt tot Weegeninge op de Latijnsche school, sij heeft mij gesegt als weederen moest kraame, dat tot nogh soo niet is, als het een soon was Wel edel Geborene te laate benoeme (...). And Nederland’s Adelsboek 1956, 49e jaargang (Van Stockum, Den Haag), blz 522, (…) Bij K.B. d.d. 13 Oct. 1860, nr 60, werd ditzelfde bepaald voor de nagelaten weduwe en de kinderen en verdere wettige afstammelingen van Jhr Lubbert Jan Aland van Lynden (...).These two men may, as stated, have enjoyed some sort of kinship tie and, if they were related at all, it was an indirect link by a marriage into the family Van Lynden. Van Eck was connected to the Van Lynden family through his sister. Nederland’s Adelsboek 1956, 49e jaargang (Van Stockum, Den Haag), 523, XI. Derk Wolter van Lynden, heer van Hemmen, Blitterswijk en Clörath, 1659-1712, tr 1699 Anna Ursula van Reede, 1669-1749. while Van Rheden’s connection to the family is less sure. Hagemeister.626 Van Eck’s career did not proceed as fast as he would have desired and he had to sit out his time philosophically, awaiting the day when he would be first in line; leaving it to his patron to search for shortcuts. Not long afterwards Van Rheden must have found some alternative, because Van Eck was promoted to Chief of Palliacatta. Although the patronage of a powerful protector was essential, if a protégé did not adhere to the creed of ‘For the benefit of the Company’, this protection was worse than useless. As a middle-ranking employee on the Coromandel Coast in 1756, Van Eck tried to attract attention to himself by scrupulously observing the Company’s credo. He worked on projecting an image of doing his job neatly. Yet every VOC servant had to walk the knife-edge between serving the VOC and making his personal fortune. A good example of this was when Vermont made a fatal career mistake in letting French enter inside the walls of Nagapatnam, an incident we have already described.627 His behaviour endangered the position and brought calumny on the name of the VOC, made his position as Governor untenable. Despite his actions which were tantamount to treason, his powerful protectors swung into action and practised damage control. Even though the Governor-General could do nothing to prevent his dismissal, Vermont was at least given the alternative of asking for retirement instead of being simply sacked and placed in the public pillory.628 No word of the real reason for this solution ever found its way into the official correspondence, but from Vermont’s will we learn that in gratitude for all his help, he had made Mossel his universal heir.629 As he rose in the hierarchy and assumed on more responsibility, a servant found he had more possibilities to orchestrate his own career. On promotion, the position of a VOC servant could change structurally and offer him new ways to attract attention and be promoted. On Van Eck’s appointment as Chief of Palliacatta, he received a letter from Van der Parra,630 advising him to tread in the footsteps of his successors631 and continue 626 NA, Van Eck, 22, 1, 10 June 1756, Van Rheden to Vermont. 627 NA, Van Eck, 19, 25, 18 April 1758, Meroz to Van Eck. His reckless decision led to violence against employees and allowed the French troops a complete grip on the town. In the end, his decision escalated into an infringement of the VOC’s sovereignty and went against the general motto ‘For the benefit of the Company’. To us, Vermont’s actions may seem reckless, but the real reason behind his behaviour was even more devious. Vermont had used his prerogatives as a Governor to sell the VOC stocks of provisions to the French army, guaranteeing himself excessive personal gain and profit. 628 P. Groot, Accompaniments to letters from Negapatam, (Madras, 1911, Government Press), 183. 629 NA, Van Eck, 27, 36, 2 February 1760, Van Teylingen to Van Eck. 630 At that time member of the High Government. to be liberal in the favours these gentlemen had given Van der Parra by sending him merchandise for his Huijsgebruijck or domestic use.632 Later, other members of the High Government entered in correspondence too, and also started ordering goods with Van Eck, but at different levels of involvement. The privilege of helping the members of the High Government to acquire articles for their Huijsgebruijck were institutionalized and were attached to certain functions. For instance, on Van Eck’s departure from Palliacatta, he was unable to carry out the orders fully and was asked to hand them over the order to his successor.633 At first sight Van Eck’s effort to satisfy Huijsgebruijck demands did not bring in much for himself, because he often had to advance money to obtain goods and frequently had to forgo a commission for his work. Nevertheless, Van Eck wished his customers to feel satisfied and made sure the desired goods were of the best quality in relation to their price and that they were delivered quickly. This structural change and control over one’s own career came with a price tag, which employees were happy to pay in order to strengthen their position for further advancement and related fortune. At the same time, both sides wanted to avoid the impression that there was a certain interest involved in these transactions. To stress the non-commercial side to the story, a pretext was adopted by which the merchandise was ordered in the name of the members’ wives.634 To avoid further confusion on the subject or to create the impression that the services offered were illegal favours enhancing Van Eck’s position, he sometimes adopted the expedient of offering gifts in return. The existence of the knife-edge was clearly revealed when Van Eck began slipping in extra gifts himself. In one case, his gifts were bluntly refused and he was ordered to refrain from sending gifts in the future.635 Although most of the trade conducted under the entry of Huijsgebruijck was said to be essential to the households of the members of the High Governments closer scrutiny shows, it was often actually a commercial proposition. On the death of Van Rheden in 631 Teesiman and Vermont. 632 NA, VOC, 13, 1, 18 October 1754, anonymous to Van Eck, (…)The Messrs Vermont and Teesiman during their worthy stay in Paliacatta have had the courtesy to supply me annually with all sorts of necessities for my household. I want to request you kindly and candidly to replace the last-mentioned, which will also give you occasion to prove your friendship (…).633 NA, Van Eck, 26, 9, 15 February 1759, Van der Parra to Van Eck. 634 For instance, Van Eck sent his regards to Van Velden’s wife in order to emphasize the goods were meant for her. 635 NA, Van Eck, 15, 7, 14 April 1756, Van Ardenne to Van Eck. 1761, the merchandise he had recently bought from Van Eck was sold at auction giving an insight into the possible markets for these goods. It transpired that some of the buyers were employees, but the majority of the stock was bought by Chinese merchants.636 Since as a friend, Van Eck never charged a commission fee for the domestic use orders and no taxes were paid, this sideline gave the members of the High Government a very competitive edge. This one-upmanship is illustrated by the incident in which De Klerk637 wrote how his mother-in-law had lost money on a shipment from the Coast because she had to pay for taxes and for cargo space. In turn, De Klerk had sent a similar shipment of cloth at exactly the same time, and he succeeded in making a handsome profit, because he had procured them through the Huisgebruijck channel. De Klerk thought it highly amusing that he had out-competed his own mother-in-law commercially, at the same time providing evidence that he had sold off the merchandise he obtained for domestic use. The direct relationship between Huijsgebruijck commissions and advancement in position is hard to prove, but it at least provided a handy pretext to enter into correspondence with the most powerful. As a successful private trader, Van Eck’s position in his network strengthened. After he had established contact with members of the High Government through commissions for Huijsgebruijck, he began receiving letters from the most powerful indicating their support for his career.638 In April 1761, De Klerk promised to compensate Van Eck with something pleasant in exchange for the beautiful cloth he had sent.639 Shortly afterwards, in 1757 Van Eck was promoted to second-in­charge,640 and two years later De Klerk gave some very simple advice to Van Eck : (…) sit out your time with Governor Vermont without making trouble. Your position in Batavia is very strong , because you are surely familiar with the fact that Vermont has a plenty of credit with His Excellency (Governor-General Mossel), who seems very fond of 636 NA, Van Eck, 42, 1, 1 January 1760, goods sold at auction after Van Rheden’s death. 637 NA, Van Eck, 26, 6, 13 February 1759, De Klerk to Van Eck. 638 De Klerk, signalling that he had heard his two superiors on the Coast were working against Van Eck. De Klerk advised him to explain his situation to his friends in Batavia, in order that they could take the necessary precautions. 639 NA, Van Eck, 15, 4, 11 April 1756, De Klerk to Van Eck and 15, 11, 14 June 1756, De Klerk to Van Eck. 640 NA, Van Eck, 16, 3, 20 April 1757, Van der Parra to Van Eck. him, so patience is necessary to fulfil your own and your friends’ wishes (…).641 Not long afterwards, Mossel indicated that since Van Eck was second-in-charge, he would be next­ in-line for Governor when Vermont left the Coast. 642 At a lower level, a similar mechanism of supplying cloth in return for a promotion was played out more openly. As Governor of the Coast, Van Eck simply thanked Vrymoet for the cloth he had received in return for promoting him. 643 The combination of private trade and improving one’s position was not considered corruption, but was even supported ideologically by an official memorandum from Mossel.644 2. Social reproduction All servants sought for fortune, status and power for themselves and for their families, during their own lifetime and if possible for future descendants.645 Within the group of servants, there were two tendencies for fostering social reproduction each with a geographical origin at work. In both cases the ultimate goal of networking was getting ahead, a guarantee of jobs for friends and making money. In the initial period, the first and foremost goal of Company servants was to earn a fortune and return to the Republic, 641 NA, Van Eck, 19, 13, 27 February 1758, De Klerk to Van Eck, (…) Voor het overige staan uw Edele sakens ten desen hooftplaats soo verre mij bewust is op eenen goeden voet, en ik wil hopen dat uw Edele: de tijd die het nog dueren mogt met den heer Gouverneur sal weten door te brengen / in een harmonie die die sonder opspreken blijft dewijl het uw Edele niet onbekent kan sijn wat credit sijn Edele bij sijn Excellentie heeft, die soo ik mij niet bedrieg hem een bijsondere genegentheijt is toedragend / een weinig gedult is er absolut noodig om uwEdele goede vrienden en uw Edele eigen wenschen haast vervult te sien. (…)642 NA, Van Eck, 18, 8, 15 November 1757, Mossel to Van Eck. 643 NA, Van Eck, 20, 424, 29 February 1760, Van Eck to Vrijmoet. 644 NA, VOC, 4747, Mossel 1752, bedenkingen over de intrinsiquen staat van de VOC. In this memorandum, Mossel encouraged private trade since it would teach employees how to conduct trade and the VOC would profit from these experienced and capable servants in more easily fulfilling the annual Eijsch. According to the memorandum, future members of the High Government should be selected from the most skilful traders, who would be the most capable of running such a trading organization as the VOC. From this perspective, domestic use was a good way to judge whether an employee was capable of supplying the right goods at the right price. This reasoning links Huijsgebruijck more tightly to the network system and offered a barter trade for favours received. 645 This is often called social reproduction. Social reproduction is often defined as the processes which sustain or perpetuate characteristics of a given social structure or tradition over a period of time. using networking as a way to forge ahead in their quest to make money, but increasingly, as time passed a group of men with roots in Asia emerged. They did not have a desire to return after retirement. The attempts of this group were not geared to social reproduction in the Republic but they had their sights set on social reproduction in Asia. This change in course inevitably slightly altered the manifestation of social reproduction. These servants’ efforts were directed towards making a career, a fortune in Asia and safeguarding the career perspectives of their family in the East. By remaining in Asia, these families held a strengthening grip on decision making and power brokerage in Batavia. There were still many retiring servants who wanted to return to the Republic in order to enjoy their fortune and build a future at home. The first step on this path was to send the fortune home via the VOC bookkeeping. In order to disguise the exact amount of their wealth, fortunes were also sent home through agents in Holland and Asia.646 The sender and recipient were known only to each other and to the agents.647 In the VOC archives plenty bills of exchange sent from Asia to Holland by and to his agents are to be 646 NA, Van Eck, 20, 386, 5 December 1759, Van Eck to his brothers and sisters, (...) dewyl onse heer vader out en zwak begint te werden en zyne gesteldheyt niet toe sal laaten om zigh met myne affaire te bekommeren en selfs daar in om te zien soo hebbe ik raatsaam g’oordeelt de broeder Alandt en Jacob Willem benevens zyn Hoog wel geborene tot myne generale gemagtige aan te stellen om myne zaake te behandelen ten welke eynde een procuratie hier nevens gaat (...). Van Eck’s money was sent home through agents, but was ultimately destined for his family. At first Samuel van Eck, Van Eck’s father, was the recipient of the money, but after 1759 bad health no longer allowed him to take care of Van Eck’s business and his brothers took over. NA, Van Eck, 9, 13, 30 August 1764, Alandt to Van Eck, (...) Het heeft den vrijmagtigen godt behaagt na sijn onveranderlijk raets besluijt onser waerden broeder den Hoog Wel Geboore Heer Alandt van Eck ritmeester in het regiment cavallerij van den heer Generaal Majoor Van Eck, amptsjonker des ambst Voorst, nadat seedert seeven maenden veel smerte aen het opbreeken sijner quetsuure aen het hooft heeft uijtgestaan deese namiddagh om twee uure in den ouderdom van drie en Veertigh Jaare en eenige daagen, soo wij op goede gronden vertrouwen in sijne eeuwige heerlijkheijt over te neemen (...)and 9, 18, unknown date, family to Van Eck. When one of the brothers, Alandt, died of a strange disease in 1764, Jacob Willem took on the full responsibility of all the work and his brother-in-law, Antonij George Van Eck, Lord of Vergana, Judge of Arnhem and of the Veluwe Fringe was given power of attorney.647 NA, Van Eck, 20, 386, 5 December 1759, Van Eck to his brothers and sisters, (...) Om zigh in tydt en occasie van te kunne bediene het zoude niet kwaat zyn een van de beyde broers zigh ten eerste naa Amsterdam begaf of anders by een brief aan eenigh bekende aldaar schreef om zigh op het Oost indisch huys t’informeere of met de scheepe van Batavia in het laast van dit of het begin van het aanstaande jaar vertrokken geen geldt per assignatie op de Compagnie was overgemaakt het welke aldaar voor d’Heeren Hugo Pieter Faure en Davidt de Cordua in cas was geteldt om in Amsterdam weeder uyt gekeert te werden aan d’Heer Jaen Sallinieres, Coopman aldaar en tegens wat tydt dat geldt staat betaalt te werden (...).One of the tasks his brother had to perform was to go to Amsterdam and ask Salinieres for the money received from India. found. 648 Van Eck had send a total of ƒ600,370 to Holland via bills, through the mediation of his agents. Apart from the official channels, Van Eck resorted to other ways of getting his money to Europe, although the total sum of these transactions is relatively insignificant.649 In return, his agents only sent goods to Asia in order to give Van Eck a little comfort.650 After the money had been retrieved from the agents in Holland by his brothers, it was invested to give the family a sustained better life in the Republic. It was ordered according to various priorities.651 The highest priority was to pay off the family debts. This construction may have reproduced a normal pattern: if the eldest son was sent out to Asia it is quite safe to assume his family was in financial straits. Consequently, we see that Van Eck’s first aim, as eldest son, was to take care of his family. As soon as he 648 In the end, Van Eck sent ƒ359,074 to Holland from Batavia, in the name of the people mentioned earlier on. Apart from the money sent via Batavia as Governor of Ceylon, he sent ƒ115,200 in the name of Felitas to Holland from Nagapatnam and ƒ126,096 from Ceylon via different persons to his agents in Holland. By order of Van Eck, his agents in Batavia, Faure & Da Cordua and Mossel & Booms, had been regularly sending money to Europe. In Holland the money was always received by his agents Salinieres or De Bordes & Ooster, except when Van Eck sent over money in his own name. Transactions from provenance other than Batavia are harder to trace, since Van Eck was less consistent in the agents he used, but proof is furnished since the agents receiving the money in Holland are the same (also Salnieres and Ooster& De Bordes). Luckily, Van Eck’s agents on the Coast and in Ceylon are also mentioned in the letters to his brothers, giving an additional check. 649 NA, Van Eck, 20, 700, 20 September 1761, Van Eck to brothers. We have already seen Van Eck bought up wage slips, but the amount he conveyed to Europe in this manner seems to have been limited, even insignificant in comparison to the amounts sent through bills on the VOC. Van Eck also used unauthorized ways of sending his money home. When he wound up his trade in India, Dumont, a French trading partner, paid the money he owed in French bills of exchange on the Royal French treasury. Van Eck was obliged to accept these bills, because the French had no money available because of the Seven Years’ War. His brothers were asked to have these bills, amounting to 25,000 rupees or 6000 French livres, paid out. 650 Jacobs, Merchant in Asia, 299, (…) In addition to the Asian commodities, the table summarizing the contacts with the Dutch republic also includes the items “on freight” and “on recognizance”. These concern goods that the VOC personnel were allowed to ship at their own expense since 1743. The Gentlemen Seventeen granted this privilege under strict rules and restrictions in the hope of discouraging illicit private trade. The servants mainly sent beer to Asia, and Chinese tea to the Dutch Republic. (…).In turn, the brothers invested money to ship goods for personal use over to Asia. From time to time Van Eck requested such goods to be sent to Asia from Europe as good wine, tobacco. While permission to ship tobacco was easily obtained, wine was a different story. Permission was hard to obtain and one had to pay for the kassen to be able to ship wine. Van Eck was not always happy with what he received, he thought the tobacco of inferior quality. NA, Van Eck, 9, 16, 27 November 1765, brother to Van Eck, There were also special deliveries, including the silver service Van Eck ordered from Europe. His brother was looking for the best quality-price ratio and decided to buy in Amsterdam. Ooster took care of the shipment of the cutlery, for safety reasons it would not be shipped as one consignment, but in different ships. Ooster received ƒ38,000 to buy the service and to ship it over to Ceylon. It was insured for 25 per cent as Lubbert Jan had ordered. 651 NA, Van Eck, 9, 2, 7 January 1761, brothers to Van Eck. The fastest time that the brothers ever received a letter from their brother was six months, but normally it would take about nine months to a year. The correspondence to his brothers is mainly concerned with this problem of money. It was Van Eck who decided how and where to invest the money, although the brothers had a certain room to exercise their own initiative, as Van Eck was so far away. commenced sending money home, he made the interest on his capital available to his sisters living on the Overbeek estate to cover their living expenses.652 The concern about taking care of his family is also conspicuously present in his will. His brothers and sisters all received one share each, while his stepmother and stepbrothers and sisters, received one share as a group. His sisters had been included in earlier deals, and were very happy with this, because this wealth gave them better chances on the marriage market653 and his brothers also dropped hints about starting a family. After repaying his own debts and taking care of his family, Van Eck ordered his brother to invest what was left safely,654 although it has to be said that often emotional value or status aspirations were also attached to investments.655 Apart from a sound investment in land, the brothers looked for more commercial avenues.656 They bought bonds on the county of Zutphen to the value of 16,000 guilders.657 In search of further opportunities Van Eck and his brothers looked 652 NA, VOC, inv 6862, 4207, 26 January 1764, Will of Van Eck and NA, Van Eck , 9, 1, 5 November 1760, brothers to Van Eck, (...)We shall invest your money the moment it has been received in the most advantageous way in your name and according to your wishes the profits will be given to our unmarried sisters until further. (...)653 NA, Van Eck, 9, 18, unkown date, family to Van Eck. His commitment to his family was also revealed during his lifetime when other members of his family asked for support. At first, his brothers were very reserved, and refused to hand money out without Van Eck’s permission, because they did not dare to give money which was not their own to a third person. When his aunts were refused aid, and Van Eck heard of their financial problems and their cry for help, he ordered his brother to give them ƒ100 straightaway. When his aunts received this money they were in tears because Lubbert Jan had thought so well of them.653 After the family debts had been paid off Van Eck gave both his brothers ƒ6000 outright. 654 NA, Van Eck, 20, 386, 5 December 1759, Van Eck to his brothers. The fact that Van Eck prioritized financial safety, meant he bought a large areas of land. The first thing he ordered his brothers to do was to: (…) if there are any debts on the Overbeek estate, these have to be paid off first, the rest of the money should be spent on buying the surrounding estates (…).This also meant repurchasing the estate of Overbeek from their stepmother, who had obtained part of the estate on the death of her husband, Van Eck’s father. This land was bought back from her for 2000 guilders.654 Then the brothers tried to get their hands on estates in the vicinity of Overbeek, and began their quest for land by buying ‘de boereplaats op Jerusalem’ which they bought for ƒ8236. With the addition of the newly bought Boereplaats, Overbeek was now valued at ƒ22,236. Afterwards they bought two paper-mills in the near vicinity for ƒ10,000, making a total of ƒ32,236. 655 NA, Van Eck, 9, 11, 27 November 1762, brothers to Van Eck, 9, 2, 7 January 1761, brothers to Van Eck and 9, 4, 17 November 1763, brothers to Van Eck. With these acquisitions of land, emotional value often played a role, but they were also seen as investments. The annual income from all these investments generated was about ƒ800, but at times when timber and corn were expensive it could be ƒ50 to ƒ100 more. The brothers did not leave it at that and on the sale of the estate of Reijswijck in Gelderland, only Van Eck’s relatives were entitled to buy and Van Eck succeeded in doing so for ƒ12,000. 656 NA, Van Eck, 9, 18, no date, family to Van Eck. The idea was to rent these lands to tenants and repairs were made to attract tenants by new investments worth ƒ200 in the estate of Rijswijck. New trees had to planted, because farmers could not do without wood and for their use a plot of land was converted into pasture an undertaking costing 300 to 400 guilders. 657 Although they had to pay a initial fee of ƒ200 to obtain the bonds they would receive 3 per cent interest a year from then on. The course of these bonds also counted and in November his brother indicated that the across the North Sea, since England offered better interest than the Republic: (…) it would do us no harm if you were to prefer employing a part of the money in England against 4 per cent interest or more, still you will have to consult with merchants or experts about what kind of investment would be the most secure and yield most(…). Heeding this advice, his brother enlisted the services of an agent in England, Muilman Brothers, merchants in London. 659 To underline the international dimension of the investment, his brothers invested money in France as well, assuring it was giving good profit (6 ½ per cent in total).660 An extrapolation of the activities of the brothers brings to light various facts about the plans Van Eck had made for after his return to the Republic. There were plans afoot to buy a house in Arnhem, because in winter ‘everybody’ of importance and who could afford it lived in town. It was judged better to act quickly, because good opportunities for buying housing were few and far between. It was better to strike while the iron was hot as later the lack of a good opportunity might lead to problems, just as it had done with a recently appointed judge in Arnhem, who was in trouble because he was not able to find a place of residence in Arnhem, who was obliged to have a residence in the town as a prerequisite of his position. In the long run, such a house meant entry into the government of the city and access to the higher positions in the hierarchy at a national level, in turn giving a prospect of a tidy income. In order to pave the way for Van Eck to have a political career, his brothers began informing him about changes in politics in the province of Gelderland.661 After Van Eck’s death in 1765, his brother assumed his role as stock he had bought in February for 128 per cent was now fetching 138 and 139 per cent.657 In 1763 they bought obligations on the ‘Quarter of Nijmegen as well as 4000 guilders in private bonds on the same conditions and rent. 658 NA, Van Eck, 20, 700, 20 September 1761, Van Eck to his brothers. 659 NA, Van Eck, 9, 3, 5 August 1762, Brothers to Van Eck, (…)In order to take care of our business in our name, we have approached theMessrs Henry Muilman, Peeter Muilman, and Richard Muilman, merchants in London. They are members of a family from Amsterdam (...).NA, Van Eck, 9, 11, 27 November 1762, brothers to Van Eck. They were given power of attorney to invest Van Eck’s money and purchased annuities on the Bank of England for the sum of £2000, with an expected interest of 4 per cent. According to the brothers, this investment was one of the most popular in Holland and later they told Van Eck the English investments were doing quite well. They had bought them at 73 ¼ per cent and they were now fetching 88 per cent, which meant a nice profit.660 NA, Van Eck, 9, 18, unknown date, family to Van Eck. 661 NA, Van Eck, 9, 19, 28 November 1764, brother to Van Eck, 9, 3, 05 August 1762, brothers to Van Eck, 9, 4, 17 November 1763, brothers to Van Eck. leader of the family and aspired to a political career. Even before Van Eck’s death, his brother had already been admitted to the peerage of Gelderland, providing him with new means of acquiring money and power. He foresaw losses in the first year, but looking farther ahead it would help him obtain a profitable job and subsequently a prosperous life. It was a particularly good time to become a member, since the peerage had only eighteen members at the time. As a consequence of his election, this brother had to quit his job in the army, which he did without regrets. Eventually, it was this brother who profited most from his eldest brother’s labour and fortune. Although he had kept a low profile while his older brother was alive, doing what ever he asked of him, the tables were turned when Van Eck died. He succeeded in obtaining an influential position and he married soon after.662 In Asia, servants who decided to remain also nurtured the same dreams, but wanted to fulfil them on the spot. Remuneration was found within the VOC hierarchy, so the primary goal was to search for profitable jobs for family members, eventually leading to more nepotism in Asia. Their fortunes did not need to be remitted to the Republic, but investments were made in Asia itself. As we have seen, as time passed these servants had to invest more in order to capitalize on their privileges. Under these circumstances, it was easier to capitalize on the family fortune if servants did not return. In the context of this newly evolving situation, the Company servants with powerful family connections in Asia were in a better position than those sent from Europe who did not have such connections. They were probably even less ‘corrupt’ as they had family capital at their disposal. Given their situation, the desire to remain in Asia was a logical choice as it made it easier for the servants to capitalize on the new opportunities presented by the decline of the VOC. The wisdom of their choice is underlined by the increasing risk in sending money to the Republic as the VOC steered a steady course for bankruptcy. 662 NA, Van Eck, 9, 18, unknown date, family to Van Eck and 9, 16, 27 November 1765, brother to Van Eck. 2.1 Balancing personal interests Van Rheden had been the strongest supporter and patron of Van Eck and had made sure he was always the first person to congratulate him with successes in his career.663 However important Van Rheden may have been to Van Eck’s career, the death of this patron in 1760 did not have a big impact on the latter’s rise in the hierarchy. Van Eck made himself useful to other powerful servants and De Klerk quickly replaced Van Rheden as his principal patron.664 Mossel had not always been favourably dispossed towards Van Eck, but after the latter’s appointment to Governor of the Coast he changed his mind. Not to mince matters since Van Eck could not be ignored when it came to promotions on the Coast, the Governor-General and Van Eck needed each other. When Van Eck heard rumours of Mossel’s return to Europe, he made sure he set a new course. As the obvious successor to Mossel, Van Eck turned to Van der Parra, indicating possible improvements which might enhance the position of the VOC in the region.665 Van Eck also discussed reforms in the private trade, explaining to Van der Parra the weak points in Mossel’s system and proposing measures for improvement.666 As soon as the information of Mossel’s retirement proved false, his stream of recommendations dried up. Even if networks functioned well, the combination of different interests did not always yield the expected result and tensions were created. After his promotion to Governor of the Coast, Van Eck and Weijdom, Chief at Jaggernaijkpoeram, had serious disagreements. Weijdom failed to inform Van Eck about what was going on in Jaggernaijkpoeram, but wrote extensively about the events there to his patron, Mossel, in 663 NA, Van Eck, 25, 5, 9 November 1758, Van Rheden to Van Eck, (…)The principle purpose of this letter is to congratulate Your Honour with your felicitous appointment to the Government of the Coromandel. I humbly again refer to the content of the same and I do not conceal that the thought behind my letter will have been clear to you already before receiving this letter, however I wshall be the first who has brought this favourable change to your attention. (…).664 NA, Van Eck, 27, 32, 30 January 1760, Bleeker to Van Eck. 665 See Chapter One: Mossel’s strategy of building smaller fortresses was useless in Van Eck’s eyes he thought the Company should focus its attention on one major fortification, Nagapatnam. He also explained how he wanted to pay for larger fortifications and more soldiers for the garrison by imposing new taxes. As we have seen, Van Eck’s plans were unrealistic as the indigenous merchants revolted. Denying that the merchants were not in favour of his new system, Van Eck blamed Vick and his employees for stirring up the merchants. 666 NA, Van Eck, 20, 260, 5 February 1759, Van Eck to Van der Parra. Batavia.667 This silent resistance to Van Eck may have been caused by the fact that most employees had been promoted by Vermont and therefore obviously orbited in another sphere of influence. These issues hindered work and, although Van Eck was Weijdom’s superior, neither desisted from pestering the other.668 When Weijdom was dismissed in 1760 because of illegally transporting French soldiers, Van Eck mentioned Weijdom’s negligence in informing him as a second reason for sending him to Batavia.669 Weijdom retorted to this duplicity by accusing Van Eck of tax evasion on his private trade ventures in Jaggernaijkpoeram. Weijdom died on his way to Batavia and this ended the dispute, although Van Eck did not understand why Mossel had believed ‘whatever this uncouth lout could dream up when he had his belly full of brandy’670 and underlined he personally had always pursued the interests of the Company.671 Such a clash of personalities shows life could be made difficult for a Governor by one of his subjects and unquestionably if his tormentor enjoyed the protection of a powerful patron this offered possibilities for resistance. When the position of the Company was in danger, differences could be set aside and the most suitable candidate was chosen. Just before Van Eck’s letter requesting furlough to Europe arrived in Batavia, the High Government promoted him to Governor of Ceylon. On hearing the news, Van Eck changed his plans and accepted the offer. This was an unexpected opportunity. Normally it would have taken him years and considerable amounts of money to reach the position of Governor of Ceylon, but because of the crisis situation he was launched into a very profitable position. Whether or not Van Eck felt himself obliged to accept the post, it was obvious the prospects of making his fortune were greatly expanded by his promotion and prompted him to accept. One of the consequences of the system was that everybody was aware of the games being played and this knowledge lay behind the resistance shown to certain 667 NA, Van Eck, 26, 81, 29 November 1759, Van Teylingen to Van Eck. 668 NA, Van Eck, 26, 98, 11 December 1759, Weijdom to Van Eck, the only letter Weijdom privately addressed to Van Eck asked him for reinforcements. 669 NA, Van Eck, 26, 81, 29 November 1759, Van Teylingen to Van Eck, (…) His Honour has the intention of asking Mr Pigot to give him and his traveling companion a passport in order to be able to leave overland for Pondichery, but the matter that has astonished me most is the the fact that Weijdom has not written anything about these circumstances although he has had plenty of opportunity. (…).670 NA, Van Eck, 20, 645, 6 june 1761, Van Eck to De Klerk, (…) Het is onbegryplyk hoe zyn Excelentie soo veel geloof heeft kunne geeve aan alles wat dien lompen fleegel maar voorgedraage heeft en die wanneer de maag vol brandewyn hadde maar ter papier stelde wat hem in het hooft kwam. Hy is doot en dierhalve sal maar best zyn van het daar by te laate (…).671 NA, Van Eck, 20,543. promotions. The best example of such a construction is Christiaan van Teylingen, who was very successful in using his networks to build his career. The fact that he was made Governor of the Coromandel Coast within ten years of his arrival in Asia, might prompt us to think he was a particularly talented man. Contrariwise, a different image emerges from his letters, since his career was tainted with fights and strewn with conflicts. Van Teylingen was invariably locked in arguments with everybody and then rushing to Van Eck, his superior, full of complaints about the treatment he had received from the employees he was supervising. Most of these arguments had to be solved by Van Eck’s intervention, as he enjoyed more respect. Van Teylingen insisted that his subordinates were doing nothing more than playing games to see if he was on top of things.672 Even employees lower down in the hierarchy were alerted to Van Teylingen’s lack of experience in doing his job and refused to trust a man who had risen too quickly in the hierarchy. Van Teylingen had to dismiss a employee who had wilfully counteracted his orders by referring to the orders of the second-in-charge, blatantly indicating that he could not be bothered with obeying Van Teylingen’s orders.673 The VOC history, the longest sitting Governors-General are often accused of having been most corrupt and nepotistic, while Governors-General with shorter terms of office enjoy a better reputation. 674 Apart from the obvious explanation that the latter group had les time to make mistakes and commit serious errors in judgement, repayment of past favours provides an alternative and more structural reason for this opposition. Since there were limited possibilities for promotion to the highest position, it invariably took the Governors-General some time to repay all their friends who had helped them. 672 NA, Van Eck, 26, 100, 20 December 1759, Van Teylingen to Van Eck. When Van Teylingen ignored the advice of several employees with more experience in the appointment of the new Chief of Palliacatta, he was asking for trouble and the other employees started to rebel. One of the leading employees, Joncheere, consistently sabotaged Van Teylingen by reporting he always said he did not know when he was asked something at a professional level, even though in the eyes of Van Teylingen what he had asked was for the sake of the Company or based on knowledge of what had been done in the past. Instead, he often proposed that Van Teylingen look up the information in the VOC books, causing Van Teylingen a great deal of extra work. If Van Teylingen asked for the requisite papers, Joncheere always forgot to bring them and answered he had forgotten as he was old and his memory was failing. What disgusted Van Teylingen was that Joncheere was un-cooperative but at the same time he acted in a very friendly fashion paying Van Teylingen all sorts of compliments. Nevertheless Van Eck and Van Teylingen refrained from openly attacking Joncheere for ‘the sake of his wife and children’, or whatever the real reason might have been. 673 NA, Van Eck, 27, 46, 11 March 1760, Van Teylingen to Van Eck. 674 L.P. van Putten, Gouverneurs-generaal van Nederlands-Indie.:Deel 1: Ambitie en onvermogen : 1610­1796 (Rotterdam: ILCO-productions, 2002); F.W. Stapel, De gouverneurs-generaal van Nederlandsch-Indie in beeld en woord (Den Haag: Van Stockum, 1941). Since these friends were often not family, to recompense their support they had to help servants outside the confines of their own family to promotions first. Only after doing this, could they turn their attention to concentrating fully on their family, which was seen as more openly nepotistic. Under these circumstances, viewed superficially without taking everything into proper consideration, short-term Governors-General are more easily seen as less corruptible, simply because they could only go as far as paying back all their friends. To become a Governors-General it was impossible not to be an adherent of and an adept at the system of networking and repaying favours. 2.2 Distribution of wealth The prospect of acquiring a fortune depended on securing a position with the VOC, obliging the employees to play the game of networking and making competition for promotions tough for others. After assuring his recall to Batavia on his own terms, Vermont was anxious to ensure the position of Governor for his trusted associate Vick who should have owed him a favourable transfer of power.675 Because as second-in­charge Van Eck was the logical successor and stood in their way, a devious plan was contrived.676 Vermont and Vick kept the information about the moment of Vermont’s resignation to themselves. They waited until the last VOC ship of that season was ready to sail, making sure their letters to friends in Batavia were on board. 677 After the ship carrying the letters was out of sight, Vermont notified Van Eck of his resignation. 678 Having to wait half a year for the next ship to leave for Batavia, Van Eck was outmanoeuvred of any chance of directly influencing the decision making process in 675 NA, Van Eck, 25, 59 november 1758, Van Rheden to Van Eck. 676 NA, Van Eck, 19, 43, 16 July 1758, Vick to Van Eck. On Van Eck’s promotion to deputy, Vick had informed him that this promotion assured Van Eck of the next promotion to Governor. Only recently superseded by Van Eck, Vick felt he was ever more entitled to the position of Governor on account of his seniority, although he assured Van Eck the opposite was true. 677 P Groot, Accompaniments, 183, In order to support Vick’s promotion, Vermont recommended Vick as Governor as well as sponsoring other employees on the Coast for promotion, with the name of Van Eck a prominent omission on his list.678 NA, Van Eck, 20, 77, 19 August 1758, Van Eck to Van Teylingen. Batavia.679 Cast in such an invidious situation, it was necessary to be diplomatic and silently hope and pray that earlier investment in friends would pay off. Even Van Eck realized that his chances were slim, or as he put it: ‘if one does not knock, the door will 680 not be opened’. As a weapon against abuse to which the system lent itself admirably, networking was permeated with a strong moral connotation. A certain moderation in behaviour in networking was expected. Acting too rashly or being too insistent and greedy could signify the forfeiture of the respect of patrons and this had grave consequences for a career. With the next VOC ship to Batavia which sailed in October Van Eck sent a message to the Governor-General reminding him of his promise to Van Eck and to Her Royal Highness that he would succeed Vermont.681 In order to show to his new and powerful protectors in Batavia that he was a worthy candidate,682 Van Eck posed his candidature indirectly by writing to Batavia about the real situation on the Coast, showing how badly matters were fairing.683 This precaution would also prevent people from later laying the blame on Van Eck.684 In the end, even Governor-General Mossel found the conduct of Vermont and Vick presumptuous as Vick was not first in line for promotion, and therefore voted against Vick’s promotion.685 Nevertheless, the tactic of sending the letter on the last ship was not reprimanded and we see a repetition of this strategy on Van Eck’s promotion to Governor of Ceylon, when Vick was bypassed by Van Teylingen.686 679 NA, Van Eck, 25, 5, 9 november 1758, Van Rheden to Van Eck. Although Van Eck was furious, he maintained his dignity. In a letter written to Vick, Van Eck indicated that Vick was in a good position, because to achieve promotion it was necessary to submit an application. 680 NA, Van Eck, 20, 99, 31 August 1758, Van Eck to Vick, (…) The one who does not knock will not have the door opened.(…)681 NA, Van Eck, 20, 153, 8 October 1758, Van Eck to Mossel. 682 Like De Klerk and Van der Parra. 683 NA, Van Eck, 20, 155, 8 October 1758, Van Eck to Mossel and 20, 158, 8 October 1758, Van Eck to Hooreman. What follows are separate letters to Mossel, Van der Parra, De Klerk and Horeman on the situation on the Coast showing Van Eck was capable of making a good analysis of the situation, and exposing what his plans for the Coast were. 684 NA, Van Eck, 25, 5, 9 November 1758, Van Rheden to Van Eck. 685 Vick was reprimanded for not waiting his turn. He was punished for his rash actions and his career was ruined. His patrons could no longer help him anymore. Since he had wanted to pass over the position of second-in-charge of the Coast, and obviously did no value the position, he was not even appointed to that position and it was left vacant.686 NA, Van Eck, 20, 753, 21 June 1763, Van Eck to Van Teylingen. He kept the date of his retirement to himself, telling only Van Teylingen in advance in order to provide him with the best opportunity to plead his case. NA, Van Eck, 38, 11, 1 January 1764, Van Eck to father of Van Teylingen. In the end Van Eck kept Vick uninformed until the last VOC ships had left. NA, Van Eck, 27, 5, 10 January 1760, Van In such a capricious system it was easy to build up grudges. As he still harboured a grudge, it gave Van Eck huge gratification, when Vermont heaped social ridicule on himself in Batavia.687 While an employee depended at first on favours to achieve promotions, this level of dependency changed once he had achieved a position with the right to appoint, as was the case when Van Eck reached the position of Governor; he had now obtained the power to promote employees. After asking the Governor-General’s consent, his propositions for promotion were normally approved (geapprobeerd). 688 The recommendation and appointment by a Governor was imbued with a certain authority689 and could not easily be overturned, since if Batavia did not approve of the people promoted, the Governor’s credit with the local servants would have been damaged, which was not in the interests of the Company. 690 This meant that the tenor of his correspondence shifted from that predominately concerned with private trade, to one preponderantly related to the more administrative task of a Governor of the Coast. Outsiders began writing him soliciting his assistance in having the employees in their network promoted. This gave Van Eck gave a stronger position in his dealing with more highly placed officials who asked him favours, which it was tacitly understood would have to be returned. Although Van Eck was still involved in the Huijsgebruijck trade through his expedition of commissions, he now also exerted influence through his right to assign positions. The one fly in the ointment was that since the presence of the VOC on the Coast was not very sizeable, he received more Teylingen to Van Eck, and several gentlemen in the High Government had already assured Van Teylingen of succeeding. NA, Van Eck, 20, 267, 17 February 1759, Van Eck to Van Teylingen. NA, Van Eck, 20, 267, 17 February 1759, Van Eck to Van Teylingen. Van Teylingen had profited easily from Vick’s faux pas. 687 NA, Van Eck, 20, 153, 8 October 1758, Van Eck to Mossel and NA, Van Eck, 26, 7, 15 February 1759, Van Rheden to Van Eck. He was delighted when news came of Vermont ridiculing himself socially in Batavia. After his arrival there, the story did the rounds that Vermont had taken a young girl from Bali as his wife. The girl was perceived as much too pretty for such an old man and ended up having an affair with an indigenous man, and Vermont’s coachman was aware of this. After taking Vermont to the theatre, the coachman would bring the lover to the girl and warned him when he left to pick up his boss. After the affair had been going on for a while, Vermont found out and trapped the lovers in flagrante delicto. Enraged, Vermont killed the lover, which amused Van Eck highly since his former opponent in this matter had made himself a figure of public ridicule. 688 NA, Van Eck, 20, 638, 24 May 1761, Van Eck to De Klerk. 689 NA, Van Eck, 26, 59, 13 August 1759, Van der Parra to Van Eck. Even if the Governor were disgraced, his authority in past promotions would remained inviolate. Just before asking his leave, Vermont had promoted two sergeants, but as new governor Van Eck wanted these promotion disapproved in Batavia. Even Van der Parra could not change the decision, giving as excuse the fact that Vermont had too much credit in Batavia. 690 NA, Van Eck, 20, 555, 25 October 1760, Van Eck to De Klerk. requests than he could honour. He was swamped with recommendations or “Overkropt 691 met recommandaties”, making strategic decisions inevitable. After he was invested with his new powers Van Eck was treated more as an equal by the members of the High Government and recommendations and obligations began to work both ways. When a servant was appointed to a better position, this was also good news for his patrons, as the servant was obliged to repay the favour received. Often promotion of protégés served as a sign of gratitude and recognition of earlier help.692 On hearing the news of Van Eck’s promotion, Van Rheden rejoiced he would finally be able to obtain a onderkoopmanschap for Hagemeister, which had been denied to him by Vermont. It even gave them the chance to circumvent the Governor-General, who had also flatly refused to promote Hagemeister. Consequently, Van Eck was able to repay Van Rheden for supporting him for so long.693 De Klerk saw similar possibilities and recommended Dormieux and Visscher, two of his protégés on the Coast. Now, Van Eck’s increased power also gave him room to bargain for new alliances with the powerful. This bargaining mechanism was at work when Schreuder recommended employees and he judiciously indicated that he would not be onerkentelijk or unappreciative if he were to obtain these promotions through Van Eck’s good offices. 694 If a promotion was considered especially significant, the Governor-General could be informed of the personal interest a highly placed employee might have in such a promotion.695 On climbing the ladder, employees normally occupied themselves less with trade and began to depend on income derived from their power. On his promotion to Ceylon, Van Eck became even more preoccupied with his network and promotions. Trade was no longer his main activity nor was he any longer depending on income from trade for his fortune. The territorial nature of the VOC presence in Ceylon meant that he had more positions at his disposal to distribute than at the trading posts in India. Invariably, more money was to be made in assigning positions, of which we have already seen plenty of examples in Chapter 7. Servants were expected to pay a substantial sum related to the 691 NA, Van Eck, 20, 541, 25 September 1760, Van Eck to Van Teylingen. 692 NA, Van Eck, 20, 288, 15 April 1759, Van Eck to Hooreman. 693 NA, Van Eck, 26, 7, 15 February 1759, Van Rheden to Van Eck. 694 NA, Van Eck, 35, 27, 13 July 1763, Schreuder to Van Eck. 695 NA, Van Eck, 20, 761, 30 July 1763, Van Eck to Van der Parra. For instance, when Van Teylingen promoted Felitas, as Governor of Ceylon Van Eck asked the Governor-General to approve this promotion as a personal favour. income expected from their newly acquired position to their superior. Through this process of cause and effect, networking functioned as a way of redistributing money upwards in the hierarchy. This indebtedness could be paid simply in money or in merchandise or by returning the favour. The amount of the sum was related to what the position was expected to bring in over a year and was calculated to its potential income. Apparently there was an approximate knowledge of how much every position was worth in terms of income. After 1780, this system of redistribution of wealth in the favour of the higher­ranking positions was utilized by the VOC to offset its lack of capital. The VOC found it reprehensible that while it found itself in dire financial strait, its servants were still making personal fortunes. Since it considered these fortunes had been made at the expense of the Company, the servants were asked to pay a quarter to a half of the income expected in the first year of a new position to the VOC. This ukase demonstrates that the VOC not only desired a share from the networking, but had also devised a way to tax the extraordinary income of the servants. The drawing up of lists of what each position brought in proves that knowledge of amounts of extraordinary income in circulation was widespread. Conclusion Fortune depended on a high position in the hierarchy. In a system of increasing remuneration, the competition for higher positions became fierce. Before reaching a profitable position, a Company servant had to rely on his patron and bribes in order to achieve the desired rise in the hierarchy. When a influential post was obtained, a Company servant’s position changed fundamentally. He had more room to bargain. Every position represented a certain monetary value and upon promotion, a price had to be paid to those who had been helpful in helping the servant to his new position. Depending on the competition among other circumstances, this could be in the range of around one-sixth of the whole income expected from the first year. It was common knowledge what the most profitable positions were and how much was earned. During most of the VOC era, the money was simply seen as a personal asset for appointing servants. Later, in its death throes, when the VOC tried to use its servants to halt its decline, the position of servants deteriorated in this domain too. In 1787, the VOC introduced the amptsgeld which was designed specifically to appropriate part of this unofficial income. As it was common knowledge how much every position yielded unofficially, lists were drawn up in order to assess the official and unofficial income appropriate of all VOC positions. Initially, servants were asked to pay half of their assessed income in the first year of their term in a certain position to the VOC as amptsgeld. Although this amount was later adjusted to a lower percentage, there can be little doubt that the VOC extracted money from servants. The introduction of ambtsgeld is another example how the VOC used part of the formerly unofficial income of its servants. In the shadow of the company : the VOC (Dutch East India Company)and its servants in the period of its decline (1740-1796) Nierstrasz, J.C. Citation Nierstrasz, J. C. (2008, November 5). In the shadow of the company : the VOC (Dutch East India Company) and its servants in the period of its decline (1740-1796). Retrieved from https://hdl.handle.net/1887/13267 Version: Not Applicable (or Unknown) License: Licence agreement concerning inclusion of doctoral thesis in the Institutional Repository of the University of Leiden Downloaded from: https://hdl.handle.net/1887/13267 Note: To cite this publication please use the final published version (if applicable). PART IV: Conclusion and Comparison Chapter 9: Dutch decline and British dominance. Introduction The second half of the eighteenth century provided both the VOC and the EIC with new challenges as well as new opportunities. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to put both companies on equal terms with regard to their future possibilities in 1750. The VOC had entered into an irreversible decline even before 1750. Conversely, the solutions the EIC proposed to the new challenges after the middle of the eighteenth century led to an increase in English power and trade, which contributed to the further decline of the Dutch Company. More than in earlier periods, European politics became intertwined with commerce in Asia. The EIC took advantage of the dual benefits accorded it by increasing military involvement of the home state and the mounting income derived from the taxation of its Indian subjects. Deprived of these props, the VOC had, as has been explained earlier, less rosy prospects. Paradoxically, in the end the result for both the VOC and the EIC was the same: both trading empires were replaced by a colonial state. Nevertheless, given the advantages the EIC had over its Dutch competitor, it was able to stave off this change for longer than the VOC, although this entailed State involvement on policy in Asia from an earlier date. It was in the nature of both the Companies that, in contrast to the rules and regulations inherent in their successors, that they were governed as much by informal institutions as by formal institutions. It has to be said that such informal institutions as private trade, fortunes and networking were tolerated only as long as they served the company’s ‘benefit’. In this chapter, the conclusions we have reached on the main theme of this thesis the role of informal institutions at work in the VOC will be compared with the situation in the EIC. By taking this step, an interesting negotiation process can be distilled from the coincident decline of the VOC and the rise of the EIC. When we focus on the relationship between servants and company by analysing the trilogy of long-term developments in private trade, fortunes and networking, we are able to acquire an insight into how trade and politics related. The time has come to analyse how such external factors as State-sponsored help and liberalized country trade contributed to the success of the EIC and how these external factors fundamentally changed the relationship between the EIC and its servants. 1. Monopolies and private trade Too often the difference in development between the VOC and the EIC has been explained on the ground of an assumed opposition between the restrictive VOC policy on trade and the assumed freedom of English country traders. Was there an alternative explanation? On the basis of my research I should state that private trade should not be considered a conflict of interest nor can it be hailed as the dawn of liberalism.696 Viewed objectively, the companies simply used the private intra-Asian trade to suit their own needs, because for both it played a not insignificant supplementary role in acquiring goods which would fetch a good price in Europe and its profits provided capital to fuel the company trade. Intra-Asian trade, whether monopolized or liberalized, supplemented the companies’ commercial capital either by profit or by taxation. Both companies made careful assessments of whether it was sufficiently profitable to invest their limited amounts of capital in intra-Asian trade. The outcome was that is was judged potentially most profitable to monopolize certain branches of intra-Asian trade, but neither company hesitated to allow private trade in Asia as an option if it happened to serve their needs. Success in the intra-Asian trade depended on the twin factors of political and military power and the availability of capital. Hampered by a shortage of capital, the VOC 696 Watson, Foundation for Empire, 17, (…) we can see that the Dutch insistence on internal company monopoly, to the exclusion of the private aspirations of their servants in Asian commerce, was costly to police. It was, moreover, a source of constant irritation in relations between the VOC servants and their masters, as well as between the Dutch and Asian merchants. In the long run the insistence on monopoly hindered the development of identification by the Asian merchants with the fortunes of the VOC. The English company, on the other hand, could not control its servants, and the desired monopoly was eroded from within. The most usual way Englishmen could break the monopoly was to join the Company and then trade under its aegis in the East. This process of erosion made the Company internally dynamic as the servants’ private aspiration surged against the Company’s discipline, discovering new outlets through Indian associates, who, in their turn, came to identify their own interests with those of the Englishmen (…). commenced transforming and relieving restrictions on private participation in its intra-Asian trade after the shoe began to pinch in the 1740s, while the lack of profitable trading opportunities had prompted the EIC to open up intra-Asian trade to the private initiative of its employees and subjects at a much earlier date. Nevertheless, both companies never lost sight of the principle “For the benefit of the Company”, as even the EIC made no bones about stipulating its employees had at all times to give priority to EIC country trading voyages over their private trade.697 As close scrutiny of the development of both companies, leaves no doubt that the extent of the growth in private trade was irrevocably tied to the power of the company. If we examine the regulations laid down to govern the private trade of their servants, we see a strong relationship between this and the development of political power. When relatively speaking a company had plenty of opportunities to offer to its servants in spheres other than trade, it was able to lure its servants away from participating in private trade, while in a weakened state a company had to concede private trade privileges in Asia and was sometimes even obliged to extend these to the European trade.698 Both companies were pragmatic and hard headed in their decisions to allow private trade. The better example of this axiom is the VOC whose intra-Asian trade first shrank because of the dual handicap of a lack of capital and increasing competition, and then finally in a debilitated condition succumbed to the pressure of the expansion of English power. Even its fulcrum the Archipelago, the VOC was forced to grant freedom of navigation to English country traders under the terms of the Treaty of 1784. Although, the EIC did not monopolize the intra-Asian trade from Bengal, it did channel capital flows by issuing bills of exchange in China. Such measures provide evidence that the companies were far from powerless in enforcing their terms in private trade and adapting it to their wishes.699 Even though private trade was allowed before Plassey both VOC and EIC servants tried 697Ibidem, 75 and 101. 698Ibidem, 75. 699 Ibidem, 64, 75, 80, (…)Regulations governing the private trade were imposed, altered and withdrawn, and reimposed, throughout the period under discussion. (…), 81 (…) So long the trade did not prejudice the Company’s position, and it could gain some pecuniary benefit through duties and levies it did not interfere, but encouraged its servants to use their own judgment to restrain excesses. (Despatch to Fort William, 3 March 1758, Fort-William-India House Correspondence volume II, p 61.) This attitude even went so far as to recommend encouragement by senior servants of their juniors’ enterprises, mainly to prevent any interference in the Company’s investments rather than as an expression of a benevolent concern for the junior welfare (…). to conceal their private dealings making it harder for companies to assess the personal gains of these servants.700 There is a clearly established link between disallowing servants their right to private trade and the acquisition of territorial possessions, which entailed the subsequent assumption of governmental responsibilities. In comparing the influence of that Company on the Coromandel Coast to its influence in Ceylon, this thesis has shown that allowing private trade privileges was more likely to occur in trading-posts, whereas conquest led Company servants away from trade an turned them towards local administration. A colony needed more man-hours to manage than did a trading possession perched on the edge of some country or even established within the domain of a foreign ruler. Once they had set foot on the path to an embryo form of colonization the companies no longer wanted their servants to invest their time in private trade, but needed them to organize government and fulfil administration tasks. Consequently, both companies were well aware of how essential it was to regulate private trade by their servants in colonies, if only to avoid conflicts of interests. As long as there were no territorial possessions to speak of, private trade privileges granted to servants were strongly tied to remuneration and freedom of trade simply did not exist. The foremost reason which prompted companies to allow servants private trade privileges was the absence of any other legitimate ways of making their fortunes. Implicit in many assumptions about the English country trade is the idea that this was the most profitable for an employee of a Company to make money. Parallelling the situation with the VOC employees on the Coast, in actual fact the EIC had to hand out privileges in private trade which did not have detrimental consequences for the profitability of the company to its servants in areas where no or hardly other sources of private income were available. Since the VOC had more to offer and more to lose to its servants, obviously this principle is shown in its regulations. Fully aware of its predicament, the Dutch Company took the plunge and made sure the senior servants obtained strictly stipulated privileges and channelled private trade through them. The decision was taken mainly on the basis of what was considered the most profitable part of 700 Both EIC and VOC employees used to destroy their correspondence after it had served its purpose. See Watson, Foundation for Empire, 102. trade in destination and in goods, namely the long-distance trade between India and the Indonesian Archipelago. When it univocally merged that too much freedom of trade was detrimental to the trade of the Company, this freedom was curbed. As recompense, the senior servants obtained privileges for trade on VOC ships and actually continued to trade more lucratively and exclusively than before. None the less, the free trade of VOC servants still depended on imports from Batavia. Never for one moment did the VOC relinquish control as the most privileged parties held a financial interest in keeping trade sanctioned and exclusive. Servants who were too avaricious or too unruly could be punished by having their privileges rescinded if their behaviour displeased the Company. Before the crucial year 1765, although the EIC had less to offer its servants and the same principles seem to have been applied. The regulations the EIC passed on the trade to Europe sound very similar to VOC regulations on permitted trade.701 The higher-ranking EIC servants were granted private trade capacity on the ships sailing home to Europe, on condition they refrained from sending any monopoly goods. As the English intra-Asian trade grew, these privileges were no longer considered necessary.702 Private trade was dominated by a hierarchy, which was created through the implementation of company institutions. In the private trade from Batavia to the Coromandel Coast, the first priority of the VOC was to make sure its own trade was not hampered. Trade in VOC monopoly goods was forbidden and on those products in which the VOC traded as well, the private traders had to pay a recognition fee. As long as private traders acknowledged these rules, the VOC did not tax the permitted trade of its servants. However, these servants who wanted buy crates which were carried in VOC ships had to pay a tax so high that free-burghers sending over their own ships would be able to compete with them. By devising such an elaborate hierarchy in trade, the VOC made sure it would be able to sell all it wanted first. Then, the persons on whom it had been pleased to bestow privileges were certain they could sell their goods. Once they had concluded their transactions, what remained was for those without privileges. The precedence was buttressed by the unlimited access allowed senior VOC servants to the facilities available in the VOC’s intra-Asian trade. As the VOC declined and made cuts in 701 Ibidem, 75. 702 Ibidem, 105. costs on facilities, this tool lost its efficacy. Before the onset of Empire, the mechanisms for exerting power in the EIC were only slightly different from the VOC, a disparity attributable to a divergence in organization. There is no dearth of evidence that the EIC officials defrauded their employer by under-assessing the tonnage of their own ships and making competitors pay the full fee, a deception which was probably practiced systematically.703 So again we see how, although official institutions recognized the necessity of taking care of their senior men in order to help them on side, they were in turn also used to create a hierarchy. The privileges of private trade and the hierarchy in these privileges were implemented as much by the companies as by the servants themselves. The men in the upper echelons considered private trade their prerogative and protected their rights. The senior VOC-servants in the different regions made sure that no private trade was allowed without their having a piece of the pie. Even the free-burghers, who had gradually been granted more freedom in trade, were kept out of the party on moral grounds. In many regions all private trade flowed towards the highest incumbent VOC official and while other servants shared commensurate with their position in the Company hierarchy. In pursuing free trade, VOC officials used taxation to heed unwanted competition at bay. Before 1765, there are strong indications the EIC servants made sure that private trade in India was arranged just as much along hierarchical and regional lines as did the VOC servants. The Governor and the Councillors were the leading European merchants of Calcutta. They regarded country trade as their prerogative and used the power with which they had officially been vested in order to safeguard their income. The EIC servants did all in their power to ward off private trade intrusion by English free traders, just as much as VOC servants guarded against any encroachment by the free-burghers. The EIC officials in Bengal did their utmost to monopolize private trade at the expense of free 703 Marshall, East Indian Fortune, 54; Watson, Foundation for Empire, 135, (…) allegations that Bombay was over-charging on duties were met with counter-claims that Bengal traders did not pay the full duties and that they also under-rated their tonnages, and so on. Although reference was made to the Company’s rights to the duties, wherever levied, the conflicts were essential between the private interests, disputing inequitable and apparently illicit interference in the free flow of trade (…); and ibidem, 119,(...) It was clear to all with a mind to inquire that the obvious advantage of position gave the ranking servants a distinct advantage over their subordinates, and that these privileges kept many of them afloat in the maritime commerce of India (...). merchants.704 There were various political tools at their disposal to achieve this. At the will of the senior servants, the English free merchants could be made to pay the ‘full twenty percent’ in Bengal, as they were not officially included in the Farman granted in 1717. EIC officials could stop the issue of ‘passes’ signifying British protection to the ships of free merchants. Just as their VOC colleagues, EIC servants had to battle to reach the top for many weary years. When they were finally in a position to reap the fruits of this investment, it would not have been considered fair that a newcomer could start as a free merchant and receive the same advantages which EIC officials had had to fight for during years of drudgery in service in India.705 This system of social inclusion of colleagues and the suppression of competitive advantages offered by the protecting arm of the Company structure has certainly been noted in Bengal in the latter half of the eighteenth century, but somehow has been modified to prove the superiority of the English in Bengal even before Plassey. 706 Exclusion from trade on social grounds also existed between servants of different regions, as local servants fiercely protected the regional trade as their prerogative. As did their colleagues in the VOC, English Company servants considered trading rights as regional privileges and responded appropriately if outsiders tried to bypass their interests in trade.707 The complaints against the exclusion of EIC officials from other regions from the Bengal trade is paralleled in the free trade of VOC servants. But these grievances have often wrongly been interpreted as proof that Bengal had become the centre of country trade in India and that EIC servants outside of Bengal were no longer able to compete with their colleagues in Calcutta. 704 Marshall, East Indian Fortunes, 74. 705 Watson, Foundation for Empire, 141, (…) Much of his can only be understood in terms of the fundamental antipathy the covenanted service displayed towards competitors outside the service; Ibidem, 170, without any cheating or other aims than the good of their Company, which allows them certain privileges and concessions as a reward for their care and work. They are quite content with these and make use of them with prudence, each according to his rank and employment (…). Also see, Ibidem, 117-118. 706 Marshall, East Indian Fortunes, 37. 707 Watson, Foundation for Empire, 126, (…) Private traders began to regard their localities as their won peculiar spheres of interest, and all transactions from the regions were at their discretion and disposal (…). 2. Empire and private trade It is universally accepted that conquest and naval superiority would have enormously enhanced the possibilities for trade. In the areas where the VOC maintained tight control, it was less eager to be liberal in handing out private trading privileges. It had no need to be, as it was able to monopolize trade. By controlling the market in and exports from Ceylon, the VOC was very well equipped to keep out the competition. On the Coromandel Coast, no European company was able to dominate a situation which led to fierce competition. After 1759, the VOC realized that the relations between the Companies had fundamentally changed as from that crucial moment the EIC possessed the power to mould the trade of Bengal to its liking and to reserve more trade for its subjects. The seizure of control over Bengal also entailed a major change in the trading pattern of the country traders. First and foremost, the geographical scope of trade by English country traders from Bengal seemed to have widened, inwards and outwards.708 They seized the internal trade of the region by seizing the advantages of the more land and river based trade it now controlled. This meant that they extended their field of operation up one level to the production sites, taking direct control. Sometimes the EIC stepped in and simply monopolized various internal Bengal trades. Secondly, the seaborne trade expanded both in numbers of ships and in the destination of trade, at the expense of the Dutch who had no option against this implacable advance but to open up Batavia to the English country trade. This advantage led to an expansion of trade in the rest of Asia too, although this only really took off after 1770.709 Strangely, the increase in trading possibilities passed the EIC servants totally by. Their presence eventually vanished from the country trade, as the free merchants became the dominant force in the new intra-Asian trade. With conquest and the acquisition of colonies, the position of an employee changed, to the same extent as conquest of Bengal altered the whole nature of English 708 Marshall, East Indian Fortunes, 44. 709 Ibidem, 75. country trade. Although the areas where the VOC did not hold monopoly rights did offer more trading possibilities, the VOC servants preferred working in such regions as Ceylon even without private trade privileges. Unquestionably, this preference was strongly related to a higher level of expected remuneration. In monopoly areas there was more at stake for the VOC and it had to tread carefully, if it were to create the indispensable mutual interest with its servants and maintain the monopolies in trade. When this happened to be combined with government this provided the VOC servants with enough remunerative work, which made investment of time in personal private trade activities detrimental to the function of the Company. After 1771, EIC servants in Bengal had alternative sources of income and private trade privileges were rescinded. Private trade was placed outside the confines of the official EIC hierarchy and no longer served as a source of remuneration for its employees.710 Now, the EIC servants were provided with new forms of income which far outdistanced what they had earned in private trade. Such new sources of remuneration could also be obtained with a lower investment in money and time. The additional advantage for the companies was that the servants, instead of dabbling in their private ventures, had their hands free to invest their time in serving the companies. Since the EIC had to assume so many new governmental tasks, it was in its interest to discourage, even forbid its employees private trade. Thus it came to pass that the EIC employees relinquished their positions in private trade in order to occupy themselves with their new tasks in government. Now, the EIC officials turned their backs to the sea and resolutely turned their faces towards the land.711 With the exodus of the EIC servants from the country trade, without the EIC instituting a monopoly, English free merchants took their place. The lapse of the tax on private trade after 1760 in Bengal had, is an indication that the whole social exclusion model within the English establishments had collapsed and foreign competition emerged as a new target.712 As private trade was no longer divided along hierarchical lines, the English free-merchants had a ‘fairer’ chance in trade. One drawback was the English free merchants did not have direct access to the capital which they were going to need to 710H.V. Bowen, Elites, Enterprise and the Making of the British Overseas Empire 1688-1775, 183, (…) Most important of all, the involvement of Company servants in private trading activity was prohibited by Lord North’s Regulating Act (…).711 Marshall, East Indian Fortunes, 75. 712 Ibidem, 53. replace the senior officials’ investment in trade. Even in earlier times, English country traders had had trouble in financing their trade.713 Fortunately, the EIC officials had their own problems, which provided the free merchants with a solution. The officials had their money ready for remittance, but in 1765 the EIC put a limit on the amount of money they could receive on bills of exchange from India to Europe. The problem of remittance probably increased when a new officials poured into Bengal in the 1760s. This led to a situation which found more EIC officials making more money, just as it was becoming an increasing headache for them to be able to send the money home. At first, this problem was at least partly solved by sending money home through other European companies. Since the other Europeans were needed to perform this service and their respective companies needed the money to buy the goods in Bengal, this mutually advantageous situation saved the other Europeans for a while at least from being totally excluded from trade in Bengal and later in India. They used English fortunes to keep their trade going. The development which required the EIC officials‘ going into government’ changed the whole pattern of interaction between the EIC officials and the free merchants. Under pressure from its employees asking for bills of exchange, the EIC had been sending home more goods than it could sell. Since the possibility of marketing Indian goods in Europe in the short-term had been exhausted, the EIC decided to redirect its attention to purchasing Chinese goods. The only problem was a lack of money in China. By accepting bills of exchange on Europe there, country trade to China was stimulated and the EIC’s European trade also swelled satisfactorily as more Chinese goods poured into Europe.714 The money had to be sent to China for remittance to Europe and the EIC officials no longer had private trade privileges or time on their hands to conduct such a trade. To solve the problem, pragmatically the officials teamed up with the free 713 Mentz, The English Gentleman Merchant at work, Madras and the City of London 1660-1740 (Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press, 2005), 235.714 Bowen, Elites, enterprise, 38 (…) This trade represented a vital mechanism that allowed the Company to transfer to Britain any surplus accruing from is newly acquired territorial revenues in Bengal. As there was only limited home demand for Bengal goods, the Company chose to focus its commercial energies on a product that was being widely consumed in Britain. However, this was not a straightforward process because the trade between India and China had first to be expanded in order to give the Company’s representatives at Canton the resources necessary to enable them to purchase large consignments to tea for shipment home. Thus, during the initial stages of this development of the China trade in the late 1760s, the Company invested as much of the revenue surplus as possible in Indian goods for sale in China and it also pursued the potentially hazardous policy of shipping bullion from Bengal to Canton. (Bowen quantifies this by showing the EIC-trade in tea tripled between 1768 en 1772, red).(…) merchants, which is illustrated by the emergence of Agency Houses. Around 1770, the end of the first phase of expansion in Bengal, the first Agency Houses were set up. In 1784, after the Fourth Anglo-Dutch Sea War, it has been noted that a fresh explosion of Agency Houses occurred.715 This was symptomatic of the situation in which the free merchants needed money to invest in trade, and the EIC officials had money to invest and searched for ways to remit their fortunes to Europe. 3. Profits and fortunes Both the VOC and EIC have been depicted as having been ill-served by their employees. Such a picture is definitely skewed; to some extent at least it was a structural mechanism to ensure the Company functioned and it would be a mistake to define this behaviour solely as corruption. The weight of evidence makes it impossible to deny that there was a structural side to ‘corruption’, since there are abundant data which show that the Companies used this as a tool to overcome inherent weaknesses in their organizations. There is irrefutable proof the companies had a vested interest in giving their servants freedom in their pursuit of a private fortune, as the prospect of becoming wealthy men is what attracted new personnel. Company servants were expected, and knew that it was expected of them to use their personal capital to help run their company’s operations more smoothly. Allowing the freedom to acquire a private fortune freed company capital for trade, as it obviated the need of a large bureaucracy and of hoarding money for salaries. Apart from obtaining a share in a private fortune by subjecting it to taxation, the companies appropriated the fortunes of their employees to finance the trade to Europe. Treading warily, the companies sought the most profitable and most workable balance between the interest of the company and those of its servants. Needless to say the interest of the company and of the servants were susceptible to change, certainly at the volatile end of the eighteenth century. 715 Marshall, East Indian Fortunes, 46. Just as did private trade, the use of personal initiatives and private fortunes of servants and networking both served a specific goal in the Company. It could not be otherwise the companies were riddled with structural weaknesses, and these were bridged by the private initiatives of their servants. The company headquarters in Europe had to leave considerable power in the hands of their servants in Asia in the organisation of trade. In return for being burdened with this responsibility, the servants pragmatically demanded to be remunerated. Here was the rub as the companies were not willing to pay adequate salaries, which would involve cutting into profit in Europe. Better by far, they thought their servants in Asia to solve this problem locally. In what they could anticipate in salaries, EIC officials were in much the same boat as VOC employees. As they did not earn much official salary until the end of eighteenth century,716 they also were anxious to make a fortune as quickly as possible. Just as the VOC, the EIC felt obliged as some recompense it had at least to create the circumstances in which it was possible for its servants to fulfil their dreams of riches without harming it as a body. Unfortunately, the EIC did not have a share in monopolies in the intra-Asian trade to offer, nor did it have extensive colonial possessions, limiting any possible hope of remuneration to private trade. Just as the situation we have seen in the VOC, the EIC had an interest in keeping remuneration low for the junior ranks, giving the most prominent privileges to the highest positions in an effort to safeguard knowledge and talent. The resemblances between the two companies meant a comparable interaction between and development of the relationship between the EIC and its employees, just as much as their country trade ventures changed fundamentally with the commencement of colonial expansion after Plassey. Every possible path open to obtaining income was strictly related to the hierarchy and servants would suffer no exceptions. It was absolutely clear where the money was to be had and the highest authority present always made sure he received his fair proportion. The evidence for this merges most clearly in private trade, but also seems to apply equally to the extortion of money from beholden subjects and even to embezzlement. In private trade the senior servants made sure they were the main beneficiaries of privileges. Those in lower ranks and outsiders were given to understand in no uncertain terms they 716 Ibidem, 18. came second. In exercises in extortion and embezzlement, the highest in rank wanted a share in everything that was to be had. Their subordinates agreed that the highest in rank should claim their legitimate share. Its victims also acquiesced in extortion as long as it was kept within reasonable bounds and did not deviate too markedly from earlier practices. In the case of the EIC, there is a lack of information about extortion and corruption, although the presence of similar mechanisms shines through. Certainly EIC servants did extort money after a military victory717 and Clive dismissed two servants who had taken too much for themselves without sharing with him. The military might of the English seems to be the sole explanation of why after 1750 the EIC servants were more successful than their VOC counterparts in acquiring a fortune. The long and short of it is they simply had more means at their disposal. Just at the time the EIC servants were being cut out of the country trade, their VOC colleagues were increasingly being given more freedom over and above their time-honoured privileges. The old privileges were creaking at the seams as they yielded less money as the power of the VOC was declining, prompting the Company to allow more. Meanwhile the EIC went from strength to strength becoming even more powerful than the VOC had ever been and this presented its servants with unprecedented possibilities of remuneration. If extorting money from their merchants was already a normal state of affairs for Company servants, the military might of the British raised their possibilities for extortion to unprecedented levels. Since they had succeeded in representing themselves as protectors of the highest tier of indigenous rulers, which automatically meant that the English reached the highest levels of extortion. The best known case is of course Robert Clive. Nevertheless on the Coast, the governors also profited from their newly won powers. Governor Pigot received a large part of his £300,000 fortune as a ‘gift’ for the restoration of the Nawab’s realm. When he was succeeded by Palk, this governor unabashedly asked £50,000 from the Nawab, since he could not receive less than his predecessor, again underlining the inflationary nature of such claims, both in the VOC and the EIC. Since the Nawab depended largely on the 717 Bowen, Elites, Enterprise, 73. governor’s favour and military support to keep himself on the throne, he paid up.718 The VOC never acquired such a position of power in India and although the servants squeezed the indigenous merchants working for the VOC, we have already seen in the first section, the VOC was often also forced to pay similar sums to indigenous rulers. Networking was not pursued solely to ensure social reproduction, it also served as a system of the redistribution of wealth. Remuneration was linked to hierarchy and consequently networking was essential to making a fortune and forcibly continuing social reproduction of such a profitable position in society. The helping of friends and the sustaining family assumed different manifestations and spanned the globe. The international aspect meant a dichotomy in which in one group social reproduction was aimed at money making to promote social reproduction in Europe; whereas in Asia making money hand over feet not only meant a fortune but also sustaining a position for the family within the VOC hierarchy. Networking also served as a system of redistribution of wealth in Asia. On promotion, it was normal to pay those who had helped a servant to a higher level of authority a substantial part of the future gains. Servants considered they had a personal right to a share in promotions, but when the cold waters of financial difficulties began to lap the VOC, it thought it was entitled to a larger share. In the Memorie van Ambtsgeld, the VOC asked its servants to pay a quarter to a half of their expected income in the first year in the newly acquired positions. The knowledge of what a position brought in was public knowledge and printed on lists. At the same time, the VOC became more demanding of its servants which forced people to search larger social networks in order to sustain themselves and profit from the new possibilities. For example, family capital was reinvested in Asia to meet the new demands on servants. By looking at such informal institutions as remuneration, parallels in the development of both companies can be drawn. Although we weigh up the phenomenon of 718 Pamela Nightingale, Fortune and Integrity, A Study of Moral Attitudes in the Indian Diary of George Paterson, 1769-1774 (Delhi Oxford University press 1985), 96, (…) Pigot, who was governor from 1755 to 1763, laid the foundation of his fortune of pound 300,000 on the Nawab’s gratitude for the restoration of his country, and when Palk succeeded him he demanded from the Nawab 50,000 pagodas on the ground that ‘he understood Mr Pigot had received a Lack, and he could not receive less than his Predecessor. It was sent him: for the Nabob had many favours to ask of the Governor.’ (note) (…) (Similar stories on pages 94­96). private fortunes morally, it is more rewarding to subject this to a more thorough analysis and see this as much as an effect of the shifts in the way servants were remunerated for their work. There were several ways to organize remuneration depending on what a company had to offer. At first, unquestionably the VOC had the best chance to be munificent, although there were marked differences between VOC regions. In the regions were the VOC had colonies, it could offer its servants a share in government, its monopolies, its intra-Asian trade and networking. In the areas where the VOC maintained only trading possessions, in the early years the VOC servants were only allowed a direct share in the VOC monopoly on intra-Asian trade. Later this was replaced by private trade privileges. As the latter option was fraught with risks it is understandable that in many respects freedom of private trade meant a deterioration in the situation of the servants. After they received more freedom, they still had to work for the Company and, in order to make their fortune, they also had to invest their own time and money in private trade, which was always overshadowed by the risk of failure. In the English case, we see an opposite development. At first, the EIC servants did not have many possibilities to acquire a private fortune apart from country trade. They jealously guarded what privileges they had against outsiders. With the coming of Empire, they obtained more possibilities of remuneration similar to those VOC servants held in colonies. Realizing the security these new sources offered, they became less interested in country trade, since it was considered a bothersome way to make money. They stepped aside and allowed English free merchants to fill the gap. This provides supplementary proof against the argument which states English country trade was a continuous period of liberty; the changing of ways of remuneration makes a splitting of the English country trade into two different periods logically. Remuneration in the first period strongly resembled the way the VOC organized private trade privileges in its trading possessions, whereas the period which dawned after the onset of Empire closely imitated the situation in the areas where the VOC held colonies. It took time for a company structure to adapt to change and the EIC responded on the same terms as the VOC did. If changes occurred the first place these were noticed was in the informal institutions. As long as a stable situation prevailed Company servants were secure in the knowledge of where remuneration was to be had. The moment this system was challenged, the hierarchy was under threat as a new distributive code had to be found. To some extent, this worked itself out through the informal institutions. Servants adapted their behaviour to suit their needs. Even before Parliament started intervening to bridle self-enrichment after Empire, the increase in networking and the creation of more positions meant that the newly acquired sources of income were divided over a larger group of servants. After this, such extreme examples of self-enrichment as Clive grew more sporadic. It was essential to internalize the new opportunities within the company structure. In remunerating their servants, the companies then turned to opposite developments, but nevertheless they both used the same methods to bend it to their ever changing interests. In both companies there was a tendency to be more restrictive in the remuneration of their servants in good times, whereas conversely in bad times it was essential to allow more freedom for private initiative. Both companies considered any swift, rich return of a servant to Europe was only possible to the detriment of the company. In the history of both companies there is a moment at which it was felt the servants had surrendered to the perversions of Asia in their acquisition of private fortunes.719 In both cases, this was in a period in which the servants had initially had obtained wider chances to make a private fortune and in both cases the companies responded to their good fortune by limiting the private trade privileges of their servants. In fact, looked at objectively, the perversions of Asia were related more to changes in the position of the companies than being simply an undesirable side-effect of local circumstances. The EIC servants used the increasing power at their disposal as effectively as they knew how, while VOC servants simply cashed in on the newly established private trade privileges designed to stave off the Company’s financial problems. Company servants had money on their mind and were only prepared to serve as long as such employment benefited their own needs, so there was a minimum to the unofficial remuneration a company was willing to offer. Moreover, if a company was in dire straits, it might consider giving its servants greater freedom in order to extract more 719Bowen, Elites, Enterprise , 144, (…) In 1769 they frowned upon ‘Eastern’ or ‘Asiatic’ practices, and declared that ‘European simplicity is much more likely to engage the respect of the natives than an imitation of their manners.” (…) They felt that ‘luxury” rather than simplicity was becoming the main feature of everyday life during the 1760s (…). profit from their labour. A healthy, stable company was better able to resist the claims of its servants for fortune and subsequently channel them. Unfortunately, companies did not control all the factors at work in determining remuneration. In a stable situation, the possibilities of self-enrichment were known. It was in periods of instability, decline or rise, that the unknown and unforeseen factors could pose a threat to the natural hierarchy which existed within the company. Caught in such an invidious situation, the VOC struggled to adapt in order to maintain servants’ remuneration at a satisfactory level and to obtain a larger amount of cash and the active co-operation of its servants. As the situation of the VOC deteriorated, it was thrown depended more and more heavily back on the private initiative of its servants. Although VOC servants now obtained more possibilities to become rich, they also had to bear a far larger part of the risk. In the end, what has been seen until now as their corrupt behaviour did not more than mirror the power of the company. In the case of the EIC, it struggled resolutely against its servants obtaining too large a share of the new opportunities and returning to England where, as rich nabobs they could challenge the whole existing social order with their newly acquired wealth. People high up the hierarchy in England began to feel they were missing out on their legitimate share. By this time, the Companies were going in opposite directions: the VOC servants were seen as becoming more and more corrupt, while the EIC servants were being pressed into good government. The VOC laid the blame for the decline on the shoulders of its servants. If we examine the informal institutions we can see how the VOC used the individual initiatives of its servants to serve its own needs. When it allowed its servants more freedom, the VOC was covertly trying to plug the financial hole caused by its lack of capital in a time increasing demands on it were made. In earlier times, VOC servants had simply profited from the work of the Company, but now they were forced by the financial plight of the Company to take on more risk and responsibility to fulfil their dreams of a fortune. The Company increasingly retracted from centre stage and expected its servants to fill the void. In other words, the VOC used its power to present its servants with profitable privileges so as to entice them to do what it wanted them to do. In Ceylon, it simply promised its servants that it would buy any produce the servants supplied from their plantations. In order to capitalize to the greatest advantage on these privileges, the VOC servants went into a partnership with the local chiefs. Together they invested their time, money and energy in building a plantation system so as to extract the maximum profit from the servants’ privileges. The steady decline of the VOC increased the possibilities for VOC servants to make their fortune, but their situation actually deteriorated as they were saddled with responsibility and greater risks. When the British took Ceylon they immediately abolished the partnerships with the indigenous chiefs as they were receiving sufficient capital from Europe and were not willing to share the opportunity with the indigenous chiefs. This offers a clear cut clue to show the lack of capital with which the VOC had to struggle even in colonisation, leading to more creative solutions, whereas the EIC had no such worries with much more capital at its disposal through its European connections. 4. Power and trade In their operations both companies combined a mixture of trade and political enforcement, but as their attention began to concentrate more on taxation instead of trade, they were left astray from the goal of commerce for which they had both been conceived. In normal times, the military expenditure of a trading company never exceeded its commercial performance. In fact, in the VOC this precept dominated policy until the end of its existence. For more than a century and a half, the VOC had always been the most powerful company, as it had succeeded in securing and expanding a very profitable intra-Asian trade. When the intra-Asian fell to decline, the military might of the VOC waned. The EIC, in contrast, managed to increase its military power without this initially having a direct impact on its commercial performance. It managed this juggling act on the basis of three vital factors. First of all, when the dispute between the old and new Company was resolved in 1705, the outcome was one single combined, better capitalized company. Quite apart from this increase in capital, the repercussions of Europeans wars were now also being brought to Asia, leading to the prioritization of politics over trade. Logically, a structure devised predominantly to promote trade did not have the wherewithal to govern territorial possessions, but rather then concentrating on making a good adjustment the main problem with which politicians dabbled was how the home-country could earn back its investment and capitalize on its newly acquired power and position. In normal times to a large extent a company could exercise control over its servants in military conflict, but the intrusion of the repercussions of European wars disrupted the balance between the centre and the periphery. The VOC was intrinsically deeply distrustful of servants who asked for reinforcements, because it realized they had their own interests in pursuing local wars. Profiteering from a war was the easiest and quickest way to make a fortune. Needless to say the VOC itself did not eschew the use of arms if it deemed this essential and it always made sure its trading interests were secured by war. The war on Kandy (1761-1765) removed any doubt that Batavia and the Republic had their own ways to managing the control of a conflict and were quite prepared to use them. They simply kept a check on the number of reinforcements sent to a military zone which gave them the power to manage the level of confrontation. As long as the companies could be independent in their management of wars, this mechanism worked quite well, keeping servants in check and subordinate to company interests. In the wake of the upheaval caused by the reinforcements from Europe and the inescapable participation of the English and French companies in European wars, the servants suddenly had unprecedented power at their disposal, and in their pursuit of fortune they could play out state and company priorities against each other. A great deal of this power ebbed as the ripples from European conflicts set in changes of power and trade in Asia. The stepping up of State support from England may also be seen as a sort of extra capital which the Company used to increase its commercial strength. Without any hope of State support the VOC remained on a lower level of involvement. Its predicament is best illustrated by the naval battle which precipitated the Battle of Bedara on land, in which its armed merchant vessels proved no match for the professional Royal Navy ships of the line sent down from Calcutta. The waxing English power 720 and the upmarch of colonisation enabled the English to enforce a system of trade which was more to their taste. Having launched the colonization process the EIC managed to bring in more tax and also enjoyed a mounting income from the English country trade. In short, during the 720 Ibidem, 104. eighteenth century the capital base of the VOC was gradually eroded, just as the capital strength of the EIC was being solidified, a state of affairs which had consequences for the political, commercial and social organization of both companies. More military investments inevitably led to more costs for the Company and the State, and when weighed up in its context, also give an alternative explanation for the growth of English country trade before the achievement of Empire. There were social implications too as the system was shaken to its foundation. The VOC was not able to invest more in its colonies; Consequently in its quest for essential funds it was forced to rely more heavily on its servants and indigenous subjects. The investment of the English State in troops overseas proved to be an economic advantage in the colonies even before Empire. Viewing these investments as much in economic as in military terms reveals an alternative explanation for the rise of English country trade before Empire. The presence of large armies served the country traders well, as it created a market for different goods. Under such circumstances, it is understandable that the main beneficiaries of this increase would have been the English country traders. Even the Dutch private traders were not excluded from rise in demand. They joined in by picking up on trades the English country traders could not supply, such as those in sugar and arrack. Investment in government and war meant that less capital was left for trade, so the EIC had to leave the intra-Asian trade to its servants. The military investment from England offered more opportunities for war, but it forced the Company to redirect its investments away from trade even in times of peace in Europe. When we compare this situation to that of the VOC, it is surprising that under the prevailing conditions the EIC did not simply rescind the private trade privileges and turn them into monopolies, ensuring more trade for the Company. Although the answer is a bit speculative, it is not strange that the EIC did not have the money to invest in new trade initiatives, since it was deeply embroiled in wars and government, demands draining capital away from trade. As the money was tied up there, the easiest and best solution was to leave trade to private traders and turn the tables to the advantage of the EIC by taxing it. Large investments in the intra-Asian trade were not an option, certainly since the potential obtained for private trade surpassed the means of the company anyway. These changes had twofold consequences. First of all, trade became more professionalized and the scale of operations was enhanced. Secondly, new opportunities opened up and new money was pumped into trade, which broke through the deadlock of an era of stagnation in the Indian trade. In conjunction, the tighter control on trade allied with the possibility to force other traders out by political means produced an explosive competitive mixture which would conquer the Asian market and render the EIC obsolete, leaving it to become solely an instrument of government, detached from trade in Asia and with Europe.